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MILITARY LIFE OF
H.R.H. GEORGE, DUKE OF CAMBRID

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THE MILITARY LIFE OF H.R.H.

GEORGE, DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

BY COLONEL WILLOUGHBY VERNER

Llate Rifle Brigade

ASSISTED BY

CAPTAIN ERASMUS DARWIN PARKER

LATE MANCHESTER (63RD) REGIMENT

VOLUME I

1819–1871

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET

1905

SPV

DA68.32
C16V4
V.1

Edinburgh : T. and A. Constable, Printers to His Majesty

PREFACE

THE military career of the Duke of Cambridge is really the history of the British Army during the latter half of the nineteenth century; he is the link which binds the Army of Wellington with the Army as we know it to-day. There can be no question but that, throughout his military life, His Royal Highness was misunderstood. Very few realised what conservatism meant in his case. It is true that his profound respect and affection for the traditions of the Army made change repugnant to him unless he was convinced that it was necessary. But when once he was assured of its necessity—and few soldiers or politicians in modern days had a keener perception of ultimate effects—no one was more progressive than he. Commanders-in-Chief have generally come on the scene too late in life, and with energies impaired. But the Duke in this respect had the great advantage of youth on his side. He was only thirty-seven when he undertook the arduous duties of that thankless post. During the first few years he was regarded by the old school of soldier as far more revolutionary than Lord Cardwell or Lord Wolseley in later days. His early correspondence with the veterans, nurtured in the stern school of the Peninsular War, shows this clearly; whilst after the death of the Duke of Wellington, when he came to the fore, the condition of the Army was indeed pitiable, as the following pages abundantly testify. It will be found indeed that, whilst only Inspecting General of Cavalry in 1852, his efforts were largely directed towards introducing order, not only into the arm with whose efficiency he was specially charged, but into the Army generally. Thus, it was chiefly due to his initiative that manœuvres on a large scale were first carried out in England, as far back as the year before

the Crimean War. He landed with our Army in the Crimea as General commanding a Division; and two years afterwards he became Commanding-in-Chief on the retirement of Lord Hardinge.

At that time there was no real system of military education—indeed nothing else than barrack-yard drill of the old-fashioned steady type. At once he turned his attention towards remedying this and many other defects, and the inauguration of the Staff College was due to him. During the next decade his efforts were mainly directed towards preserving to the nation an Army at all; because then, as ever throughout our military history, reduction on the close of a great war has been the order of the day. So also it was till the very close of his military career—a see-saw of never-ending reduction and increase of establishment, as the danger of war seemed far or near.

After the wars of 1866 and 1870-71 came the introduction of the so-called modern system; and here again his attitude has often been misunderstood. One of his first acts when Mr. Cardwell became War Secretary was to call attention to the absence of a Reserve in an effective form. But what he did, and very rightly, object to, was the creation of a Reserve concurrently with a reduction of establishments. For if establishments were reduced, it was obvious that a sufficient Reserve could not be forthcoming; and towards the other great questions which were prominent at this period his attitude was equally logical and consistent.

His command of the Army was marked throughout by tact and extreme fairness to all ranks, and by a sincere desire to do the best he could for those under him, whilst at the same time carrying out loyally the policy proposed by successive Governments.

With the vast amount of patronage at his disposal, it is significant to note how rarely his selections or appointments gave cause for hostile comment in the forty years during which he wielded these powers. In his correspondence, as may be easily imagined, there are scores, even hundreds of applications from all sorts and conditions of men, in dealing with which H.R.H. invariably evinced the soundest judgment.

It is a reasonable presumption that, as Colonel of a Regiment of Foot Guards, and as having commanded the Brigade of Guards in the Crimea, His Royal Highness might be favourably inclined to every request made in the interests of its officers. The following instance will therefore be of interest.

A distinguished General and old friend, when in high command abroad, wrote asking the Duke to sanction his son's exchange from the Guards to the Line. At this time, it must be remembered that 'Guards rank' still obtained, and that every Ensign in the Brigade ranked with a Lieutenant in the Line.

TO LIEUT.-GENERAL ——.

'. . . I have received your letter of 16 December, in which you request me to allow your son to exchange from the Guards to the Line.

'. . . I could not possibly allow so young an officer to exchange, with all the advantages of the superior rank he possesses in the Guards, into a Regiment of the Line, over Ensigns his senior in the Army; and therefore I was compelled to refuse the exchange proposed.'

Some years later, in 1871, the name of an officer in whom he had an especial interest was put forward by the Military Secretary for a Staff appointment. Writing a private letter in reply to this, the Duke says:—

'I fear it would be looked upon as favouritism if —— was selected, however good an officer he may be, not having been at the Staff College.'

The Duke was a notorious advocate of 'seniority,' save where there was evidence of the incompetency or undesirability of any officer on the list for promotion. But despite his general views on this subject, he was nevertheless fully alive to the vital importance of securing the services of the most competent men for conducting operations in the field. Thus, in writing to a General Officer holding an important command abroad, who had selected officers for high command on active service in consequence of their seniority, he said, 'Seniority is all very well, but efficiency is what must be looked to, on such grave occasions as field service.'

At times he was brought into sharp conflict with the Military Authorities in India when they were over-prone to advance individuals who chanced to be *personæ gratæ* with them. The following is a typical letter of H.R.H.'s to a Commander-in-Chief who had induced the Indian Government to accelerate unduly the promotion of one of his protégés:—

TO GENERAL ——.

'. . . Let me again take the opportunity of pointing out to you that the arrangement is a most inconvenient one by which a very junior officer is placed over the heads of many most excellent officers of the senior rank. Colonel —— is a very good officer, I know, but there are many officers equally good, if the chance be only given them, and they are in many cases greatly senior to Colonel ——. The Army as a whole is *not* benefited by causing heartburnings and dissatisfaction amongst these officers, and I certainly *strongly object* to be made a party to such an arrangement.'

At a subsequent period the same General wrote from India to acquaint the Duke that he had provisionally appointed to a highly-paid and most important Musketry post an officer whom he described as 'an enthusiast in the work,' and to ask for H.R.H.'s sanction, although he admitted that this was somewhat irregular.

To this the Duke replied:—

'. . . As regards the selection of Lieut.-Colonel —— for the post of superintendent for the Musketry Department, you will see by the enclosed Memo. that Colonel —— has been confirmed by *Gazette* in that post, and I cannot therefore approve of the selection you have made. Moreover, I should *not* have approved of it even if the *Gazette* had not already decided otherwise. Lieut.-Colonel —— is far too junior an officer to fill so important a position, and he has, moreover, been on your *Personal Staff* for a considerable period, which I cannot look upon as at all a desirable school for posts requiring great experience. He can know little of musketry, though you say he is an enthusiast for that special practice, for he was only Musketry Instructor of his Battalion for one year and a half, and he gave it up to go on your Staff. . . .'

But perhaps one of the greatest tributes to the Duke's work was that, whilst popular with the Army in the best sense of that word, he yet managed to secure the gratitude

and esteem of most of the War Secretaries with whom he was associated in his long tenure of the Commandership-in-Chief. How difficult it was to do this is only too well shown by the subsequent history of the office, which culminated in the wholly unwarrantable and unprovoked personal attack which was made on his successor in the House of Lords.

As regards Continental military opinion, the Duke of Cambridge was held in high esteem both as regards his administration of the office of the Commander-in-Chief in the notoriously difficult and complex circumstances existing in the British Army; and as a soldier who was thoroughly well versed in all the details of his profession.

Shortly after the death of His Royal Highness, the present writer had the honour of conversing on the subject with the German Emperor, who spoke in the most eulogistic terms of his late 'uncle,' and stated that in Germany everybody, and more especially everybody in the Army, thoroughly realised what an excellent soldier he was. His Majesty added that he had often heard his grandfather, the Emperor William I., say that the Duke of Cambridge was 'the most sensible soldier in the British Army.'

Allusion has repeatedly been made to the well-known belief entertained by all ranks in the Army that the Duke was 'The Soldier's Friend.' It is not easy at all times to ascertain how and why such opinions arise. But it was notorious throughout our Crimean Army that the Duke took the greatest possible interest in the welfare of the men of his Division; and in all probability the good opinion thus formed of him by the Rank and File—admirable judges of their officers, as we all know—was the basis upon which his subsequent popularity throughout all ranks in our Army was founded.

As an instance of the prevalence of this sentiment among the men, among the numerous letters received by H.R.H. on his retirement in 1895 was one from Lieut.-General Sir A. Lyttelton-Annesley, 11th Hussars, in which the following passage occurs:—

'I have served many years as a Regimental Officer, and commanded a Regiment for a long time, and I can con-

At times he was brought into sharp conflict with the Military Authorities in India when they were over-prone to advance individuals who chanced to be *personæ gratæ* with them. The following is a typical letter of H.R.H.'s to a Commander-in-Chief who had induced the Indian Government to accelerate unduly the promotion of one of his protégés:—

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fidently say that the Army, from the highest officer to the youngest band-boy, will feel we are losing our best friend. No one who has not mixed with the *rank and file* of the Army can know the deep feeling of affection entertained by them for Y.R.H. I recollect, on returning from the Crimea, at a parade at Aldershot being in command of a large party of dismounted men, and hearing them say when you passed, "There's the Duke; he's our best friend." And such, I am sure, has been the feeling of the men up to the present time.'

Whilst he was Commander-in-Chief, the pay of the soldier was considerably increased, largely owing to his repeated efforts. On 1 March 1860 the conditions under which men could earn Good Conduct pay was improved; and again, on 29 June 1867, an increase of twopence a day was made to the soldier's ordinary pay, and an additional sum of one penny a day was granted to all who re-engaged. As the stoppages for messing remained the same as before, our soldiers derived the full benefit of this increase.

On 6 June 1870, however, the extra penny a day, granted in 1867, was abolished. But the scale of Good Conduct pay was again improved. On 20 September 1873, the scale of pay was once more revised. Beer money and the stoppages for bread and meat were abolished, the Secretary of State undertaking to furnish the N.C. Officer and the Private Soldier with a daily ration of one pound of bread and three-quarters of a pound of meat, in addition to his pay of one shilling a day. These changes on the whole represented an addition of 10½d. a week to the soldier's pay.

On 1 April 1876 the pay was again increased by the granting of deferred pay at the rate of twopence a day, not payable till the soldier had left the colours.

Naturally these questions of Pay and increase of Pay were settled by the various Governments of the day; but it may be easily imagined that on every occasion the Duke was not backward in pressing for them.

It is a curious example of the profound confidence that the Rank and File entertained for H.R.H., that throughout the barrack-rooms it was ever believed that it was owing to the Duke, and to the Duke alone, that these increases were effected. Among the old long-service soldiers it was ever an

article of faith that the Duke had obtained for them the extra twopence per diem in 1867, alluded to above, which was greatly appreciated.

Closely connected with the question of 'stoppages' of pay is the perennial one of 'barrack damages.' It is within the knowledge of every Company Officer how grievously these charges weigh on the Rank and File; and the fact that H.R.H. was known to sympathise with our soldiers in this matter caused great satisfaction, for in their belief 'the Duke's' powers were illimitable. In 1866, when giving evidence before the Royal Commission on the recruiting problem, the Duke expressed himself strongly on this nefarious system of barrack damages. What he said was cordially endorsed by every Soldier. He stated that 'barrack damages' are a source of constant complaint. There is scarcely ever a change of quarters where some complaint does not arise out of 'barrack damage.'

'The Soldier is a rough creature. . . . If, therefore, you introduce what may appear very great improvements in hospitals, and in other ways . . . the expense of barrack damages greatly increases.

'I think that fair wear and tear ought to be more liberally accepted than it is now; and thus I think that if any little thing has been done which has rather improved than deteriorated the barrack, which is now considered as "barrack damage," it should be accepted as an improvement and not charged at all.'

In yet another matter the Soldier's lot was vastly ameliorated during the Duke's command—that of the Clothing supplied gratis to all Non-Commissioned Officers and the Rank and File.

In 1854 the Soldier had issued to him free of cost only the following articles:—His full-dress coatee—the famous 'sparrow-tail'—and his trousers, and one pair of boots annually. He had to pay for everything else he wore, besides providing himself with a knapsack, haversack, and leathern stock.

All this was altered by degrees, the men being given a free issue of serge—almost all the outer clothing they required; and the issue of all kit on joining was made

'free.' It is pitiable to recall the treatment of our gallant soldiers prior to the Crimean War.

Some may possibly consider that in thus basing the claims for the Duke's popularity on the mercantile standpoint of terms of service, rates of pay, and 'stoppages,' a somewhat sordid view has been presented of the men in the ranks. But starting from the basis that our Army is recruited entirely on the voluntary system, and that the men who enlist do so with a knowledge that their services are required all the world over, and that remuneration in the shape of money is by no means lavish, it is but reasonable to place these factors first and foremost, exercising, as they are bound to do, the very greatest influence on the soldier's early career.

But beyond and far above all these questions connected with the just payment of our men, and the undoubted influence they exercised on their minds in their estimate of the Duke, was the higher bond of his sympathy with them in all their minor troubles, and their profound belief that he would preserve for them their cherished privileges, based, as they invariably were, on their feelings of *esprit de corps*, and would protect them by every means in his power from any injustice, such as being ordered to vary their terms of service or leave a corps to which they had become attached.

It was the outcome of these feelings that unquestionably obtained for His Royal Highness the proud title of 'The Soldier's Friend.'

In the preceding remarks, reference has only been made to the Rank and File of our Army.

The same feelings for the Duke were entertained by the splendid body of Non-Commissioned Officers who serve in the British Army.

Lastly, we come to the Officers of our Army. Here, with one accord, all that stands for what is best and most desirable in our service was wholly in favour of 'the Duke.'

Throughout the period of his command there was a tradition in the British Army that he was a strong friend

of the much-abused Regimental Officer. Those who knew him well were aware that such was the case; but it was not so easy to account for the widespread prevalence of the same belief in the Army. It is of interest therefore, if possible, to trace how this opinion became so universally accepted; and the present writer would suggest that the inception of the belief may date from the following incident. On 7 March 1855, H.R.H. took the chair at the meeting of the Central Association for Soldiers' Wives and Children, and in his diary for that day the following entry occurs:—'Made a speech; everybody much pleased with the part I took for the Regimental Officers.'

The following is an extract from the report on this speech:—

'I have seen with very deep and sincere regret observations which have been made on the Regimental Officers of the Army. Some seem to think that our Soldiers are neglected. All I can say is that there never yet were men more anxious, more zealous, and more desirous to perform their duty than are the Regimental Officers of the British Army. I feel sure that the Soldiers, if asked, will declare that their Officers not only can't be surpassed, but that they cannot be equalled. Our Soldiers will hear with regret that their Officers have been disparaged. The Officers of the British Army have nobly performed their duty by their men, and have set an example to them which has enabled the Army to perform those acts of valour and undoubted courage which I am gratified to see have been duly appreciated by the public. On the other hand, no Officers were better followed than were ours.'

But the views and ideals of his whole military life can best be summed up by saying that throughout he was perfectly 'straight'; and that his sole object was to do the best he could, according to his lights, not only for the particular units or individuals which composed the force he commanded, but for the general welfare, from a national point of view, of the great institution which he loved to describe as 'the King's Army.'

It only now remains for me to explain why, how, and when he intrusted me with the task of presenting his Military Life, and the sources from whence information was drawn. My previous acquaintance with H.R.H. was slight; I could

not in any sense claim the honour of his personal friendship. On 24 July 1901 I received a note from General Sir Martin Dillon asking me to call at Gloucester House, where I saw the Duke.

He told me that he wished me to undertake the task of presenting to the nation his military life, being at the same time kind enough to remark that, although he had noticed that I wrote frequently on military subjects, I had never written anything I should not have done. My literary experience, nevertheless, having hitherto been extremely limited, the first idea which struck me was the magnitude of the task before me. But I then thought that, as H.R.H. was well acquainted with my work, he must be the best judge; and so I accepted his gracious offer, which to me at that time was especially welcome. My active military career had virtually come to an end some months before, owing to the grave injuries which I had received after the battle of Graspan in South Africa, whither I had proceeded in 1899 on the Headquarter Staff.

On the same occasion, he told me that during his tenure of office certain unsuccessful measures had been introduced, blame for which had in many cases been laid to his account, although at the time he had strongly protested against them. But in numerous instances subsequent history had shown that his objections were justified. Still, as in duty bound, when the Government of the day had decided upon any measures, he had carried them out to the best of his ability. He wished me to deal with all matters in the simplest and the most direct form; and he considered that the mere publication of his various memoranda, minutes, and letters would prove that his objections and apprehensions were genuine, and that subsequent history had justified many of his doubts. He ended by saying that I could have access to all his papers; and in conclusion told me, 'In fact, you can let them know that I am not quite such a d——d old fool as some of them say.' A cursory glance at the papers showed me at once the immensity of the task. All were admirably arranged, and endorsed in his own handwriting. But the initial difficulty lay in deciding which were material and which were

not. The most interesting of all were Queen Victoria's letters, which range over the whole period of his military career; and those of Her Majesty, which have been published by the King's permission, show the deep interest which she always took in the affairs of Her Army.

It was the Duke's custom, whilst Commander-in-Chief, to require every General abroad to correspond with him privately, as well as officially, on all matters of interest which occurred in his command; and amongst his letters there are hundreds which emphasise this point.

His correspondence with the Secretaries of State for War and for India; with the Home Office, with Governors, Generals, and the Commanders-in-Chief in India, and in the Presidencies, is very voluminous. It is naturally of unequal interest. But as only those letters which are absolutely pertinent have been included, it follows inevitably that much interesting matter had to be excluded. The mere list of correspondents is a catalogue of the principal military and political figures of the last sixty years; and it has been simply impossible even to allude to some of these.

Again there are the Duke's official memoranda, the original drafts of which are almost invariably in his own handwriting, the annual letters which he addressed to Secretaries of State on the Army Estimates, and the diaries which from earliest childhood he had been accustomed to keep.

So much for the materials at my disposal. Now as to those who assisted me in the task.

First and foremost must be placed His Royal Highness himself, who until within a few months of his death was ever ready to give any necessary information or to discuss a difficult point. To the end his memory was always marvellously clear, though, as is often the case with people of an advanced age, he was at his best in the morning. Of matters and details connected with his early years he had an exactly clear recollection, and he has more than once corrected me as to Christian names of officers of no especial note with whom he had to deal thirty years ago.

Upon H.R.H.'s death in March 1904 it became evident

that, if the book of his life was to appear within reasonable time, it was absolutely necessary that I should obtain some help. On my return to England I had the good fortune to secure the assistance of Captain E. D. Parker, formerly of the 1st Battalion Manchester (63rd) Regiment, who had been during the years 1902-03 at the War Office as Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, the Earl of Hardwicke. Captain Parker's help has been of the greatest value to me; and I take this opportunity of placing on record how deeply I am indebted to him.

From the permanent officials at the War Office I received every possible consideration; my friend Sir Edward Ward, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, was ever ready to afford me information, whilst I am especially indebted to Mr. A. D. L. Cary, the Parliamentary Librarian at the War Office.

With regard to the papers at Gloucester House, my thanks are due to General Sir Martin Dillon, who for a considerable time prior to my taking up the work had been engaged in arranging and putting in order H.R.H.'s papers and correspondence—a touching testimony to his devotion and love for his old Chief.

Admiral Sir Adolphus FitzGeorge and Colonel Sir Augustus FitzGeorge have since the Duke's death afforded me every facility for the continuance of my work; and have placed at my disposal much interesting and important information which has greatly facilitated the progress of the book.

The Rev. Edgar Sheppard, D.D., Sub-Dean of the Chapels Royal, who, since H.R.H.'s death, has had charge of his voluminous private correspondence, has been most kind in sending me anything connected with his military life. I am especially indebted to him for being able to peruse H.R.H.'s Diaries prior to his proceeding to Gibraltar and commencing his military career in 1838, whence I obtained much information of the Duke's early education and training.

Viscount Wolseley's letters to his old Chief form of themselves an almost complete record of the military operations

undertaken by Great Britain between 1870 and 1885, and further deal in a most interesting fashion with many questions in connection with our Army both at home and on foreign service. In response to my request for permission to embody in this book such of these letters as seemed desirable, I met with the most cordial and absolutely unreserved assent. My request was not always received so graciously, for some of the 'lesser lights' in our Army showed great anxiety to know how much of their writings would appear, while others refused altogether. In such cases I have preferred to dispense with the letters.

My grateful thanks are also due to the Earl of Cranbrook (Mr. Gathorne Hardy), who placed at my disposal the letters which H.R.H. had addressed to him; and to General Sir Robert Biddulph, who afforded me much useful information as to the course of events during the 'Cardwell' period.

Mr. Harold Hodge, the editor of the *Saturday Review*, most kindly offered to read over the proof-sheets, an advantage which I accepted with gratitude, and for which I now thank him cordially.

Lastly, to my daughter Dorothy I am deeply indebted for having deciphered and typewritten innumerable letters containing several hundreds of thousands of words in handwriting of varying degrees of legibility, letters of Great Personages, Statesmen, and Soldiers, written during the last seventy-five years. In numerous cases it was manifestly impossible to allow these letters out of my possession; hence the supreme importance and advantage to me in being able to have them copied at home.

Certain letters from and to the Duke, which only came to hand after the book was written, have been given in the form of an Appendix at the end of the second volume, where also will be found a tabulated statement of some of the more important measures recommended at various times by H.R.H., and with what results.

WILLOUGHBY VERNER.

HARTFORD BRIDGE,
WINCHFIELD, *September* 1905.

H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE'S CONTEMPORARIES—1856-1895

Prime Ministers.	Secretaries of State for War.	Adjutants-General.	Quartermasters-General.	Military Secretaries.	Indian Commanders-in-Chief.
[1856.] Viscount Palmerston.	[1856.] Lord Panmure.	[1856.] Sir George Wetherall.	[1856.] Sir R. Airey.	[1856.] Sir C. Yorke.	[1856.] General Hon. G. Anson.
1858. Earl of Derby.	1858. General Peel.	1860. Sir James York Scarlett.	1865. Sir J. Hope Grant.	1860. General W. F. Forster.	1857. Lord Clyde.
1859. Viscount Palmerston.	1859. Mr. Sidney Herbert (Lord Herbert).	1865. Lord William Paulet.	1870. Sir F. P. Haines.	1871. General C. R. Egerton.	1860. Sir Hugh Rose (Lord Strathnairn).
1865. Earl Russell.	1861. Sir G. C. Lewis.	1870. Sir Richard Airey.	1871. Sir C. Ellice.	1874. Sir James Lindsay.	1865. Sir W. Mansfield (Lord Sandhurst).
1866. Earl of Derby.	1863. Earl de Grey (Marquis of Ripon).	1876. Sir Charles Ellice.	1876. Sir D. Lysons.	1874. Sir A. H. Horsford.	1870. Lord Napier of Magdala.
1868. Mr. Disraeli.	1866. Marquis of Hartington.	1882. Sir Garnet Wolseley.	1880. Sir Garnet Wolseley.	1880. Sir E. A. Whitmore.	1876. Sir F. P. Haines.
1868. Mr. Gladstone.	1866. General Peel.	1882. Sir R. C. H. Taylor.	1882. Sir A. J. Herbert.	1885. Sir G. H. Harman.	1881. Sir Donald Stewart.
1874. Earl of Beaconsfield.	1867. Sir J. S. Pakington.	1882. Lord Wolseley.	1887. Sir Robert Biddulph.	1892. Sir R. Gipps.	1885. Lord Roberts.
1880. Mr. Gladstone.	1868. Mr. Cardwell.	1885. Sir A. Alison.	1887. Sir Redvers Buller.		1893. Sir G. S. White.
1885. Marquis of Salisbury.	1874. Mr. Gathorne Hardy (Earl of Cranbrook).	1885. Viscount Wolseley.	1890. Sir T. D. Baker.		
1886. Mr. Gladstone.	1878. Colonel Stanley (Earl of Derby).	1890. Sir Redvers Buller.	1893. Sir Robert Biddulph.		
1886. Marquis of Salisbury.	1880. Mr. Childers.		1893. Sir H. E. Wood.		
1892. Mr. Gladstone.	1882. Marquis of Hartington.				
1894. Earl of Rosebery.	1885. Mr. W. H. Smith.				
1895. Marquis of Salisbury.	1886. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman.				
	1886. Mr. W. H. Smith.				
	1887. Mr. Stanhope.				
	1892. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman.				
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MILITARY LIFE OF H.R.H. GEORGE, DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

CHAPTER I

EARLY YEARS

Birth and Parentage of Prince George of Cambridge. Position with regard to Succession of Thrones of Great Britain and Hanover. Early Education at Hanover. Comes to England when ten years old. Life at Windsor Castle with his Uncle, William IV. Education and Training. Extracts from H.R.H.'s Diary, 1834-1836. Visits to Brighton and Hanover. Gazetted Brevet-Colonel, 1837. Coronation of Queen Victoria. Review of Nature and Character of Education and Training of Prince George.

H.R.H. GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERICK CHARLES, 2nd Duke of Cambridge, was the only son of Prince Adolphus Frederick, 7th and youngest son of His Majesty King George III.

Prince Adolphus was born on 24 February 1774, and was created Duke of Cambridge, Earl of Tipperary, and Baron Culloden, all in the peerage of the United Kingdom, in 1801. He married, on 7 May 1818, H.S.H. Augusta Wilhelmina Louisa, daughter of H.S.H. Frederick, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; and on 26 March 1819, Prince George of Cambridge, the story of whose military career it is the purpose of this work to relate, was born in Hanover.

Adolphus, Duke of Cambridge, resided in Hanover, having in 1816 been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the same by the Prince Regent on behalf of King George III., and as such he remained until the death of George IV. in 1830, when William IV., upon his succession, appointed him Viceroy of Hanover.

But upon King William's death in 1837, and the accession

of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria, the Salic Law excluded the female line, and in consequence the throne of Hanover passed to Her Majesty's uncle, the Duke of Cumberland.

It is a matter of interest, therefore, to recall the fact that for the first two months of his life Prince George of Cambridge was the prospective Successor to the Thrones of England and of Hanover; his six uncles, at that time, having no children. The birth of his cousins, Princess Victoria of Kent on 24 May, and of Prince George of Cumberland on 27 May 1819, placed him at a further distance from the line of succession. Possibly in view of the fact that both his children had died in their early infancy, King William wished the young Prince to live with him in England, and to be educated there in a manner befitting the great position to which it was always possible he might, some day, be called. His education was first placed under the Rev. Mr. Reineckar, Military Chaplain at the Court of Hanover; but subsequently it was supervised by the Rev. Mr. Harvey and the Rev. Mr. Walsh.

The latter gentleman used to occupy the same sleeping-apartment as the young Prince; and his departure from office was as sudden as it was tragic, in that he went out of his mind one night. He was succeeded by the Rev. Canon Wood, who came over to England with the young Prince in 1830.

Upon Prince George attaining his eleventh year, in 1830, it was deemed expedient, for reasons already alluded to, that his education should be proceeded with in England, and he accordingly went thither under the charge of Canon Wood. From thenceforth he lived with his uncle, William IV., and aunt, the Queen Adelaide, usually at Windsor, save during the winter months, when the King and Queen went to the Royal Pavilion, Brighton. It was customary for him to spend a few days annually in London on his way from Brighton to Windsor.

The Rev. Canon Wood appears to have had considerable influence in moulding the young Prince's character; and among other things caused him to keep a Diary, which of itself is a most complete and interesting record of the Prince's early days.

During the years 1830 to 1836 he paid periodical visits to his parents in Hanover. A record of one he made in 1833 appears in his Diary, and is given here as affording some idea of the difficulties of Continental travel at this period.

Leaving London on 14 October 1833 with Canon Wood, they arrived at Walmer Castle the same evening, and embarked on the following morning at Dover at 11 o'clock, arriving at Calais at 3 P.M. after a stormy passage, and at St. Omer at 10 P.M.—'a most dreadful night, in which the Chain Pier was blown down at Brighton,' is H.R.H.'s entry. Leaving St. Omer the following morning, they reached Lille on the 16th, Valenciennes on the 17th, Namur on the 18th, Aix la Chapelle on the 19th, and passed through Cologne on the 20th, to Bonn. On the 21st they travelled to Boppard on the Rhine, passing through Coblenz on the way, 'where we stopped to see the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, one of the strongest fortresses in existence.'

On 22 October they arrived at Frankfort, where the Prince paid a visit to his grandfather (H.S.H. Frederick, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel). On the 26th he left Frankfort for Cassel, and on the 28th arrived at Hanover. 'Papa I saw at Einbeck, Uncle Frederick (a son of the Landgrave) was at Hanover; never shall I forget my joy at seeing them all again.'

Throughout the Prince's Diary dealing with the events of years 1833-1836, there are unquestionable traces that Canon Wood exercised a close supervision over the entries from time to time, and he seems to have adopted very practical methods to induce the young Prince to note all daily occurrences, not simply by making a record in pen and ink, but by making remarks on all that came under his observation from day to day, and giving his opinions on the same. Thus, after reading English History, he gives briefly his views of the characters of the chief actors of each period, and we have his written confession that on one occasion he 'wrote by no means a just character of William the Conqueror.' This entry was probably made 'to order.' He continues with a saving clause: 'I think, however, it is a most difficult thing to write a good character of any

person'—a remark which may be variously interpreted, when dealing with the standard of morals of the time of the Norman Conquest.

His entries respecting the Cabinet Crisis of 1834, and of the probable holders of office in the event of a new Ministry being formed, are obviously a part of Mr. Wood's scheme to introduce him to the mysteries of political life and the workings of the British Constitution.

The Prince's playmates and comrades were usually boys from Eton, and with the aid of their society, combined with fishing and sailing the 'frigate' on Virginia Water, he appears to have had no lack of amusements; his particular friends at the time seem to have been 'the Curzons' and 'Emlyn.'[1]

It is amusing to note how between all the platitudes and enforced moral precepts dictated to the Prince from time to time by his excellent instructor, the boy's natural instincts assert themselves. Thus in a page devoted to his opinion that *Télémaque*, which he read in his French lesson, 'is beautifully written, and shows great sweetness of expression,' with kindred remarks on the delights of '*Egmont*, a tragedy by Gœthe, and Shiller,' which he gravely informs us are 'standard works in the German language,' we come on a line, 'Took several running footers and a hedder'! (*sic*). As months passed, Canon Wood seems to have encouraged the Prince to write his own opinions, and to have merely inspected the 'log-book' periodically. Dr. Küper, who was his German teacher, upon going for his summer holiday to Hanover, gave the Prince one of Shakespeare's plays to translate into German. 'It will be a difficult task,' writes H.R.H., 'but yet faint heart never won fair lady'!

On 22 August he proceeded to Woolwich to welcome his aunt, H.M. Queen Adelaide, on her return from the Continent. With the advent of September his thoughts turn to sport. Early in the month he writes: 'Took out my little hounds for the first time, and they hunted very nicely'; and on the following day 'went out coursing in the afternoon.'

[1] John Frederick Vaughan Campbell, afterwards 2nd Earl Cawdor; he died 1898.

On 7 September he records obtaining 'the Queen's permission to begin to shoot.' About this time he became the possessor of a 'pair of iron-grey driving ponies, 14.2 high, both mares.'

On 12 September the Prince had his first day's shooting, not very successful. 'I had three shots, but as might be expected, killed nothing,' owing to the fact, as he himself admits, that he was 'quite alarmed lest the gun should kick'! Those who have witnessed H.R.H.'s performance with the gun in after years, and know what a capital and keen shot he was, will be entertained at this, his début in the shooting-field, now just seventy years ago. But it was not alone in the direction of shooting that his sporting instincts lay: here are a few extracts from his diary of 1834.

'16*th Sept.*—Went out with the harriers yesterday and had on the whole a very good run.'

'18*th Sept.* 1834.—I hear the St. Leger has been won by Lord Westminster's Touchstone, Bran being second, and General Chassée third, Plenipotentiary last but one. The latter was probably poisoned or at least some trick was played so as to make him loose' (*sic*).

On 21 September he took the Prince of Orange's son, who was on a visit to Windsor, together 'with four Eton boys to Ascot to see the King's Hounds'; and a few days later he shot pigeons in the park, 'killed five, three sitting on a tree and two flying. I like it uncommonly. I think I also wounded a hare.'

A few days later, when out hunting, his horse 'Sweeper put one of his feet into one of the little ditches, and down we both came.' About this time there are numerous entries of his days out hunting, and *Hecuba* and 'even mathematics' are relegated to their proper positions from his standpoint. On 1 October 'feasant shooting,' we learn, begins.

Canon Wood, despite his obviously very precise views and methods, seems to have been a good sportsman, and he is noted by the Prince from time to time as selecting horses for him and 'trying them at the leaping-bar.'

On 11 October occurs his first military entry. 'Several cavalry officers arrived yesterday, to examine to-day together

with the King whether the Lancers could use carrabins (*sic*) together with their lances and various things of that kind.' On the 13th the Prince writes: 'Yesterday the King had an inspection of several of the Lancers to see whether they could use carbines, and it being found serviceable they, the latter, are to be adopted.' It must be remembered that our Lancers were only armed with lance, sabre, and pistols in those days: the addition of the carbine (despite this trial) was not made until the year 1873.

Some of the Prince's reflections on his youthful crimes show a good deal of shrewdness. Thus: 'I have lately got into the old habit of arguing and that too in a very improper tone of voice. Mr. Wood has now told me that if I did not behave well during the remainder of the week, he would send the few harriers they have lent me from the King's Kennel away on Monday. *I am therefore on my good behaviour!*'

It is consoling to see by this week's diary that he took the hounds out regularly, and that on 30 October, his last day of the season, 'we had both the King's and my little pack of harriers out, making altogether a pack of nineteen and a half couple. We had very pretty fun.' On 3 November 1834 he writes at Brighton, a place he evidently failed to appreciate: 'We can make but little use of the hounds, and this adds to the disagreeableness of Brighton.' Here also his studies seem to have been somewhat increased, and he welcomes the advent of 8 November. 'Today being my Aunt Augusta's[1] birthday, she has been good enough to ask for a holiday for me, which I shall take advantage of, to go out with the foxhounds which meet about eight miles from here on the London road. Yesterday I rode out with the Queen.' The holiday was a success: albeit it 'rained in torrents, we all went out hunting, and had a tolerably good run. The mare went very well indeed, but gave me one tumble in a brook, and struck me in the face in her efforts to scramble out. . . .' It was after this that a great concession was made by Canon Wood, in that the Prince was to be allowed 'to

[1] Princess Augusta Sophia, daughter of George III. Born 1768; died 1840.

hunt regularly once a week instead of having two half-holidays.'

On 1 December the Court proceeded to London. Before starting from Brighton the news arrived of the death of the Duke of Gloucester on the preceding day. The Prince now went to Cambridge House. His Diary at this period is full of references concerning the fall of Lord Melbourne's Ministry and the new appointments under Sir Robert Peel.

On 22 December he returned to Brighton, and on 17 February 1835 he was back in London. His note on the 18th was: 'Yesterday, at a little after five we arrived in town, having left Brighton at a little before twelve. Cambridge House is very snug and comfortable. Yesterday evening I dined at St. James's as usual.'

An entry rendered interesting by events many years later is that of 25 February 1835. 'Our affairs in China are by no means pleasant, and the Chinese have besides stopped the tea-trade. It appears that an action has been fought between some of their forts and two English frigates, in which the former were worsted.'

Just a quarter of a century later it fell to H.R.H. as Commander-in-Chief to order and arrange for a military Expedition, to induce the Chinese to behave in a more pleasant and rational manner. On 2 March 1835 he writes: 'To-night I believe the Supplies are to be voted, and I hope that no opposition will be made to that, for if they did make some, the Army would no longer be paid and would accordingly be disbanded'—a curious remark for a lad destined to spend forty of the most strenuous years of his life in endeavouring to induce successive Secretaries of State for War to prepare adequate Army Estimates.

On 12 March 1834 the Court moved to Windsor, and on the 14th the Prince writes: 'Yesterday I began by going out hunting with the King's Staghounds. We had a very good run.' During the remainder of the month he hunted with the harriers regularly. On 26 March he celebrated his sixteenth birthday—'Thirteen Eton boys came up and went out hunting with me. We had on the whole very good

sport.' On 3 April the Prince welcomed his mother at Deal, and on the 15th his father arrived.

On 25 May 1835 he writes: 'Yesterday was my cousin Princess Victoria's birthday. I went to pay her a congratulatory visit at Kensington in the morning.' On 2nd June the Prince was present at his first Derby '. . . a very pretty sight. The road was crowded with carriages and foot-passengers. At three o'clock the race commenced, but they made several false starts. At length they came in in capital style and at a sharp pace, Trim leading, but presently Ibrahim took the lead, which however he soon lost, for Mundig and Ascot soon were before him, and the former won cleverly by half a neck, Ascot being second, and Ibrahim third.'

On 14 June he writes: 'The Ministers have repealed the Foreign Enlistment Bill, and have permitted 10,000 men to go to Spain. Accordingly, Colonel Evans is, I understand, to erect a corps of Volunteers to go there.' The Colonel Evans thus alluded to was the subsequently well-known General Sir de Lacy Evans, who, like H.R.H., commanded one of our Divisions at the Battle of the Alma eighteen years later.

There is direct evidence in the Prince's Diary of this period that he had no desire of entering the Army. By degrees, however, he seems to have taken more interest in affairs military. Thus on 11 July he writes: 'Yesterday I went to a very beautiful review of all the troops in and near London, which took place in Hyde Park. The King himself was present, which made the whole sight more beautiful, and he was, I think, very well received.' Again on the 24th he 'attended the King to Woolwich to see a review of the Artillery, which I had never seen before. The ball practice was really excellent.'

On 15 August 1835 the King, at Windsor, invested Prince George with the Order of the Garter. 'The King has been kind enough to give me a most beautiful set of the Order. Two Stars and two splendid Georges, besides what I have got from the Lord Chamberlain's office.'

On 25 August the Duchess of Cambridge and her two

daughters returned to Hanover, and were followed about a week later by the Duke.

Early in November the King and Queen returned to Brighton, where the Prince indulged in a little hunting, both with the foxhounds and harriers. On the 18th he writes: 'After I had done my work, went out with the hounds and had an excellent run; the harriers are certainly the best hounds on hills, but yet one cannot help preferring, on the whole, the foxhounds.'

In January 1836, Prince George went on a visit to Lord Howe, but the frost cut short his hunting. He, however, had some shooting, and records that he 'shot much better than last year. One day I shot more than twelve hares, but I missed the pheasants terribly.'

The Prince continued to reside at Brighton with King William, and subsequently at Windsor Castle, and seems to have obtained plenty of sport between the staghounds, foxhounds, and his harriers. It is noticeable in his journals what genuine difficulty he ever experienced in his classical studies. 'It is very hard that I cannot get on with my Latin and Greek' is a common entry; whereas of the study of mathematics and French he writes with enthusiasm, and also evidently takes a most intelligent interest in all matters connected with history, geography, politics, and physical science.

As the time approached for him to return to his parents at Hanover he was torn by conflicting emotions. He had got to like England and the English life. 'God knows how much attached I am to this country and to its inhabitants'; and he writes openly with regard to his return to Hanover. 'I must say I do not look forward to it with much pleasure, and were it not for the idea of seeing my dear parents and sisters again, I should dislike it a great deal more.' Evidently the field sports of England had taken a strong hold on his imagination. The return to Hanover also meant his separation from Canon Wood, who had been his 'beloved preceptor for eight years.' He was unquestionably greatly attached to Canon Wood, who seems to have exercised a remarkable influence for good over the young Prince.

On 21 July, Prince George quitted England for Hanover. There is a break in the Prince's journal from 17 July to 13 August 1836—a very unusual thing for him. He writes on the latter date from Rümpenheim: 'Since the 17 July great changes have taken place in my education. For at that time I was still in England under the direction of the King and Queen and having Mr. Wood as my tutor, and at this moment I am in Germany under the care of my own parents and having at the same time a military governor in the person of Colonel Cornwall.'[1] He adds that it is his intention 'to continue a regular diary from to-day,' but it is evident that his severance from the estimable Mr. Wood produced a reaction unfavourable to such a course, for after casual entries on the 16 and 21 August there is only one more, that of 6 November, up to the end of the year! In justice to Prince George's diligence it must be noted that after leaving Rümpenheim in August, the Royal party proceeded on a series of travels: it 'consisted, including servants, of about thirty-two people, who occupied eight carriages.' After a visit to Hanover they proceeded to the Château de Celle, and subsequently to Montbrillant and Rothenkirchen, and thence back to Hanover. On 1 February 1837, Prince George recommences his Diary with the expressed determination 'to keep it regularly from day to day, and if I possibly can, to continue it as long as I live.'

How remarkably he kept to this resolve is now a matter of record. He seems at this time to have been kept very close at his books—he was just eighteen. 'In the morning from half-past seven till one I am occupied with my studies. Then I generally ride in the school till three, and then have another lesson till dinner time. We dine at half-past four. . . . Three times a week I have a music lesson in the evening. Wednesday and Saturday I have more time to myself': a great contrast to his free life and hunting at Windsor and Brighton.

In March he accompanied his father on a visit to Berlin, where he was greatly pleased at all he saw. It having

[1] Lieut.-Colonel W. Cornwall, Coldstream Guards.

been decided by the Duke of Cambridge that Prince George should now commence his military career, some time in April 1836 he was attached to the Jäger Battalion of the Guard in the King of Hanover's service, and after doing duty for a month in private, he was permitted to take his turn as a Lieutenant of the Palace Guard.

The following entry occurs in the Prince's journal:— 'On May 9th of this year, I mounted my first guard at the Palace of Hanover. Lieutenant Basing was on guard with me, and I must confess it was one of the happiest days of my life, for I, for the first time, felt as if I was really a soldier.'

On 26 May 1837 came the news of King William's serious illness, and on 20 June he died. It was immediately settled that Prince George should proceed to England to attend the funeral. In his Diary he says: 'The Duke of Cumberland, now King of Hanover, arrived at Hanover on Wednesday, 28th June. I saw him for a few hours, and then the same night, at twelve o'clock, started with Colonel Cornwall for England.' . . . On Wednesday, July 1, I went up to London to see my relations, and at half-past two I went, by appointment, to Queen Victoria, who received me most graciously.' The King's funeral took place on the evening of 8 July, after which 'the Queen Dowager drove down to Bushey, which from this time has become her own home. She desired me to come likewise, and I am at this moment writing from that place.'

Shortly after this Prince George rejoined the Duchess of Cambridge and family at Düsseldorf. Here on 19 July he had an opportunity of inspecting some Prussian cavalry.

'I began by riding out with the Prince of Solms to see a Regiment of Hussars exercise, that are quartered at Düsseldorf. I must say, that though not equal to the Hanoverians, yet I was very much pleased with their appearance and their manner of moving. The horses were not as good as I have been accustomed to see, but yet they were not bad, though on the whole rather small. It is really wonderful to think that men can ride so well, who only serve for three years.'

Many officers who read these lines will recall the Duke's quick eye for a Cavalry Regiment, a gift for which he was

for many years so famous, and of which he thus shows indications at this early period of his career.

His remark about the good appearance of the short service soldiers might well be laid to heart by those who, over thirty years afterwards, took upon themselves to instruct H.R.H. in the advantages of Short Service and of what could be done in the way of instruction of men in a brief period.

On 3 November 1837 Prince George, now in his nineteenth year, was gazetted to the rank of Brevet-Colonel in the British Army. Sixty years ago it was the custom thus to bestow high military rank upon members of the Royal Family at an early age.

Still, although Prince George thus commenced his military career with the Brevet rank of Colonel, this did not in any way prevent him from subsequently going through a most thorough and complete course of drill and instruction. How thorough this was, and how completely H.R.H. made himself acquainted with every detail of his profession, is a matter of common knowledge to all those who, in after years, were brought into contact with him.

On 2 January 1838, Prince George paid a week's visit to Queen Adelaide at St. Leonards and there met his old tutor, Canon Wood, and made many expeditions with him. He found him more delightful than ever. 'I am most truly attached to him,' he writes. On his return to London occurs the first entry in his journal dealing with military movements; this was in connection with the Canadian troubles in 1837-38. Most people nowadays are happily unaware that such an affair ever took place.

'The news from Canada was on the whole satisfactory. Sir John Colborne[1] with a strong force started to drive the rebels out of their last stronghold, and I hope he may succeed in his undertaking. The rebellion there is a sad event, which I hope, however, may yet be put down. Several half-pay officers who are to organise the Militia are to start on Tuesday next. General Clitherow is to go as second in command to Sir John Colborne, and will also embark on Tuesday. The 93rd Regiment has already sailed for Canada, and the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadiers and the 2nd Battalion of the Coldstream, together with the 11th, 73rd, and probably

[1] Afterwards Lord Seaton.

the 23rd and 71st, the 1st Dragoon Guards and 7th Hussars with four companies of Artillery, are to go in March. General Macdonald will command the Brigade of Guards.'

Towards the end of January he paid a visit to the Duke of Wellington at Strathfieldsaye, where he had some good shooting and skating.

Among His Royal Highness's papers is a Commission as 'General-Lieutenant' in the Army of the King of Hanover, to which rank he was promoted from 'Major-General' on 6 January 1838. These were of course purely honorary Commissions due to his position as a member of the Royal Family, standing at the time in direct succession to the Throne of Hanover.

On 12 February the Prince notes that he 'skated on the Serpentine, the ice was excellent, and I got on tolerably well and without many falls.'

On 21 March he writes: 'I went into the Park this morning, where I saw the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadiers inspected by the Duke of Wellington. They looked remarkably well, and are a very fine body of men. The Duke drilled them himself, and it was quite delightful to see in what excellent spirits he was, and how pleased he appeared to be.'

It should be mentioned here that the Duke of Wellington at this time was Colonel of the Grenadier Guards, an appointment of an honorary nature in so far as it carried with it no actual command in the field. The spectacle of the Iron Duke, a Field-Marshal of twenty-five years' standing, in his seventieth year thus indulging in battalion drill, which in all probability he had not had occasion to do since he commanded the 33rd Regiment towards the close of the eighteenth century in India, must indeed have been a remarkable one.

On the following day:—

'This morning the Brigade of Guards under orders for Canada were inspected in the Park by Lord Hill. The 2nd Battalion of the Grenadiers and the 2nd of the Coldstream form this Brigade under the command of Sir John Macdonald. Of the sixteen hundred men out, there were hardly any under 5 feet 9 inches, and so remarkably even that it was quite beautiful to see them. They appeared to be in very

high order, and executed the few manœuvres they had to do with the greatest precision. The inspection lasted not quite two hours. . . . In the evening I dined with the Duke of Wellington, who gave a great dinner in uniform to the Officers of the Battalion that is going out, which went off very well indeed.'

On 12 April:—

'The accounts from Canada are on the whole favourable. There has been rather a smart engagement between some American pirates and the Queen's forces, in which two men of the regular troops were killed and twenty-eight wounded. The rebels lost a great many more and some officers. The Grenadiers sailed last Monday, and the Coldstream are to sail on Sunday next.'

The Prince's Diary for the London season of 1838 is most voluminous. He was much in request at all the great dinners and entertainments. At the State Ball on 19 May he 'opened the Ball with Her Majesty, and I thought she danced really very nicely and seemed to be much amused.'

On 28 May he writes: 'I am now quite a gay man and leading a regular London life, in a quiet sort of way, nevertheless. Really pleasure sometimes becomes quite a business and in that respect is not very agreeable.'

The Prince's writing now begins to change, the extreme clearness of his boyish diaries is not always maintained, and shows symptoms of assuming the well-known caligraphy of his official life.

On 18 June 1838 he writes:—

'To-day is the anniversary of the ever memorable Battle of Waterloo. What a glorious victory that was to be sure, and how that one event has immortalised the name of Wellington. I only hope and trust that the great man may long live to be a blessing to his country. Of course I left my name upon him and went to see his table laid out, which certainly was very handsome. He gave his great annual dinner to the officers who served on that glorious day.'

Ten days later he was at the Coronation of Queen Victoria on 28 June, and of this he writes an excellent description, entering into full details of all the troops assembled in London on that memorable occasion.

'The 20th Regiment extended from Buckingham Palace to Hyde Park Corner; the two Battalions of Rifles[1] from

[1] Rifle Brigade.

thence to the top of St. James's Street; the Marines, all the length of St. James's Street; then a detachment of the Coldstream occupied a part of Pall Mall, the two Battalions of the Third[1] the rest of Pall Mall, Charing Cross, and Parliament Street as far as the Admiralty; the 3rd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, the Royal Company of City Artillery,[2] and the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, the rest of the space to the Abbey: the three Regiments of Household Cavalry, the 4th and 6th Regiments of Dragoon Guards, the 10th Hussars, and the 12th Lancers were interspersed along the whole line. The Artillery were stationed in the St. James's Park Gardens.'

From time to time he alludes to the probability of his being sent on a tour to Gibraltar, Malta, and the Mediterranean. On 13 July he finally bade farewell to his books.

'I had my last lesson with Mr. Jebb, which I regret exceedingly, for I like him of all things, and I have never studied with more pleasure, and I think I may add, with more advantage to myself, than since I have been reading with him. We finished Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion* a short time ago, and since that time have examined the accounts given in the *Annual Registers* about the Belgian and Dutch affairs, and those of Greece and Turkey.'

It having been finally arranged that Prince George should adopt a military career, Gibraltar was decided upon as a station where he could acquire the first preliminaries to learning the duties of a soldier, viz. a knowledge of drill and discipline. H.R.H. was in consequence ordered thither, and in a Horse Guards letter of 29 September 1838 to the Governor of that fortress, Sir Alexander Woodford, K.C.B., it was notified that 'Her Majesty had been pleased to approve of Colonel H.R.H. Prince George of Cambridge being attached to the Garrison of Gibraltar and being employed in any manner in which the Governor may require H.R.H.'s services.' In accordance with this order Prince George, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Cornwall, started on his journey to Gibraltar on 21 September 1838.

Prince George may be considered now to have fairly embarked on his military career—a career which, commencing thus in September 1838, was actively pursued until

[1] 3rd Guards (Scots Fusilier Guards.)
[2] The Hon. Artillery Company.

his retirement from the high office of Commander-in-Chief in October 1895, a period of no less than fifty-seven years.

Reviewing the nature and character of the training which the Prince received in the period immediately preceding his introduction to military service in the British Army in 1838 at Gibraltar, one sees that it was so arranged that between his studies, field sports, and social engagements he was always kept fully occupied; and that every effort was made by his parents and preceptors to that end. Possibly we may here find the germ of the principle which in after years caused him to lead such an extremely busy and active existence. It may surprise not a few of those who may read the successive chapters of this book to see how H.R.H., despite his innumerable duties, military, social, public, and family, and his ardent devotion to field sports in every form, yet found time to write such an enormous number, not only of official letters and memoranda, but also of letters of a private and semi-private nature to his military friends, a small portion of which only are referred to in this story of his life.

His voluminous diaries alone show a remarkable degree of application and attachment to his daily duties, and not the least of the difficulties of the present writer has been the attempt to select, from among the enormous mass of correspondence which H.R.H. had amassed at Gloucester House, those letters which would best illustrate his marvellous industry and the extraordinarily strenuous life which he lived for so many years. It will ever be a matter of astonishment how any man could have found time to write so many important letters on such a variety of subjects as did His Royal Highness the late Duke of Cambridge.

CHAPTER II

COMMENCES HIS MILITARY CAREER

Leaves London for Falmouth. Voyage to Gibraltar. Visit to Lisbon. Service at Gibraltar, 1838-39. Proceeds to Malta, Corfu, Athens, and Constantinople, 1839. Return to England. Attached to 12th Lancers, 1842. Gazetted to 17th Lancers. Appointed Colonel on Staff, Ionian Islands, 1843. Promoted to Major-General. Commands Limerick District, 1846. Commands Dublin District, 1847-1852. Succeeds to Dukedom on Death of his Father. Appointed Inspecting General of Cavalry at Headquarters, 1852.

On 21 September 1838, Prince George bade farewell to his parents after dinner, and at 11.30 P.M. started from London with Colonel Cornwall for Falmouth. They travelled all night by road, and after breakfasting at Salisbury the following morning, continued through Exeter. Again, after travelling all night they breakfasted in the morning 'at a miserable little inn on the road,' and finally arrived at Falmouth at half-past one on the afternoon of the 23rd—a thirty-nine hours' drive.

On 24 September they embarked on the Falmouth steam packet, and after a rough passage arrived late on the evening of the 26th at Vigo. Here 'the Madrid mail is landed, and so the Lieutenant of the Navy in charge of it lands and delivers it over to the Vice-Consul.' The Prince landed with the mail officer, but was naturally enough not impressed by his nocturnal visit to the little seaport.

The following day 'the Oporto mail was dropped into a boat off that town, the packet not anchoring.' On the 28th the packet anchored in the Tagus, where a British Squadron was lying, and the Prince was taken ashore by one of H.M.S. *Donegall's* boats and took up his quarters at the British Consul's house.

At Lisbon he was entertained by the King and Queen of

Portugal, and the following day, accompanied by Colonel Cornwall, Major Dodwell, an ex-British Dragoon, a courier, and servants, drove to the Royal Palace at Cintra. On the following day the party started on a riding tour, stopping the first night at Mafra, and the next day riding to Torres Vedras, where they closely examined the famous lines, which the Prince well describes in his journal. At this time, less than thirty years had elapsed since they were first constructed, and they were yet in good order. 'I was very much surprised to find them so perfect; indeed with a very little trouble they might be easily restored.' From Torres Vedras the party rode on to Caldas.

'We passed over the field of Roliça, the first action fought by the Duke of Wellington, and in which the 29th Regiment particularly distinguished themselves by storming a very steep and rocky hill and driving back a whole division of French Infantry stationed on the top. Colonel Lake, their brave commander, was killed in the attack, and a monument is erected to his memory, which we saw. We next passed through Obidos.'

Obidos was the scene of the first affair in the Peninsular War on 15 August 1808, two days before the battle of Roliça. The party slept at Caldas, 'a small, miserable little town,' where they had the worst possible accommodation. 'We had been riding more than forty miles to-day, and were more than twelve hours on the road,' writes the Prince.

The party returned to Lisbon on 5 October, and on the 7th the Prince sailed in the *Tagus* steamer for Gibraltar. On the 8th the steamer called in at Cadiz, and the Prince landed for a few hours, and sailed on the same evening for Gibraltar, where he arrived early on 9 October.

Prince George landed at the Waterport at 8 o'clock A.M. and was 'received with a guard of honour of the 33rd Regiment, and several of the principal officers of the garrison. The Governor's carriage was waiting for me, and I got in with Colonel Cornwall and drove to the Convent, where I was very kindly received by Sir Alexander and Lady Woodford. I breakfasted with them. At eleven, I went out with him to what is called the "Neutral Ground,"

where the troops were drawn up in line, consisting of five companies of Artillery, one of Sappers and Miners, and six Regiments of the Line, viz. the 33rd, 46th, 48th, 52nd, 81st, and 82nd. They looked very well, and marched by both in slow and quick time.'

In a letter from Colonel Cornwall to the Duke of Cambridge of 11 October announcing Prince George's safe arrival at Gibraltar the following passage occurs: 'I hope to be able by Monday to establish a regular occupation for the Prince. I have heard of a good Italian and French master, and have succeeded in procuring a piano-forte. Everything shall be done to keep H.R.H. as much occupied as possible.'

Prince George was the bearer of a letter from his father, the Duke of Cambridge, to General Sir Alexander Woodford, who writes on 11 October to the Duke announcing the arrival of Prince George two days previously, 'in excellent looks and spirits,' and giving his views as to employing him whilst at Gibraltar as follows:—

'I am willing to persuade myself that the Prince is disposed to take interest in everything here, and I shall propose a plan whereby H.R.H. will get every information relative to the interior order of a regiment, and I shall also arrange for some drill and exercises with the 33rd Regiment. After that I propose that the Prince should take duty on the Field Officer's roster, and on field days I shall put the light companies of the five regiments together and give H.R.H. the command. . . . I trust that all this, with what the Prince will see of daily routine of duty here, will give him much insight into everything connected with the service in general. I have selected an officer of Engineers who will give the Prince information upon that branch of the service, and I shall do the same for Artillery practice and Gunnery. . . . I am certain that it will be very agreeable to the Duchess and to you, Sir, to hear that the Prince has pleased everybody here on his arrival by his good-humoured and unaffected manners.

'I have only to add that the Prince was received with the usual honours on his arrival, and that H.R.H. afterwards accompanied me to the Neutral Ground where the whole garrison was drawn up in line, when I had the honour of presenting him to the troops, and he received the general salute. The Prince is now become a member of of the garrison, and will only receive compliments due to his military rank.'

By the same mail Sir Alexander Woodford wrote to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, at the time Military Secretary to Lord Hill, the Commander-in-Chief, and expressed his confidence that Prince George would soon 'master the drill, which, as he has drilled with the Jäger Guards at Hanover, I should think will not be long.'

On 12 October 1838 Prince George commenced his military duties. 'This morning I went for the first time to the barracks of the 33rd to be drilled. I am to be attached for the present to that regiment, and learn my duty with them. They are a very nice corps, and were the Duke of Wellington's own regiment in the East Indies. . . . I confess the whole thing reminded me rather of my stay in Hanover, where I had the same sort of work to do. . . .'

On the 30th the Prince writes: 'I drill generally twice, in the morning after breakfast and in the afternoon at four o'clock. I have besides an Italian master, whose lessons I like very much, and a music master.'

In November the Governor writes that Prince George is 'much liked and respected in the garrison. H.R.H. has met the plan (for military instruction) proposed to him in the most frank and satisfactory manner.'

Next month we learn that 'Prince George enjoys the hunting twice a week very much, and is very nicely mounted.'

On 1 December the Prince paid a visit to Ceuta in H.M. Brig of War *Wasp*, Captain Dudley Pelham, and well describes that moribund fortress: 'The works are exceedingly strong, but not in very good repair, and one great fault of the place is that it is commanded in a great degree by the Neutral Ground, which is very high. The effect produced by seeing the Moorish and Spanish outposts close together was very singular. There is a very bad feeling between the two nations. . . .' The following day the *Wasp* proceeded to Tetuan Bay, and the Prince landed and made his first expedition into Morocco.

On 2 January 1839 occurs the proud entry in the Prince's diary: 'I went to drill and commanded the Regiment.' On the following day there is an allusion to his other military

studies. 'I like the course of study I have begun with Major Hall very much. I am now reading with him Vauban's description of the attack of a fortified place. . . .'

On 6 January 1839 the Prince enters in his journal: 'To-day I went out for the first time with the whole Regiment to drill. I commanded the second company, and did tolerably well considering.'

On 11 January he crossed to Tangier in the *Wasp*, and rode out to the house of Mr. Hay, the English Consul, in after years the well-known British Minister, Sir John Drummond Hay. He subsequently visited Cadiz and Seville, and Sir Alexander Woodford, ever careful of the military education of his charge, writes 'after which we shall have a good many field days.' During this month he went on a shooting trip into the Sierra, north of the 'Cork woods,' and camped out with a party for four days. As is not uncommon in Southern Spain in winter, the sport was spoiled by heavy rains and impassable streams. Meanwhile, despite these various expeditions, his military education was steadily progressing.

In his diary of 21 January he writes: 'The half-yearly inspection of the 33rd took place on the Neutral Ground, and in the afternoon I went with the General to examine the books of the Regiment.' Military readers will doubtless appreciate this the Prince's first reference to this exhilarating and intellectual occupation, which, according to his diary, H.R.H. was by special favour permitted to do in the case of every corps inspected! And on 26 January: 'Went out to the Neutral Ground with the 33rd. My foot-drill will soon be over, and then I shall be mounted, which I shall not be sorry for, as half the work will be done.' On 9 February: 'The 33rd and 46th Regiments were out to-day on the Neutral Ground. I acted first as Major, and then had to take command of the Regiment. Colonel Knight took charge of the Brigade. I confess I was rather frightened at first, but got off better than I expected.'

On the 14th he was placed in command of the 33rd Regiment at a Divisional Drill of two Brigades; subse-

quently he did Field-Officer's duty, and eventually 'Colonel of the Day' with the two Field-Officers under him.

Every letter from the Governor to the Duke during this period contains favourable reports on Prince George's progress in his military studies. Thus in January 1839 the Governor writes: 'He has continued to work as a mounted officer of the 33rd, and has on several occasions been desired by Colonel Knight to drill the Regiment. The officers tell me H.R.H. does it well.' And again in the following month: 'We had a Brigade Drill on Monday, the 33rd and 81st Regiments, and Prince George fell in with the 33rd as Major, and seemed very much at home in all he had to do.'

In the same month he sailed for Malaga in the *Wasp*, and visited that town and Granada, and later on the Governor writes that he 'has lately commanded the Battalion (the 33rd) by itself and in line with the other troops in garrison, and I was pleased to observe that Prince George seemed quite clear and collected in all he had to do, and certainly acquits himself very well. . . .'

In February we learn from Sir Alexander that the officers of the garrison were 'anxious to offer Prince George a mark of their respect and good opinion, and to present a sword to H.R.H., which, I feel sure, will be very gratifying to you, Sir, and very complimentary to the Prince. . . .'

Sir Alexander was apparently oblivious of the order against officers 'presenting public marks of esteem,' for on 18 March the Prince enters regretfully in his diary that 'a Horse Guards letter had come pointing out that such a proceeding was contrary to a G.O. of 1810'! Boy-like he deplores the loss of 'the sword itself, which in after days would have reminded me in the most pleasing manner of my stay at Gibraltar.' At any rate the Horse Guards of the day cannot be accused of undue partiality.

In April Sir Alexander writes: 'H.R.H. has been twice Field-Officer of the Day, and being on parade myself I was glad to see H.R.H. so much at his ease and so clear in command.' Doubtless Sir Alexander refers to the ancient and time-honoured ceremony of Guard-mounting and Trooping

the Colour on the Alameda Parade. The last military entry which occurs in the Prince's diary at Gibraltar is as follows:—

'22*nd April*.—I was occupied the whole of this morning with Sir Charles Smith, who was good enough to read his report to me on the state of Gibraltar, which was exceedingly interesting to me. . . . Afterwards I rode with Sir Charles to see various parts of the Rock where he would be anxious to make improvements, and saw the naval tanks and stores as well as one of the principal powder-magazines, all of which are most interesting things to see. . . .'

Three days later Prince George quitted Gibraltar for Malta. Prior to Prince George's departure for Malta, Sir Alexander wrote as follows:—

'It has afforded me much pleasure to have H.R.H. here, and I feel persuaded that he has seen a great deal of life, and has heard a great deal of the opinions and sentiments of men of all ranks, which knowledge is always useful to a young man, and particularly to one so circumstanced as your son, Sir, and who is, moreover, a quick and apt observer.'

In Sir Alexander's next letter, dated 25 April 1839, he announces to the Duke of Cambridge, Prince George's departure from Gibraltar.

'Prince George embarked this morning at eight o'clock on the *Acheron* steamer for Malta. . . . We have parted with H.R.H. with infinite regret. . . . His last public duty was as Colonel of the Day. I consider H.R.H. to be quite competent to take the command of a regiment, and I feel persuaded that he has all the qualifications to become, with practice and experience, a distinguished officer in the service.

'Prince George has much grown since he came to Gibraltar, and has acquired breadth and substance, and appears perfectly well.'

At the same time Sir Alexander Woodford wrote to Lord Normanby, Secretary of State for the Colonies, officially reporting the departure of Prince George for Malta, and ending as follows:—

'It is very gratifying to me to be able to add that Prince George has entered upon all the duties assigned to him in the most exemplary manner.

'H.R.H.'s conduct throughout has been highly praiseworthy; the quickness of his perception and taste for the

profession give a fair promise of his becoming a distinguished officer in the service.'

Prince George landed at Malta on 30 April 1839, and remained there as the guest of His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir H. P. Bouverie for about a fortnight. During his visit he accompanied the Governor on his half-yearly inspections of the various regiments quartered in the island, and on 16 May embarked in H.M.S. *Hermes* and sailed for Corfu. Colonel Cornwall's letters to H.R.H. (Adolphus) Duke of Cambridge give detailed accounts of the Prince's travels, relating how on 30th May he left Corfu and visited various places of interest on the Greek coast *en route* for Athens. At Athens he was the guest of Sir Edmund Lyons; thence he proceeded to Constantinople, and on 20 June sailed for Smyrna and Syra. On his return voyage to Athens, in a specially chartered Greek vessel, he was placed in quarantine, 'a penalty incurred by our visit to Constantinople.'

During the ten days he was confined in the lazaretto, the King of Greece paid him a visit. On leaving the lazaretto he returned to the house of the Minister, Sir Edmund Lyons. On 12 July the Prince departed and travelled *via* Ancona, Bologna, and Milan to Geneva. Here he remained until the end of September, living with a French family in order to improve his knowledge of that language. Colonel Cornwall reports that 'H.R.H. has certainly derived much benefit as regards the French language,' and that 'the French and Music masters have regularly attended H.R.H., and the Prince allows that they have been of great use to him.'

From Geneva Prince George returned to Italy to witness the Austrian Army Manœuvres under Field-Marshal Count Radetzky. These 'splendid reviews' were brought to a sudden termination by the death of Prince Bentheim, who commanded one of the Divisions. A final grand Parade took place on 13 October.

Colonel Cornwall reports that 'H.R.H. took much interest in the manœuvres, and cannot have failed in deriving much improvement from them.'

After the manœuvres Prince George paid a flying visit to

Venice, and thence travelled homewards *via* the Splügen Pass, Zürich and Strassburg to Frankfort.

Leaving the latter place on 2 November, he proceeded down the Rhône valley to Mayence, Bonn, Cologne and Rotterdam, paying various visits *en route*, and arriving in England in November 1839, after an absence of rather over fourteen months.

On 6 December 1839 Sir Alexander Woodford writes from Gibraltar to the Duke of Cambridge to congratulate him on Prince George's safe return to England, and says, 'I am glad to hear Prince George likes the thoughts of joining a Cavalry Regiment, which I hope will lead to H.R.H.'s permanent appointment to that branch of the service.'

Prince George's first experience of Infantry soldiering in a fortress such as Gibraltar, where the duties are circumscribed by incessant guard-mounting and 'sentry go,' can hardly have been conducive to fostering within him any special attachment for that arm, and it is not difficult to see that his thoughts turned towards life in a cavalry regiment. His experiences of the Austrian Military Manœuvres in the autumn of 1839, when he beheld the splendid squadrons of Austrian Cavalry in the field, no doubt further influenced his inclinations.

On 8 January 1840 he was attached (not gazetted) to the 12th Lancers, and did duty with them for two months at Brighton, and subsequently in Dublin as a Lieutenant-Colonel. On 15 April 1842 he was gazetted Lieutenant-Colonel of the 8th Light Dragoons, but he never joined that corps, and was gazetted on 25 April as Colonel of the 17th Lancers, then serving at Leeds.

The following extract is taken from the *Record Book*, 17th Lancers, 1842:—'H.R.H. Prince George of Cambridge, K.G., was appointed Colonel and took command of the Regiment. H.R.H. was actively engaged in suppressing the disturbances that took place that year in the manufacturing districts, receiving the thanks of the magistrates of Leeds for the effectual efforts of the military there stationed in assisting the civil power in preserving the peace of the town.'

It was during this period of his career that H.R.H.

acquired that intimate knowledge of Cavalry organisation and drill for which he was ever famous, and which has at times surprised cavalry officers who were unaware of H.R.H.'s early training.

On 20 April 1843 Lieutenant-Colonel and Brevet-Colonel Prince George was promoted to a substantive Colonelcy, and appointed Colonel on the Staff to command the garrison at Corfu, at that time one of our Mediterranean stations, Lord Seaton being at the time High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. Of his services at Corfu little record remains. The following extracts from private letters may, however, be of interest.

On 19 August 1843 Lord Fitzroy Somerset wrote from the Horse Guards to the Duke of Cambridge that, 'having seen the following observations in a letter from Mr. Becket, M.P., to Sir James Graham, I hasten, with the permission of the latter, to transmit it to Your Royal Highness, under a conviction that it will afford satisfaction to Your Royal Highness and the Duchess. "The Prince is most active and delightful to work under, and gains the admiration of everybody."'

In the spring of 1845 Prince George applied for two months' leave prior to quitting Corfu, and on 7 February Lord Seaton wrote to the Duke of Cambridge:—

'In transmitting the application for leave, I considered it incumbent on me to state, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that Prince George had by his exertions and unremitting attentions to the discipline of the troops under his immediate command, and the duties of this garrison, effected a great improvement in the several corps, both as to their general conduct and appearance under arms.'

A week later, Lord Seaton wrote to the Duke of Cambridge to suggest that the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George might be properly given to Prince George of Cambridge *previous* to his leaving the Ionian Islands. . . . Such a mark of Her Majesty's approbation would, I think, be very acceptable to the Prince and satisfactory to the Ionians.'

On 7 April 1845 Prince George vacated his Staff appointment at Corfu, after just two years' service at that station.

On 7 May 1845 he was promoted to the rank of Major-

General. On 1 October 1846, when in his twenty-seventh year, he was appointed to be a Major-General on the Staff and given the command of the troops at Limerick. After six months' experience of a mixed command at that station he was appointed, on 1 April 1847, to the command of the Dublin District *vice* Major-General Sir W. Wyndham. Here he served his full period of five years, up to 31 March 1852.

During the time of H.R.H.'s command in Dublin, he had as his Adjutant-General, Colonel W. F. Forster. A close friendship grew up between the two, which continued uninterruptedly until General Forster's death in 1879.

Among H.R.H.'s papers are numerous packets of letters written by him to General Forster, and returned after the death of the latter, mostly dealing with the period of his command in Dublin, from which it is evident that H.R.H. availed himself liberally of the time-honoured privilege of the British officer to indulge in 'leave of absence.' Such was the uninterrupted and constant nature of his correspondence with his Staff Officer, that it has been possible to follow out H.R.H.'s movements when not in Dublin week by week, and indeed at times even day by day.

Although these letters are of no especial public interest, since they deal mostly with purely technical details connected with his military duties, they indicate beyond question that it was his unvarying rule, even when on leave, to give the closest personal attention to all and every question affecting his command.

At the period of Prince George's taking up his command at Dublin, affairs in Europe were in a very unsettled and dangerous condition; there were grave disturbances in various places—for example, the Revolution in Paris of 1848, and the Baden insurrection of the same year.

In England we had the Chartist troubles, and the disloyal party in Ireland as usual were not backward in setting forth their grievances, real and imaginary, and in doing their best to impede the government of the country. Within a year of H.R.H. coming to Dublin occurred the outbreak known as the 'Smith O'Brien Rebellion,' in suppressing which he was actively engaged.

Owing to the disaffection in Ireland, and the work of the political agitators, it was necessary from time to time to confine the men of the various regiments in Dublin to barracks, and also to stop all night-passes for men usually entitled to such indulgences, both to keep out of mischief such as might be inclined to sympathise with the disaffected, and also to ensure that all ranks should be at hand in event of a sudden call for the services of the military to aid the civil power.

In a letter from H.R.H. to General Forster is enclosed the following curious one written by a loyal soldier who found the restrictions imposed on himself and his comrades unduly irksome. The letter, being anonymous, may shock the susceptibilities of some who may consider that undue prominence has been given to such an emanation, but it affords evidence that even in these his early days of command, H.R.H. had already inspired that confidence in the rank and file of Her Majesty's Army which he enjoyed for so many years subsequently, and that they had learned to look on him as one who sympathised with them in their little troubles, and would do his best to alleviate the same.

'DUBLIN, *27th May* 1848.

'MOST NOBLE PRINCE AND GENERAL,—We, the well-conducted and loyal servants and soldiers of Her Most Gracious Majesty serving under Her Royal Cousin in Dublin, pray of Y.R.H. to give Commanding Officers permission to grant night-passes to a few of the best-conducted men of each company: we the well-disposed soldiers who have the honour to serve under Y.R.H. would feel for ever indebted for such a mark of favour to their beloved General and noble Prince. I understand that some of the Corps having the honour to serve under Y.R.H.'s command in Dublin is receiving this indulgence. I know the honour and integrity of the brave Colonel commanding the distinguished Regiment in which I have the honour to serve Her most Gracious Majesty [too well] to suppose for a moment that he would take upon himself to grant such indulgences without Y.R.H.'s authority while the publick peace is disturbed by a few selfish rebels.'

His Royal Highness was on leave in London when he received this letter, but at once wrote to his Adjutant-General in Dublin as follows:—

Major General H.R.H. Prince George of Cambridge K.G.
1847

TO COLONEL FORSTER.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *3rd June* 1848.

'I forgot yesterday to send you the enclosed anonymous letter which has been sent to me. I really think that now, some *relaxation* in the way of passes might be made, and perhaps you would kindly speak to General Macdonald about it.'

We may be sure that H.R.H.'s kindness in thus at once attending to what after all was a very natural and fair request respectfully preferred, albeit in a manner so terribly unorthodox to military minds of the red-tape nature, was not lost on the men under his command.

On 16 March 1850 Prince George of Cambridge was appointed to be one of the Commissioners for the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and also for the Royal Military Asylum, Chelsea.

On 8 July 1850, upon the death of his father, Adolphus, Duke of Cambridge, he succeeded to his titles and dignities as 2nd Duke of Cambridge, and as such he will in future be referred to in this work.

The following letter from the Duke to Colonel Forster, although of a semi-private nature, is given since it affords eloquent testimony to the state of things at the Head-quarters of our Army in the middle of the nineteenth century. This letter speaks for itself.

TO COLONEL FORSTER.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, 11*th January* 1851.

'I have had a great triumph over General Brown[1] about the *sounds*.[2] I started the subject yesterday. He said he would acknowledge nothing but what was in the *Drill-book*. I said many sounds that were indispensable were not in this book, particularly the "lie down," "rise up," etc. He declared that I was perfectly mistaken. Well, a book was searched for, but will you believe it? in the *whole of the offices of the Adjutant-General of the Army*, no *drill-book was to be found but* the old one of Dundas.[3] A pretty

[1] General Sir George Brown, K.C.B., Adjutant-General to the Forces, 1850-1853.

[2] Infantry Bugle Sounds.

[3] General Sir David Dundas was born in 1735, appointed a 'Lieutenant-fireworker' in the Royal Artillery in 1754, and at different times served in the

state of things this! Brown was, of course, much annoyed. A book is immediately ordered from the *bookseller*, meanwhile Dundas is searched and the sounds are discovered in it which I said were not there. I began to feel uneasy when the *present drill-book* spick and span arrives, is opened, and oh horror! *No* sound for "lie down," *no* sound for "get up," *no* sound for "*go out to skirmish*," and another principal point which I forget at this moment is discovered! My triumph was complete, Brown quite astonished and struck dumb. "Well, General," say I, "what say you now?" "Oh! this is all *wrong*, but the fact is that I have always gone by *Dundas*, and did not know that there was anything different in the *New Book*." A pretty admission for an Adjutant-General! However, there it is and nothing to be said. I state to you the circumstances exactly as they occurred. Of course the whole thing was in good part, and Brown laughed as much as I did, but still it proves *how things are done* at Headquarters for many of which we, the Staff, get blown up. Brown has promised that upon my representing the case to the General and his forwarding it, the thing shall be at once corrected. He will not hear of *Mitchell's* book at all nor of *Potter's* sounds, and says people are fools to be taken in by such books. Of course this matter is quite *entre nous*, but the scene was so rich that I was obliged to recount it as it actually took place. Thanks for your letter and Memo. I will consider some of the points mentioned in it. . . .

'Tell Cochrane as much as you think *judicious* of my interview with Brown, as I think he will be *amused* by it.'

In the spring of 1851 Colonel Forster was seriously ill, and the affectionate regard in which he was held by H.R.H. is well exemplified by the following letter:—

TO COLONEL FORSTER.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *May* 19, 1851.

'I cannot tell you how much I have been gratified by the receipt of your letter of Friday last, as it is the best proof to me that you are progressing favourably. We have all been most anxious about you and have felt much for you in your sufferings, but I trust that now with care and quiet you will gradually regain your strength, which is the chief thing to be looked to. Do not trouble yourself on any account about business, for we will look to that

R.A., R.E., Cavalry and Infantry. In 1788 he brought out his great work, *The Principles of Military Movements chiefly applicable to Infantry.* Four years later, in June 1792, the Horse Guards issued as an official book his *Rules and Regulations for the Formation, Field Services and Movements of H.M.'s Forces.*'

It was under these rules that the armies which fought under Abercromby, Moore, and Wellington were disciplined. He died 1820.

until the medical men pronounce you fit for duty. I think the wisest thing will be change of air as soon as you are enabled to move. Scott has done the business very well as yet, but I dare say we shall get somebody to assist him in case he finds it more than he can manage. But all this you must really leave to us, and you know full well that we are all only anxious and desirous to make ourselves useful to you, so as to enable you without loss of time to resume your work. But pray don't trouble yourself about business at all as yet. It is your best chance of getting well soon.

'London is very full and very gay. The dear Duchess of Gloucester very well and making many inquiries after you. My hands are so full that I never have a moment to myself.'

Upon vacating his appointment in Dublin the Duke wrote the following memorandum embodying his experiences whilst in command for the benefit of those who might succeed him.

It is both interesting and instructive to note that H.R.H. so far thus initiated a system of military training in graduated drill, outpost work, and instruction in camp duties many years before such became an acknowledged part of the annual training of our officers and men.

Observations on the Dublin District and Garrison.

'After an experience of five years certain points have occurred to me, which I think it desirable to put on paper for the perusal of those who are likely to succeed me in the Command. It must be obvious to every body that the Garrison of Dublin must be looked upon as the school for the whole of the British Army, composed as it is of a considerable force of the various branches of the service, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry. On this account I have ever deemed it most essential that the Dublin Garrison should be kept up at the greatest possible amount of force so as to enable the several corps composing it to turn out for the field as strong as possible. It is on this account that I have used my best endeavours to find as much barrack accommodation for the troops as possible, and in this I have had the good fortune to succeed. The Garrison is now composed of a troop of Horse Artillery, a Field Battery, three Regiments of Cavalry, and six of Infantry. This force in my opinion should be invariably kept up as far as circumstances will admit, and should at times a demand be made for troops in other portions of the country, I hold it to be of great importance that such detachments should be looked upon as merely a temporary measure to meet certain contingencies, and that when the

necessity for them is at an end, the Garrison of Dublin should again resume its above-mentioned strength. The position of Dublin in this respect is highly favourable for the objects in view. The railroad communication to every part of Ireland is nearly completed, rendering all movements into the interior extremely easy, and the facility for embarking troops and of obtaining the necessary steam tonnage is great. . . . As regards drill, I have always considered the three Regiments of Cavalry with the troop of Horse Artillery as a Brigade, and have formed the six Regiments of Infantry into two Brigades of three Regiments each, giving each Brigade in charge to a Field Officer of Infantry, to which has been attached the Field Battery. At first steady independent drill by Brigades has been resorted to in the Park, then combined Divisional Drill of the whole force and manœuvring over the whole of the Park, and during the winter months I have found manœuvring on the roads in the country in heavy marching order an immense advantage as affording interest and instruction, with a view to a knowledge of country. Outpost duty too is most requisite, both for Cavalry and Infantry, and Dublin has from its locality advantages in this respect not to be found elsewhere. The encamping of troops has also been a portion of the drill during summer, and I think it is very desirable that Cavalry should be instructed in the picketing of horses, in which practice at present most of the corps are most defective. As regards discipline, my chief endeavour has been to keep up as much as possible the *esprit de corps* in the several corps of the District, and I have endeavoured by this means to instil into the minds of both officers and men that feeling of emulation which has carried them through the numerous temptations of a large town, by the desire to rival their neighbours both in smartness and good conduct, not causing feelings of jealousy but arousing them to every exertion to prove themselves equal if not superior to their comrades of other corps by general good conduct and by a uniform soldier-like bearing on all occasions, individually and collectively, when in the field or in quarters. . . .'

On 18 January 1852 the Colonelcy of the 'Cambridge Dragoons' in the Army of the King of Hanover was conferred upon the Duke.

On 1 April 1852 he received the appointment of Inspecting General of Cavalry at the Headquarters of the Army, a post for which his varied experiences with that arm rendered him very suitable. On 28 September 1852 he vacated his Colonelcy of the 17th Lancers, and became Colonel of the Scots Fusilier Guards 'by exchange.' His

farewell order to the 17th Lancers is given, since it was more than a mere compliment of the usual type. As is well known now to all, the Duke throughout his subsequent long career as Commander-in-Chief, and indeed down to the very last, maintained the warmest regard for his old regiment. During the last years of his life he, by a happy assertion of his position as Colonel-in-Chief, prevented a grave injustice being perpetrated on the senior officers of the 17th Lancers in an attempt to forward the interests of a favoured individual of another corps. The correspondence regarding this incident did not come into the present writer's possession until after the death of H.R.H., but it well exemplifies his keen sense of justice and of horror at anything approaching to the nature of a 'job,' and was peculiarly gratifying to the officers and men of his favourite Lancers.

FAREWELL ORDER TO 17TH LANCERS.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *October 6th*, 1852.

'Major-General the Duke of Cambridge having been graciously appointed by Her Majesty to the command of the Scots Fusilier Guards cannot separate himself from the 17th Lancers, with whom he has been connected for upwards of ten years, without expressing to Lieut.-Colonel Lawrenson, and the officers and men of that corps, his deep and sincere sorrow at parting from his old comrades. During the period he has had the honour to be at the head of that regiment, he has ever had cause to be proud of their conduct and general efficiency. He trusts that they will ever prove themselves worthy of the high character they have acquired in the Army; and in thanking them for the cordial and zealous support he has received from all ranks, he assures the whole regiment individually and collectively that his best and sincerest wishes will attend them wherever duty may call them.'

Hitherto, owing to his youth and to the fact that he had served abroad or away from Headquarters, H.R.H. had been unable, naturally enough, to show his undoubted administrative abilities to our military rulers. He was now thirty-three years of age, and had, as has been shown, filled many and various appointments with credit. From this period (1852) his active military career—active inasmuch as he was now in a position to make his voice heard in the councils of the nation—may be said to date.

CHAPTER III

INSPECTING GENERAL OF CAVALRY—1852-1854

Disorganised condition of the British Army in 1852. The results of prolonged peace and political exigencies. Repeated but fruitless efforts of the Duke of Wellington to get adequate provisions made for National Defence, 1827-1852. Memorandum on 'Organisation of the British Army at Home,' November 1852. Memorandum on 'Organisation of British Infantry,' January 1853. Correspondence relating thereto with Colonel Hon. C. Grey (Private Secretary to the Prince Consort). Memorandum on 'Organisation of British Cavalry,' October 1853. Memorandum on 'The Age of General Officers,' December 1853. The Camp at Chobham, August 1853.

On 1 April 1852 the Duke of Cambridge became Inspecting General of Cavalry at Headquarters, a post which he held until the outbreak of the Crimean War two years later. The notorious lack of organisation in the home army at once engaged his earnest attention, not only as regards his own arm, but also as regards the infantry and the army generally. It is hard to realise nowadays how completely any sort of system was lacking in the British Army fifty years ago. Thirty-seven years had elapsed since Waterloo was fought; and ever since the return of the British army of occupation from France in 1818 successive governments, not content with the dangerous reductions which had been made in the fighting forces of the Crown, had lost no opportunity of effecting further economies at the cost of naval and military efficiency.

It has been frequently said that the Duke of Wellington, both as Prime Minister (1828-30), and as Commander-in-Chief (1827-28, and 1842 till his death), failed to maintain the Army in a state of efficiency. Indeed, in the very latest

work dealing with the Duke of Wellington and his times, the following passage occurs:[1]—

'It would be a great oversight were I, while on this subject, to pass by unnoticed the charge which has been brought against the Duke of neglecting, during his long continuance of office, the best interests of the Army. As Prime Minister he reduced the artillery to a state of inefficiency. He allowed the wagon-train to die out, and eventually extinguished the commissariat.'

How far these accusations were true, and how far the Duke was compelled by the feeling of the nation and the political exigencies of the times to acquiesce in what he knew to be fatal to the efficiency of the Army, may be judged by the following brief recapitulation of the efforts he made to oppose an evil which he was powerless to avert. As far back as 1827 he had protested vigorously against the pernicious policy of reduction which had been advocated by the Treasury, pointing out the grave national danger which such a course involved.

In 1838 he again strongly criticised the powerless condition of our home defences, both as regards the Army and the Navy; and in the following words he bluntly summarised the real motives which throughout had actuated our rulers: 'The Government will not, they dare not, look our difficulties in the face and provide for them. I do not believe that any Government that could be formed in these days would have the power.'[2] In 1844 he endeavoured to induce Sir Robert Peel to take some steps to remedy the defenceless condition to which arsenals, etc., had sunk. But once again his representations were of no avail. A year later the Government was attacked by Lord Palmerston and Sir Charles Napier, and charged with neglecting the national defences. The Prime Minister, as many other statesmen have done in similar circumstances, got out of the difficulty by declaring that no cause for alarm existed; a statement which induced the Duke to pen a stringent memorandum on the subject of national defence to the

[1] *Personal Reminiscences of the First Duke of Wellington*, by the Rev. G. R. Gleig, Chaplain-General to the Forces; edited by his daughter, Mary E. Gleig, 1904.

[2] *Apsley House MSS.*: Letter to Sir Willoughby Gurdon.

Prime Minister, which contained, amongst other things, a scheme for organising the Militia. Sir Robert Peel again refused to take steps on financial grounds; but the Duke of Wellington once more returned to the charge when Lord John Russell assumed office in 1846.

The climax came in 1847, when the Commander-in-Chief wrote his celebrated letter to Sir John Burgoyne, in which he laid down what in his opinion was absolutely necessary for the bare safety of the country—a properly organised force of all arms:—'I know of no mode of resistance, much less of protection from this danger [of invasion] excepting by an army in the field capable of meeting and contending with its formidable enemy.'

In practically the last speech which he delivered in the House of Lords, on 15 June 1852, only a few months before his death, the Duke of Wellington advocated strongly the reorganisation of the Militia, and in this case at last he carried his point. For the bill then passed proved to be the foundation of the system which is now in force. In stating that the bill provided for a peace establishment, he added:—

'We have never up to this moment maintained a proper peace establishment, that is the real truth. I tell you that for the last ten years you have never had in your Army more men than enough to relieve the sentries on duty of your stations in different parts of the world. . . . The noble Marquis [Lansdowne] says he thinks he should prefer an Army of Reserve. What is an Army of Reserve? Is it an army to cost less than £40 each man? If he thinks that is possible, I tell him he can have no such thing. But what I desire—and I believe it is a desire the most moderate that can be found—is that you should give us, in the first instance, the old constitutional peace establishment' [the Militia].

The Duke of Wellington's efforts to make our Army efficient have been dealt with at length, because they have an important bearing on the Duke of Cambridge's subsequent efforts to introduce some sort of method into our military organisation in 1852; and because they show how difficult it was for a Commander-in Chief to get these vitally important matters attended to under our Parliamentary system. But in this particular case it must be remembered that the nation, then as now, was much agitated as to the respective

advantages of Free Trade and Protection, whilst everything connected with national defence was absolutely ignored. So strong indeed was the general dislike of military matters that the Duke of Wellington—although none knew better the resultant disadvantages—was compelled to acquiesce in letting things run on as they were. Hence it came about that our weak and inadequate forces were scattered broadcast over the country, and subdivided into insignificant units with no semblance of organisation.

It is said that the Duke was wont to remark that the less the public saw of the Army in peace time the better; since, unless soldiers were kept judiciously out of sight, the Government of the day would hardly be able to refrain from disbanding them.[1] At any rate the reason adduced for the unnecessarily large forces which were kept in the Colonies (40,000 in 1852) was that this was the best method of preserving them from wholesale reduction.

With a nation and a government thus determined to crush out of the national life all traces of military spirit, it is no small wonder that our army of 1852 had attained such attenuated proportions, or that its component parts were so distributed as to make it impossible to assemble a force of the three arms at any particular point for the defence of the country, or even for instructional purposes. The total available force in Great Britain at this time was nine regiments of cavalry, twenty-one battalions of infantry, sundry depôts in a notorious state of inefficiency, and a 'very limited proportion of mounted batteries'; though these numbers excluded the Household troops and the Irish and Channel garrisons.

The Duke of Wellington died on 14 September 1852, and was succeeded by Lord Hardinge; and in the following December the Duke of Cambridge, who, it will be remembered, was then Inspecting General of Cavalry, submitted an exhaustive memorandum dealing with the various points which he considered demanded instant attention.

[1] In 1802 certain batteries were sent back from India. The Duke of Cambridge strongly deprecated the measure; pointed out that if the batteries came home, the Government would certainly call for their disbandment. The batteries were, however, brought home and disbanded, but they were raised again in 1808.

It has been considered desirable to present this memorandum as a whole, because it sets forth in a peculiarly lucid manner the lamentable state of affairs at this period; and because it affords proof, if any proof were needed, that many of the failings and shortcomings of the Army which were noticeable for years afterwards, were pointed out by His Royal Highness fifty years ago.

It commences with a painful *exposé* of our military unpreparedness in 1852, and it points out that of all armies of the great Powers at that time, only the British was devoid of some higher organisation than the regimental one. The importance of creating brigades and divisions is insisted upon; and this dictum is the more remarkable when one considers how urgently these problems are still exercising the minds of our military rulers.

The precise objects for which a regular army is maintained at home are recapitulated, and the scheme generally is well worked out. It may indeed be pronounced the first tentative measure, since the termination of the Napoleonic wars, which aimed at organising our dislocated and scattered forces, so as to make them effective as a fighting machine.

It is true that the numbers which it was proposed to assemble do not to-day sound in any way formidable—only 16,500 men with 48 guns—but it must be remembered that in those days even this was a most revolutionary proposal.

In 1852 there were no Volunteers, and the Militia had not been called out since the termination of the great War. Not the least valuable amongst the many excellent suggestions contained in the Duke's memorandum is the proposal that periodical concentrations of at least a division should be made annually, so that officers and men might be vouchsafed an 'opportunity of really learning their duties in combined bodies, which is now unfortunately not afforded them, with the solitary exception of the garrison at Dublin.'

Once again we are irresistibly reminded of the divisional training which, with the exception of Aldershot and the

Curragh, was only a few years ago rendered possible by the acquisition of Salisbury Plain and other places as Manœuvre areas. The repeated attempts of the Duke to induce successive Secretaries of State to provide ground for manœuvring, during the last twenty years of his tenure of office, belong to a later portion of this work.

Observations on the Organisation of the British Army at Home.

'It will no doubt be generally admitted that no army can be considered as in a proper state to take the field, however good its component parts may be, unless it has some organisation on a more extended scale than the mere formation of Regiments and Batteries, in fact unless a Brigade and Division system be introduced, which is to be found in every Continental army. The British Army alone is from its peculiar duties and the fact of the nation not being a military one, not at present subject to any such organisation, the result of which must be inevitably that, however excellent the Regimental system existing in it may be, and which no doubt cannot be surpassed, still the confusion and uncertainty on the first outbreak of a war or an attack from without would be most lamentably and seriously felt.

'On considering this subject a little in detail, however, it would appear that the means are at hand to obviate this difficulty to a certain extent, and to improve these more or less faulty arrangements, even with the limited force at command, without materially changing the present system for the quartering of the small number of troops stationed at home or adding considerably, if at all, to the expense. Looking to the Continental armies, it will there be found that no force is considered as complete unless it be based on the principle of a due admixture of the three several arms of the service, viz. Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, these to be divided into Brigades and then into Divisions under a General who is made responsible for the whole.

'Putting altogether on one side the Irish Army, which cannot be touched under any circumstances, and leaving a due proportion of troops for the maintaining of order in Scotland and the manufacturing districts, it does seem that the South and West portions of England, together with the districts surrounding the Metropolis (these, be it remarked, all our most vulnerable points) could furnish now, with some trifling addition and after the present increase of the Artillery has been carried out, a sufficient body of troops to make a commencement of some such system, however limited it might be, which could at any moment be easily

extended, if found to answer, as there is little doubt that it would.

'In order to make the idea clear it must be borne in mind that the force at home in England, Scotland, and Wales consists of but nine Regiments of Cavalry, of twenty-one Regiments of Infantry, of eleven Infantry depôts exclusive of the Channel Islands and the Provisional Battalion at Chatham, and of a very limited number of Mounted Batteries besides the Household Troops of Cavalry and Infantry stationed in and about London, and Companies of Foot Artillery stationed at Woolwich and the different fortified ports and dockyards. The Royal Marine force is not taken into account, their services being supposed to be exclusively required for the manning of the ships, whether portions of the active fleet or block and guardships. It will be necessary to demonstrate that of this force two combined Divisions of the three arms of the Line may be formed, with a reserve Division of the Household Troops, leaving still a sufficient number of Regiments for Scotland and the manufacturing districts, and adapting the whole, as far as practicable, to the barrack accommodation at our disposal. It must be taken for granted that the garrisons for the chief Arsenals and Dockyards at the time of war or invasion must be formed more or less of Depôts of Regiments, Militia and Pensioners, with a due proportion of Artillery Companies (dismounted) for the service of the batteries.

'Starting from these premisses we may arrive at the following result, viz. to form the troops stationed along the Southern coast into two Divisions, each Division composed of one Brigade of Cavalry, two Brigades of Infantry with three Battalions to each, and having a reserve Division of the Household Troops with a due proportion of Artillery stationed as a support in or near the Metropolis. A difficulty here occurs which it is not easy to get over, and which must account for the apparent want of extent of the quartering of the troops. No doubt it would be most desirable to include the entire Southern and Western Coast as far as Plymouth in any plan to be made out, but on reference to the map and to barrack accommodation it will be found that there is no barrack accommodation whatever for Infantry but only for Cavalry between Portsmouth and Plymouth.

'It must therefore be attempted to concentrate the troops as far as possible between—say Chatham on the east and Portsmouth on the west, leaving Plymouth entirely out of our calculations, occupied by two Regiments of Infantry and keeping up a sort of communication between that portion of the country and the main Infantry force by a Brigade of Cavalry distributed between Dorchester, Exeter, and Bristol. The mode of effecting the necessary formations would be the following, that three Regiments of Cavalry with one Troop

of Horse Artillery form a Brigade of Cavalry under the Senior Lieutenant-Colonel of Cavalry, and to place Colonels on the Staff at various important points to act as Brigadiers of Infantry, each Brigade to consist of three or four Regiments of Infantry and a 9 Pr. Field Battery, the whole force under a General Officer as commanding the Division. These troops would be completely equipped for the field, having camp equipages, etc., the Brigadier to be responsible for the efficiency of his Regiments, and the General of Division to superintend the whole. The force so divided would stand in the following manner as regards formation and quarters:—

DIVISION OF RESERVE (OR GUARDS).

1 Cavalry Brigade (commanded by the Senior Lt.-Colonel).
2 Regiments of Life Guards, . . . London
1 ditto, ... Windsor
Troop of Horse Artillery, ... Woolwich

1*st Infantry Brigade* (Senior Lieutenant-Colonel).
3 Battalions Guards, ... London
1 12 Pr. Field Battery, ... Woolwich

2*nd Infantry Brigade* (Senior Lieutenant-Colonel).
2 Battalions, ... London
1 ditto, ... Windsor
1 ditto, ... Weedon
1 9 Pr. Field Battery . . . Woolwich or Croydon

1ST DIVISION OF THE LINE.

Brigade of Cavalry (Senior Lieutenant-Colonel).
1 Regiment, ... Canterbury
1 ditto, ... Brighton
1 ditto, ... Hounslow
1 Troop of Horse Artillery, ... Canterbury

1*st Brigade Infantry* (Colonel on the Staff).
1 Regiment, ... Canterbury
2 ditto, ... Chatham
1 9 Pr. Field Battery, ... Chatham

2*nd Brigade Infantry* (Colonel on the Staff).
1 Regiment, ... Dover and Hythe
1 ditto, ... Dover
1 ditto, ... Walmer
9 Pr. Field Battery, ... Shorncliffe

2ND DIVISION OF THE LINE.

Brigade of Cavalry (Senior Lieutenant-Colonel).

1 Regiment,	Dorchester and Christchurch
1 ditto,	Exeter
1 ditto,	Bristol, Trowbridge, and Taunton
1 Troop Horse Artillery,	Exeter

1*st Brigade Infantry* (Colonel on the Staff).

3 Regiments,	Portsmouth
1 ditto,	Isle of Wight
9 Pr. Field Battery,	Portsmouth

2*nd Brigade Infantry* (Colonel on the Staff).

2 Regiments,	Winchester
1 ditto,	Gosport
1 ditto,	Chichester and Brighton
9 Pr. Field Battery,	Chichester

'The force thus composed would give, taking the Division of Guards at somewhat over 4000 men, and each Regiment of Infantry of the Line at 800, and of Cavalry at 230, an amount of—say 16,500 men and 48 guns, fully equipped in every respect for the field. There will then be left disposable: for Scotland a Regiment of Cavalry and three Regiments of Infantry, besides a due proportion of Artillery (mounted), and two Regiments of Infantry for Plymouth, eleven depôts being still available for general purposes, to be employed with more advantage in the interior of the country than, as at present, in exposed portions of the coast. The changes of the present distribution of quarters would amount to this: one Battalion of Guards to be removed from Chichester to Weedon, one Regiment of Cavalry to be withdrawn from Ireland, one Regiment of Infantry from Scotland, one do. from Wales, a Troop of Horse Artillery, two Regiments of Cavalry—say the one from York and the other from Birmingham—and three Regiments of Infantry from the manufacturing districts, one Regiment of Infantry from Weedon to Dover, and the Field Batteries to be posted at the various above-named stations as the horses are purchased and become available for use. Barrack accommodation can be found for the whole of this force, with the exception possibly of one Regiment of Cavalry, which could not as yet be put up at Bristol, Trowbridge, and Taunton, but for which, no doubt, further accommodation could with very little difficulty be procured.

'The next consideration would be that of the expense of the additional staff required. But there again it would occur that a redistribution of the present staff might obviate all difficulty. The Brigadiers of Cavalry being the Senior Lieutenant-Colonels of Regiments, no addi-

tional pay would be required for them. The two Infantry Brigadiers of Guards would be the two Senior Lieutenant-Colonels of Regiments, also causing no additional expense. The Lieutenant-General being no longer required for the Northern District, might be transferred to the command of the Division of Guards. The Major-General at Portsmouth could, of course, be made available for the command of the Division of the Line. The Inspecting General of Cavalry, in addition to his present duties, might have charge of the other Division, his Headquarters being either retained in London or moved to some other more convenient post. There is a Colonel on the Staff at Birmingham, and another at Caermarthen. These two could be transferred, with great advantage to the service (their present duties amounting to little or nothing), to Winchester and Dover, and the Commandant of Chatham could be called upon at the same time to perform the duties of Brigadier at that station. There would then be but one additional Colonel to be provided for the Portsmouth Brigade, and should it not be thought necessary for two Staff officers to be employed at one and the same place, the Major-General commanding the Division at Portsmouth might, in addition to his other duties, temporarily also perform those of a Brigadier, or it may devolve on the Senior Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry in Garrison at that time. The above-named officers having a Major of Brigade already, the Staff would then be complete without the necessity of one single additional Staff officer. Should this general plan be approved, it could be further materially improved by detailing a certain number of Militia Regiments, say three, to each Brigade, which would double the force of Infantry on an emergency.

'Other Regiments of Militia should be told off for the several Fortresses and Arsenals and Dockyards, such as Portsmouth, Plymouth, Pembroke, Dover, Chatham, Sheerness, and Woolwich. The enrolled bodies of Pensioners should be formed into Battalions for the same purpose, and thus at the moment the regular troops are withdrawn for the field duties, their place would be at once supplied from the other available force at the disposal of the country. A considerable reserve force of Artillery (mounted) would still be left as a grand reserve at Woolwich, and the force detached to Scotland and the North of England could, if withdrawn from these portions of the country, form another Division of troops ready to take post, as the case might be, in a second or third line. The whole of these arrangements would be greatly facilitated by the present most extended system of railroads, which are now carried out over the entire country, and more particularly over the Southern portion of it, and indeed the distribution of the troops has been considered as much as possible in reference to these

railroads and the facilities for concentrating the Brigades and Divisions. Such are the suggestions which occur on the consideration of this most important subject. The facility with which the arrangements can be made cannot, it is thought, be questioned, and it is to be hoped that, when established, means may be found for periodical concentrations of a portion at least of these bodies of troops, say a Division annually, where officers and men may have an opportunity of really learning their duties in combined bodies, which is now unfortunately never afforded them, with the solitary exception of the Garrison of Dublin.'

A month after this memorandum was forwarded, the Duke of Cambridge submitted a second one dealing with the Regimental Organisation of the British Infantry, and called 'Observations on the Regimental Organisation of the British Infantry, with Suggestions for its Improvement,' January 1853. In the preamble to this paper it was stated that—

'On reference to the last Army Estimates, it will be found that the Infantry of the Line of the British Army is placed on various establishments, and there is no uniform system adopted, it being apparently left to chance as to whether a Regiment is composed of 1200, 1000, 900, or 850 rank and file, whether it be divided into double Battalions of 600 each, whether it be sent abroad bodily, or whether it be divided into six Service Companies for Foreign or Colonial Service, and four Depôt Companies to be retained for recruiting and for general service in the United Kingdom. Now it must be admitted that such an organisation is most anomalous and faulty, and it remains to be seen whether some uniform system might not be adopted to obviate the confusion noticed above, and to render at the same time the Regiments far more efficient for general purposes than they are at present.'

It would be hard to conceive a more chaotic condition of things than is thus presented, removing as it does the one saving clause of the state of the British Army in 1852-53, as set forth in the Duke's memorandum on 'Home Army Organisation.' For the latter, though it showed that no organisation of our land forces existed, specifically stated that the regimental system 'cannot be surpassed'—from whence it might reasonably be inferred that the British Infantry Regiments were uniform in organisation and

strength. Such, however, was by no means the case, as the Duke's memorandum exhaustively proves.

It recapitulated that 'exclusive of the Regiments[1] serving in India, which it is not intended in any way to interfere with, and of the Colonial Corps, which likewise are not taken into account, the British Infantry of the Line is at this moment composed of—

59	Regiments	at	850	rank and	file.
9	,,	,,	900	,,	,,
8	,,	,,	1000	,,	,,
4[2]	,,	,,	1200	,,	,,

These last being formed into Double Battalions.'

No less than 44 of the above 83 Battalions were at the time on Colonial Service; of these, eight were formed into ten companies 1000 strong, all serving abroad and with an eleventh 'Skeleton Recruiting Depôt Company' at home. It was these eight skeleton Companies which formed the 'Provisional Battalion' at Chatham. Nine Battalions of a total strength of 900 men had six companies of 600 men serving abroad, with 300 men at home formed into a 'Four Company Depôt.' Next came four Regiments each 540 strong, known as 'Second or Reserve Battalions' of Regiments actually serving at home. Lastly, there were twenty-three Regiments each 850 strong, of which six companies 540 strong were abroad and were styled 'Service Companies,' leaving a Four Company Depôt of 310 men at home. It will thus be noted that four totally different methods of organising our Regiments of Infantry were in vogue at one and the same time.

Among the many expedients to smooth over the failure of the Territorial System of 1881, when both Battalions chanced to be stationed abroad, was the revival of this Provisional Battalion at Shorncliffe in 1890. This custom was also largely adopted and extended in 1900-1902, owing to the war in South Africa. The case of the Regiments

[1] The number of Infantry Regiments serving in India in 1852-53 was twenty-two.

[2] The 12th F., 23rd R.W.F., 71st H.L.I., and 91st Highlanders had at this time two Battalions, each of which was treated as a separate Regiment.

serving at home was comparatively simple, each being divided into ten companies with a total strength of 850, the only exception being that of the 'Four mysterious Double Battalion Regiments,' which were subdivided into six companies, and only 660 strong. None of these Regiments serving at home had any Depôts or Depôt Companies. To recapitulate briefly — the British Infantry Battalion, the fighting unit of the day, was composed of from six to ten companies and varied in strength from 540 to 1000 men. It is almost unnecessary to add that the 'authorised establishment' of a company varied in a still more bewildering manner, and might be anything between 70 and 110. The Duke continues—

'It will very naturally be asked on looking over this analysis, *Why* these various formations and establishments, and what is gained by such varied distribution? A reply to this question will be found to be next to impossible, and the only way to account for such a system must be found in the fact that there have been various reductions and changes from time to time, and that these have been made, not on any general principle, but according to the exigencies and requirements of the moment, and that, once established, it has not been thought desirable or necessary to make a change, until the altered state of circumstances call for or require it. Now this appears a most singular and not altogether a very intelligible proceeding, and when it can be proved that a unity of system is not only most desirable to simplify organisation but that it will also tend to make our small force far more available for the varied duties it is called upon to perform, it is to be hoped that steps may be taken for at once revising the whole system as at present constituted.

'To anybody who has watched the working of the Four Company Depôt system, it must be obvious that, however excellent the principle may have been upon which it was originally founded, viz. that of being a nucleus for a second Battalion in time of war, it has entirely failed for all the purposes of peace establishment, and has to a very considerable degree diminished the efficiency of our already too small force. *On paper* it would appear that these Depôts are of considerable strength, and that they would therefore perform valuable home service; *in practice* it will be found that, from their fluctuating state and the constant changes that must occur in them, *they are wholly inefficient* and cannot produce more than a very reduced number of duty men and these of a very inferior description, such as men sent

home in bad state of health from Colonial service in order to be pensioned or to recover from the effects of climate, others being mere recruits just joined, and who are in various stages of drill prior to being sent out to join the Service Companies. In point of expense, too, these Depôts are a serious drain upon our limited means.[1] The Staff, as for a whole Battalion, is kept up for this handful of men, and though no doubt this Staff is but an acting one, still addition pay is allowed, and officers and non-commissioned officers who might do good service in the ranks of their corps are employed in a very unprofitable, unsatisfactory, and useless manner. . . .

'If then it is deemed essential that the present Depôt system should be kept up, let this be done effectually, which alone can be accomplished by adding two companies to each Depôt, and thus in fact forming a second or reserve Battalion out of each Four Company Depôt when a Regiment is ordered abroad.'

It will be remarked that we here have the germ of the 'linked' or 'Double Battalion' system, only with this advantage: that the main objective, viz. of keeping the Battalion abroad at its effective strength, was here placed on the Depôt of the same Regiment, and not on another corps frequently totally unconnected with the Regiment abroad.

The Duke proceeds to point out how also the establishment of the Service Companies (six of a total of 540) was not of sufficient strength to keep up a Regiment efficiently in the field, which in his opinion should consist of eight companies each 90 strong, or a total of 720 rank and file.

Having thus formulated his views, he records his opinion that he does not suppose 'that the country would sanction such an increase, namely of four companies (except under the actual pressure of war) to each of the Regiments serving abroad.' Such being the case, he endeavours to devise a plan whereby the efficiency of the Regiments on Foreign Service and their Four Company Depôts at home may be obtained at less cost to the nation.

After alluding to 'the very great advantage of the system' of sending an entire regiment of ten companies for service in India at their full strength (viz. 1000) leaving only

[1] In 1852-53 the Army Estimates were £6,010,372, against £5,925,942 in 1851-52. But this did not include the charges for ordnance, commissariat, and militia services, which in those days were provided for in separate estimates.

a skeleton company at home, he proceeds as follows:—'This same plan has been further extended to eight Regiments now serving in the Colonies, and with the best results. Why, then, should it not be extended still further and be adopted generally as the system upon which the whole of the Army is to be formed?'

With a view to this proposal, he submits three alternative schemes which are here reproduced. The first, which in the Duke's opinion was 'the best and simplest'—an opinion which will most assuredly be shared by every thinking soldier of the present day—was to 'take one uniform establishment of 1000 rank and file for every Regiment in the service, whether it be at home or abroad.'

This, it was pointed out, would entail 'an increase of 8800 men at an annual additional cost of about £227,799; and certainly when one reflects on the times in which we live, the general apprehension of war or invasion, such an addition of strength at so comparatively small a cost can hardly be considered as uncalled for or exorbitant.'

The second plan was the more modest one of adopting a uniform strength of 900 rank and file, which would add but 900 men to the Army at a cost of £23,412.

The third scheme—and one which it may be noted is practically what, after innumerable changes, we have now adopted—was to give the Regiments going abroad an establishment of 1000 rank and file, and leaving those on home service at 850. This, it was calculated, would add 2050 men to the Army at a cost of £54,054.

The Duke personally advocated the third alternative (in the event of the first being rejected, as he foresaw would be likely), since it had the great merit of at least keeping the Regiments abroad up to their full effective strength, although it did not add sufficiently to the home force, which he considered to be 'certainly a most essential object in the present times.'

A very clear tabular statement of the distribution of the British Regiments of Infantry serving abroad at the close of the year 1852 follows, and is here given *in extenso*. It makes a most interesting study to all those interested in

the great problem of Imperial Defence, and it shows how widely the conditions then existing differed from those which prevail to-day.

Present Force.				Proposal Force.			
Station.	No. of Regts.	Strength.	Total.	No. of Regts., each 1,000.	Total.	Regts. withdrawn.	Increase or Decrease.
Cape . .	10	1 at 1,000 9 at 600	6,400	7	7,000	3	+600
Malta . .	3	1 at 1,000 2 at 540	2,080	2	2,000	1	− 80
Gibraltar .	4	1 at 1,000 3 at 540	2,620	3	3,000	1	+380
Corfu . .	5	5 at 540	2,700	3	3,000	2	+300
West Indies .	6	1 at 1,000 5 at 540	3,700	4	4,000	2	+300
Mauritius .	1	1 at 1,000	1,000	1	1,000	0	no change
China . .	1	1 at 600	600	1	1,000	0	+400
Ceylon . .	2	1 at 1,000 1 at 600	1,600	2	2,000	0	+400
North America	7	1 at 1,000 1 at 850 5 at 540	4,550	5	5,000	2	+450
Australia and N. S. Wales	5	1 at 1,000 4 at 540	3,160	4	4,000	1	+840
Totals .	44		28,410	32	32,000	12	3,590

Giving for Home Service an addition of 12 Regiments, each 1000 strong, ... 12,000
As against the present 32 inefficient Four Company Depôts = 9830
And the 4 Six Company Battalions, each 640 strong = . 2560
or a grand total of 12,390

This result is obtained by a positive increase at every station of our Colonial Possessions with the single exception of Malta, the total increase for Foreign Service being 3590 rank and file equally distributed, and in most places urgently required.

With reference to the reduction of the Malta Garrison, the Duke advocated that 'a Battalion of Marines should be

detached there' of eight or ten companies of 100 men each, 'which would prove of the greatest advantage at the most important foreign dockyard we keep up in our Colonies, and which is, moreover, the permanent headquarters of our sea-going or Mediterranean Fleet.'

The increase of the Malta Garrison, as thus advocated by the Duke in 1852, would have brought the Garrison up to a strength of 3000 rank and file of British Infantry. It is not uninteresting to note that in 1901, owing to the great strain put upon our resources by the war in South Africa, the Garrison of British Infantry at Malta, although officially 7000 strong, was reduced to very little over 4000 men, of whom a considerable portion were untrained Militia.

In the scheme for Army Reorganisation as first promulgated in the early months of 1901, the Secretary of State for War revived the proposal of the Duke of Cambridge so far as regards utilising the services of a portion of our Marine Forces for the garrisoning of our coaling stations abroad.

In the concluding portion of the Duke's memorandum, he pointed out what great benefits would ensue if the establishments of all our Infantry Battalions were to be raised to 1000 men. It would give an increase of over 5000 rank and file serving at home, 'the whole of them distributed among strong and efficient Regiments available for any duty and any service, which certainly is not the case with the Four Company Depôts. . . .'

Finally, he urges that 'the formation of the Depôt Companies of such Regiments on Foreign Service would be exactly on the same plan as that adopted for Indian Regiments. They would be formed into Provisional Battalions.'

This memorandum was forwarded to H.R.H. the Prince Consort, who, as is well known, took the very greatest personal interest in all Army matters. Less than two years previously the Duke of Wellington had urged on the Queen the advisability of making Prince Albert the Commander-in-Chief, a position, however, which the latter very wisely declined.

On 7 February 1853, Colonel Hon. C. Grey, who was at

this time Private Secretary to the Prince Consort, wrote to the Duke of Cambridge as follows:—

FROM COLONEL GREY.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, *Feb.* 7, 1853.

'The Prince has allowed me to see your Royal Highness's memorandum of January last, in which the evils attending our present anomalous Army system, or rather our total want of system, are most clearly pointed out, and a mode of remedying them suggested, which is, as it appears to me, recommended by every principle of common sense.

'As it is a subject in which I have long taken the deepest interest (having already written more than one memorandum upon it), and as I entirely agree with your Royal Highness, both as to the evils of the existing system and as to the principle on which they should be remedied, I hope I am not taking too great a liberty if I point out the few points on which I would recommend some alteration in the details (none in the principle) of your Royal Highness's suggestions.

'I think, with your Royal Highness, that *every* Regiment in the service should have a uniform strength, or rather 'establishment,' of 1000 men. But instead of having only One Company Depôts, and those confined to Regiments abroad, I would divide *every* Regiment, whether at home or abroad, *permanently* into Service and Depôts Companies—eight of the former and two of the latter—and all at the same nominal strength of 100 men each.

'The Depôts so formed I would collect (as your Royal Highness also recommends for the One Company Depôts) into Provisional Battalions, permanently stationed in particular districts. Of the importance of such Provisional Battalions, I believe the advantage to Regiments of being relieved from the encumbrance of a long train of Recruits, when ordered to move according to the demands of the Service, and to the Recruits themselves of not being interfered with in their drill by frequent changes of quarters, cannot be overestimated, and I look to the establishment of local connection between Regiments and Districts as most useful, both as regards recruiting in the first instance, and the formation of a Reserve of discharged men in the second.'

Briefly, Colonel Grey accepted the Duke's views, but went further in that he advocated that every Regiment, whether at home or abroad, should be divided into eight Service and two Depôt Companies. On the following day he forwarded to the Duke a sketch of the manner in which the Provisional Battalions might be advantageously posted. This scheme embodied the principles of Mr. Pitt's scheme of 1803 for

'connecting the Army with the country' by more 'effectually maintaining the connection between the Army and the several counties.' In Colonel Grey's scheme the 'localisation of the Forces' was worked out with far greater regard to the historical traditions and aspirations of the various Regiments concerned than was the case when Mr. Cardwell carried out his scheme twenty years later, or when Mr. Childers abolished the numbers of the Regiments in 1881.

The Duke of Cambridge, in his reply to Colonel Grey's letter, pointed out that, although there were obviously some advantages in the proposal to form Two Company Depôts for all Regiments, yet there were also serious disadvantages. He admitted the gain of breaking up 'the present objectionable Depôt system,' but declared that the proposed modification would only be changing the present Depôt system into another, and throwing away the services of some 15,000 men; whereas his original proposal for certain Provisional Battalions was only intended to provide for 'skeleton Recruiting Depôts for Regiments abroad.' His Royal Highness roundly averred that 'all Depôts are conceived to be objectionable both for officers and men, and the sooner both are ordered to rejoin their respective Regiments the better. . . . The throwing together of different corps excepting for the purposes of Recruiting is not thought desirable, and would lead to much annoyance and confusion.' He also advocated that Recruits should be drilled with their Regiments, since 'the drill is more attended to, and the interest and *esprit de corps* is more efficiently kept up.'

The Duke's views on localisation in 1853 are summed up as follows:—'If it is thought that local connection of counties and particular localities is desirable, this might be obtained by permanent recruiting parties at each station.'

With regard to Colonel Grey's scheme for localisation, the Duke pointed out that the entire absence of barrack accommodation at some places and insufficiency at others would be a difficulty. Further, that at the time of writing more accommodation in the South and West of England was 'imperatively called for for defensive purposes.'

Colonel Grey replied on 29 February in a lengthy

memorandum, in which he sought to justify his scheme. In a covering letter, however, he admitted the grave objections to the existing system, saying, 'I have no hesitation in saying that I should infinitely prefer seeing the Depôts done away with altogether to their being continued on their present footing.'

The correspondence was subsequently sent to Sir Richard Airey; and we find him, when returning the papers to the Duke on 6 May, expressing his dislike of Provisional Battalions and his preference for officers who had graduated at their own Regimental Depôts.

But the various points now raised by H.R.H. regarding infantry organisation must again be referred to at a later stage. Still it is typical of the difficulties which in this country habitually attend all questions of Army reform that nearly twenty years elapsed (1872) before the Duke's proposals for abolishing the Four Company Depôts were carried out, and yet another twenty (July 1892) before all Infantry Battalions on Home Service were placed on the same strength.

The Organisation of Cavalry.

Having thus done his best to direct the attention of the Secretary of State to the anomalies and lack of organisation in the Infantry, the Duke turned his attention to the condition of the Cavalry.

He had been for over a year Inspecting General of Cavalry, and during that period had had personal experience of the inconvenience of many of the existing arrangements.

About November 1853 he accordingly drew up a memorandum, in which he commenced by calling attention to the 'inconvenience and annoyance which result to our Cavalry Service from the change of equipment from *Heavy* to *Light* Dragoons upon their being prepared for Indian Service. I have come to the conclusion that our present Cavalry formation is not altogether a satisfactory one,' and he suggests certain changes so as to 'place this branch of the service on a footing more suitable to its duties.'

After pointing out that Light Cavalry are most suitable

for service in India and the Colonies, he says that after consulting all the first military authorities of the day on the subject, who have had practical experience in the field, he has gathered that 'a due admixture of Heavy and Light Dragoons for Continental warfare is indispensable.'

In consequence he advocates that the greater part of our Cavalry ought to be prepared for these special duties—viz. service in India and the Colonies, and that in furtherance of this it would be well to make all our Cavalry *Light* Dragoons with the exception of six Regiments (exclusive of the Household Cavalry) which might be retained as 'Heavies' for European warfare.

As an example of the incongruity of existing regulations, he cites the case of the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers), which, having been placed under orders for India, had to be converted from 'Heavies' into 'Lights'; also of the 7th Dragoon Guards, which had been employed in the Cape War of 1851-53, and which, although 'Heavies,' had been converted into 'Lights' for the campaign.

The absolute inconsistency of the general organisation of our Cavalry at the time he exemplifies by quoting the case of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, who 'are in fact at this moment, both as regards men and horses, Light Dragoons, though their equipment is that of Heavy Cavalry.'

As a remedy for the extraordinary confusion then existing, His Royal Highness recommended that the first five Dragoon Guard Regiments should be kept as they were—'Heavy Dragoons'; and that 'the 2nd Dragoons—Scots Greys, a very magnificent national Regiment which it would be a pity to change from what it is at present—should likewise be retained as Heavies.'

The Duke's ingrained anxiety at all times to consider the susceptibilities of different corps, and to avoid the slightest chance of wounding *esprit de corps*—one of the characteristics which especially endeared him to the Army in later years, when the spirit of 'reform' so-called and change was rampant—is admirably exemplified in this memorandum.

Proceeding with his scheme, he points out that, after the 6th and 7th Dragoon Guards had already been converted

into 'Lights,' there only remained the Royals and the Inniskillings.

'The only difficulty which at all presents itself is as to the position to be occupied by the various Regiments in the Line, as it is at all times well not to interfere with ancient custom and habit, and it consequently would not do to take from the 6th and 7th Dragoon Guards their denomination of "Guards." . . . I can discover no reason why Dragoon Guards may not equally be "Light" or "Heavy."'

Turning to the question of the denominations of the Light Cavalry, he remarks that it is very much a matter of taste in dress whether we are to have 'Hussars, Dragoons, or Lancers. I do not think the present Light Dragoon's dress is very becoming or useful, and I think that probably a modified Hussar dress with somewhat less lace and made large and long would be most convenient for a cavalry soldier.'

With regard to the armament of our Cavalry, the Duke writes:—

'There are many who contend against the use of the lance for Cavalry. Marshal Marmont in his writings is in favour of this weapon, the Russians have adopted it for the whole of their *Heavy* Cavalry, the Austrians since their last campaign in Italy, and more specially in Hungary, have *doubled* the number of their Lancer Regiments, and have found by experience in the field that the lance was a more formidable weapon than the sword.'

It will be remarked that the Duke does not discuss the question of 'Medium' Cavalry, since at this period the expression was not in use. As regards his proposals for 'Heavies' and 'Light,' these were afterwards substantially adopted, but gradually. As the demands of our Indian reliefs increased, the number of Heavy Regiments was reduced, and at present the only ones so styled, beyond the three Regiments of Household Cavalry, are the Royal Dragoons and the Scots Greys. All the Dragoon Guards and Lancer Regiments are now styled 'Medium,' and all the Hussar Regiments 'Light' Cavalry.

The Age of General Officers.

In December 1853 the Duke of Cambridge wrote a memorandum directing attention to yet another anomaly in the

British Army, namely, the advanced age of the General Officers on the active list.

According to the current Army List, this worked out as follows:—

General Officers of seventy years' *service* and upwards, .	13
Do. do. of 60 to 70 years' service, . . .	37
„ „ 50 to 60 „ „ . . .	163
„ „ 40 to 50 „ „ . . .	72
„ „ under 40 years' service, . . .	7
	292

'Assuming that no man obtains his commission under eighteen years of age or thereabouts, it may fairly be argued that we have hardly a General Officer in our service who has not attained or will shortly attain his sixtieth year. It must be admitted that this is far too advanced a period of life to *commence* upon the arduous duties of active military command in all parts of the world, subject to every variety of climate, and often to much discomfort. The energies of both mind and body would in most instances have been shaken before the attainment of the ages above named, and at all events it will be admitted that the commencement of responsibility at so advanced a period of life cannot be satisfactory, when, moreover, the officers so promoted have, up to that period, been in a more or less subordinate military position.'

His Royal Highness proceeded to analyse the Colonels list which showed:—

Colonels with 50 years' service and upwards, . .	44
„ „ 40 „ „ to 50 years' service, .	40
„ „ 30 „ „ to 40 years' service, .	30
	114

After discussing the uselessness of attempting to cope with such a condition of things, 'even by a most liberal brevet,' he states—

'It is hopeless to expect that any improvement is likely to take place in this growing evil, unless some plan can be devised by which, without injustice to the service at large, younger men could be brought forward in the vigour of life and physically capable of filling satisfactorily the higher grades of the service. . . . A system of retirement must sooner or later be adopted, and how can such be effected without injustice unless the country is prepared to grant the funds for carrying it out? yet the evil must be met boldly at

last, and the sooner this is done the better, for the longer it is delayed, the greater will be the difficulty of meeting it.'

The Duke's proposals to remedy this condition of things were simple and logical, viz.:—

'That every officer should, after fifty years' service, save under most special circumstances, be placed on the retired list. Of the General Officers thus circumstanced, the great proportion are in possession of Regiments[1]; for these, retirements are therefore already provided. For the remainder, it can hardly be supposed that the country would object to grant a sufficient sum to defray the expenses of these old officers on a fair and liberal scale. This fifty years' (service) retirement rule if enforced would relieve the General Officers List of at least 200 members, an immense boon to the grades below, especially if a proposition be adopted in connection with it as regards future promotion such as the one now about to be named. The great drawback to all promotion in the higher grades originated with the large Half-Pay List consequent upon the war, which has never been got rid of. The natural result of this is that the Colonels to be promoted to General Officers are almost all from the Half-Pay List, men who probably have not been employed for twenty years and upwards, but who all take their turn of promotion in accordance with their Army rank and standing, and quite irrespectively of the services they may or may not have rendered in later years.'

The Duke's proposal was that every Lieutenant-Colonel commanding a Regiment should, after six to eight years, be granted 'as a matter of right the Brevet rank of Colonel,' whilst, if he had chanced to serve for an unduly long period as a Major, this further service as Lieutenant-Colonel should be reduced to four years.

This he declared 'would be an immense advantage to the really working members of the profession,' in contradistinction to those who had 'preferred to go on Half-Pay, be it for the sake of convenience or other unforeseen causes,' and over whose heads the former 'would jump without the least injustice.'

Provision was also made for permitting service on the Staff of Half-Pay Officers to be considered equal to continued regimental service; and it was also proposed that an officer

[1] The Colonelcy of a Regiment at this time carried with it pay at £1000 per annum. But this has now been discontinued, except in the case of the Household Cavalry.

who had not been employed for ten or fifteen years should not be allowed to avail himself of promotion to the full extent 'when he reached the top of the list.'

Exceptions were to be made in the case of 'officers who had been incapacitated by the service, and to whom a lengthened period of Half-Pay might be a necessity.'

All those acquainted with Army matters during the last quarter of a century will instantly recognise many of the so-called reforms effected during that period, and thus set forth and advocated by the Duke in 1853.

It must be remembered that, at the time of writing, H.R.H. was thirty-four years of age, in the prime of life and with already a wide experience of our Army and Garrisons at home and abroad. It will be noted that he urges the importance of an officer *commencing* to exercise active military command at an earlier age, and that his subsequent retention in active employment should not *as a rule* exceed the age of sixty-eight.

There are numerous other points which have only been adopted in comparatively recent years, such as the limited tenure of command by Lieutenant-Colonels of Regiments, the promotion by Brevet to Colonel after a fixed period in the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, etc.

The provisions for getting rid of officers who had been unemployed are not unfamiliar to soldiers of to-day. It was not until 1876 that Lord Penzance's Royal Commission, acting much on the lines of this memorandum, fixed the ages of compulsory retirement; and five years later, in 1881, the exact proportion of all ranks from Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Colonel was laid down, and the principles of Lord Penzance's Commission made workable. Since this many minor changes as regards ages for retirement have been made, but the broad scheme of the Duke of Cambridge, as outlined in 1853, has become a part of our Army organisation.

It is true that the Abolition of Purchase in the interim (1871) cleared the way for many of the subsequent changes, and amongst them a workable scheme for superannuation, since it overcame what the Duke in his memorandum of 1853 pointed out—'the great difficulty which always pre-

sents itself to any such plan, the necessarily additional expense to the country which it entails.'

That the country in 1871 would be ready to expend eight millions for the Abolition of Purchase, and the payment of both Regulation and over-Regulation purchase money, in order to give the Secretary of State a free hand, was a contingency which, in 1853, nobody could have foreseen, and one which, in consequence, the Duke was fully justified in ignoring.[1]

The Camp at Chobham.

It was undoubtedly, to a great extent, owing to the Duke of Cambridge's earnest representations as set forth in his various memoranda during the years 1852-53 that our authorities decided in the summer of the latter year to hold the Camp of Exercise at Chobham.

Fortunately for the Army and the nation, the Prince Consort was most profoundly interested in the question of Army organisation, and was well aware of the absolute non-existence of any system of military instruction in our service.

He had carefully studied the Duke of Cambridge's memoranda exposing our lack of organisation and military training; and to the information thus obtained, added his own sound judgment and personal experience of Continental armies, where all such matters were treated as of paramount importance and dealt with accordingly by military experts, entrusted with adequate powers, not only to recommend improvements, but to carry them out.

The Duke's diaries of the summer of 1853 are full of references to the Camp at Chobham. Thus on 28 May he notes that he 'dined with Lord Hardinge, where met Lord Seaton and all the officers to be employed in the Camp.' Two days later the entry occurs: 'To Chobham by Woking at a quarter past ten; rode over the whole of the ground with Lord Seaton.'

On 14 July he went 'to Windsor and rode into Camp,' and thenceforward he was constantly there during the two

[1] Sir R. Biddulph in his *Lord Cardwell at the War Office* states that the Abolition of Purchase actually cost the country seven millions.

months that it lasted. During this period the Duke frequently took command of the troops, and numerous field-days were carried out. The favourite ground for the larger operations seems to have been 'the Chobham Ridges four miles from Camp.' This region, so well-known to every officer and man in the British Army during the last half-century, became part of the training ground of the Aldershot Command upon the Government forming the Camp there in 1855. The Queen visited the Camp at Chobham on 4 August, and again two days later. The Duke notes the last field-day as taking place on 17 August, and on 20 August the Camp was broken up.

If one looks back to the newspapers of this period, it is curious to note how great was the interest excited by a military Camp of all arms, a novelty unknown to a whole generation of Englishmen.

In the *Times* of 16 August 1853, and later, columns are devoted to describing the military operations in 'the wilds of Surrey'; and no more eloquent testimony to the general ignorance of military matters which then prevailed can be adduced than these crude descriptions of the results which military manœuvres aim at attaining. The Duke of Cambridge was placed in command of the bulk of the forces; and he conducted operations against a skeleton force under the command of Colonel Vickers. It was fortunate that these manœuvres took place when they did; for within a year of their being held, all ranks engaged were on active service in the Crimean campaign.

Another very important step taken in 1852 was the calling up of the Militia, some 60,000 of which were enrolled and mustered in the course of the year; this for the first time since the termination of the great War. Military reforms are notoriously difficult to carry out, more especially in the case of such an unmilitary country as England was in 1852. But it may safely be said that during this year the authorities were for the first time induced to take some steps to possess an effective force for purposes of home defence.

How slowly that force was eventually organised is now a matter of history.

CHAPTER IV

THE CRIMEAN WAR

The Duke attends Prussian Manœuvres. Death of the Duke of Wellington. War Clouds in the East. Lord Hardinge and the Minié Rifle. State of Army at outbreak of Crimean War. The Duke appointed to command Guards Brigade at Malta. Secret Mission to Austria. Proceeds to Constantinople and Varna. British Army sails for Crimea. The Alma—H.R.H.'s account. Balaclava and Inkermann. Letter to General Moncrieff. Tributes to H.R.H. His Letter to Brigadier-General Reynardson on behaviour of Guards Brigade at Inkermann. Return to England: the Summer of 1855. Death of Lord Raglan. The Fall of Sebastopol. The Paris Peace Conference. The Duke's Memorandum. Sir Edward Hamley's Summary.

WHILST Inspecting General of Cavalry at Headquarters during the years 1852-54, the Duke of Cambridge resided at St. James's Palace. From his private correspondence with Lord Bloomfield, at that time British Ambassador at Berlin, it appears that he was most anxious to attend the 'Prussian Reviews' in the August and September of 1852. With this object in view he accordingly paid a visit to his sister, the Grand Duchess Augusta of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, at Strelitz; whence on 3rd September he proceeded to Berlin to witness the review of the Guard Corps by the King of Prussia. He also asked Lord Bloomfield, about the same time, to ascertain for him when the 'Grand Manœuvres in Hungary' were likely to take place.

The Duke of Wellington died on 14 September 1852, and on 26 October H.R.H. writes from London to Lord Bloomfield:—

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE.

'We are all expecting the arrangements for the great funeral of our illustrious Chief to come out, and it is said that the office is to be conducted in the most imposing and solemn manner. I confess for one to be very sorry that this melancholy duty has been so long deferred: it ought to have taken place, I think, at once, as soon after his death as

possible. Now the intensity of feeling has naturally evaporated. As to the great loss that the country has sustained by the Duke's death, it is quite incalculable, and will be felt more and more daily. His name was a tower of strength.'

The Duke was by express command of Queen Victoria placed in supreme command of the troops assembled in London from all parts of the United Kingdom to take part in the funeral obsequies of the Duke of Wellington.

The following year, in 1853, the King of Prussia invited him to attend the Grand Manœuvres at Berlin, including some great cavalry manœuvres which the Duke was especially anxious to see. Writing to Lord Bloomfield to make arrangements for the proposed visit, he informs him that he would like to go to a hotel at Berlin, not a palace, and that he hoped to be allowed to '*arrive privately* and *without fuss*: when I shall be happy to obey the orders I receive.' H.R.H. arranged to take with him Lord William Paulet and 'Colonel Lawrenson of my old Regiment, the 17th Lancers.'

Owing to the serious aspect of affairs in the East, at the very last moment we find the Duke writing to Lord Bloomfield to make his excuses, as he is unable to avail himself of 'the most gracious invitation of the King of Prussia.'

The remarks which in 1852 the Duke made on the unpreparedness for war of the Army at that time, and the lamentably deficient state of its entire organisation, will be within the memory of the readers of this work; and it is a remarkable coincidence that these pessimistic forecasts were so soon to be realised. For within two years England was engaged in a momentous struggle with one of the very greatest of the European military Powers, after an interval of forty years of profound peace following on the close of the Napoleonic wars. There was no organisation deserving of the name; and the subject of arms and equipment had been equally neglected. Throughout the Peninsular Campaign and at Waterloo, rifles had been used with undeniable effect by three Battalions of the 95th Rifle Corps. Nevertheless the Guards and the Line Infantry were still armed with the antiquated 'Brown Bess,' identical in pattern with that which was carried at Waterloo, save only that the percus-

sion-lock had replaced the flint and steel lock in 1848—a result owing largely to the invincible opposition to change on the part of military men, and the apathy displayed by successive War Ministers. Moreover, had it not been for the foresight of Lord Hardinge, who eventually succeeded the Duke of Wellington as Commander-in-Chief, there would have been no supply of Minié rifles for the Crimean War.

It is related by Sir Robert Biddulph[1] that Lord Hardinge told Mr. Cardwell in 1851 that he had been trying to persuade the Duke of Wellington to have the Infantry armed with the Minié rifle, but that he had been unable to obtain his consent. Lord Hardinge added that he foresaw that before many years had passed we should be engaged in war with a great European Power, and that unless we had a good rifle we should most assuredly be beaten. Not long after this conversation had been held, Lord Hardinge became Master-General of Ordnance, and consequently he was then in a better position to persuade the Duke of Wellington to consent to the change, as he eventually succeeded in doing. The manufacture of arms was comparatively slow in those days. But Lord Hardinge pushed on matters as quickly as possible, and also took steps to provide the Army with its requisite number of guns and wagons. Still, in spite of all his efforts, the Eastern Field Force embarked in 1854 with the old smooth-bore musket, although happily it was found possible to issue rifles to the majority of troops before they reached the Crimea.[2] As regards equipment, it is enough to say that the pattern of water-bottle carried by our troops in the Crimea is to be found accurately figured and coloured in the Blenheim tapestries illustrative of Marlborough's victories in 1704!

These items have merely been specified in order to demonstrate the absolute state of apathy into which the Army had sunk during those years of profound peace, but of political excitement, which followed on the exhausting struggles of 1793-1815. To military minds they carry an

[1] *Lord Cardwell at the War Office*, by General Sir R. Biddulph, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., p. 47.

[2] The 4th Division were not issued rifles until after Inkermann.

even deeper significance. Not only were we then devoid of proper fighting units to put in the field with their correct proportion of horse, foot, and guns; but there were no organised staffs accustomed to deal with a force of the three arms. In addition, no effective supply or transport system was known to the living generation of soldiers[1]; and no proper field hospitals or other medical arrangements were even in existence. Lastly, there was, as the course of the war so painfully demonstrated, no system of supplying drafts to fill up the terrible casualty rolls of battle and sickness—caused largely, as regards the latter, by the crass ignorance generally displayed by the Government as to the inevitable effects of a war waged in so remote and treacherous a region as the Crimea.

But to pass from details, important though they were in their subsequent bearing on the course of the campaign, to larger issues. The storm clouds were gradually gathering in Eastern Europe in 1853. In the July of that year Russia invaded the Danubian Principalities, and on 22 October Turkey declared war against her. A day earlier the English and the French fleets had entered the Dardanelles; and on 30 November the Russian fleet destroyed the small Turkish squadron at Sinope. This event created widespread indignation in England; and from thenceforth matters moved more rapidly.

On 17 February 1854, England and France demanded the evacuation of the Principalities by 30 April, and soon after war became practically inevitable.

In the meantime, on the British side, half-hearted preparations for war had been progressing in a somewhat leisurely manner. In February a Brigade of Foot Guards was dispatched to Malta, and the Duke was appointed to command it—a post, however, which he did not actually take up till some months later.

On 10 April H.R.H., in company with Lord Raglan,

[1] In *The Story of a Soldier's Life*, vol. i. p. 53, Lord Wolseley, writing of this period, says: 'Sir Thomas Picton was popularly believed to have shot the last commissariat officer belonging to the Army for incompetence; and although the Army List recorded the names of a few others said to be at the Cape and in our Colonies, the Home Army, having never seen them, was inclined to disbelieve their existence.'

the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces destined for service in the Eastern Campaign, proceeded to Paris.

Here he was engaged in discussing various matters connected with the coming campaign with the Emperor Napoleon. The outcome of these discussions was that on 18 April the British Government directed the Duke to proceed to Vienna, charged with a secret mission to the Court of Austria. In consequence, he left Paris at 9 P.M. on the same day that he received his orders, Lord Raglan having continued his journey to Marseilles a few hours earlier.

It is characteristic of the hasty and unreasoning criticisms passed by the public on matters that are necessarily beyond their knowledge, that the Duke's visit to the Emperor Napoleon in company with Lord Raglan was the subject of hostile attack in the press, which represented H.R.H. as dallying in Paris for his own amusement! On 29 April 1854, *Punch* honoured him with a cartoon representing *Hector* (Mr. Punch) chiding *Paris* (H.R.H.) for not hastening to the seat of war. The peculiar ineptitude of this is best demonstrated by reference to the dates of H.R.H.'s movements to Paris, Vienna, and the East, and those of the troops proceeding to the seat of war.

The Duke arrived at Vienna on the morning of the 21st. Vienna was at this time the scene of great festivities upon the occasion of the wedding of the Emperor Francis Joseph; hence H.R.H.'s mission attracted but little attention.

The Duke's letters to Lord Bloomfield, our Minister at Berlin at this period, indicate the general tenour of the result which this mission was designed to effect. Writing from Vienna on 26 April he says:—

TO LORD BLOOMFIELD.

'You will be surprised to hear of my sudden journey here. Augusta[1] will have explained it all to you. I don't know whether my coming here will have done any good, but I think it has been well taken here, and will certainly do no harm. I am very much satisfied with my mission, and have heard enough to feel convinced that this Government will be all right if we don't press them too much. Their feelings are

[1] The Duke's sister, H.R.H. the Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg-Strelitz.

Austrian, which is just what they ought to be, and their interests are with us. . . . Only look after Prussia, that is the great difficulty. . . . I think they would wish much still to effect a *peace* here, but I feel it is too late for anything of the sort. . . .'

That he succeeded in his mission to the Court of Vienna and carried out his task in a manner satisfactory to the Queen and the Ministry will be gathered from the following. Lord Clarendon,[1] writing to Lord Westmorland, our Minister at Vienna, on 5 May 1854, says: 'I have only time to say how intensely we are gratified by the reception given to the Duke of Cambridge, and how admirably we think he has performed his mission.'

Again, on 8 May, Lord Clarendon wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM LORD CLARENDON.

'It would have been impossible for any experienced diplomatist to have conducted matters (under circumstances certainly not favourable to business) with more judgment and ability, and to have rendered an account of them in a manner more accurate and interesting. I lost no time in transmitting Y.R.H.'s letter to the Queen, who, as well as Prince Albert, was greatly pleased with them, and I can assure Y.R.H. that H.M.'s opinions are those of the Government.

'We consider that Y.R.H.'s mission has succeeded beyond our expectations, as it has been the means of obtaining information that was much needed, but that we should otherwise have been without, and it has served to revive those friendly feelings on the part of Austria towards England. . . .'

Reverting to the war preparations made by England, our army had gradually been assembled in the Mediterranean. The Guards Brigade was moved from Malta to Scutari in April, and other troops followed. Soon afterwards, on 1 May, the arrival of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan was notified in General Orders, and on the same day the formation of the Army into Brigades and Divisions was announced.

The Duke left Vienna on 1 May, embarked at Trieste on the following day in the Austrian Lloyd's SS. *Messina*, and arrived at Corfu, his old station, where he had served on the Staff during the years 1843-45, on the 6th. Here he

[1] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

trans-shipped to H.M.S. *Caradoc*, and sailed on the following day, arriving at Constantinople on the 10th. On landing he received the news of the formation of the Divisions, and of his own appointment to the command of the 1st Division, consisting of the Brigade of Guards under Brigadier-General Bentinck, and the Highland Brigade under Sir Colin Campbell, afterwards Lord Clyde.

On 13 June, H.R.H. embarked with his Division for Varna in Bulgaria, arriving there and disembarking on the 14th and following days.

The general political situation had meanwhile undergone important changes. On 3 June Austria, with the support of Prussia, demanded the evacuation of the Principalities, having already moved 50,000 men to the frontier on the Danube. This threat on the flank of the Russian line of advance on Constantinople eventually resulted in the Czar raising the siege of Silistria and withdrawing from the Principalities, which were thereupon occupied by Austria. Austria and Prussia from this moment took no further part in the demonstrations against Russia, leaving it to England and France to settle by themselves their outstanding difficulties with that country.

The evacuation of the Principalities by Russia, although satisfying Austria and Prussia, was not sufficient to appease public opinion in France and England; and a strong feeling arose that it would be impossible for the Allies, with the memories of Sinope fresh before the world, to withdraw their fleets from the Euxine, leaving Sebastopol and the Russian fleet based thereon as a standing menace to Turkey. On 29 June the Secretary for War, the Duke of Newcastle, wrote to Lord Raglan a letter, in which the project of the reduction of Sebastopol and capture of the Russian fleet were mentioned as 'the only means of securing an honourable and safe peace.'

It was whilst the preparations for this great enterprise were being pushed forward that cholera attacked the Army of the Allies in Turkey; our regiments in Bulgaria, according to Sir E. Hamley, losing 500 to 600 men, whilst three French Divisions lost 10,000 men; and the fleets also suffered

severely. This was the first of the series of contretemps which delayed the operations against Sebastopol. Finally, on 7 September the immense fleet of transports, escorted by the combined fleet of the Allies, sailed from Varna for the Crimea, a distance of about 300 miles.

The disembarkation was commenced on the 14th, and by the 18th the whole force was ashore and ready to advance. On this day the Duke wrote to his old friend, General George Moncrieff, the Colonel of the Regiment of Scots Fusilier Guards, as follows:—

'CRIMEA, *near* EUPATORIA, *Sept.* 18, 1854.

'. . . We are landed all safe and without opposition, and have as yet seen no Russians. . . .

The following day the advance of the Allies on Sebastopol was commenced, and on the 20th was fought the Battle of the Alma. Having arranged with the French commander, Marshal Saint-Arnaud, that the Allies should deliver a combined attack on the Russians holding the height of the Alma, Lord Raglan's tactics were of the simplest nature. He launched two Divisions in line against the strongly entrenched Russian position, supported by two more Divisions in the second line, the remaining Division moving in the rear of the left. The Light Division was the left of the two leading Divisions; and the 1st Division, commanded by the Duke, moved in support of it.

The Light Division, under a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, crossed the river, gained the heights, and actually closed on the Russian battery; but the Russians brought up fresh troops, and eventually it was compelled to give ground. By this time all definite formations had been lost; but the men fell back slowly and stubbornly, keeping up an effective fire on the enemy. The four Battalions of Infantry, with the four companies of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, which had covered the advance across the Alma, had already lost 47 officers, 50 sergeants, and 800 rank and file killed and wounded. At this critical moment the Duke of Cambridge appeared on the scene with his Division. The Guards Brigade deployed into line on the

right, with the Highland Brigade on its left, the latter overlapping and aiming at the Russian right flank.

Sir Edward Hamley thus describes this advance of the Guards Brigade:—

'. . . The Guards, after gaining the farther bank of the stream in good order, had already begun the ascent, and their centre Battalion, the Scots Fusiliers, was disordered and swept down by the retreating troops, with the loss of 11 officers and 170 men. But the Grenadiers on its right, and the Coldstream on its left, continued to advance in lines absolutely unbroken, except where struck by the enemy's shot. Such French officers on the hills on the right as, in an interval of inaction, were free to observe what our troops were doing, spoke of this advance of the Guards as something new to their minds, and very admirable. . . . The two Battalions of Guards with some men rallied from the Scots Battalion, went up the hill on each side of the gap in the centre, and were met by the four Battalions of the Vladimir Regiment, and the two Kazan Battalions, much shattered in the fight, which had hitherto been engaged with the 7th. This new phase of the battle was not of long duration. The columns could not stand before the close fire of the lines. Moreover, at this moment the Highland Regiments, after receiving the badly aimed fire of the field-guns in the earthwork on the flank (which then rapidly withdrew from action) had now approached the right of the Russian position. The Brigade was in echelon, the right Battalion leading and already past the earthwork defended by the Vladimir. This Russian Regiment, after undergoing heavy loss, still hotly assailed in front by the Guards, and its rear threatened by the Highlanders, retreated to its right rear towards the right Kazan column, upon which it endeavoured to form, and both came under the fire of the leading Highland Regiment (42nd). At the same time Campbell's other regiments attacked the columns hitherto in reserve high up the Kourgané Hill. These did not maintain the contest; the Russian forces all over the position were quitting it. . . .'

An officer[1] who served as A.D.C. to Lord Raglan in this memorable battle, and was an eye-witness of the scene, has graphically described this phase of the fight.

'It was just at this time that the Brigade of Guards came up on the left of the Light Division, and the Brigade of Highlanders again on *their* left. This magnificent Division —the flower of the British Army—had crossed the river rather higher up than the Light Division, and consequently

[1] *Letters from Headquarters*: Captain Hon. Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, 5th Dragoon Guards, now Lieutenant-General, retired.

were on its left. The attention of the enemy being chiefly taken up in repelling the attack of Sir George Brown, the 1st Division had formed-up after crossing the Alma; and although they incurred considerable loss in so doing, they nevertheless advanced in most beautiful order; really as if on parade. I shall never forget the sight—one felt so proud of them. Lord Raglan had been looking on all this time, having arrived on the high ground before alluded to just as the Light Division advanced up the hill. When he saw the 1st Division coming up in support, he said, "Look how well the Guards and Highlanders advance!" . . . They were advancing in beautiful order, and marched straight on the Russian battery. When half-way up the hill, the Fusilier Guards were, to a certain extent, thrown into temporary confusion by the left of the Light Division, who were retiring. This momentary check caused them great loss, but after a minute or two they rallied and soon rejoined their comrades. It was at this moment that the guns directed by Lord Raglan came into action, and, as I before told you, after the second shot the Russian Artillery limbered up and began to retreat. Thus the heavy cannonade which the Light Division had been under was at a most important moment arrested and thus spared to the Guards. I say Guards, because the Brigade of Highlanders, being more on the left, were almost entirely out of the line of fire, and consequently escaped with comparatively trifling loss.

'Directly the Russians had withdrawn their guns, three heavy masses of infantry advanced slowly down the hill. It was an anxious moment, for, if they only had had courage to charge, their very heavy weight must have swept our thin line before them. I should say these three columns could not have numbered less than 9000 men, for they were three entire regiments, which as yet had not been into action, each regiment nominally consisting of 3000 men; yet such was the imposing air and perfect formation of the British troops opposed to them that they never advanced out of the slowest walk. The 1st Division paused for a moment—it was only to "lock-up" more closely. Some one said to Lord Raglan, "The Guards are going to retire"; but he knew them better, for he said, "No such thing; they'll carry the battery. It's time for us to go and join them." . . . Before we had got half-way we saw the 1st Division and the Russian columns approaching towards one another, at a distance of sixty yards apart; the Brigade of Highlanders having been brought round so as to take the Russian columns in flank, the whole Division sent in a withering volley, which perfectly staggered the Russians, literally knocking over every man in their two front ranks. The enemy stopped, fired a random volley, turned and fled without another attempt at staying the victorious course of the British troops. The moment the Russians turned, down went the bayonets, and

the whole Division charged up the hill, dashing through the battery and capturing a gun which some Russian artillerymen were in the act of carrying off. Cheering as they went, they bayoneted hundreds of the flying enemy.

'During the confusion into which the Scots Guards were thrown, and the severe and close nature of the fighting at one time, the Colours of this Battalion were in great jeopardy. The Queen's Colour had twenty-four shot-holes, and the pole was shot asunder about the centre, and again at the lower end. Of the four Sergeants who successively were with the Colour, one was killed and two were wounded, one of the latter mortally.'

The officer[1] who was the Lieutenant in command of the left centre company, *i.e.* one of those next to the Colours, has described to the writer how after the battle, when the Regiments were assembled, the Duke rode up, and calling out the officers with the Colours before the Brigade, personally thanked them for their gallantry, of which he had been an eye-witness. The officers in question were Lieutenant Lindsay,[2] who was awarded the V.C. for his behaviour on this occasion, and Lieutenant A. H. Thistlethwayte, who died at Scutari on 26 November 1854.

The following is the Duke's own account of the advance to the Alma and the events of the next few days, taken verbatim from his field journal, which he was in the habit of writing up daily:—

'*September* 19, *Tuesday.*—All under arms by daylight, and assembled in front of the Light Division. The Light Division led the left column, the 1st followed, the 2nd in line with the Light, the 3rd followed, the Cavalry and Rifles[3] protected the flank, and the 4th Division brought up the rear. The French were on our right. We marched in double column of companies at half distance from the centre of each Division; Artillery on right flank of their Divisions. It was a very fatiguing march over a steep and open country, and the men fell out very much, which annoyed us greatly. Towards the afternoon we came upon the Bulganak, a small dirty stream. Here, some Cavalry and guns appearing, the Cavalry and the Horse Artillery were brought to the front, and shots were

[1] General Sir Reginald Gipps, Military Secretary to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge when Commander-in-Chief.

[2] Better known as Colonel R. J. Loyd-Lindsay. He took the name of Loyd in 1858, and was created Baron Wantage 1885. He died 1901.

[3] 1st and 2nd Battalions Rifle Brigade. The Regiment was always styled 'The Rifles' by the Army and public.

exchanged, our Artillery firing to perfection. We had three men wounded and five horses killed. The Infantry were brought up in support, and formed partly in line and partly in support, with the left on the Bulganak.

'*September* 20, *Wednesday.*—The great day of battle had now arrived, and the Alma will be ever memorable in the history of the world. The morning was lovely, and it was ascertained that the whole Russian force were in position on the Alma, very strongly posted with heavy batteries ready and determined to contest the passage of that river. We were all under arms at seven, and in the same formation as the previous day. After a good deal of delay, so as to enable the Chiefs to examine the position very minutely, it was determined that the Division Bosquet (French) should cross the stream at its mouth under the protection of the fleet, which could approach to within easy range, followed by the Turks, whilst the 1st, Canrobert's, and the 3rd, Prince Napoleon, attacked in front with the 4th, Forey, in reserve. At the same time the English were to attack the right of the position. The advance was made in excellent order, the left covered by our Cavalry, and the left rear by the 4th Division. Immense masses of Russian troops appeared in position on the opposite bank of the stream, which was high and difficult of access, whereas on our side there was a shelving bank exposed to the whole of their fire. The French having succeeded in the passage on our right, we approached the heights alone, and the first shot was fired at half-past one o'clock. After some delay to give time for this fire to tell, the whole line advanced, the first deploying, the second in column of support. It was about half-past two when we got under fire, having the village of Alma in our front in flames, and our right being on the road leading to the bridge over that stream. Evans' Division first got under fire, Brown soon was equally engaged, and being opposed to a murderous fire from a large heavy battery in its front, suffered most severely; still it advanced, covered by the Rifles,[1] 2nd Battalion, who behaved most nobly and gallantly all day. At about three, Brown's Division was fairly over the stream, advanced in line and carried the battery, but being hard pressed I moved up in line to support, across the village, vineyards and stream, where the Brigade of Guards was especially exposed to a most fearful fire. I was myself with the Coldstream and the Highlanders on my left. On we went notwithstanding, and the men, having got into some confusion from the roughness of the ground they had to pass over, were re-formed under the bank of the stream. Now an awful moment occurred. On getting up the bank, the Light Division partially gave way and were driven out of the captured battery, 23rd and 33rd going right through the Fusilier

[1] Rifle Brigade.

Guards, who were thus exposed to a very rough handling, and lost 11 officers, 11 N.C.O.'s, and 168 men in a very few moments. The Grenadier and Coldstream Guards, however, were enabled to hold their ground, and poured in such a fire, gaining ground in so doing all the time, that the Russians could not re-form, the battery was recarried, and the Highlanders nobly ascending a hill on the left, they too gave the enemy so deadly a fire that the day was ours, which was further completed by the Artillery coming up and firing rapidly into the retreating masses.

'Thus ended the Battle of the Alma, which has been a great victory not only physically but morally over the Russians, and has entirely destroyed their prestige as troops in the field. Menschikoff's carriage was taken with his papers, and it is found that he expected to hold the ground occupied for three weeks, whereas it was taken in three hours! We had the whole Army in the Crimea opposed to us, about 55,000 men and 100 guns; but two guns were taken from our want of Cavalry to follow in pursuit. The battlefield afterwards was an awful sight, and I shall never forget it to the last days of my life. Our escape was marvellous, and I thank God for His gracious and merciful protection. When all was over, I could not help crying like a child, and the whole Army complimented me on the success of the 1st Division. Thoroughly fatigued and worn out, the troops rested for the night.

'*September* 21, *Thursday.* — Dreadfully tired after the fatigues of the previous day, but still up and about early. Rode over the field of battle and the whole position. It was an awful and a most fearful sight. The troops were employed in burying the dead and picking up wounded, both enemies and our own. I visited the wounded, and tried to get them sent on board. Nothing thought of or spoken of but the great action.

'*September* 22, *Friday.*—Finished the painful work of the preceding day. The English have lost in killed and wounded about 2400, the French name their loss as 1400, and that of the enemy must be very great. All our wounded are doing well, and our people were all put on board to-night. Everything prepared for a start the following day.

'*September* 23, *Saturday.*—Marched at seven, the French on the right and we on the left. My Division next to the French, leading and followed by the 2nd, the Light Division on my left followed by the 3rd, the 4th bringing up the rear, and the Cavalry on our left flank and front. Thus we moved in solid masses to the Katshka river. It was a noble and a glorious sight. Finding no enemy to dispute the passage of the stream, we passed it at once and bivouacked for the night on the opposite banks. We found the village deserted and nearly destroyed, but plenty of forage and water, and it is a charming valley. The Greys and 57th landed and joined the Army. . . .'

After this came the 'flank march' round Sebastopol, and the establishment of the British base at Balaclava. The siege operations were now pushed forward, the Duke bearing his share in the manifold and trying duties connected with all such work. It was on 25 October that the Russians, detecting the undue extension of the British forces between their camps and base, made a sudden attack on the British, with the intention of cutting off their forces, engaged in the attack on the fortress, from their base at Balaclava.

The battle that ensued is rendered famous for all time by the charge of the Light and Heavy Brigades. The Duke was present with the 1st Division: but his troops were not engaged, save the 93rd Highlanders, which were detached under Sir Colin Campbell. The 1st Division was ordered by Lord Raglan down into the valley, and formed in echelon of Brigades, the Guards in the first, and the Highland Brigade in the second line. The Russians opened on them with shot and shell; but the distance was great and no harm was done. At nightfall the 1st Division was ordered to return to its camp along the Woronzoff Road.

The day following the Battle of Balaclava the Russians made a sortie with six battalions and 4 guns, and were met by the 2nd Division with its two batteries.

Later on, H.R.H. brought up the Brigade of Guards to support the 1st Division; but it was not engaged, though the battery attached to it joined those of the 2nd Division, and the combined fire of the three batteries soon compelled the Russian Artillery to withdraw. Their fire was then directed on the enemy's Infantry, which retired in great disorder. After the repulse of the Russian sortie of 25 October, the forces under Sir Colin Campbell completed a strong line of defence, with batteries to protect Balaclava. On the other side of the English defences across the Quarry ravine, a new work known as the 'Sandbag Battery' was constructed to command the Russian batteries. A line of picquets with supports was thrown out to observe the army of Liprandi on the side of the Tchernaya, and was furnished alternately by the Guards Brigade and the French Zouaves; and upon the duties being found by the former, it was the habit of H.R.H.

personally to visit the outpost line thus held by the men of his Division.

The Battle of Inkermann was destined to be the last of the great fights in which H.R.H. took part. Owing to the peculiar conditions under which the action took place, and which, owing to Mr. Kinglake's researches and Sir Edward Hamley's admirable account, are now known to all the world, any further description of it here would be superfluous. Suffice it to say that the Russians, realising the weakness of the position of the Allies, and cognisant of the trivial forces at the disposal of the British Commander, Lord Raglan, arranged to concentrate some 35,000 men with 81 field-guns and aided by 54 guns of position in Sebastopol and on the heights beyond the Tchernaya, and to attempt a surprise on the camps of the Allies.

Every factor was in favour of the originators of this bold scheme; and, but for the desperate valour of our soldiers, there can be no doubt that the Campaign in the Crimea would have ended on 5 November 1854 with the practical annihilation of the Allies.

At half-past five in the morning, ushered in by dense fog and drizzling rain, the Russians delivered their first attack. The combat centred in the possession of the Sandbag Battery. The 41st and 49th Regiments held this post against enormous odds, but were eventually forced to retire. Of this phase of the battle, Captain Gough-Calthorpe writes:—

'. . . H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge arrived with a portion of the Brigade of Guards, under the immediate command of General Bentinck, on the right. The principal part of these men had only shortly returned from twenty-four hours' duty in the trenches; they could hardly, therefore, be considered as *fresh* troops; nevertheless they marched into action with their usual proud step and bearing, regardless alike of Russian shot and shell, which was showered with deadly effect on them as they advanced to the brow of the hill. The 41st and 49th Regiments had been repulsed by the Russian columns from the Sandbag Battery, and were now formed on the right of the 2nd Division, keeping up a heavy fire on the enemy, who were collecting in force by the aforesaid work. It was of importance that they should not establish themselves at that point, and therefore without more ado the Guards were ordered to retake the battery.

A cheer arose at this command, and the Grenadier and Fusilier Guards rushed down the incline towards the battery, and dashed with irresistible force against the enemy. They, however, were in such numbers that nothing but the indomitable courage of the English could have overcome such overwhelming superiority. The Russians in a few minutes were driven out of the work, and none of them remained but the dead and wounded. Up to this time the Guards had scarcely fired a shot; their whole attack had been made with the bayonet. Now, however, their Miniés came into play, and the retiring troops suffered seriously from this destructive arm.'

Later on the Russians made a determined attempt to recapture the work. To quote from the same author[1]:—

'The Russians, having completely overcome this attempt to turn their flank, advanced to recapture the Sandbag Battery, swarming up the hill on all sides.

'The Coldstream Guards, who had been placed to defend the work, held it for a long time with the utmost determination and vigour: with five times their force opposed to them, they continued to fire on the Russian masses with such coolness and accuracy that the ground was covered with dead and wounded. But no amount of slaughter seemed to check the enemy's onward course; they showed a reckless bravery and stolid determination for which we had never before given them credit. Numbers at length overcame in this unequal struggle, and the Guards, after having lost a third of their officers and men, and exhausted their ammunition, slowly retired out of the work, without, however, turning their backs upon the enemy, but leaving behind them many wounded. . . . The Duke of Cambridge, on seeing his men retire, galloped across their front, and urged them to stand firm and fire upon the enemy, but he was met with the unanswerable reply that they had no more ammunition. His Royal Highness had his horse shortly after shot under him, but was fortunately not hurt, though a bullet passed through the sleeve of his coat; of his staff Major Macdonald (who particularly distinguished himself) and Captain Clifton had their horses killed under them; the latter was also wounded. A few minutes later and Captain Butler (Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General) was shot through the head and fell dead. General Bentinck was also wounded in the arm and had to leave the ground. In such a state of things, there was nothing for it but to rally the men, and place them in the most advantageous position to prevent the enemy from making a sudden rush and carrying the ridge; of course, immediate orders were given to bring up the reserve ammunition with the least possible delay.'

[1] Calthorpe.

The story of Inkermann needs no retelling, nor can the present writer pretend to shed further light on the details of that terrible and stupendous struggle.

Sidelights of history, however, often illumine corners which have hitherto been passed by as but of little interest. The following are therefore given as affording momentary glimpses of the Duke's movements during the progress of the great battle—the first by a Sergeant of the Scots Fusilier Guards who for his gallantry at the Battle of the Alma was selected for a commission in the Rifle Brigade. At Inkermann he was still a Sergeant with the Fusiliers, and in his diary the following occurs:—

'After the death of Sir G. Cathcart, our troops were hard pressed and barely able to hold their ground against the enemy. Our leaders deemed it necessary, and wisely so, to get all the men together that they could lay their hands on: the three Regiments of Guards managed to gather some three companies more or less in line. The Duke, placing himself in the centre, drew his sword and called out, "Come on, my brave fellows, I will lead you!" and we steadily followed him until we reached the ridge of the hill, in front of the camp of the 2nd Division. There we were ordered to lie down.'

The veteran Field-Marshal, Sir Frederick Paul Haines, who was in command of the right wing of the 21st N.B. Fusiliers at Inkermann, has kindly given me permission to quote the following.

The Field-Marshal at the time, although a Captain in his Regiment, was a Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel (and senior to his own Colonel and those of other corps), and was holding 'The Barrier' on the old Post Road against which the Russians made such repeated and determined attacks. He has described to the writer how, during the midst of the great struggle, he had reason to communicate for a second time with his immediate chief, General Pennefather, commanding the 2nd Division; and how, when crossing the plateau through the fog and smoke, he suddenly came upon him. At this moment General Pennefather was moving across the front of the ground held by his Division from right to left, and the Duke of Cambridge was riding on his right side next the enemy. Colonel Haines rode up on

General Pennefather's left to report to him and receive instructions, and accompanied the two Divisional Generals in their ride between the lines of the hostile forces. He thus had a good opportunity of hearing their views on the situation, and he relates that what particularly struck him was the Duke's absolute calmness, and the lack of any excitement on his part.

The following is an extract from the Duke's own diary describing the events of Inkermann and the following days:—

'*November* 5, *Sunday.*—This was a most dreadful and a most fearful day, and one that I shall never forget as long as I live. Just at daylight I heard musketry fire on my right, jumped up and dressed, and had hardly got out of my tent when I saw heavy guns in position in front of the 2nd Division, on the hills generally occupied by the picquets of that Division, and firing upon them. It was very evident that during the night, by some accident, the enemy had occupied these heights without our discovering it, and we all hurried out as rapidly as possible. It being the hour for relieving the picquets, all the Battalions were extremely weak in the morning, but as not a moment was to be lost we pushed on to support the 2nd Division, hardly pressed, and at General Pennefather's request took up our station to the right of him; our batteries at the same time firing to the front. We had to pass through a murderous fire of heavy shot and shell, which was falling into the camp of the 2nd Division, and then pushed forward to within very short range of the 18-Pounder Battery erected to silence the Inkermann Russian guns. The fire upon us now became very heavy, and seeing that the battery in question was strongly occupied by the enemy I directed it to be taken, which it was in most gallant style by the Grenadier Guards, though after a stout resistance on the part of the enemy. It was now evident that we had become a good deal isolated and that our left was much threatened. I therefore sent up the Coldstream and Fusiliers to the left to endeavour to keep us united to the 2nd Division. I at that moment had my poor dear old horse "Wide Awake" shot in the leg and had to get on the horse of my orderly. Soon after a ball passed through the sleeves of my two coats and shirt, but most providentially merely grazed my hand, inflicting a severe blow without breaking the skin. I then rode back to see whether I could not bring up some more troops, and found Sir George Cathcart just come up with his Division. I rode up to him and begged him to support me on the left, but, poor man, he would not listen to me, but persisted in sending

his men down to the right into the Inkermann Valley. This was a most fatal error and cost us most dearly. Hurrying forward, the 4th Division rushed down the hill right into the valley below, carrying along with them many of my fine Guardsmen, who could not be restrained in their ardour. I saw the danger of our position and rode about to look for other troops when I met the 20th and 95th, and my picquets coming off duty, all of which I pushed forward to the left of our battery, as I heard that large masses of Russians were coming up. Seeing Lord Raglan at a short distance, I hurried to him to inform him that unless he supported us we must be cut to pieces. He desired me to try and get the men back. I rode back to the battery and found this was out of the question, as the men had gone so far down the valley, owing to poor Cathcart's fatal error. On trying to get back myself I found the Russians crowning the hill between us and the 2nd Division and regularly taking us in flank. I had no troops in hand, and Macdonald and myself being quite alone and having got between the fire of the enemy and our own people, had regularly to ride for it in order to get back. Providentially we escaped unhurt, though Jem's horse was shot. On getting to the rear I found no men, but Assistant-Surgeon Wilson of the 7th Hussars collected a few stragglers, and these kept the Russians off till General Adams was enabled to come up with some of his men and drive them off the plateau. Four successive charges were made by the enemy, but they were all driven back when the French most providentially came up to our assistance. I then tried to collect the poor Guards, who had not a round of ammunition left, but at first only three companies of these Regiments could be got together. I looked upon the rest as lost. I was then ordered with this handful of men again to go forward, this time on the left of the road in rear of the 2nd Division. Here we made the men lay down, as the fire of Artillery upon us was fearfully heavy. To my joy, on riding to the right front I found Upton with the rest of the Guards and the Colours of the Grenadiers behind the breastwork of the 2nd Division. There was now a pause and long consultation as to what was to be done, we being all the time exposed to a most fearful shower of shot and shell. At last it was decided that the French Division (Bosquet) was to push forward on the right and dislodge the enemy (who had suffered fearfully) from the heights they were occupying with their Artillery. The Russians, however, retired before the French came up, and these latter then went forward in pursuit and inflicted immense losses upon them on descending the Inkermann Hills and crossing the bridge. Two 18-Pounders of ours, served by Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson and brought up late in the day, greatly contributed to their retreat. The day was won, but at a fearful sacrifice. The Guards have lost alone 12 officers killed and 21 wounded, and including all the list of

casualties amounts to 589 in the Brigade alone. Poor Butler was killed; Clifton, who behaved admirably, was first wounded in the cheek, but would not leave the field in spite of my entreaties, and then had his horse killed under him, but not even satisfied with this came out on another charger. The conduct of all the troops concerned was noble in the extreme, but nothing could surpass the noble devotion of the Guards. They have lost in killed Pakenham, Neville, and Newman, Grenadiers; Dawson, Cowell, Ramsden, Mackinnon, Greville, Bouverie, Desborow, and Elliott, Coldstream; Blair and Charles Seymour, Fusiliers. Of General Officers were killed Sir George Cathcart, Strangways, and Goldie; wounded, Bentinck, Buller, Torrens, Adams, and Sir George Brown. My personal escape is perfectly miraculous, and I never can feel sufficiently grateful to God, that out of eleven Generals who went into action, I am one of the three who escaped unhurt. The troops returned to quarters about three, and we went over the field of battle to behold a field of blood and destruction and misery, which nothing in this world can possibly surpass. After dinner I had to ride to Lord Raglan to consult with him, and on my return I was so overpowered by all I had gone through, that I felt perfectly broken down.

'*November* 6, *Monday.*—After a wretched night I was up before daybreak to be on the alert and to look after the various duties which the previous day had produced. The wounded were a fearful sight, and our tents happened most unfortunately to be placed between the Field Hospitals of the two Divisions, so that the poor sufferers were constantly heard by us both day and night. All was quiet this morning, and we were burying our own and Russian dead. Our loss amounts to about 2590 men killed and wounded; of these 459 killed, 1933 wounded, and 188 missing. The French loss is estimated at 1400, whilst that of the enemy is supposed to be not much short of 20,000 men. Never shall I forget that fearful day. God was merciful to me, and I am grateful. All day long I was busily engaged, but I was dreadfully knocked up and quite worn out. I attended the funerals of Sir G. Cathcart and Strangways. They were buried close together, just in front of Sir G. Cathcart's tent, where, poor man, I had so often seen him sit looking at Sebastopol. It was a most melancholy duty.

'*November* 7, *Tuesday.*—I was up early again, but the Russians did not come out. I called on General Bosquet to make some arrangements with him as to our right, where there are now several French Battalions in support. I then saw Lord Raglan, with whom I breakfasted, and then made all arrangements for the removal of the sick and wounded, and there were several alarms, but they came to nothing. It appears from what we learn from the prisoners that large reinforcements have just arrived from the Principalities,

being the corps of Generals Dunnerbery and Liprandi, that they have come by carts from Odessa in nine days, that two Grand Dukes, sons of the Emperor, have arrived, that they abused all the General Officers, telling them they were fools and cowards, and that after that this attack was made with fresh troops. The cruelty of the Russians was fearful, and our wounded officers and men were fearfully ill-treated by them and stabbed in all directions without any mercy. Gilson, seeing how unwell I was, expressed a strong desire that I should go on board a ship for a short time. I felt myself for the moment quite unequal to work, and Lord Raglan has kindly permitted me to go on board the *Caradoc*, so after dinner to-day I rode to Balaclava and embarked on board of her at about 9.30 P.M.'

On the following day the Duke left H.M.S. *Caradoc* and went on board H.M.S. *Retribution*. The same evening he wrote the following letter to Brigadier-General Reynardson, who had succeeded Bentinck in the command of the Brigade of Guards, upon the latter being wounded:—

TO GENERAL REYNARDSON.

'H.M.S. RETRIBUTION,
'BALACLAVA HARBOUR, *8th November* 1854.

'As you are in command of the Brigade of Guards, I address myself to you, to say that Lord Raglan has given me leave to go to Constantinople for a short period for the recovery of my health, and as I have not had an opportunity to see the Brigade together since the battle on the 5th instant, I must request you in my name to assemble the Three Battalions and to assure them in my name, as I intended to have done myself, that I am personally most grateful to both Officers and Men for their Noble Conduct on that most trying occasion, and that I feel confident their services will be duly appreciated by the Country and the Army. Where all distinguished themselves so much, it would be both impossible and invidious to name any one in particular.

'Most deeply do I deplore the heavy loss the Brigade sustained, but the Victory gained has been most important, and the enemy himself sustained a loss he will not so easily forget. Wishing you all health and happiness during the period of my absence from you.'

The same night he also wrote

TO GENERAL MONCRIEFF.

'BALACLAVA HARBOUR, *November 8th*, 1854.

'One line to tell you that we have had another fearful struggle, in which as usual the Regiment and the Brigade

of Guards behaved most nobly, but they have had terrible losses both in officers and men, and are really all but destroyed, Heaven knows from no fault of theirs, but because they nobly held the ground which it was absolutely necessary for us to maintain. We have lost in all, of the Brigade, 589 killed and wounded; of these 12 officers killed and 21 wounded. Poor Blair and Charles Seymour are killed of our Regiment; Pakenham, Neville, and Newman of the Grenadiers; and Dawson, Cowell, Mackinnon, Bouverie, Ramsden, Greville, Desborow and Elliott of the Coldstream. The wounded are too numerous to mention, but of ours there are Walker, F. Seymour, Baring, Drummond and Gipps, etc. Bentinck is wounded in the arm, but I hope not seriously. Sir George Cathcart, Goldie, and Strangways are killed. General Sir G. Brown, Torrens, Adams, and Buller wounded. How I escaped is a miracle to me, but my horse was disabled by a shot in the leg, and I had a shot which grazed my hand, entering through the sleeve of my coat, besides which I nearly was cut off and taken prisoner. However, the loss inflicted upon the Russians has been quite fearful, and is estimated at nearly 20,000.[1] Still they have other masses of troops that they can constantly bring up, whereas I fear we have no Reserves. What is now to be done I know not, but I cannot see how the place can be taken at this advanced season of the year, or how this Army can possibly stay here this winter. That we must see, and hope for the best.

'The disappointment and sorrow in England will be very great, but the good people there expect too much, and know nothing of the difficulties with which one has to contend. I must think over the filling up of the death vacancies.'

The Duke had now, as events proved, bade farewell to the Army in the Crimea. Before describing the incidents which immediately followed on the Battle of Inkermann, and which led to his being eventually invalided home, it will not be out of place here to allude to the affection and esteem with which he had inspired the men of our Army—no bad judges, as all the world knows—by his general conduct during the war, and more especially during the great Battle of Inkermann. A humble testimony to the impression made on the soldiers, not only of his own Division, but of the whole

[1] P. 158, Hamley, writing in 1890, when the Russian official losses were of course known, says:—'The Russian losses in the battle were four times as great as the number of the troops with which the Second Division met the first attack. They lost 12,000, of which an immense proportion were left dead on the field, and 256 officers. The English lost 597, of whom 39 officers, killed, and 1769, of whom 91 officers, wounded; the French 13 officers and 130 men killed, and 36 officers and 750 men wounded.'

Army, by his kindliness of heart and solicitude for their welfare and comforts, is afforded by Sergeant Morris, of the 63rd Regiment, in his little volume *The Three Sergeants*, published in 1858. Writing of the Duke's share in the Battle of Inkermann, he says:—

'That he had been preserved through the dangers of the battlefield was really wonderful, as the Russian riflemen had been specially directed to pick him off. No officer was more truly beloved by the Army than was the Duke, from his constant attention to their welfare, his identity with them in their dangers and sufferings, and his ready acquiescence in anything likely to add to their comforts, or that was conducive to their welfare.'

The Duke remained on board the *Retribution*, which was anchored outside the harbour, for some days, always hoping to shake off the fever and ague from which he was suffering. He, however, made no improvement, and most unfortunately came in for the great gale of 14 November, in which numbers of our transports were lost, several with all hands.

The entry in his diary of 14 November gives a graphic account of his experiences on that memorable day.

'*Tuesday*, 14*th*.—This was without exception the most fearful day of my life. About five o'clock in the morning the wind, which had hitherto been strong, began to freshen and was soon a gale, and by eight o'clock it was blowing a perfect hurricane with a most fearful sea on. It came upon us so suddenly and unexpectedly that we could not get to sea and were obliged to lay there, making the best of it and hoping for the best. It soon, however, became evident that our position was a most critical one, and that we were in great danger from our proximity to the shore and the coast, a terribly steep and rocky one. The transports near us were driving fearfully at their anchors, and the *Rip Van Wynkle* as nearly as possible got foul of us, when we must have gone. Providentially this was avoided, but the unfortunate transport soon was ashore, and all hands but two or three perished. At ten our rudder was carried away, and then all the upper deck guns and shot were thrown overboard. This lightened the ship considerably, and no doubt principally contributed to saving her. At twelve, two anchors went out of three; we had only one left and our steam that could possibly save us. At two a thunderbolt fell and struck the ship, with a heavy shower of hail. This cleared the atmosphere, and the wind went down gradually, though the sea continued as fearful as ever. Had we had a rudder, we would have made

a start as others did, but totally helpless without one, we were obliged to remain in our most critical position about 200 yards from the shore. Thus we lay all night hoping for the best, and a most fearful and awful twenty-four hours we spent, but God's mercy came to our rescue, and we were most providentially saved.'

The anxieties and exposures of this terrible gale did not tend, naturally enough, to improve the Duke's condition, and he was eventually, on 25 November, sent down to Constantinople.

From there he writes to his friend General Moncrieff:—

TO GENERAL MONCRIEFF.

'CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 6th*, 1854.

'I could not sooner reply to yours of the 30th ultimo, as I had no time, but as I have a little repose here at present I will do so at once. You will long ere this have heard of our fearful losses of the 5th November at Inkermann, though the fight was a noble one, and will, I trust, raise the Brigade of Guards still more in public estimation; but it was an awful and a fearful day, far more so than the one at Alma. I wish I could add that Sebastopol had fallen, but I cannot, though I live in hopes from day to day that it will come off, as it is high time for the sake of the Army, which has suffered so much from the bad weather and exposure, beside fatigue, which a protracted siege brings with it. We have lost two most excellent fellows, poor Blair and Charles Seymour. Their conduct was in every respect admirable. Poor Thistlethwayte has since fallen a victim to fever. This gives us three death vacancies which you must prepare at once to fill.

'I am very much grieved to tell you that in that dreadful storm of the 14th, during which I was myself nearly lost on board the *Retribution*, the *Prince* steamer[1] went down close to us, and our clothing which was on board *was lost*. This is a most serious calamity to our poor fellows, who were dreadfully in want of clothes. I have directed Colonel Walker to confer with Upton and Ridley, Grenadier Guards, and I doubt not that they will allow our men to have the surplus clothing of their two Battalions. By this means our poor

[1] 'Twenty-one vessels in or near the harbour of Balaclava were dashed to pieces, and eight others disabled. All these were full of stores urgently needed for the Army, and among them the *Prince*, a magnificent steamer, containing, says the *Journal of the Royal Engineers*, everything that was most wanted—warlike stores of every description, surgical instruments, guernsey frocks, flannel drawers, woollen stockings and socks, boots, shoes, watch-coats, in fact all that the foresight of the Government could devise for the equipment and comfort of the troops.'—Hamley, pp. 166, 167.

fellows will get things even though they be not quite regimental. . . . Walker behaved very well indeed on the 5th, and of the Regiment I can only say that all did their duty most nobly, and that I cannot praise one more than another. Young Lindsay is a very fine fellow, and I cannot say too much in favour of Drummond, our Adjutant, another gallant soul, severely wounded through the body, but doing remarkably well. Should young Lindsay at any time ask for the Adjutancy he ought to have it, for both at the Alma and at Inkermann he greatly distinguished himself. Sergeant-Major Edwards too behaved to perfection, and I wish we could do something for him. Walker was wounded, but is all right again and going back to rejoin. I wish we could get more recruits. A great many men are wanted, and the quicker you can get them the better.

'The drafts have come, but I have not seen them, as I was on board when they arrived. Having been quite worn out by fatigue and anxiety during so protracted a period, I have obtained leave to recruit here, but I am already better, and hope soon to be all right again.'

On 27 December, as he was still unfit to return to duty, a Medical Board examined him, and he was ordered to go home on sick leave.

The Duke's diaries of this time show that he was in a very anxious and perturbed condition, being swayed on the one hand by his anxiety to return to the war, and on the other by his physical weakness. Finally, on 3 January 1855 he sailed for Malta, where he hoped to recover sufficiently to return to the Crimea.

At Malta he remained for some weeks, meeting there a number of his comrades who had been wounded or invalided and ordered home. Sir de Lacy Evans, commanding the 2nd Division, had completely broken down from the hardships and exposures of the campaign and had returned to England, whilst Sir George Brown was at Malta suffering from his severe wound received at Inkermann. The commander of the 4th Division, Sir George Cathcart, had been killed; hence Lord Raglan at the most critical period of the campaign found himself deprived of the services of four out of his five divisional commanders, and in addition lost eight generals of lower grade, killed or wounded. It was at this period that the press in England indulged in most violent attacks on the gallant old Field-Marshal, regretful allu-

sions to which from time to time appear in the Duke's diaries.

Finally, on 22 January 1855 he started for England, and landed at Dover on the 30th: here he 'met with a most hearty reception from the inhabitants. It was truly gratifying.' The entry in his diary for the following day runs:—

'*Wednesday*, 31*st*.—The Queen having come to London in consequence of the defeat of the Ministry and their resignation, sent for me and received me most kindly and graciously, together with the Prince. I was some time with her, and I lunched with her. Being still far from well and anxious to keep quiet, I did not go anywhere else excepting to see my own family. Dined with the Duchess [of Gloucester].'

On Friday, 2 February, he writes:—

'I saw a few people to-day, amongst others Lord Hardinge and the Duke of Newcastle. All are full of kind expressions towards me and of anxiety about the Crimea; all desirous to know how matters really stand there and what can be done.'

On the following day he writes:—'Called on Lady Raglan and her daughter. They received me most kindly. They are in great distress about the attacks on Lord Raglan, which continue in violence.'

On 6 February occurs his first entry with reference to Lord Panmure, who was subsequently his colleague when at the War Office. 'Lord Palmerston has formed his Government. Panmure takes the Ministry of War: a good appointment, I hope.' Three days later on 9 February:—'I had a long interview with Panmure, who is installed in his new office. He asked me many questions and listened to all I had to say. I think he will do very well, but it is a great undertaking.'

On 18 May the Queen held a parade in London for the distribution of the Crimean medal.

'I commanded the parade, and was the first to receive the medal. Everything went off to perfection; the weather was lovely, and it was a beautiful sight, to me it was indeed a proud moment, when I stepped forward to receive the medal at the Queen's hand. I shall never forget it as long as I live. I was much cheered on my return home. Went to see the medal men dine at the Palace. To the House of Lords to hear Panmure explain his proposed Army Reform.'

The earliest reference to Aldershot occurs on 5 June:—

'Went with Adolphus[1] to Aldershott by rail. A fine day. Got out at Farnborough and rode across and about the place with General Knollys and Sir Frederick Smith. Much pleased with all I saw, and it will soon be ready for a considerable body of troops. At present only four Regiments there.'

On 8 June H.R.H. was offered the command at Gibraltar, which, however, he declined, as he still hoped to return to the Crimea. On 22 June the first news of the repulse of the British troops on the assault of the Redan reached England. Hitherto, since the return of the spring, all had been going well, and hence the news came as a great shock to everybody. Three days later the number of officers and men killed and wounded was received.

On Sunday, 30 June, came the news of Lord Raglan's death. The Duke writes:—

'This was indeed a most sad and melancholy day to all of us. . . . I received a message from the Queen to say that they had just received a telegraphic message from the Crimea to the effect that poor dear Lord Raglan had suddenly become worse on afternoon of the 28th, and had died that evening at half-past nine. This is a fearful catastrophe, a sad and most painful blow. It has filled all hearts with mourning and sorrow, and has afflicted me personally most deeply. His death at such a moment is an irreparable loss to the country.'

On 11 September the long-expected news of the fall of Sebastopol arrived. 'This is such immense, such glorious news, that one can hardly realise it. God be praised it is so. Our loss on the assault of the 8th appears to have been very heavy.'

On 5 October he writes: 'Saw Lord Panmure, with whom I had a long conversation about myself and my anxiety to command the Army in the field.'

During the summer he had made constant visits to Aldershot to inspect the troops, Regulars and Militia, under training. From his private letters it appears that he was ever endeavouring to obtain employment at the seat of war. Writing to General Forster, he bemoans his fate at

[1] The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, H.R.H.'s brother-in-law.

being unable to return as follows: 'I wish to God I could discover some work by which I could return to the Army in the field. I never can and never shall be happy unless I do, and am pining here for employment, without seeing the smallest prospect of getting it.'

After the fall of Sebastopol, the Russians withdrew to their entrenched position on the Mackenzie Heights, to the north-east of the ruined fortress. The question of the next move of the Allies in the great game of war now entered upon a new and most difficult phase. It would be impossible here even to outline the various machinations of Russia, or the vacillations of Austria and Prussia. The French nation were undoubtedly tired of the war, and the bulk of their leading men were anxious to secure a peace at any price. The Emperor Napoleon, however, despite the enormous difficulties of his position, remained thoroughly loyal to the British nation. Austria, after several ineffectual efforts, at length submitted to the Allies a projected Treaty of Peace, based on terms which the British Ministry could accept. The Emperor Napoleon had let it be known that he was prepared either to make peace on these terms or to continue the war with increased vigour. A Conference was held at Paris early in January 1855, at which he himself presided, and H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge was the senior military member representing England. This memorable Conference took place during the period when the Austrian ultimatum was under consideration at St. Petersburg.

The first meeting was held at the Tuileries on 10 January, the principal members being Princes Jerome and Napoleon Bonaparte, Lord Cowley, Marshal Vaillant, Count Walewski, and General La Marmora, with a proportion of British and French Admirals and Generals.

Throughout the deliberations, which extended over ten days, the Duke wrote almost daily reports to Lord Clarendon and to Lord Panmure. The two main considerations before the Conference were the best methods to adopt in the Crimea and how to attack Russia in the Baltic.

The Duke, writing to Lord Panmure on 12 January

after the second meeting, announces that it was generally agreed that the Crimea must be held, whilst an army based on Eupatoria might aim at the Russian rear; he also alludes to a 'wild scheme for attacking St. Petersburg,' prepared by one of the French Generals. Speaking of Napoleon, he says: 'Everything the Emperor said to-day at the Council was most judicious and prudent, and he expressed his opinion very freely that it was ridiculous to say that with an army of upwards of 200,000 men, nothing could be done; this admonition will doubtless produce its effect on the several members of the Council.'

In accordance with the Emperor's desire, each member of the Conference prepared a brief paper giving his views on the future conduct of the war.

As H.R.H.'s suggestions were eventually adopted by the Emperor in all their main details, and were embodied in his own final statement, it has been thought desirable to give them here.

OPINION OF THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, HANDED IN, IN WRITING, AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE, 16TH JANUARY 1856.

'. . . As a matter of policy alone, it would be most imprudent to abandon the Crimea, and as a military operation an embarkation from the present position held by the Allied Armies would be most difficult, if not next to impossible, without very serious loss both to men and material, which would in effect amount to no less than a defeat. . . . It is evident to me that our present position must be held by from 60,000 to 70,000 men, and in holding it I should attach much importance to retaining our present position from the heights opposite to Inkermann with the line of the Tchernaya. . . . I think it is of immense importance to a large army to have the double ports of Balaclava and Kamiesch . . . strengthened by field-works, with a line of defence round Balaclava, etc. All the troops above the 60,000 to 70,000 men would then become available for other operations, and assuming that . . . in the spring, there will be an available army of 200,000 men, we may fairly calculate that nearly 150,000 men would be left to be disposed of.

'These should, in my opinion, first be transported to Eupatoria, as the point whence the most favourable diversion could be effected, and the army to be there landed should be most complete and should consist of 80,000 men.'

(The question of water supply is here entered upon.)

(Landing easy in summer months.)

'. . . A combined movement can be made both in the front and rear of the Russian Army on the heights of Mackenzie, for, whilst the force from Eupatoria would threaten the enemy's rear and would in all probability be enabled to cut off his communication with Perekop, the force in position before Sebastopol might, either by a rapid *coup de main* or by judicious manœuvring, seize upon the position of Mackenzie from the side of Inkermann, and, at all events, so threaten the entire line of the Russian works . . . as to prevent the enemy from detaching a sufficient number of troops to enable him to fall with overwhelming force on that part of the Allied Army which is advancing from Eupatoria.

'In order to make this operation still more effectual, it would be very desirable if a force of 15,000 men were to be sent round into the Sea of Azoff, land at Genitchi and make a bold dash at the Tchergun Bridge with a view to its destruction. . . .'

The Duke further suggested that the 60,000 over and above the 155,000 thus provided for, should be used in Asia to assist the Turks and oppose an advance from Kars or Erzeroum, though he was aware that for such an undertaking the transport considerations would be a very serious matter. As regards the Baltic, he considered that the season was too advanced for *large* military operations. Cronstadt, however, should be bombarded, and 15,000 men sent as auxiliaries to fleet.' He concluded as follows:—

'In making arrangements for these vast operations it appears to me to be most essential, if possible, to separate the action of the Allied Armies. Divided command in the field is always most objectionable, and the difficulties attending it have been already too sensibly felt. These difficulties would no doubt increase when vast operations in the field were commenced by the Allied Armies.'

In the Duke's report of the fourth sitting on 18 January, he writes:—

'The opinions of members were handed in, each member reading his opinion aloud as to the future conduct of the war. The opinions of Princes Jerome and Napoleon and my own were not read but merely handed in, at the express desire of the Emperor, and no opinions were given by any of the French Ministers present, nor by the English Ambassador. . . . The general opinion of the members of the Conference was this:—As speedy an evacuation of the Crimea as circumstances would admit of, but the necessity of beating the enemy in the field in the first instance and thereby probably forcing him out of the Crimea, such operation to be effected by an advance from Eupatoria, combined with an attack in front on the heights of Mackenzie, if found practi-

cable, which it was imagined it would be. It was further suggested that an attempt might be made on the Bridge of Tchergun from Genitchi.

'An Army of the Rhine,[1] to be formed as speedily as possible after these operations in the Crimea had been accomplished, was hinted at in several of the papers; further, a suggestion of occupying Constantinople by an army of 30,000 men, the British forces being sent to Asia to carry out operations in that direction.

'The Baltic was thought impracticable for any great military operation, for this year at all events, but the attempt on Cronstadt seemed to most to be desirable by the fleets, etc., with 15,000 men. . . .'

(The various schemes for combined operations in Crimea, etc., were described.)

'The Emperor, having heard all these papers read, said he considered the general deliberation as closed. H.M. further informed me he would give me his views in order that I might put H.M. Government in possession of them.'

Finally, on 20 January, the Duke writes as follows:—

'The members of the Council of War were reassembled after dining with the Emperor this evening, with a view to hearing and discussing the views put on paper by the Emperor as regards a future campaign. They were all present with the exception of the Princes Jerome and Napoleon, Count Walewski, and Lord Cowley. H.M. has promised to give me a copy of his memo, the conclusion to which he arrived being that as regards the Baltic, the only thing to be done would be to endeavour to destroy Cronstadt by the fleet, laying down a basis for such fleet, 12 line-of-battle ships prepared to meet and engage the Russian Fleet in the event of its attempting to come out of harbour, dividing the gunboats into two grand divisions, one of which, numbering about 100, to meet the Russian Gunboats in the event of an opportunity offering, and the other, of about 60, to bombard the place. He did not think that an auxiliary landing force would be desirable.

'With reference to the Crimea, H.M. says that he holds the evacuation of the country to be neither possible as a military operation, nor desirable as a political measure. He suggests that 120,000 men should be landed at Eupatoria, Old Fort, and near the Bulganak . . . that 100,000 should be left in the positions at present occupied before Sebastopol, ready not only to defend the place but to be prepared to move forward in case an opportunity should offer. As a diversion he would wish a small corps of 10,000 to 15,000 men being landed near Yulmo so as to threaten the passes of Alach. The

[1] The present writer has been informed on high French authority that this was considered desirable owing to the uncertain attitude of Prussia at this period.

Emperor expressed himself as adverse to an attack on the Tchergun Bridge from the side of Genitchi. The movement from Eupatoria to be supported by entrenched camps to be formed at Sak and Tchobotar, which places would then form strong *points d'appui* for an army advancing into the interior, especially in the event of a retreat being necessary, and under any circumstances giving great confidence to the advancing troops. The movement to be prepared for as speedily as possible, and 80,000 French troops to be taken to Eupatoria by detachments. These would form the French contingent: when the time of action arrived the French to move forward by Sak, the Sardinian 20,000 to land at Old Fort and move thence to their front on the right of the French, and connecting them with the English force of 40,000 men to be landed off the Bulganak and move up this stream. . . . The question of the divided command was brought up by myself, and was at once entertained by everybody as a most desirable subject for mutual arrangement. . . . The Emperor solved the difficulty by saying that . . . without reference to the number of troops composing either Corps, the French Commander-in-Chief should have chief command of the troops of all nations operating from the one side, and the English Commander-in-Chief that of all troops operating from the other. . . . The members generally approved of this. It was thought that no great operations would be undertaken before the 15th May, by which time all preparations should be made,' etc.

The Duke's last letter to Lord Clarendon was written on the same day as the foregoing.

'. . . Cowley has reported to you the interview that took place between the Emperor, himself, and Walewski, at which I was present. The impression produced by it on my mind was a painful one, and I have felt since that period that my position here is a very difficult and delicate one. . . . It is essential for the Ministers to know in respect to the Emperor's present position and difficulties with regard to France . . . there is far more public opinion in France than we in England are aware of. . . . We would accept peace, if good, safe, and honourable. . . . Here, however, I regret to say in all classes, from the highest to the lowest, and nowhere so much as in the Army, they will have peace for the sake of peace, leaving the future to take care of itself. The Emperor does not share these views, I am happy to say, but he finds himself in a great perplexity, and does not see his way clearly out of it. The great object must be now so to adjust matters by a mutual give and take as to respect the susceptibilities of both countries. The Emperor, I believe, intends to give me his views before leaving in order that I may explain them more in detail to the English Government. I have done my best to smooth down matters here in all directions, and I

trust I have to some extent been successful, but it has been a most delicate and difficult task. . . . I have given the subject my most anxious thought, and am convinced that at the present moment I can serve my country best by a personal interview with the Government.'

As has been already stated, it was whilst this Conference was holding its sittings that Russia came to terms with the Allies. Sir Edward Hamley thus describes the situation at the close of hostilities in January 1856:—

'The alliance, thanks to the good faith of Louis Napoleon, having thus proved firm, the hollow pretensions of Russia vanished like a bubble. Her exhaustion left her no choice but to accept. Her losses, never accurately known, had been stupendous. Up to the end of August those in the Crimea alone were estimated at 153,000 men, while hundreds of thousands, drawn from the recesses of the vast Empire, had died of the hardships of the march. Altogether it was confidently believed that her total loss during the war was not less than half a million of men. On the 16th of January she accepted the Austrian terms as the basis of conference, and on the 25th of February the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers met at Paris. Their first act was to settle the conditions of an armistice which was to last till the 31st of March. . . . The Treaty of Paris was signed on the 30th of March. . . .'

CHAPTER V

THE COMMANDERSHIP-IN-CHIEF—1856

Lord Hardinge resigns. H.R.H. appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. Historical Sketch of the Office. The King and the Army. The Secretary at War. Controversy between Sir D. Dundas and Lord Palmerston. The War Office before the Crimean War. Changes in 1854. The Duke's Memorandum. Parliamentary Debates. The later History of the Commandership-in-Chief.

THE period between the Duke's return from the Crimea and his assuming the important post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army on 15th July 1856 is one of which but little record remains, chiefly because during these months he was not holding any active command.

In these circumstances, recourse has been had to his diaries to bridge over the interval, and occasional extracts are here given which afford ample indication of the occupations and thoughts of the Duke during this portion of his career.

H.R.H.'s DIARY.

1856.

'21*st February*.—To House of Lords to hear Lord Derby put a question to Panmure with reference to the duties of the H.G. and Secretary for War. The reply was highly satisfactory, and the Government are pledged to maintain the Commander-in-Chief as he at present exists. This is a great point gained.

'27*th March*.—Started with Clifton by seven o'clock train for Aldershot. Breakfasted with General Knollys, and then accompanied him to a drill of the troops. Twenty-one Battalions were out in five Brigades and really did wonderfully well, and I must say I am very much pleased by all I saw, and by the efficiency of the Militia Regiments. . . .

'30*th March*.—At ten the guns in the Park were fired on the announcement of peace; fifty-one guns. It had a curious effect upon one's feelings. The war had just lasted two years and two days, it having been proclaimed 27th

March 1854. I cannot regret the peace, which is said to be a good one, though perhaps for England, well prepared as she is, another year of war might have been an advantage, but, after all, this is problematical, and so it is as well as it is. I only hope the peace may be a good one. . . .

'19*th April*.—Started for Aldershot with Tyrwhitt by seven o'clock train. Day bad at starting, but it mended later. Rode across from Farnborough. Breakfasted with the Antrim Rifles, and went up to the Queen's Pavilion. It is really very nice, and nicely furnished and fitted up.

'The Queen started on horseback at 10.45. I rode on her right, the Prince on her left. The day fine but cold. The troops looked well and gave us a very creditable field-day, finishing by marching past. Lunched with the Queen, and then went on to the Permanent Barracks that are building. Rode back to Farnborough, and then came up with the Queen in her special train, arriving in London at 6.30. . . .'

During the month of April the Court of Inquiry on matters connected with the Crimean War sat at Chelsea, and the Duke makes frequent entries in his diary, commencing with one on 7 April, as to his attendances there.

On 1 June the Duke proceeded to Aldershot to take part in the laying of the foundation stone of Wellington College, which was performed by H.M. in person on the following day, all the troops from Aldershot being present.

'7*th June*.— . . . Had a long visit from Panmure, with whom discussed my future prospects. I am satisfied with what he said. . . .'

As far as can be gathered, Lord Panmure must at this interview have informed the Duke of the probability of his early employment at Headquarters.

Certain it is that during this month Lord Hardinge had under his consideration a scheme for the creation of a new office to be styled 'Inspector-General of Infantry in the United Kingdom.' This appointment was approved, and the Duke received the following letter from Lord Panmure:—

'W.D., 23*rd June* 1856.

'I have the satisfaction to inform Y.R.H. that I saw the Queen on Saturday, and Her Majesty at once consented to the arrangement by which Y.R.H. should be appointed Inspector-General of Infantry.

'I have received Lord Hardinge's official communication on the subject, and will answer it as soon as it has been formally laid before the Cabinet.'

A few days afterwards the Duke received the following letter from Lord Hardinge giving him further details of his new office:—

'HORSE GUARDS, *5th July* 1856.

'I have the honour to send Y.R.H. a rough draft of the proposed instructions for the Inspector-General of Infantry.

'Y.R.H. will perceive that he will have under his orders about 30,000 men, besides Regiments not in Camps or Garrisons.

'I think a strong case is made out, in the altered organisation of the Army, for the creation of such an office.'

The Duke never took up this appointment, for within two days of penning the above, Lord Hardinge was on 7 July seized with the attack of paralysis which resulted in his resignation and death within a brief period.

The events of this momentous period, which had such far-reaching effects on the Duke of Cambridge's subsequent career, are thus described by him in his diary:—

'*5th July.*—Went to Aldershot by quarter-past ten train to welcome home my Regiment; was delighted with their general appearance. Rode about the Camps. The 79th Highlanders marched in as I arrived, looking wonderfully well. The Guards Brigade were out for my inspection at 2.30, and magnificent they looked. Three thousand men on parade, every man a soldier in feeling and bearing. It was a most glorious sight. . . .

'*7th July.*—Went down to Aldershot by one o'clock train with my mother and Mary, Edward, young Prince of Hesse, etc.,[1] to attend the Review of Troops returned from the Crimea. On arrival it came on to rain, and continued so the whole afternoon.

'I therefore showed Mamma and Mary the Camp, and we went to all the old Regiments of my Division. All looked admirably well, and received me with the greatest cordiality and good feeling. Finding there was no review, the Duchess returned to London at six, and I remained with Panmure at his hut at Camp.

'In the course of the afternoon, Lord Hardinge, whilst conversing with the Queen and Albert, was seized with a paralytic attack. The Queen thought that it was a slip and fall, and was not in the least aware of what had occurred. Lord Hardinge's head remained perfectly clear all the time. They were unable to move him to London, and he remained

[1] T.R.H.'s the Duchess of Cambridge, Princess Mary (afterwards Princess Mary of Teck), and Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar.

at his hut next to our own. I dined with the Queen, meeting all the Commanding Officers of Regiments. We got home at eleven, and I saw poor Lord Hardinge for a moment. He spoke clear and connected. . . .

'*8th July.*— . . . Poor Lord Hardinge was moved to London at eight o'clock. I saw him before he started, his head was clear and collected, but his right side is helpless. . . . We breakfasted at the Club, and at eleven the troops were out in spite of the most desperate weather. Besides the Brigade of Guards, we had the 1st Royals, 1st Batt. 7th, 19th, 79th, 1st Battalion Rifles,[1] 4th Dragoon Guards—all Crimean Regiments—and the rest of the garrison looked on. It was a noble sight in spite of the weather.

'The Queen made a beautiful address to the troops after they had marched past in splendid style. Nothing could be more beautiful than the manner in which all went off, with the exception always of the weather, which was dreadful. Returned to Farnborough, where changed my things and came up with the Queen at three in her special train. . . .

'*9th July.*—This was the day fixed for the entry of the Guards into London. Morning very fine. At eleven the Guards, under Rokeby and Crawford, left the station, the streets were crowded, the enthusiasm immense, and everything went off most satisfactorily. In Hyde Park the four other Battalions of the Guards were drawn up to receive their comrades. On their arrival I took the command, and everything went off admirably, and the enthusiasm was unbounded. The troops looked to perfection. I was greatly cheered on my return home. After paying visits, dined with the Lord Mayor to meet General Williams.[2] It was a handsome dinner and very good gathering. Home by 11.30. Poor Lord Hardinge is going on favourably, but he has resigned, and it is said I am likely to succeed.

'*12th July.*—To-night I had a letter from Panmure, informing me that the Cabinet had recommended me to the Queen as Commander-in-Chief. The responsibility very great, and so is the honour.

'*Sunday, 13th July.*—Went to Chapel Royal at twelve, then at home, and paid visits. On my return to dress for dinner at seven, found a note summoning me to the Palace. The Queen saw me in the Garden, and in conjunction with Albert announced to me my appointment to the Command-in-Chief of the Army. She was most gracious and most kind in her expressions of pleasure, as was the Prince. Thus I am placed in the proudest military position that any subject could be placed in: it is an onerous one, but I will do my best to do myself credit. I saw Lord Hardinge, who was aware of the appointment, and who I found rather better, but still very feeble. From Lord Palmerston I had also a communication to the same effect. . . .

[1] Rifle Brigade.

[2] Sir Fenwick Williams of Kars.

'14*th July*.—Saw General Yorke at nine. I have confirmed his appointment as Military Secretary, as he is so highly spoken of by the Army. At ten down to Woolwich with Jem. The Queen arrived at eleven with the Prince of Prussia and Princess, and the whole of the Artillery recently returned from the Crimea was reviewed. We had ninety-two guns out. The day lovely; the Queen rode, and everything passed off to the greatest satisfaction. The troops looked beautiful and did great credit to their officers. General Williams commanded. It was all over by one, and I was at home by a quarter past two, when I went to the Horse Guards to talk matters over with the Chiefs there. Dined at the Palace, where there was a dance till 1.30 o'clock.

'15*th July*.—Saw the 1st Battalion Fusilier Guards in the Park at nine. They looked remarkably well and marched past most creditably. Then went to the Horse Guards after breakfast and was busy there till twelve, when had a long and satisfactory interview with Panmure, after which went to see Palmerston, with whom I was equally satisfied. Back to the Horse Guards, and later paid visits. Dined and went to the opera, *Lucretia Borgia*.

'16*th July*.—To the Horse Guards after breakfast, and then with the Queen's train to Aldershot at 12.30, having missed the train for the Houses of Parliament. The morning commenced badly, but afterwards turned out better, and ended by being really quite fine. Lunched with Panmure in his hut, where Mamma and Mary joined us, and then went to the Queen's Pavilion at four. The whole of the troops at Aldershot were reviewed by the Queen, several Regiments having but just arrived, looking remarkably well. After seeing the last Crimean arrivals, there was a little field-day of the other troops, ending with a great march past. It was not over before eight o'clock, and went off very well. The Queen was much pleased. I was there for the first time as Commander-in-Chief. Came back by special train, but reached London too late to go to the Coldstream dinner as I had intended. Dined quietly with the Duchess, and then to bed after writing letters.

'17*th July*.—To the Horse Guards at eleven, and remained there the greater part of the day seeing the heads of departments, etc. It will be a most interesting though arduous post to fill, and will require much time and attention. To the House of Lords for a moment, and then paid visits and saw Lord Hardinge, who I found tolerably well, though feeble. Dined alone at White's, and early home.'

The momentous letter from Lord Panmure referred to in the preceding diary is here given:—

'W. D., 7 P.M., 12*th July* 1856.

'I have much satisfaction in informing Y.R.H. that the

Cabinet have cordially concurred in recommending you to the Queen as Lord Hardinge's successor.

'This is a step to which I rejoice in having been a party, and I have no doubt that it will be beneficial to the Queen, the Country, and the Army, to have Your Royal Highness at its head.

'I shall come to Y.R.H. on Monday at *twelve*, if convenient, as there are some things on which I must have a conversation with you.'

On this same day, Lord Palmerston informed the Queen that the Cabinet had come to the unanimous conclusion that no one was more fitted to succeed Lord Hardinge than the Duke of Cambridge. Accordingly H.R.H. on 15 July 1856 was promoted from Lieutenant-General to General and gazetted Commanding-in-Chief, an appointment which was received with universal approval.

Upon Lord Hardinge resigning his appointment as Commanding-in-Chief, he issued a Farewell Order to the Army, in which the following passage occurs:—

'HORSE GUARDS, 16*th July* 1856.

'. . . Viscount Hardinge can only add the expressions of his sincere gratification that the command of the Army is, by H.M.'s pleasure, about to be assumed by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., G.C.B., the illustrious Prince whose name is associated with some of the most splendid triumphs of the war just concluded, and whose devotion to the interest of the service is well known.'

The Duke of Cambridge upon assuming office issued the following General Order:—

'HORSE GUARDS, 16*th July* 1856.

'In obedience to the Gracious Order of H.M., General H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge assumes the command of the Army which has been confided to him by H.M.'s favour on the resignation of Field Marshal Viscount Hardinge. H.R.H. feels it no easy task to undertake the responsibilities of so honourable and arduous a post, as the successor of that distinguished General who has found himself compelled to retire from it by the state of his health, and who again was preceded by that illustrious chief whose name will ever continue to be the glory of the British Army and British nation; but he has the strongest reliance on the support of the General Officers with whom he will be associated, and on the Army at large; and in this reliance he enters confidently on the noble trust which has now devolved upon him.

'H.R.H. has had the advantage, as a General Officer in command of a Division under the orders of his lamented and gallant friend the late Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, of being to some extent personally acquainted with the heroic deeds of the Army in the recent arduous contest, now so fortunately brought to a successful end. He knows of what excellent materials the troops are composed, both as to officers and men. It will be his anxious endeavour to maintain the Army in the high state of efficiency in which it has been left by his distinguished predecessor, and he doubts not that the Army itself will be mainly instrumental in enabling him to carry out this most anxious wish of his heart.'

Historical Sketch of the Office of Commander-in-Chief.

A Commander-in-Chief of the British Army was appointed by patent or letters of service, signed on behalf of the Sovereign by a Secretary of State; and the difference made in the mode of appointment determined the title by which he was to be known. The Duke of Cambridge was not appointed by patent; and he held his position on the authority of a letter from the Secretary of State, which notified Her Majesty's pleasure.

The principal command of the British Army has at various times been held under different names—Captain-General, Generalissimo, Commander-in-Chief, General Commanding-in-Chief, Field-Marshal on the Staff, and General on the Staff. The Duke of Wellington had been Commander-in-Chief; but the Duke of Cambridge was General Commanding-in-Chief from 1856 to 1887, when, on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Jubilee and in commemoration of his jubilee of military service, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief—a designation subsequently borne by the last two holders of that exalted office.

The status and powers of the Commander-in-Chief play so important a part in the Duke's life that a short sketch of the history of the post may not be inappropriate.

Till 1793 Army administration was actually in the hands of the Sovereign personally, although before that period there had been at least two Commanders-in-Chief—Lord Stair and Marshal Wade—and several Captains-General. Orders and regulations as regards military matters were in

those days communicated to the Army by the Secretary at War, who was not a Secretary of State and not usually a member of the Cabinet. He was responsible generally to Parliament for the Army; but his actions had to receive the sanction of a Secretary of State, who, up to 1794, was the Home Secretary. Thus much power both as regards administration and the making of appointments rested in the hands of political officials; and the history of the wars and military appointments of the eighteenth century shows that they were not sparing in making use of their opportunities. As a general rule political, rather than military, qualifications were then considered necessary attributes for high command. Needless to say, complaints against the unsuitability or lack of experience of Commanders were frequent and numerous, not only in the War of American Independence, but in other cases. So far back as 1740 the appointment of an authoritative Commander-in-Chief, with a view to ensuring that military merit, instead of political services or influence, should govern the system of selection had been advocated in Parliament. The want of such an official had also acted injuriously on the discipline of the Army, which had suffered in consequence of power and patronage being virtually in the hands of the Secretary at War—for of course the King had neither time nor opportunity to deal with such matters in the necessary detail. The Adjutants-General of the period complained that they were powerless to enforce regulations, and many abuses sprang up in consequence. Officers neglected their duties. But when they happened to be Members of Parliament they knew that they would escape scatheless if they voted 'straight.' Thus discipline was altogether sacrificed to the supposed exigencies of party government.[1] So the removal of political influence from Army affairs had become a burning question; and, in order that promotions and appointments might rest in the hands of a soldier—a change which few will deny was necessary—a General Commanding-in-Chief was appointed in 1793.

All orders and regulations subsequently were communi-

[1] Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, vol. iii. p. 524 *et seq.*

cated to the Army by a Commander-in-Chief, and not, as formerly, by a Secretary at War. The latter official, however, still existed; and thus arose the dual control of the Horse Guards and the War Office, which lasted in practice till 1870. Its abolition then, though doubtless reasonable and necessary, rendered the position of the Commander-in-Chief an altogether impossible one, when once the tact and prestige of the Duke of Cambridge disappeared.

Meanwhile in 1794 a Secretary of State for War was appointed; though seven years later the burden of the Colonies was also thrust upon his shoulders, and he thus became the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. He sat at the Colonial Office, and he exercised a general though somewhat vague control over military affairs, without being actually responsible for details. His real functions in respect of the Army were in practice confined to times of war: although in theory he was responsible for military policy generally, for the number of men who comprised the Army, and for the movement of troops on foreign or colonial service.

No clear definition of the respective duties of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary at War had been made in 1793. So a collision between them was a mere question of time. Curiously enough, it did not arise till 1810, when Sir David Dundas was Commander-in-Chief and Lord Palmerston Secretary at War.[1] Sir David Dundas's view was that the Secretary at War stood in the same relation to the Commander-in-Chief as formerly he had done to the King, when the latter was in personal command of the Army; and on the analogy of the Secretary at War's former subordination to the King as actual Commander-in-Chief, he held that he was now also subordinate to him. The Secretary at War, he maintained, was only entrusted with the duty of seeing that the law as between soldiers and citizens was

[1] On two subsequent occasions Lord Palmerston himself acted as Commander-in-Chief. On the death of the Duke of York in 1827, he asserted that when there was no Commander-in-Chief, it was the Secretary at War's business to issue orders to the Army, and this view was upheld by George IV. Again, on the resignation of the Duke of Wellington in the same year, Lord Palmerston acted as Commander-in-Chief.

duly observed, and that the accounts of the Army were properly balanced.

On the other hand, the Secretary at War thought that, as Controller of Military Finance, he was entitled to issue orders to the Army, a course which the Commander-in-Chief considered an unwarrantable interference. So on the one hand it was maintained that the War Office was subordinate to the Horse Guards; and on the other that the War Office was an independent institution. In support of this last contention Lord Palmerston drew up a long and exhaustive historical retrospect, in which he endeavoured to prove the soundness of his standpoint. The controversy finally was submitted to the Cabinet, with the result that the aspirations of the War Office were upheld. Nevertheless the Secretary at War was desired by the Prince Regent to show all orders, which he proposed to issue, to the Commander-in-Chief before actually doing so; and it was further provided that, in cases where the opinion of the two did not coincide, the matter should be settled by an appeal to the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. No further collision, however, occurred till the sytem ended in 1854.

Thus, till the time of the Crimean War, the Secretary at War prepared and presented the Army Estimates, checked expenditure, was supposed to be responsible that the provisions of the Mutiny Act were duly observed, and that the security of civil rights was respected. His duties as regards the estimates, however, by no means covered the whole field of annual expenditure which might properly be called military. The Militia, Commissariat, and Ordnance Estimates were each presented separately to Parliament by those who were responsible for them. So in those days at any rate there was decentralisation with a vengeance. Consequently, before the Crimea and the changes which it gave rise to, the Army was still ruled by that wide dispersion of duties and offices, the original reason for which was the supposed constitutional safety which lay in this amazing form of decentralisation. In effect, business was in those days distributed as follows. The Commander-in-Chief was respon-

sible to the Crown for discipline, appointments, rewards and punishments. The Secretary at War, who was not a Secretary of State, was responsible to Parliament for the money voted, and for what might be called the legal status of the military machine. The Secretary of State for the Home Department was responsible for such reserve forces, including the Militia, as then existed. The Ordnance Board under the Master-General of Ordnance was responsible for defences, and for Army and Navy stores, and the Commissariat was under the direct control of the Treasury. Lastly, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, endued with large though vague powers, was constitutionally at the head of the military machine.

In 1854 a fourth Secretary of State—there were already three: Foreign, Home, and War and Colonies—was appointed for War alone; and to him also shortly afterwards were directly assigned all the departments which dealt with military matters, except that of the Commander-in-Chief. In 1855 the lamentable breakdown of arrangements in the Crimea attracted attention to the question of military responsibilities. So the matter became the subject of parliamentary debate, with the result that Lord Aberdeen resigned and Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister. At the same time Lord Panmure was appointed Secretary of State for War, and at once he proceeded to set his department in order. The complex nature of his position will be readily appreciated when one considers how inconvenient it must have been in time of war, for the Army to be ruled by the multifarious officials who have already been alluded to.

The new Secretary of State soon realised that in order to administer the Army effectually he must be master in his own house. Accordingly, in addition to his higher appointment, he took over himself the Secretaryship at War, a post which was altogether abolished eight years later; by which means he secured the immediate control of the War Office, which he actually administered through a deputy Secretary at War. He also took over from the Home Office the Militia and the Yeomanry, from the Treasury the Commissariat,

and from the Board of Ordnance the work which it had hitherto performed.

The Board of Ordnance at this time had no less than three Parliamentary representatives—the Master-General, the Clerk, and the Principal Storekeeper; and consequently, having regard to its actual duties, it was greatly over-represented. Lord Panmure effected the abolition of the Board by obtaining the revocation of its patent on 25 May 1855. At the same time the military functions of the Master-General, as Commandant of the Artillery and Engineers, were transferred to the Commander-in-Chief; and the civil duties of the Ordnance office were from henceforth administered by the Secretary of State through the Clerk of the Ordnance.

Thus the newly created Secretary of State became responsible for the whole administration of the Army. It is true that the Commander-in-Chief still exercised independent military control; but the Secretary of State was nevertheless in the last resort responsible to Parliament for its exercise.

It was whilst these changes were under discussion that the Duke of Cambridge wrote, in April 1855, the following memorandum, in which he endeavoured to lay down in a workable manner the respective duties of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State.

Military Organisation.

'The Military Departments of the country are now being reconstituted, it is to be hoped on firmer and sounder principles than has hitherto been the case. This, then, is the moment to simplify business in these departments as much as possible, placing the proper responsibility in the proper quarter, and separating the purely military details of the Army from those of a Political or Financial character, the former being under the immediate control and direction of the Commander-in-Chief, the latter under that of the Secretary of State for War. It is supposed by many that such a division of labour cannot be effected without bringing forward the question of the Royal Prerogative, which is at all times not desirable, more especially so at a moment of no little excitement.

'But this view is a most mistaken one, and all that is required is to lay down within broad principles, either by an

Order in Council or by a Ministerial Minute, by which the details of office may be so clearly defined as to simplify all business, yet in no way to trench on the authority of the Minister. There is little doubt that this can be effected without any great difficulty, provided the question is calmly reviewed and entered upon with a spirit of wisdom and conciliation. Nobody questions the right of the War Minister to have entire control over the Political and Financial details of his office. It is the purely professional subjects of the department which should be left to be regulated by the Commander-in-Chief, and as the Minister holds the purse-strings in his hands, he would naturally have that genuine control over military details which would keep him informed of all that was going on, and would enable him to prevent any abuse of power in an officer not immediately responsible to Parliament for his acts. Even this, however, is more of a fiction than a reality, for every officer under the Crown is responsible to public opinion, and no Commander-in-Chief could ever, even if he were so disposed, overstep the limits of prudence and discretion in his administration of the Army.

'Let us instance by some few examples in what way this object may be most easily obtained. It has been said before that all Political and Financial Questions connected with the administration of the Army rest with the Minister for War. On the other hand, all matters of Discipline and Military Detail of Organisation should rest exclusively with the Commander-in-Chief.

'Thus it would be the Minister who would decide upon any military operation, its extent, as to the numbers of troops to be employed, and the object in view. He would hereupon issue his instructions to the Commander-in-Chief to prepare the force so decided upon, and to fit out that force militarily, according to the Regulations laid down, taking care that nothing should be wanting as regards clothing, arming, etc., to make it thoroughly efficient for the field. If the service is a peculiar one, and the Commander-in-Chief were of opinion that a special outlay of money is required to meet the peculiar exigencies of the case, he would submit his professional views to the Minister for his consideration and sanction, leaving the responsibility with him to carry these out or not, as he may think fit. This at once proves that nothing either could or would be done out of the ordinary routine without the knowledge and approval of the Minister; but the responsibility would rest in the proper quarter, and whilst the military authority points out the professional requirements, the civil Chief sanctions these views or not as he may think fit. Thus everybody would know to whom to look, whereas now what is everybody's business is nobody's business, and many things are neglected or delayed which with a little forethought could so easily be provided for at the proper time. In like

manner, no professional matter would fall into the hands of a non-professional authority. Had such a system been in operation lately, no regiment would have been sent to the seat of war but partially equipped as has unfortunately been the case, with such lamentable results to the health and comfort of the men. Again let us look at the Transport service. What is the case now? The Quartermaster-General's department, acting under the Commander-in-Chief, is not permitted to have any direct communication with the Admiralty. Everything connected with the embarkation of troops and their conveyance across sea must go through the the War Office. How much simpler it would be for the War Minister, when he determines upon the number of troops to be sent and the period at which they are to go, to make his demand upon the Admiralty, and at the same time issue his directions to the Commander-in-Chief to carry out all details by means of the Quartermaster-General's department direct with the Admiralty. The whole of this duty would then rest entirely, as heretofore, with the Minister, the mere detail would be left to the two immediate departments who alone can conjointly carry it out, thus simplifying labour and avoiding the innumerable confusions which otherwise instantly occur, to the great discomfort of the troops and the detriment of the public service.

'The organisation of troops, be they British or Foreign Auxiliaries, should rest with the Commander-in-Chief. The Minister decides upon the policy of the measure, he thereupon issues his orders to the military authority to carry it out in accordance with such Rules and Regulations as he may think proper to lay down for the special service in view.

'The clothing and equipment for the Army is conducted according to Regulations laid down for that purpose. The Minister should in no respect interfere with this, but should any special case occur in which he may think it desirable to propose some change or alteration of the usual practice, he should state his views to the Commander-in-Chief, who would thereupon issue the necessary instructions, after submission to the Sovereign, whose Regulations might have to be temporarily suspended for the reasons assigned. Such are merely some instances in which a most beneficial change might be effected from the present mode of transacting the military business of the country. Many more such instances might be adduced, but enough has been shown to prove that no diminution whatever is intended in the authority of the Minister, but that it is merely desired to distribute the details of office in such a manner so that every department should perform its legitimate duties, with the greatest amount of efficiency and simplicity, leaving professional details, as much as possible, in military hands, and yet keeping the general control of all matters under the immediate supervision of the responsible Minister of the Crown.'

Even after the readjustment of duties which was effected in 1854, the Commander-in-Chief's relations with the Secretary of State remained almost as undefined as they had been before with respect to the Secretary at War and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. But the consolidation of certain departments under the Secretary of State for War in 1855 brought about the necessity of defining more clearly, not only their positions, but that of the Commander-in-Chief's as well.

Still matters went on in their old ways for some time longer. On 30 May 1858 the subject was brought up in the House of Commons by Captain Vivian calling attention to the necessity of defining the responsibilities and duties of the various military departments. He then moved a resolution setting forth that, although the recent consolidation of the several departments of Ordnance, Commissariat, and the Secretary at War had somewhat improved matters, divided responsibility still existed; and that to promote greater efficiency the departments of the Horse Guards and War Office should be placed under one responsible Minister.

The House divided, and for the resolution 106 votes were recorded against 104, giving a majority of two in favour of the resolution. On the following day the Duke of Cambridge wrote as follows to Her Majesty on the subject, and received the reply which is given below.

TO THE QUEEN.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *June 1st*, 1858.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—You will have seen the vote the House of Commons came to last night. I am told by Lord Derby and by all those who are versed in Parliamentary tactics, that it was a mere accidental vote and will not lead to any further results. I trust it may be so, but I confess, that I think it will bring with it much mischief and will be constantly referred to by that party, which seems determined to place all power in the House of Commons. Lord Derby will, I believe, write fully to You his views and opinions upon what had better be done. We have had some conversation to-night upon it, and I think agree generally on the line to be adopted. Having on several occasions discussed the matter with You, I believe You are fully alive to the importance of the question, which is one affecting the Royal Prerogative, more than any other that could be brought

forward. The Duke of Wellington felt most warmly upon it, and guarded this prerogative of the Crown with the greatest jealousy. Once allow the command of the Army to pass out of the hands of the Crown, which it would do if the Commander-in-Chief were abolished, and the Army becomes a Parliamentary Army and would become dangerous to the State; these I believe to be the Duke of Wellington's views, they were the late Lord Hardinge's, and I venture to add that they are mine, and being so, I think it my duty to draw Your attention to them. As regards myself, I am at all times ready to aid in any arrangement that may be best for the Crown and for the State, and I put my own personal feelings entirely out of the question, as I am only animated with the desire to serve You; but I should not be doing my duty by You, nor by the noble Army, at whose head You have honoured me by placing me, were I not to point out to You the danger of this accidental vote, and to express a hope that nothing may be done upon it without the greatest deliberation.'

FROM THE QUEEN.

'OSBORNE, *June 3rd*, 1858.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I received your letter this afternoon about the Vote of Tuesday night. I wrote at once to Lord Derby, and have received a very satisfactory answer.

'I think that good may come out of this very Vote, as it may lead to a clearer and more satisfactory definition of the relative positions of the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State. . . . But the subject is ill understood, and people are carried away by wild and foolish notions.'

Meanwhile, on 2 June, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli), in answer to a question as to whether it was intended to take any steps to comply with Captain Vivian's motion, stated that as so few members were present in the House at the time, the Government did not propose to do anything. It was in fact a 'snap' division. The question of military and civil control arose also in the House of Lords on 4 June, when Lord Breadalbane asked what were the relations at present subsisting between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief in India with respect to military matters. There were rumours that Sir Colin Campbell (the then Commander-in-Chief in India) had been overruled by Lord Canning on some purely military questions, and it was desirable that the point should be cleared up at once. Lord Derby, in replying for the Government, denied that this

was so; and maintained that the most cordial relations subsisted between the civil and military chiefs. It was, of course, essential that there should be a certain amount of give and take between the two; and, in any case, it was inevitable that the Governor-General should be supreme. The latter sometimes gave way to the Commander-in-Chief in view of the importance of some military point which was raised; and no doubt the Commander-in-Chief did so likewise in the case of political reasons put forward by the Governor-General.

On 9 June, Queen Victoria wrote to the Duke enclosing an extract from a letter which she had received from the Prime Minister, which also refers to the question of patents, which will be alluded to subsequently.

'St. James's Square [6 *June*], *Sunday Evening.*

'Lord Derby, with humble duty submits to Your Majesty, in reference to the note which he has just had the honour of receiving, that the Cabinet came to no final conclusion yesterday as to the production or non-production of the Memorandum to which Your Majesty is pleased to refer; and the subject was referred to the consideration of another meeting, probably on Wednesday. As far as Lord Derby has been able to consider the question, he inclines to the opinion that, although the memorandum in question defines clearly enough, though perhaps hardly more clearly than the respective patents, the distinctions between the functions of the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, it enters rather largely into the relations subsisting between Your Majesty personally and Your Majesty's confidential servants, and that, although these relations ought to be clearly understood, they are hardly matter for discussion in Parliament. Lord Derby is unwilling to pronounce any absolute opinion on the question, but before any final decision is taken, he thinks it right to lay before Your Majesty the main consideration which has occurred to him as to the production of a document which, in other respects, would be quite unobjectionable. Lord Derby hopes that the result of the debate on Lord Breadalbane's motion on Friday will quite do away with any unfavourable impression which may have been made by Captain Vivian in the House of Commons.'

On 10 March in the following year (1859), Captain Vivian moved for a Select Committee to inquire into the effect of the recent alterations in military administration with regard to the War Office and the Board of Ordnance, and

whether any changes were still required in order to produce greater efficiency and economy. He declared that if the duties of the Commander-in-Chief were defined, he would be glad to see him in possession of more extended powers than were already allotted him, so that he might be able on his own authority to decide many questions which had now to be submitted to the Secretary of State. This time, therefore, Captain Vivian simply asked for a committee to inquire into these matters; and this the Government readily granted, though the question was not finally settled till many years later.

FROM THE QUEEN.

'BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *March* 11, 1859.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I can't resist writing to say how very *much* pleased we are at the manner in which Captain Vivian's motion went off last night. It has done away with all the mischief which last year's untoward Vote produced.'

This practically completes the subject for the period with which we are dealing. But perhaps it will be as well, though in anticipation of the order of time, to complete this sketch, though naturally the topic must again be referred to when the momentous changes of 1870 are considered. Acting on this principle, it has been deemed advisable to break off temporarily the subject of the Military Career of the Duke, and to carry first the history of the Commandership-in-Chief of the Army to its logical conclusion.

At first the Secretary of State received, under the new plan, besides the seals and letters-patent which then constituted his office, a supplementary patent restraining him from interfering with military affairs—discipline, promotion, command, etc.—and in 1855 such a patent was issued to Lord Panmure, conferring upon him all powers with respect to the Army, except those which 'related to and concerned the military command and discipline of those forces, as likewise the appointments and promotions in the same.'

Such a reservation of powers had not before been made in the case of a Secretary of State for any other department; and the House of Commons Committee, which deliberated

on the subject in 1860, considered that, as the Secretary of State was, whilst in possession of his seals of office, responsible for the acts of the Crown and removable at will, it was not necessary that his wings should be clipped by such a supplementary patent. The Duke of Cambridge, in giving evidence before the Committee, stated that the Secretary of State's consent was always obtained before important appointments were made; and that in the event of a difference of opinion the last word lay with the political chief.

In any case the supplementary patent was from thenceforth abolished. But it still became necessary to define the respective positions of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State. In 1861 Sir George Lewis was transferred from the Home to the War Office, and, as he was already a Secretary of State, he did not need a new patent—a custom, by the way, which has since been discontinued. But he prepared a memorandum and obtained Her Majesty's signature to it, which, with a view of more clearly defining the situation, provided that the Command and Discipline of the Army and the promotion and appointments in it, together with the power connected with these matters, should be excepted from the department of the Secretary of State; and that all powers and business relating to the above should be carried out by the Commander-in-Chief, subject of course to the control of the Sovereign, 'and to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of Our Royal Prerogative, and subject to any powers formerly exercised by the Secretary at War.'

This document was then apparently lost sight of; and it was not again seen until it was found by Mr. Cardwell, whilst Secretary of State, amongst Sir George Lewis's papers at the War Office.[1] It was then laid on the tables of the Houses of Parliament, and its bearings discussed; the Government being advised that, in spite of its provisions, there was in law no dual control, though there might be in practice, and that sole responsibility rested on the Secretary of State.

Mr. Cardwell then determined to place the supreme

[1] *Lord Cardwell at the War Office*, by General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., p. 238.

authority of his office on a statutory basis; and to this end the War Office Act of 1870 was passed, supplemented by an Order in Council;[1] which finally welded together the Military authority of the Horse Guards and the Civil Administration carried out at the War Office under the sole and immediate control of the political chief.

The actual administration was grouped under three officials. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the personnel of Regular and Auxiliary Forces; the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, for the business appertaining to the purchase, construction, and charge of *matériel*; and the Financial Secretary was made responsible to the Secretary of State for the preparation of the Estimates and the accounting and audit of all sums voted—all under the immediate and direct control of the Secretary of State, who was generally responsible.

The Surveyor-Generalship was not a success, and in 1888 the office was abolished; and the business of the War Office redistributed into two groups, both still under the Secretary of State, as responsible for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. Sole responsibility to the Secretary of State for military efficiency, both as regards *matériel* and men, was concentrated in the Commander-in-Chief, who thus became sole military adviser to the political chief.

The Duke of Cambridge retired in 1895, and was succeeded by Lord Wolseley; and then a further Order in Council again redistributed the duties. The concentration of military responsibility in the Commander-in-Chief was abolished, who from henceforth only retained the general command of the Military forces at home and abroad, and the 'general supervision' of the Military departments at the War Office. The Military Secretary's department, Mobilisation and Intelligence, were placed under his direct control; but the Recruiting, Education, Discipline and Training of troops were placed under the Adjutant-General, subject only to the Commander-in-Chief's general supervision. Similarly, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Inspector-

[1] 33 and 34 Vict. c. 17, and Order in Council 4 June 1870.

General of Ordnance (after 1899 styled the Director-General of Ordnance), were each made co-ordinately responsible to, and vouchsafed the direct ear of, the Secretary of State. Thus was witnessed the supreme anomaly of a Commander-in-Chief, whose high-sounding designation would lead one to suppose that he commanded an army, bereft of all direct responsibility for discipline and personnel.

The policy of undermining the power and position of the Commander-in-Chief had been initiated under Lord Cardwell, although the process was to some extent arrested whilst the Duke still held office.

But it was surely one of the most remarkable of the ironies of fate that the Cardwellian policy should at last have been carried to a triumphant conclusion at the expense of Lord Wolseley, who has always been one of its most enthusiastic advocates, by Lord Cardwell's former Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, under whose rule at the War Office the Commandership-in-Chief was reduced to a nullity, and complete and detailed responsibility concentrated in the hands of the Secretary of State. It is true that in 1901 a new Order in Council, more or less restoring the Commander-in-Chief's former position, placed the Adjutant-General's department once more under the control, and not merely under the supervision, of the Commander-in-Chief; and that in the hands of Lord Wolseley some of the former power and prestige of the office might have been restored. But, as it was, after Lord Roberts had held the post for three years, it was deemed advisable to abolish it. This was effected in February 1904, and at the same time an Army Council was created.[1]

[1] Books referred to for sketch of Commandership-in-Chief:—Anson's *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, Clode's *Military Forces of the Crown*, *The Manual of Military Law*, the *War Office List*, G. H. Knott's article on the 'Commander-in-Chief' in the *Encyclopædia of Law*, and Fortescue's *History of the British Army*.

View of the old Horse Guards
H.R.H's offices 1856-1879

CHAPTER VI

BECOMES COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF—1856-57

The Task before him. His Relations with Lord Panmure. Queen Victoria's Letters. The Question of a Peace Establishment. The Duke's Fears as to Reductions. The Appointment of Inspector-General of Infantry. The Consolidated Depôt Battalions. The Duke's Memorandum on the Constitution of the Army and the use of the Militia as a Reserve to the Army. The Retention of Aldershot and the Curragh. His Memorandum on this Subject.

On taking up his duties as General Commanding-in-Chief on 15 July 1856, H.R.H. at once threw himself into the new work with his accustomed ardour.

Truth to tell, the task before him was stupendous, and sufficient to deter most men from venturing to grapple with the many difficult problems, which equally seemed to demand attention. No one knew better than the Duke where the most serious shortcomings in our Army were to be found. He had, as has been shown, during the years 1852 to 1854 called attention to the more glaring of these; and had also experienced the difficulties which ever beset those who endeavour to improve matters in our peculiarly constituted land forces. Thus it must have been the reverse of encouraging for him, entering upon his new duties, to find that much that he had so earnestly advocated some four years previously had so far been but partially carried into effect.

But apart from the numerous matters of urgent importance which now confronted him, some of long standing and some brought into prominence by the recent war, there underlay the fixed determination of the Ministry, now that peace was happily restored, to reduce our military institutions to the least possible dimensions. Thus it is that, amidst the mass of military correspondence with the Secretary of State

and the communications between the Queen and H.R.H. that were constantly passing, there arose again and again the old theme of how to prevent reductions and the consequently rapid reversion of the recently reconstituted Army to its former evil ways.

Although the Secretary of State, Lord Panmure, as has been already shown, was determined to rule in his own department, it is both interesting and instructive to note how, throughout the enormous mass of correspondence which passed between him and the Duke, the same excellent tone of courtesy and common sense pervades the letters of each.

Lord Panmure did not attempt to conceal that he viewed his position as Secretary of State as paramount; and in all his correspondence he writes on the assumption that he and the Cabinet were the supreme arbiters of all military questions. So he approves or disapproves of H.R.H.'s views; but he always does so in a courteous and considerate manner. On the other hand, the Duke invariably asks permission and approval for all his plans, and he invariably writes as the Constitutional subordinate of his political chief. There is no trace of friction throughout the voluminous correspondence; and in view of the many difficult questions which had from time to time to be decided, it bears eloquent testimony to the tact and sound common sense of the Duke.

Throughout, he was in constant correspondence with the Queen and Prince Albert; and it is of much interest to note what close attention the Sovereign bestowed on all questions which regarded the comfort and welfare of Her Army.

The earliest letter from the Queen to the Duke upon his becoming Commander-in-Chief refers to the General Order issued on that occasion, the first official act of the new Commander-in-Chief:—

'OSBORNE, 19*th July* 1856.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—Many thanks for your letter of the day before yesterday with the General Order, which is a very appropriate one. . . . We had a charming field-day on Thurs-

day, which I enjoyed more than any I ever saw, and was on horseback for four hours amongst all the troops; the day was beautiful, and the troops marched admirably.

'We saw the 18th Royal Irish arrive in camp yesterday morning, in excellent order. Altogether we spent a most agreeable time at Aldershot.

'One word about the Beards. I fear Colonel Ward has been clipping the Grenadiers, as I heard that our little Arthur's *Drum Master*, who belongs now to this band, arrived clipped the other evening, and he had *really* what I should not *call even a beard*, so very *moderate* it was. I mention this just to remind you of this *important subject*! We find everything in great beauty here.'

The satisfaction expressed by Queen Victoria at the fine appearance of the 18th Royal Irish will doubtless recall to the minds of hundreds of officers still living the old camp tale of the praise awarded to that gallant corps by Her Majesty. It is a curious example how impossible stories are often based upon facts, albeit, as in this instance, strangely distorted.

One of the very first duties which fell to the Duke on assuming office was to provide and arrange for the transition of the Army and its services from a war to a peace footing, and the consequent reorganisation and distribution of the various units which composed it.

On 7 August 1856 Lord Panmure, in reference to a memorandum written in July and submitted by the Duke on this subject, gives his views acquiescing on a number of subjects which had been brought forward. The more interesting among these, in view of the subsequent developments in our Army, are the following.

The Medical Staff Corps was to be arranged so as to suit permanent establishments such as Hospitals, likewise the Divisions and Brigades of the Army. We here see the inception of our present Army Medical Staff organisation; for up to this time the basis of all the medical services had been strictly regimental.

As regards the question of numbering the Divisions of the Army on Home Service, he agrees with the Duke that, 'although this would be a more regular course of proceeding, it would give a handle for the ignorant to pull at, and it will be prudent to avoid it.'

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a war establishment, bringing into the field 200 guns amply horsed with wagons complete and a pontoon train, besides Garrison Companies of Artillery for the permanent Garrisons, and a due supply of Sappers and Miners for any field service that might be required.

'The Cavalry force has been much reduced, and it would take time to complete it both in men and horses to a proper war establishment, but it is hoped that the additional dismounted men, now allowed by regulation, will on an emergency make up three War Squadrons per Regiment, and the formation of the fourth or Depôt Squadron would have to be proceeded with at the earliest possible moment.

'The Infantry Regiments, inclusive of the Depôts, are on an establishment of 1000 rank and file. The addition of 200 men would at very short notice complete these Regiments to 1200 men—800 for the service companies, and 400 for the Depôt in reserve—to be further increased by the addition of two companies to the reserve, should the dimensions of the war, as in the recent contest, assume a more extended and general scope.

'To render such expansion, however, certain and easy, it is essential that the Militia force of the country should be considered as the grand reserve of the Army, and if this is admitted as a principle, it would be most desirable to bring the Militia more in connection with the Army than it has hitherto been. With this view, it is submitted that Her Majesty's Government should lay down certain rules according to which the Militia is to be from time to time called out for training; and as it is presumed that the cost of an annual training would amount to too large an expenditure, it is proposed that one half of the Militia force of the United Kingdom should be called out each year for 56 days, the first half of this period, or 28 days, to be employed for the Battalion drill of each Regiment so embodied, the latter half, or further 28 days, to be set aside for concentration on a larger scale and at great military stations, such as Aldershot, the Curragh, etc., where the Militia would be joined to the Brigades and Divisions of the Regular Army, and would, under able supervision and control, acquire those rudiments of the art of War, which would prepare both officers and men for such active duties in the field as on the outbreak of hostilities might be required of them. Such an arrangement would not only prove of immense advantage to the Militia by giving it a more military character, and holding out an inducement to Militia Regiments to become efficient, but it would further be of the greatest benefit to the Army at large, by enabling it at certain periods of the year to act in large masses, giving the greatest possible amount of practical instruction in the field during peace, not only to the Regiments of the Line, but to the superior officers of the Army, and the Staff of the Army at large.

Apparently at this period the public mind was as little prepared for the numbering of Divisions as it was fifty years later for the numbering of Army Corps.

The Duke had urged the maintenance of the Commissariat service in peace time; and Lord Panmure replies that he will see to this, but that 'the supplies for the Army at home will have to be obtained in the most economical manner, in order to keep John Bull in a good humour.'

'The appointment of a new Staff Officer to be entitled the Inspector-General of Infantry,' which in the Duke's opinion was rendered necessary by the newly introduced organisation of our Infantry Regiments, meets with Lord Panmure's approval, who adds that 'his duties will be severe.'

Lastly, as regards officers attending foreign reviews, Lord Panmure agrees, and adds that 'they should be officers of rank and in actual command at home, so that they may apply any improvements that struck them.'

It will be noted throughout this correspondence that the Commander-in-Chief was ever striving to maintain the Army as an effective war machine; whereas the Secretary of State for War, though extremely deferential to the Duke's views and evidently most anxious to give them effect, was, as has ever been the case with our Army, weighed down by the demand of the Treasury to curtail expenditure, and constantly haunted by the anxiety to soothe down public susceptibilities on the question of our armed forces. In his own words, he shows how the imperative necessity of 'keeping John Bull in a good humour,' then as now, frequently militated against the proper carrying out of many practical and sorely needed reforms, all tending towards increased efficiency and the thorough preparation in peace time of our Army as a machine for war.

Many and various difficulties of detail had to be surmounted, and the correspondence between the Civil and Military Heads of the Army at this period is incessant.

On 11 August Lord Panmure writes:—

'I have been working hard at the peace establishment, and have sent it in a parcel to show to Your Royal Highness,

before I send it to the Queen; I think that it is one that is likely to pass thro' Parliament and to stand the attacks of the economists. . . .'

To this the Duke replies:—

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, 15*th August* 1856.

'. . . . I trust you will have been *moderate* in your *reductions*, for depend upon it we must not reduce much at the present moment and until we see our way more clearly as to the state of Europe, which at present still appears very unsettled and uncomfortable in many quarters.

'At present the Army is in a most efficient state, and much has been spent in arriving at that point.

'It would be a pity to throw this efficiency away hastily, and I doubt not you have given the subject your most serious attention.'

Throughout the remaining months of 1856 the correspondence between Lord Panmure and the Duke is incessant, as one question after another demands settlement.

The memorandum in which the approval of an Inspector-General of Infantry is brought forward, contains much of interest, especially as regards the light it sheds on the working of the then 'new' depôt system.

The outcome of the Duke's memorandum on the organisation of Infantry[1] in 1853 and the subsequent correspondence on the subject, was that early in 1854 the strength of Infantry Battalions serving abroad was fixed at twelve companies, of which eight were for foreign service and four for service at the depôt. Hitherto the usual custom had been to have six service companies abroad and four at the depôt. These depôts were at the same time consolidated into 'Provisional Battalions' of varying strength, some consisting of the depôts of as many as seven Battalions (twenty-eight companies), or from 1500 to 2500 men.

The Duke in his memo. of August 1856 pointed out that the importance of these consolidated Battalions had been 'amply proved by the War; no less than 33,000 men having been thus trained and sent out, an operation which would have been impossible if only dispersed depôts officered by regimental officers had been in vogue.' He considers that

[1] See Chapter III. p. 44 *et seq.*

our two years' war experience had 'proved the great advantage of this system of consolidated Depôts of Provisional Battalions over separate Regimental Depôts.'

At the same time, his admission that he considered the appointment of an Inspector-General of Infantry was rendered necessary by the new organisation, shows that he was aware that the working of these consolidated Battalions required close watching, and that abuses were not unknown. Indeed, it was found that, owing to the mass of young officers of different corps thus thrown together at the very outset of their career, there was decidedly more tendency to play than to work.

This memorandum therefore terminates with an order that instruction in military duties is to be carried out, and 'the practical education of officers in professional knowledge provided for'; and it further states that there is to be 'no undue licence or practical jokes'!

On 25 October the Duke wrote at length to Lord Panmure on the whole subject of the Army, as reconstituted after the War; and at the same time forwarded his recommendations for making the Militia more readily available as a Reserve force.

TO LORD PANMURE.

'. . . I have drawn up the enclosed Memorandum on the general state of the Army and the future arrangements necessary for bringing it more immediately into connection with the Militia. . . . Something of the sort I have proposed must be done if the Militia Force is to be made really useful, and the great thing we want in this country is a Reserve Force for the Army, whence the latter can be easily and quickly recruited in time of war.'

'HORSE GUARDS, *25th October* 1856.

'The period having arrived when the Army has been placed on a peace establishment as fixed by Her Majesty's Government, it is important that its present position and future prospects should be considered with a view to its future efficiency and the means of its rapid expansion in the event of war.

'The Royal Artillery and Sappers and Miners have been placed on so liberal a scale that it is hoped these corps would, by the addition of a certain number of horses to fill up Batteries, be completed in the shortest possible period to

a war establishment, bringing into the field 200 guns amply horsed with wagons complete and a pontoon train, besides Garrison Companies of Artillery for the permanent Garrisons, and a due supply of Sappers and Miners for any field service that might be required.

'The Cavalry force has been much reduced, and it would take time to complete it both in men and horses to a proper war establishment, but it is hoped that the additional dismounted men, now allowed by regulation, will on an emergency make up three War Squadrons per Regiment, and the formation of the fourth or Depôt Squadron would have to be proceeded with at the earliest possible moment.

'The Infantry Regiments, inclusive of the Depôts, are on an establishment of 1000 rank and file. The addition of 200 men would at very short notice complete these Regiments to 1200 men—800 for the service companies, and 400 for the Depôt in reserve—to be further increased by the addition of two companies to the reserve, should the dimensions of the war, as in the recent contest, assume a more extended and general scope.

'To render such expansion, however, certain and easy, it is essential that the Militia force of the country should be considered as the grand reserve of the Army, and if this is admitted as a principle, it would be most desirable to bring the Militia more in connection with the Army than it has hitherto been. With this view, it is submitted that Her Majesty's Government should lay down certain rules according to which the Militia is to be from time to time called out for training; and as it is presumed that the cost of an annual training would amount to too large an expenditure, it is proposed that one half of the Militia force of the United Kingdom should be called out each year for 56 days, the first half of this period, or 28 days, to be employed for the Battalion drill of each Regiment so embodied, the latter half, or further 28 days, to be set aside for concentration on a larger scale and at great military stations, such as Aldershot, the Curragh, etc., where the Militia would be joined to the Brigades and Divisions of the Regular Army, and would, under able supervision and control, acquire those rudiments of the art of War, which would prepare both officers and men for such active duties in the field as on the outbreak of hostilities might be required of them. Such an arrangement would not only prove of immense advantage to the Militia by giving it a more military character, and holding out an inducement to Militia Regiments to become efficient, but it would further be of the greatest benefit to the Army at large, by enabling it at certain periods of the year to act in large masses, giving the greatest possible amount of practical instruction in the field during peace, not only to the Regiments of the Line, but to the superior officers of the Army, and the Staff of the Army at large.

'The training being completed, and before the Militia Regiments are again disembodied, it would be most desirable that they should be permitted to volunteer for the Army in proportion to the requirements of the same. By this means the Army would be always kept complete, the expenses of recruiting greatly kept down, and the military spirit of the Militia encouraged.

'To carry out such a scheme, however, it is absolutely necessary that Militia Regiments should be kept up at all times, whether in peace or during war, as complete in point of numbers as possible. In this respect new and very stringent regulations seem desirable, for, on turning to the recent returns of Regiments of the United Kingdom at the period of their being disembodied, it will be found that whereas the authorised establishment of Regiments amounted for England, Scotland, and Ireland to 111,437 rank and file, the actual numbers borne on the muster-rolls did not amount to more than 58,773 rank and file, leaving a deficiency of 52,700 rank and file, or nearly one half of the establishment fixed by Parliament. Such a deficiency would, in the event of war, be the source of most serious embarrassment; and whilst it is very important to place the whole Militia system on a better footing, it becomes essential to devise some plan by which it is made imperative on Counties and Districts to furnish the complete quota of men intended to be raised by Parliament. Should the Government be disposed to adopt these views, it would then be a subject for further consideration whether Militia Regiments might not be brought more immediately in connection with corresponding Regiments of the Line, which it is thought might greatly facilitate the recruiting both for the Army and the Militia, and get rid of much that is objectionable in our present recruiting system.'

Lord Panmure, writing to the Duke on 28 October 1856, to acknowledge the receipt of the foregoing, makes use of the following words:—'I will read Y.R.H.'s paper attentively. I have a plan for a reserve which I will submit, and we can talk over.'

The Duke, writing to Lord Panmure on 18 February 1857, says:—'I send you a Copy of my Memo. on the distribution of the Army . . . including that portion which we have got in India, which latter you will observe amounts to only 20,049 men, which, in my opinion, is certainly not sufficient for the requirements of that vast Empire.' It is significant to recall that at the time this letter was written there was no idea in England of any trouble brewing in India, though we now know that many officials in the latter country were

well aware that all was not going well. The well-known complaint of recent years as to the impossibility of arriving at the truth in matters Indian would appear to be nothing new.

The quartering of our Army on its return from the Crimea presented considerable difficulties. During the summer months the newly acquired ground at Aldershot afforded plenty of accommodation; but, with the advent of winter, many troubles arose. Writing to Lord Panmure on 3 December 1856, the Duke says:—

'The present state of the weather has again made me feel most anxious about the position of the troops at Aldershot. I confess I do not think that it is at all desirable that a large body should be there assembled during the winter, and I should greatly prefer to send them into winter quarters by Brigades, assembling them again when the spring set in. There are, however, two difficulties which present themselves to me in making such an arrangement. In the first place, I do not like to disturb the new system of concentrating our troops by Brigades and in Divisions, fearing that, if once infringed upon, it may be altogether abandoned, which I should much regret; and in the next place, I know not what you will say to the additional expense that must be incurred by the moving of the troops into winter quarters now, and bringing them together again in a few months. I hear that the officers dislike Aldershot very much, a feeling which I believe is further shared by the men. The want of occupation during the long winter nights is the great drawback. . . .'

This memorandum is undated, but a covering letter to Lord Panmure is dated 3 March 1857. In this letter he expressed a hope that this memorandum 'may be of use to you and to the Government in defending the continuance of these stations.'

On 5 March 1857 Lord Panmure writes to the Duke: 'I have circulated Your Royal Highness's paper on Aldershot to the Military Committee, and I think it will do much to sustain the Camps, tho' I hear the war on them is to be vigorous.'

The Duke's efforts to induce successive Secretaries of State to provide manœuvre areas have already been alluded to, and his interest in the subject is a matter of history. Still he was by no means inclined to run his hobby to death;

and, by keeping troops concentrated in remote country quarters from year's end to year's end, to make the Army unpopular. It is, of course, inevitable that manœuvre areas should be situated in non-populous districts and away from the immediate vicinity of large towns, except in so far as a fair-sized town has since grown up at Aldershot. But take such places as Salisbury Plain in winter. The officers, no doubt, are able to amuse themselves to some extent; but there is nothing to attract the men, whose lives in such circumstances must necessarily be dull, a factor which reacts injuriously on recruiting. The permanent concentration of troops in manœuvre areas has also the additional disadvantage of circumscribing unduly the very limited space usually available.

The Duke was of opinion that troops should merely be concentrated in the various camps of exercise during the summer months; and he held that it was desirable, in the non-training season, that they should mix freely with the civilian population, though the brigade and divisional organisation should still be maintained.

In view of recent history, there can be no doubt that he was right; and his memorandum, replete with sound common sense and pertinent comment, applies as well to-day as it did then.

MEMO. ON ALDERSHOT AND THE CURRAGH TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

'*March* 1857.

'The question as to the advantages or disadvantages to be derived by the troops from stations such as Aldershot and the Curragh have been much canvassed and various opinions have been expressed, coming from quarters deserving of the highest consideration. It may be well, therefore, to consider the objects for which these stations are formed, and at the same time to lay down certain principles upon which they ought to be conducted for the future.

'At the commencement of the late war it was felt that, however good our troops were, they laboured under the great disadvantage of being wholly unaccustomed to act in masses, and that neither the superior officers nor the Staff ever had opportunities of studying their profession practically in field operations, even on a limited scale. The troops in general, too, were in want of that constant supervision so essential to

the efficiency of an Army, however small in numbers, and the various branches of the service, being isolated and detached, were never brought together for unlimited operations, save in one locality (Dublin), and even in that garrison their sphere of action was extremely limited.

'Hence the selection of Aldershot and the Curragh as stations affording space and every possible advantage in point of ground to correct these deficiencies.

'During the war it was found necessary and desirable to concentrate as much as possible the Militia at these stations with a view to drill, and also in order to obviate the great inconvenience of billeting the Militia Regiments in their various localities. On the return of the Army and the disembodying of the Militia the troops took the place of the Militia, and during the present winter[1] both stations have been fully occupied by them, much having to be done to reduce the Army from a war to a peace establishment, which could be better effected when the troops were concentrated than when scattered about in small detachments all over the country. It was also desirable in this manner thoroughly to establish the Brigade and Divisional system which had been decided on as essential for the efficiency of the Army for the reasons before stated.

'As soon, however, as these arrangements are completed, and that the new system is practically introduced, it becomes a matter for consideration how these stations can be made most useful for the public, and whether they should be constantly occupied by the troops or only filled for drill and exercise at certain stated periods of the year. After giving the subject the fullest consideration, it certainly would appear that the interest of the service and the advantage to the troops would be best consulted by sending the greater portion of them into permanent barracks for winter quarters during a considerable portion of the year, whilst concentrating them there for drill and exercise in larger masses during the summer months only—say May till the end of August or September. At other times Aldershot should only be occupied to the extent of the permanent barrack accommodation which is now being erected; and the Curragh, with reference to the protection of the huts, which will always require a small force for their security.

'During the summer months specified above, as large a number of troops should be collected as can be spared from garrison duty, every species of field exercise should be practised, officers and men should be thoroughly trained and prepared for war, and uniformity and combination be established and enforced.

'Such is the practice which obtains in all armies, whether great or small. Why should the British Army form the solitary exception?

[1] 1856-57.

'On the other hand, during the winter months the troops are better in barracks in various parts of the country, and the inhabitants of the several large towns and districts where barracks exist are gratified by their presence. The friendly intercourse that is carried on between the armed force of the country and its population in general is of great benefit to the Army and of advantage to the country, and a feeling favourable to the Army is thereby encouraged and kept up.

'But even during this period of dispersion the Divisional and Brigade system must be continued, and this can easily be effected if due regard is paid to the mode in which the various portions of the troops are quartered and the proper localities are selected for the Staff that accompany them.

'The arrangements by which these views can best be carried out are appended to this memo., from which it will be seen that though the barrack accommodation throughout the country is not altogether as convenient as could be wished, still it is sufficiently so not to present any great difficulties to the attainment of the important objects which ought never to be lost sight of.

'The stations at Shorncliffe and Colchester have not been included in these observations, as being in close proximity to considerable towns, and may be looked upon in the light of Permanent Barracks, and may therefore be kept constantly occupied.'

Officers who have, during the last twenty years—in fact, ever since Company and Battalion training and Divisional manœuvres have been so much more largely indulged in—had experience of Aldershot, will sympathise with the Duke in his outspoken protest against the conversion of Aldershot into a huge standing camp, and the consequent retention there of troops through successive summers and winters for an average period of two years. The grave objection to such a system is that all ranks soon know the whole country by heart, with the result that the advantages of tactical training are reduced to a minimum.

On the other hand, methods grow up which, however convenient for the Staff, give an absolutely false idea of both the theory and practice of war to the troops concerned. For men trained season after season over ground they know intimately and of which the name of every insignificant mound, lane, or copse is clearly indicated by a series of large signboards, must necessarily find themselves at a disadvantage when manœuvring over ground fresh to them.

Memo. of H.R.H. 15th July 1857 (Horse Guards) to Secretary of State on Increase of Home Army, etc.

The outbreak of the Indian Mutiny in 1857 cast a fresh and unexpected strain on our Army system, already so severely tried by the but recently concluded struggle with Russia in the Crimea.

The Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief of the Army on 15 July wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of State for War, in which, after alluding to the condition of affairs in India and recapitulating the steps already taken by the Government to reinforce our sorely pressed troops in that country, he stated explicitly what further measures he considered to be of urgent importance, 'in the order in which it is suggested they should be carried out.'

The troops under orders for India at the time (in addition to two Cavalry and eight Infantry Regiments in course of embarkation, and of the corps destined for China which had already been diverted to India) were one Regiment of Cavalry, six Regiments of Infantry, six Companies of Artillery, and two Troops of Horse Artillery with *matériel.*

In the opinion of the Duke this had caused 'a considerable drain on our much reduced force at home,' despite the fact that four Regiments had been ordered home from the Mediterranean.

In consequence, he advised that 'a Reserve Force should be raised at home ready for all eventualities.'

He proposed to attain this object by raising the strength of every Infantry Regiment to 1000 rank and file, whereby an addition of 10,000 men would be made to the Army. He further recommended that every Infantry Regiment serving in India should be increased by 200 men, such men to serve as a Reserve at home; thus giving an addition of 6800 men. Also that ten new Battalions should be raised 'as second Battalions to Regiments already existing, but perfectly distinct as corps.'[1]

[1] The reasons for this must be referred to 'the Customs of the Service' of this period, combined with the advantages derived from thus making each infantry unit entirely self-supporting and not liable to be depleted and rendered ineffective for the sake of strengthening another Battalion.

In advocating the creation of a Reserve to the Regiments in India, the Duke pointed out how the system then in vogue was to send every available man in a Regiment to that country, whereas his proposal to have ten companies (1000 rank and file) in India with two companies (200 rank and file) at the Depôt at home (which, it may be noted, was one mooted in his correspondence in 1852 with Colonel Grey, Private Secretary to the Prince Consort), would afford 'a supply of officers and men upon which to draw.'

He pointed out strongly how 'the casualties in the field will be very heavy, the climate alone prostrating vast numbers of officers and men,' and that in consequence an increase of 6800 could hardly be considered as exorbitant.

With regard to the proposed raising of the additional Battalions, he said: 'We have at present twenty-four Regiments of Infantry at home and eighty-one abroad. From these twenty-four, six, having been ordered out, must be deducted, leaving eighteen.'

To make good this deficiency, four Battalions had been ordered from the Mediterranean, and two from Australia and New South Wales.

He then pointed out that, setting the requirements of India aside, 'it was quite impossible to furnish the necessary and indispensable reliefs from this small number of corps, and hence the absolute necessity for the proposed increase of ten complete Battalions, which would make the home force up to thirty-four Battalions, no undue proportion to the eighty-two Battalions employed on foreign service.' The whole force he thus proposed to raise was 26,800.

It will be noted that the vexed question of providing for the relief of the Regiments on foreign service, by striking some sort of balance between those serving at home and abroad, was a matter of pressing necessity so long ago as 1857.

Having thus enunciated what he considered to be the urgent wants of the service, the Duke proceeded to deal with the question of how the necessary men were to be raised. 'At this time of the year' (July), he wrote that 'two hundred men per week is as much as can be fairly expected.'

A matter which also had to be considered was the fact that the effects of the Limited Enlistment Bill[1] would come into operation in 1857, and it was certain that many of the ten-years men enlisted under its provisions would claim their discharge.

To meet the inevitable lack of Recruits and the increase in discharges, the Duke recommended that, as soon as the harvest had been got in, some '20,000 to 30,000 men of the Militia should be called out and permanently embodied (if the Act admits of it), or to be trained for fifty-six days; at the end of which period a second portion of equal amount should replace the portion sent home.'

Before this latter was done, the trained Militia were to be 'called upon to give volunteers to the Regular Army.'

The Duke, whilst admitting that this might be thought by some to be an unnecessary precaution, justified his demand by the great rapidity with which an army actively employed in the field dwindles, adding that 'an army on paper is very different indeed to what it can produce actually in the ranks.'

Another difficulty to be faced was the fact that the Militia Regiments were mostly raised for only five years, and that in consequence the mass of men who had been enrolled in 1852-53 completed their service in 1857, and no provision had been made for renewing their engagement.

The Duke suggested that, if the Militia were to be called up and permanently embodied, it was probable that many men would re-engage, whilst others would transfer their services to the Regular Army.

He recommended the appointment of a few General Officers for service in India, 'for undoubtedly Queen's General Officers ought to accompany Queen's troops. The troops look up to and prefer their own officers, men who are accustomed to their habits and disposition.'

To obtain a proportion of officers of recent Indian experience for such posts, he proposed that the Senior Colonels of Queen's troops in India might be given the rank of local Major-General.

[1] The Army Service Act of 1847, by virtue of which enlistment for ten years took the place of enlistment for life.

As regards the general strategy of the operations in India, he added: 'As at present arranged, all troops are ordered to proceed to Calcutta. Would it not be well to consider the propriety of sending some troops to Bombay, or rather to Kurrachee? No doubt the principal force should act from Calcutta, but a force moving up the Indus from Kurrachee on the NW. Provinces would facilitate the movement from Calcutta, and would add to the completeness of the work to be accomplished.'

Amongst minor details, he suggests that the small-arm ammunition should be 'specially marked for *Queen's and European Troops only*, to avoid any difficulty as regards the greased cartridges.'

Under the stress of circumstances the 'ten Battalions' he asked for very shortly increased to fifteen, and subsequently to twenty-five. The following letter from Prince Albert shows that the increase to fifteen had been decided upon in October:—

'BALMORAL, *5th October* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—. . . Recruiting seems to go on well, but I long to see the fifteen new Battalions put on foot and on their full establishment of twelve companies. We are now to have twenty-five Battalions of Militia called out instead of fifteen, the more the better. Unless we have a broad basis of bayonets of one sort or the other, we cannot build a superstructure.'

CHAPTER VII

MILITARY EDUCATION—1856-70

The Importance of an educated Corps of Officers. Recent Example in Japan. The Experiences of the Crimea. The Sandhurst Committee, 1853. Mr. Sidney Herbert's Efforts. The Duke takes up the Matter on assuming Office. Mr. Gleig's Efforts to educate the Army in 1844-50. His consequent Estrangement with the 1st Duke of Wellington. The Duke consults Mr. Gleig. Mr. Gleig's Letter in reply; strongly recommends the Duke to bring out 'his own plan.' Correspondence with Prince Albert: his excellent Ideas on the Subject. The Duke's Minute on Education is forwarded to Lord Panmure. Advocates a D.G. of Education and Staff. A firm Believer in Public School Education. The Development of Sandhurst. Examinations for Promotion. Courses at the S.M.E., Chatham. The Duke's 'ideal Staff-officer.' Queen Victoria's Approval of the Scheme. Reorganisation of the R.M.C. Prince Albert's Criticisms on the Same. General Orders on Staff College Training, 1858. The Duke's Evidence on Staff College Training in 1870. Advocates Regimental Instructors. Garrison Classes instituted, 1871. And abolished, 1896. Regimental Instructors advocated, 1904.

No topic has, in recent years, demanded greater public attention than the question of the education and military training of the officers and men of our own Army. The subject has ever been considered in all foreign armies as one of the most vital of the factors which lead to success; and quite recently the successes of the Japanese have been ascribed to the careful professional education and training of their officers and staff.

The experiences of the Crimean War made the British public aware that, however gallant and devoted might be the officers of our Army, the lack of sound professional knowledge, in innumerable cases, was only too painfully apparent. In consequence, spasmodic attempts were made to remedy this condition of things, and matters were advanced so far that a Committee of the House of Commons made a report on the system of education at Sandhurst on

18 June 1855. The general subject of Education in the Army was, however, not referred to this Committee, and they in consequence did not feel themselves authorised to give any opinion on it.

Mr. Sidney Herbert (who became Secretary of State for War in succession to General Peel, and who, from 1852-5, held the office of Secretary at War) further interested himself in the matter, as did Lord Palmerston, but the whole subject was in abeyance when the Duke assumed office in July 1856.

How soon he took it up is not certain, but in October 1856 he was in correspondence with Prince Albert on the whole subject, and the latter in returning to him sundry papers suggests that 'the Board which was to have assembled in January last might now be appointed.'

Most fortunately for the due evolution of the subject, among the Duke's earlier papers is a letter from the Rev. G. R. Gleig, written in 1856, who at that time, and for many years afterwards, was Chaplain-General to the Forces.

Only recently in a book[1] that has appeared does Mr. Gleig tell the story of his differences with the 1st Duke of Wellington arising from this very matter of education in the Army.

Mr. Gleig was appointed Chaplain-General in 1844, and two years later, in 1846, he received the further appointment of Inspector-General of Military Schools. In his dual capacity he made vigorous efforts to improve the status and education of our soldiers, and thus brought himself into collision with his old chief, with whom he had lived on the terms of closest friendship for so many years. One of his greatest delinquencies was in carrying through his scheme for the provision of schoolmasters in the Army, and the Great Duke's dislike for them is amusingly described by Mr. Gleig in an interview he had with the Adjutant-General, Sir George Brown.

In the following letter there is an interesting corroboration of the determination of 'The Horse Guards' to leave

[1] *Personal Reminiscences of the First Duke of Wellington*, by the late George Robert Gleig, M.A. Edited by his daughter, Mary E. Gleig.

the question of education alone, and of how the matter, being one that pressed for solution, had thus gravitated towards the office of the Secretary of State for War.

FROM MR. GLEIG.

'WHITEHALL, *Nov.* 1, 1856.

'I have thought much over our conversation of yesterday. . . . I am inclined to think that it will be best for Your Royal Highness to take the initiative in this scheme of military education. The country has long cried out for something of the kind. One Cabinet after another has played with the question, and the idea entertained not very long ago of bringing the whole matter under the management of the Privy Council is a tolerably sure index of what the present War Office authorities would have done had not public opinion and the House of Commons itself declared against them. It will place the Army, and Your Royal Highness especially, in the position which most befits you, if, after all the hesitation elsewhere, you stand forward as the true founder of a system of military instruction in this country. If Your Royal Highness approves of this plan which is in your hands, and are prepared to commit the working of it out to General Cameron, or to any other individual, I would recommend your going on with it at once in your capacity of Commander-in-Chief to the Queen, and asking Her Majesty to approve of it—for the question is, in point of fact, one of discipline.

'No point of constitutional law or usage is involved in it. It is clearly within the province of the Commander-in-Chief to deal with all its details. Her Majesty's Secretary of State has really nothing to consider—but how and to what extent the necessary funds shall be supplied. Hitherto there has been a fixed determination at the Horse Guards not to move in the matter at all. And this underground hostility to change drove the War Office to do the work—which ought to have been done by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge. Moreover, the success which attended the first efforts of the Secretary at War encouraged him continually to aim at more.

But times, as well as men, are now changed, and it is, I think, in the power of Your Royal Highness to reassume the authority which to a considerable extent had passed out of the hands of your predecessors. You will be able to manage the education of the Army for yourself, if you be prepared to aim at high results, and to approach them wisely and therefore by degrees.

'If I were in Your Royal Highness's place, therefore, I would not wait for the development of any other man's plans; but being satisfied of the excellency of my own, I

would obtain for it the sanction of the Crown, and then open a communication with the Secretary of State; not as seeking advice from him, but as desiring his co-operation in the execution of a plan already well considered and matured.'

It is evident that the Duke accepted Mr. Gleig's suggestions, and decided to proceed forthwith with the matter. It is notorious that Prince Albert was profoundly interested in the subject, and throughout the correspondence of the years 1856-57, there are constant evidences that the Duke and H.R.H. were constantly exchanging their views upon it.

On 27 November 1856, the Duke writes from the Horse Guards as follows:—

TO PRINCE ALBERT.

'HORSE GUARDS, *27th November* 1856.

'After the communication I had with you on the subject of Education in the Army, I thought that the best thing I could do would be to assemble a small board of officers in this house, to whom I could submit the various plans for education that had been drawn up at different times and by various persons, and who were, out of these plans, to draw up a detailed report for my information in the first instance, as to what they might deem the best plan that could be devised. This report is now completed, and after having carefully gone over it again with the heads of Departments here, I think it is on the whole the best that could be put together, and I am prepared to forward it to the Secretary of State for War and the Government, if it should meet with the Queen's approbation and support. As yet nobody knows anything about it but the officers of this house, so that I can do with the plan whatever may be thought best. I should feel greatly obliged to you if you would look it over and let me have your opinion upon the details which it embraces, and perhaps you would let me know whether the Queen would sanction my forwarding it to the Government with as little delay as possible. I fear you will find this document somewhat long, but it was impossible to shorten it, as I was anxious it should embrace all details so as to be as complete as we could make it. The sooner we can get it sent on the better it will be.

'I propose sending a covering letter with it to Lord Panmure accepting it as my views, and expressing an earnest hope that it may be adopted.'

Four days later, Prince Albert replies to this letter. His views are given at length, and it will be noted that H.R.H. arrived at almost the same conclusions as did the Committee

on Military Education thirty-five years subsequently in 1901, as to the desirability of candidates for H.M. Army being first given 'a thorough gentleman's education from the public schools,' and then commencing their military instructions.

FROM PRINCE ALBERT.

'1*st Dec.* 1856.

'I have carefully read and considered the Report of your Committee on Military Education, which contains a great deal of good. . . . I think the Commission has lost sight of the suggestion in your former memorandum which appeared to me admirable, viz.—that of doing away with the present examination on previous cramming, and of substituting a course of testing for a few months before admission to the Army. It is acknowledged in the Report to be important to obtain young gentlemen with a thorough gentleman's education from the public schools. I think it would be unwise to set up in competition with this a Military School, which if it taught military science would teach what was not then wanted, and ought not then to be given; and, if teaching the same as other schools, would be a gratuitous effort on the part of the Government, with the additional disadvantage of introducing a set of young men with different feelings from the rest.

'I consider the description of knowledge required on entering into the Army as proposed by the report to be too professional. A boy at sixteen will have done well to have made himself master of the principles of Mathematics, and ought not to have been tempted to slur them over in order to pass on to their partial application to Fortification, of which, again, he could only obtain a smattering. Public schools, like Eton, have set up military classes which are a perfect farce.

'The general knowledge of the young gentleman having been tested and found satisfactory, he ought to get his commission from the Commander-in-Chief, and *then* should commence his *military* instruction, and the subjects pointed out in the Report as recommended "for the probable outline of study at the Junior Department" appeared to me extremely good.

'Whilst making the first probation before obtaining a Commission uniform for all arms, I don't think it useful that the subsequent instruction should be so, for any time afterwards, and I should consider it as a great detriment to the Army generally if the most proficient and intelligent were continually drafted out to the Artillery and Engineers.

'The Instruction for the Staff should again be quite distinct, but might, as proposed in the Report, be given only to certain successful candidates after a higher examina-

tion. I highly approve of the proposals for the Staff in the Report.

'*Now as to the Machinery.*—I think the appointment of a Director-General, as suggested, a most important step, and look upon his being placed under the immediate direction of the Commander-in-Chief as of the highest importance.

'For the testing on admission into the Army, I think a Military College like Sandhurst quite necessary. . . .

'With regard to the Staff, the proper school will be the Staff at Headquarters at the Horse Guards, and I feel persuaded that no system will ever work satisfactorily unless there be a department established there where officers will work in all the branches of the service, yet acquainted with the service in all parts of the globe, and be tested as to their efficiency by having to elaborate papers, and also military problems, draw plans, write letters and dispatches, etc. The Department will thus give the Commander-in-Chief all that assistance in Deputies and Assistants which he so often wants, and an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with the real merits and moral worth of the officers who are to receive Staff employments.'

After receiving the Duke's reply to this letter, Prince Albert again writes on 6 December as follows:—

'OSBORNE, *Dec.* 6, 1856.

'. . . The system I would recommend is: Get gentlemen with a gentleman's education from the public schools, and do away with your Military Schools for boys as a competing nursery for the Army. Test their qualifications by two months' probation and then give them a Commission for specific Regiments. When they are officers, require their making themselves proficient by giving them two years' military education at a Military College: don't promote them till an examination has proved that they have really learnt what was required. . . .'

Apparently the Duke's answer to this last did not altogether satisfy Prince Albert, for he writes on 9 December:—

'. . . I object to the two classes of Military and Civilian Candidates, from whom different qualifications are required. I want to have only one set, and that of *gentlemen* from the public schools, etc. etc., in fact being at the top of the education of the day, which must necessarily vary and progress.

'I am glad that the whole question is now to be discussed with the Government, but I fear that from an anxiety to satisfy public demand and expectation, the Horse Guards may bring forward a general scheme which is not thoroughly matured, while the Secretary of State tries to establish in

his department the office of a Director-General of Education, without any scheme at all!'

Finally, on 12 December, the Duke forwards his amended scheme to the Secretary of State:—

TO LORD PANMURE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 12*th December* 1856.

'In reference to our conversation the other evening on the subject of Education in the Army, I now beg to forward for your consideration a Minute I have drawn up on this most important subject, after much consideration and after taking into account the various papers that have been written from time to time, both by Statesmen and Military writers. I am afraid it is rather long, and will take a good deal of reading, but it was impossible to shorten it.

'May I beg of you to look over it, and in doing so, will you bear in mind that the principles laid down are what I look to, and that as regards details they are open to such modification as may be suggested. I should be glad if you would allow this paper to be printed for the information of Lord Palmerston, or any other of your colleagues who take an interest in the subject, and I hope you will bear in mind that these are my individual views in this great question, and that as such I put them forward.'

The memorandum in question, which is also dated 12 December 1856, begins by saying: 'The question of military education having for some time engaged the attention of Parliament and the public, I felt it my duty, soon after assuming command of the Army, to give my best consideration to the subject with a view to the adoption of a practical scheme.' This project combined an extended system of instruction and examination. The Duke maintained that it was essential that the educational system should be uniform, in order that it might obtain the confidence of the Army and the public; and the only way to do this was to create a special department directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, and charged with the superintendence of military education. He also recommended the appointment of four Assistant Directors, one each for the Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry.

The Director-General and the Board were to have their

offices in London; and their duties were to prepare and issue papers for Sandhurst and other examinations, such as the Staff College, Promotion, and the practical Artillery and Engineer Courses which the Duke very wisely succeeded in inaugurating.

His Royal Highness was a firm upholder of a public school education; and he proposed that gentlemen should enter the Army, partly through the military schools and partly through the ordinary schools of the country, by appointment to direct commissions, to be conferred only after certain tests and conditions had been fulfilled. For it must be remembered that in those days cadets joined at Sandhurst between the ages of thirteen and fifteen. In commenting upon the contention that all candidates for commissions should pass through a military school before obtaining them, His Royal Highness thought that the effect would be to deprive the Army of the great advantage it 'derives from receiving into the ranks of officers, men who have formed their minds and tastes at the great public schools, together with the great majority of those who in after life are distinguished in statesmanship, in law, in literature, in religion, moral and physical science, and who, moreover, imbibe a tone at those great institutions, which is seldom found elsewhere. The education may be in some respects defective, but it is the education of the best class of English gentleman; and it is moreover manifestly in course of improvement year by year to meet the new requirements of society.' Surely an admirable summary of the subject, and one replete with that broad-minded common sense and knowledge of men which always so pre-eminently distinguished His Royal Highness.

Nevertheless he insisted that all candidates, without exception should pass an examination before entering the Army. So he proposed to establish a class of candidate from the ordinary schools, who should study for a short period and be resident at Sandhurst or at some establishment in connection with it, but who should be distinct and unconnected with the ordinary students of the College. In support of his contentions H.R.H. very truly pointed out

that habits and characters can be better formed at the ordinary public schools than they can ever be at professional institutions. So he proposed to raise the average age of entrance to sixteen years, with a one or two years' course according to the capacity of the student; whilst he recommended that the examinations of Lieutenants for promotion to Captain should be composed entirely of professional subjects.

Thus it will be seen that his proposals formed the groundwork of the educational system subsequently adopted, even to almost minute details, such as the very valuable fortification and surveying classes since carried out for Line officers at Chatham. His recommendation that a Director-General of Military Education should be appointed was carried out; and when, somewhat unwisely, a few years ago that post was abolished, a very authoritative Royal Commission recommended that it should be at once restored. This has been since done.

As regards the Education and Training of our Staff officers, the Duke's recommendations had almost as far-reaching results, since in this memorandum he sketches out the system which has ever since been carried out, without substantial changes, at the Staff College. This is especially interesting in view of the prejudice against Staff College graduates which H.R.H. is generally, though erroneously, supposed to have entertained. Indeed, generally speaking, the Duke may be pronounced a pioneer of exceptional originality in the realms of military education. Few details seem to have been too insignificant to escape his notice; and even such matters as the attaching of Staff College graduates to arms other than their own—a course which is now generally adopted — had long ago been thought of and worked out by the Duke.

He commences his disquisition on the Staff College course by laying down a distinction between the different branches of the Staff. For instance, he held that an A.D.C. could scarcely be counted as a Staff officer in the true sense, since, properly speaking, he was never responsible for giving decisions or even advice. The ordinary troop or company

promotion examination would therefore suffice for him, as also for the somewhat similar case of a military secretary.

But as regards other Staff officers, additional qualifications are required: study, and examination at the Staff College, and some practical experience of the working of each arm in the field, though the Duke admits that no examination can test one vitally important quality for Staff officers, namely, 'energy of character.' The Duke lays down the course of study to be followed at the Staff College, which is very much the same as that pursued at the present day; and in the following words he pertinently sums up the results which a Staff College course is expected to accomplish. It 'ought of course not only to instil information, but also give the student the precision and strength of thought and that enlargement of mind which may prepare him for the higher and more extended duties he may some day be called upon to undertake. . . . Narrowness of mind is too often the fate of those whose labours for a series of years have been entirely professional. When placed in the highest position an officer can aspire to—the command of an army—nothing can be more injurious to the public interests than the possession of such a mind, which, from want of habit, is incapable of taking a comprehensive view of the political as well as military posture of things before it.'

When candidates had completed the Staff College course, the Duke recommended that they should be attached to the arms of the service in which they had not previously served; and subsequently that, if not immediately appointed to posts on the Staff for which they had made themselves eligible, they should return to their regiments.

In conclusion, the Duke pointed out that it would take time to inaugurate the new system satisfactorily; but that in his opinion the plans which he proposed would 'tend to the advantage of the service and to the elevation of our military character.'

Lord Panmure evidently approved of the Duke's scheme, and we have him writing on 1 April 1857: 'I send you the Queen's reply to my submission on the subject of Education.

You can now proceed to systematise, and we should, I think, meet to-morrow and talk over our views.' Two days later the Duke writes to the Queen on the subject:—

'HORSE GUARDS, *3rd April* 1857.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—I herewith beg to lay before You the draft of a letter to the Secretary of State for War and a General Order on the subject of Education for the Staff of the Army. If You approve of these two papers they shall be sent on at once to the Government, and I hope we have thus taken the first step towards the great object we must all have in view, the general education of the Officers of the Army in a strictly professional point of view. I doubt not that it will at once produce its good effects, and I hope it will shortly be followed by other measures which will refer to the officers in general, and to those youths who are seeking first commissions.'

'BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *4th April* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I return you this Draft of a Letter to the Secretary of State, which I entirely approve, and of which, as well as of the rest of the correspondence between you and the Secretary of State on this very important subject, I should wish to have copies.

'I am very happy that we have arrived so far, so satisfactorily.'

A few days later, on 9 April, Lord Panmure writes to the Duke: 'I see no reason why the General Order should not be promulgated immediately, and I must take steps to increase the Senior Branch at Sandhurst by provision of such Staff of Instructors as we shall agree upon.'

A series of General Orders subsequently gave effect to most of these proposals. One dated 9 April 1857, after stating that H.R.H. has had 'under his serious consideration the question of Army Education, especially relating to the qualifications for Staff appointments,' sets forth the requirements which are to be considered indispensable. Every officer before appointment to the Staff will have to fulfil the following requirements:—Write a distinct and legible hand, have a good colloquial knowledge of at least one foreign language, possess a good eye for country, and be able to make an intelligible sketch of it, know the use of sketching contours, etc., possess a thorough knowledge of regimental

duty, tactics, and movements, etc., field fortification and military law; and also have all the qualifications necessary for making a good regimental adjutant, and be able to ride. Further requirements still are laid down for officers of the Adjutant and Quartermaster General's Staffs.

In transmitting the draft of this order to Lord Panmure, the Secretary of State, the Duke remarks:—'I consider this the foundation of a system which may hereafter be extended as experience may show to be desirable; but, as it is necessary to make a beginning at as early a period as possible, I do not think that higher attainments could be exacted, at all events in the first instance.' 'To superintend the whole system of the education of officers and examinations, I propose that a Council should be appointed, consisting of one Major-General with the title of Vice-President, two members, the General Commanding-in-Chief being himself *ex officio* the head of the Council as President.'

On 24 July 1857, the Duke writes to Prince Albert, and returns 'the submission to the Queen, being the first paper on Military Education.' Allusion is made to a certain 'slight change which has been made at Lord Palmerston's suggestion.'

The following day Prince Albert writes: 'I return the papers on Army Education. Victoria has signed the submission. . . .'

On 31 October 1857, Prince Albert sent the Duke his remarks on the 'Report of the Committee for Education on the reorganisation of the R.M.C. at Sandhurst,' which he declares to be 'very good, and well calculated to improve the usefulness of that Institution for the Army.'

The Prince Consort had, as is well known, a very great knowledge of matters educational, and in this paper he goes exhaustively into all the details of the various subjects taught, and of the proportion of marks allotted to each. His chief contention was that undue prominence was given to the study of mathematics, and his remarks on this subject are peculiarly practical.

'What is to be gained by making the officers of the Army, and the Staff in particular, abstract *mathematicians*

instead of *scientific soldiers*? A special education must have a special reference to the work to be done and services to be rendered in a special profession. The most exaggerated supporters of the Mathematical System of Cambridge have never maintained that abstract Mathematics had any value in themselves for the students, but assert that they are the best means for training the mind to take up afterwards any practical study in life—an assertion, however, doubted by many, and denied by the whole University of Oxford. The Military profession is a distinct profession like the Law, the Church, the Medical professions, etc. etc., and Mathematics gone once through at school have, with the exception of the case of the Artillery and Engineers, no value for it except in their applications to Geodesy, Topography, Mechanics, and Physical Philosophy. If we were to make our Staff officers theoretical Mathematicians, we should inflict the greatest injury on the Queen's service, for it is a well-ascertained fact, and admitted all over the world, that Mathematicians, from their peculiar bent of mind, do of all men show the least judgment for the practical purposes of life, and are the most helpless and awkward in common life, whilst the Staff officer should have the greatest amount of knowledge of men and the world, and the greatest readiness in judging passing events and circumstances.'

The Duke sent these remarks to Lord Panmure on 3rd November, and at the same time expressed his opinion that there was 'a great deal of truth in them,' and that General Cameron was 'inclined to think the same.'

He states his wishes to amend these points, and also the proposed plan of Provisional Commissions, which 'would break down if officers were with their Regiments in the field. . . . I think we must try a different plan, which will be that of not promoting an officer to a higher rank till he has gone through a certain examination on professional subjects. It cannot then be said that we send him back to school; but he feels the necessity of acquiring the information before he can rise in his profession.'

It may be remarked, parenthetically, that this very system of Provisional Commissions, and of sending young officers to Sandhurst after they had been gazetted to their corps—in fact, 'sending them back to school'—was tried when Mr. Cardwell was Secretary of State in 1871-72, and had to be very shortly discontinued.

In this letter of the Duke's, in 1857, may be found the

inception of the system of Garrison Classes and Examinations in (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), and (*e*), as instituted by Mr. Cardwell in 1871.

On 3 June 1858 another General Order dealt specifically with the subject of the Staff College. The course was to be for two years. There were to be thirteen vacancies annually for the Cavalry, Guards, and Line, and two for the Artillery and Engineers—making a total of thirty officers. The subjects for examination to be Mathematics (two papers), Military History (two papers), French, Chemistry, German, Geology, Fortification, and Military Drawing.

General Officers commanding stations abroad were to place no restrictions upon officers competing for the Staff College examinations, beyond those which the exigencies of the service might absolutely require.

On 7 June 1858 a memorandum, prepared for the information of the Adjutant-General, stated that General Peel, the Secretary of State, concurred with H.R.H. in his opinion that officers who had passed through the Senior Department at Sandhurst — the precursor of the Staff College — and obtained certificates, should be considered equally eligible for Staff appointments with officers who had been at the Staff College.

The modern form which military education was to assume having been thus finally settled by the Duke's efforts, it may perhaps be advisable, though in anticipation of the order of the time, to deal now with H.R.H.'s views on the subject, after he had had opportunities of observing the effect of his proposals, as given before Lord Dufferin's Royal Commission on Military Education in 1870.

On 12 March 1870 the Duke stated to the Commission: 'I have known some men of very great scientific attainments who were not good officers, not from want of zeal, but because their aptitude was more towards scientific acquirements than military acquirements, and it does not follow that the one results from the other. . . . I should like to see these (scientific attainments) extended as much as possible, but I think that a happy combination of both is what we should strive at.'

In view of Lord Kitchener's recent order to the Indian Army, and recommendation that military education should be conducted regimentally, it is interesting to note that the Duke, in his evidence before the Royal Commission in 1870, outlined a scheme which is in effect very much the same as that proposed by Lord Kitchener. In his evidence, on 15 April 1870, H.R.H. stated:—

'I do not see why you should not have in every Regiment an officer qualified to give instruction to officers, and to superintend the performance of the work of the men in barracks such as is now contemplated . . . Of course you must look at the expense of the arrangement. No officer could be required to perform this duty without having a sufficient amount of remuneration for it. . . . A scientific officer would be the best qualified for such a duty.'

The Duke also stated that there was one great difficulty as regards inducements for officers to qualify at the Staff College: the military authorities had not sufficient appointments at their disposal to provide employment for all those who had graduated at that establishment.

Speaking, however, of the regimental instructors whose appointment he had advocated, the Duke said:—

'In my opinion they [Staff College graduates] would be the most qualified for such appointments. There would then be an opening for men to induce them to go to the Staff College . . . and in that way you would diffuse through the Army a great deal more information than it possesses now, because by holding out inducements to men to get better appointments you will get men to work for them, but without inducements you cannot get men to work for them.'

The system of 'Garrison Instruction,' one of Classes of Officers from various Regiments formed under a Staff College officer at our principal military stations at home and abroad, was the one adopted in 1871, and was, in view of the prevailing lack of military education of the period, probably the best that could be devised in the circumstances. As years passed, and the general amount of knowledge in the Army increased, the Garrison Classes became less necessary, or, at any rate, were no longer indispensable as hitherto. In consequence a feeling grew up that it would be

better if some system of Regimental Instruction took the place of Garrison Instruction by Staff Officers especially detailed for the purpose; and the idea of replacing the latter by the former, the money thus saved by the abolition of centres of instruction being appropriated for the payment of Regimental Instructors, was brought before the authorities. It was, however, rejected on the grounds that, although in some corps officers could be found competent and willing to undertake the duties, in others the reverse might be the case.

After the Duke's retirement from office, the system of Garrison Classes was somewhat hastily abolished, but unfortunately no recognised scheme for Regimental Instructors, as advocated by the Duke in 1870, was ordered to take its place.

The results have not been satisfactory and have led to the order, sound in theory but in practice unworkable, of making commanding officers responsible for the technical professional accomplishments of all their officers. The latest phase of this is seen in Lord Kitchener's recent Order on Military Training in India. As far as can be seen, the outcome of this and similar orders will be the eventual adoption, at any rate in principle, of the Duke's recommendations in 1870.

The Duke is popularly supposed to have had a prejudice against Staff College graduates. Nothing could be more inaccurate. It is perfectly true that, with his shrewd common sense and thorough practical knowledge of all military details, he had a dislike of the class of officers, not unknown among those who have graduated at Camberley, who, viewing the Staff College solely as a means of personal advancement, took little or no trouble to master their regimental duties, or to maintain themselves proficient in a knowledge of the same, their one and only object being to escape from what they viewed as the tedium of regimental life, and to attract the eye of the public. For such officers he always evinced an undisguised contempt, whence has unquestionably arisen the story of his prejudice against the Staff College.

It was against certain types that graduated there, not

against the Establishment itself, that his criticisms were levelled.

All who read the foregoing extracts from the Duke's writings and evidence will realise that H.R.H. was himself the founder of the Staff College system in its modern form; and that he took the most lively interest in inaugurating a sound system of military education. Hence it must be admitted that in this instance, as in many others, popularly accepted ideas were very wide of the truth, and so far from the Duke objecting to the Staff College, he made it.

CHAPTER VIII

PERSIA, CHINA, MUTINY—1856-57

Persian War. Paucity of Troops in India. Chinese Difficulties. Command offered to Sir Colin Campbell. Home Needs. Embodiment of Militia. The Queen's Letters. Organisation at Home. Need of more Regiments for India. Supplies for India. Passage of Troops through Egypt. Colonial Military Requirements. The Queen's Letter *re* General Havelock. Sir Colin Campbell's Demand for Stores. Question of raising a Foreign Legion. The Spirit of Revenge in India. The Queen's Letter. Relief of Lucknow. The Queen's Appreciation of her Soldiers.

In this and the immediately following chapters it is proposed to deal with the various military operations in the East in which Great Britain was engaged during the years 1856-60, and in considering them every endeavour has been made to confine the story to the actual events and to the part taken by the Duke in the preparation and organisation of the forces employed. Thus, matters of general military interest—such, for example, as Home Defence, Organisation and Military Education—which occupied the attention of the Ministry and the Commander-in-Chief during the same period, will consequently be found in another place.

Difficulties had arisen with Persia owing to that Power having annexed Herat. On 1 November 1856 war had been declared, and a small expeditionary force under Sir James Outram, consisting of Queen's and Indian troops, had been sent to the Persian Gulf and captured the Fort of Reshire on 7 December, and Bushire on 10 December. Owing to the smallness of the force employed and the absence of any proper transport, it now became a question as to what should be done to coerce Persia.

The Governor-General of India advocated an invasion of that country, but to this the Duke, writing on 27 December to

Lord Panmure, says:—'I cannot anticipate so mad a policy.' Three days later, on 30 December, he again writes in reply to a communication from Lord Panmure with reference to an expeditionary force to the Persian Gulf. 'Ten thousand men is not in any respect too large a number of troops, and I will take care to have them in hand.' He expresses his fears, in the event of hostilities, of 'Russia mixing herself up in it, hating us as we know she does,' and suggests that Sir Colin Campbell would be a good officer to send in command of any force dispatched.

On 6 January 1857 Lord Panmure, when discussing 'the possibilities of this Persian War' and the demand for more men it inevitably would entail, grimly reminds H.R.H. of 'the impending reductions of 7000 on 31st March,' the end of the financial year.

Thereupon ensued a correspondence, culminating on 18 February by the Duke penning a memorandum on the distribution of the Army, in which he energetically protests against further reductions, and mentions that there are only 20,649 Queen's troops in India, most significantly adding, 'which in my opinion is certainly not sufficient for the requirements of that vast Empire.'

With reference to these weighty words, it should be borne in mind that, owing to the slowness of communications in those days, this memorandum of the Duke's dealt with the position of affairs in the early weeks of 1857 before any serious misgivings as to the loyalty of the native army or the possibilities of an immense Mutiny, such as took place four months later, had arisen.

On 8 February Sir James Outram obtained a signal victory over the Persian forces at Kooshab, but the question of more extended operations in that country was still under consideration, and for some weeks Persia occupied much attention.

After the capture of Mohammerah, hostilities ceased, and eventually Persia agreed to give up Herat. Meanwhile the Duke returned to the charge with respect to the paucity of Queen's troops in India, and on 29 March writes to Lord Panmure:—

TO LORD PANMURE.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, 29*th March* 1857.

'. . . I return the papers you have sent me on the force of the Queen's troops in India.

'There cannot be two opinions as to the necessity for increasing this force, whether the war in Persia is concluded or not. I have minuted accordingly, and backed up your opinion as strongly as I can. The increase, however, refers only to these papers. What must not be lost sight of is, that we are sending four Regiments to India *via* China. It is possible that, after the last news from China, the troops will not be there required, at all events for any length of time. Suppose, however, that they are required there for some time. What are we to do then as to supplying their place in India? which is a possibility, or rather a contingency, which cannot be overlooked. I draw your attention to this in a private letter, as it has nothing to do with the Minute I have written on the general question of the Queen's troops in India.'

Apparently the Duke considered he was not kept sufficiently well informed of the progress of the military operations in Persia, for on 18 March Lord Panmure, in sending the Duke some Persian papers, writes: 'It is quite right that Y.R.H. should see all the military dispatches, and as soon as the Cabinet have done with them they shall be sent to you to make confidential extracts.'

Replying to this on the following day, the Duke writes: 'I am glad that you entirely agree with my views that the Commander-in-Chief should see all Military Dispatches in cases in which the Queen's troops are concerned.'

Referring to the arrangement which had been arrived at as regards the cessation of hostilities in Persia and the withdrawal of Sir James Outram's force, he adds: 'It is quite clear that the force at Bushire is not of sufficient strength to have made any permanent forward movement.'

Hardly had the Persian difficulty been settled when fresh trouble threatened us in China, and it was decided to organise a force to proceed thither, and in conjunction with our late allies in the Crimea, the French, to coerce the Chinese into keeping their engagements with reference to the Treaty Ports established in 1842.

China consequently occupies a considerable place amid the papers of the early months of 1857. The Ministry

decided to offer the chief command to the veteran Sir Colin Campbell, who had, after many years of honourable service in the Peninsular War and subsequently in high commands in India, recently returned to his native country to enjoy a well-earned repose.

On 9 May the Duke sent for him and offered him the chief command, and a few hours afterwards received the following characteristic reply, in which, after thanking His Royal Highness 'for his verbal offer of this afternoon of service in China,' he proceeds:—

'. . . I have spent about twenty-one years in tropical climates—for a large portion of which period I was a martyr to fever and ague, first contracted at Walcheren. I still suffer from this disease, and I am certain that at my age a fresh exposure to a tropical sun will bring on fresh attacks which will render me unfit to perform my duty. . . . It seems to me more becoming that . . . I should be contented with a repose in my own country after an active service of nearly half a century. . . .'

The occasion was not one of great emergency, and hence Sir Colin Campbell was doubly justified in refusing the proffered command. When, only a few months later, the terrible crisis arose in India, the veteran at once responded to the call and proceeded thither. After reading his reasons for thus declining to go to China, the splendid patriotism of this most gallant old soldier shines forth with increased glory.

But there were other gallant souls among those who might legitimately consider that they had amply fulfilled their duties to their country, who strove to assist at this period. On 13 March another fine old soldier, Sir John Burgoyne, who had served with Sir John Moore at Corunna and in most of the great battles of the Peninsula, and recently had rendered invaluable services in the Crimea, where, indeed, he was the oldest officer present, proffered his services. Writing to the Duke he says: 'It is reported that there has been some difficulty in finding a General Officer to take command of the Service in China. . . . If Your Royal Highness thought that my services would be of avail, I shall be quite at Your Royal Highness's dis-

posal. . . .' At the time of writing this letter Sir John was in his seventy-fifth year.

On the same day that Sir Colin Campbell declined the offer, the Government selected Sir John Pennefather, who was in command at Malta, and the Duke at once wrote to notify him of the fact. Within three days, on 12 March, Lord Panmure wrote to His Royal Highness that the Cabinet had decided after all not to send Sir John Pennefather, but General Ashburnham. The justifiable vexation of Sir J. Pennefather can easily be imagined, and he writes at length to the Duke as to the 'bitter disappointment' he had experienced. Troops were now ordered to embark for the Far East and all preparations pushed on for the coming campaign.

On 30 April Lord Panmure, in writing to His Royal Highness as to the Chinese preparations, says:—'You will observe what Outram says of the value of "The Chief of the Staff." I take credit to myself for introducing this from our neighbours into our own Army.'

Amid the Duke's letters respecting the claims and requests of various officers for employment in China there are at times some humorous hits. Thus in the case of an officer who had experienced some rather stormy episodes on account of a book which he had published on the Crimean War, and who now sought employment in China, the Duke writes: 'I think China will be a very suitable place for him, especially with regard to the annoyance which has been caused by the publication of his book.'

It was in the midst of these preparations for an expedition to China that suddenly the news of the revolt of our Native Army in India came as a thunderclap upon the nation. The storm had been impending since the beginning of the year, and several cases of trouble in the native regiments had occurred early in that year. In March it was found necessary to disband certain corps; and on 10 May matters came to a head in Meerut, then one of our largest military stations in India. The mutineers broke into the jail and released the prisoners who were there

confined, and forthwith proceeded to massacre all the Europeans they happened to meet.

Subsequently they proceeded to Delhi, where they stirred up the garrison to mutiny, incited the large civil population to rebel, and proclaimed as their leader the discrowned Moghul Emperor.

The white garrison in India at the time was dangerously scattered and weak, and the cry for Europeans was pressing in the extreme. Fortunately troops at the time were on their way to China, to take part in the expedition which was eventually postponed till 1860. The needs of India were then so extremely urgent that the Indian Government determined to utilise them. Steamers were therefore sent to interrupt the transports and divert their course from China to India.

Sir Henry Lawrence, who then was Chief Commissioner of Oudh and who accurately judged the gravity of the situation, wrote to Lord Canning, the Governor-General, and impressed upon him the necessity of obtaining all the Europeans he possibly could from China, Ceylon, or anywhere else. He also emphasised the fact that whether China was coerced then or at some more favourable opportunity was a matter of the smallest concern. The needs of India, on the other hand, were pressing and vital. The call for white troops was therefore most urgent, and in those days, it must be remembered, there was no Suez Canal. The overland route through Egypt was consequently the shortest by which it was possible for the reinforcements to arrive so as to avoid the long sea journey round the Cape.

As troops were dispatched from home to satisfy the urgent needs of India, it became necessary to embody the Militia in order to take their places and to provide in other ways for the security of the United Kingdom. The organisation of the home forces, which the Duke of Cambridge had taken such pains to improve and place upon a satisfactory footing, both before and since he became Commander-in-Chief, was naturally to a large extent dislocated; and certain modifications in the plan became necessary.

Queen Victoria, as will be seen from the letters which she wrote to His Royal Highness on the subject, took the liveliest interest in these matters, and was ever ready to support the Commander-in-Chief in attempting to obtain what in his military judgment was wanted from the Ministers of the day. It was only by embodying Militia that more regular troops could with safety be spared for India; but it was urged that it was most desirable that the Brigade and Divisional organisation so recently established should be retained, even if there were few troops to compose its units, as, if once parted with, great difficulty would be experienced in effecting its restoration.

FROM THE QUEEN.

OSBORNE, *23rd July* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—. . . Thank God, the Government have decided to do what is necessary. I hope and think that my letter did good. It is only a pity that they have reduced the number of the Companies with the Second Battalions; but as Lord Palmerston says that it is only "*for the present*," I hope it won't signify. Only be stout and determined, and you may rely on our backing you up. We have charming weather with much pleasant air. We have just heard that the Emperor and Empress are to arrive on the 6th.'

FROM THE QUEEN.

'OSBORNE, *1st August* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—Thank you for your letter received yesterday. I should think it best not to make any change at this moment with regard to the Divisions and Brigades. If once done away with, it will cost a good deal of fighting with the War Office to get them re-established, although the appointments might remain temporarily vacant.

'The Government have it under consideration to call out and keep embodied for some time a portion of the Militia; these Regiments should then not be left to themselves but put under the supervision of Brigadiers and Generals of Divisions. These Militia Regiments, together with the new Battalions, would quite fill up the Divisions.'

TO THE QUEEN.

'HORSE GUARDS, *3rd August* 1857.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—Since the arrival of the last mail from India, various arrangements and changes have become necessary, all of which will be officially brought before You, but which I think it right meanwhile to bring to Your notice.

The 7th Hussars are ordered to India, also one Troop and four additional Batteries of Artillery, and to-day we have got the order for three more Regiments of Infantry, and I have selected the 66th, 72nd, and 56th for this duty. This will leave our home force extremely weak, but the exigencies of the Service requiring it, the force must be found and sent. I think the time has now really arrived when 10,000 to 20,000 Militia should undoubtedly be called out and embodied for Garrison duty, at all events until the new Regiments of the Line are raised, about which I intend to commence this very day. . . . All these changes render it absolutely necessary that the force at Aldershot shall for the moment be considerably diminished, and the Curragh I fear for the present to be discontinued, the Staff being to some extent kept up, but no vacancies filled. It is impossible for me to do the Garrison duty in this country without the troops at present in the Camps, and the Cavalry Regiments are encumbered with supernumerary horses which must be taken care of and cannot be so well, out of barracks. Therefore I think the larger portion of the Cavalry at Aldershot must now return to quarters, which will have the further advantage, I should hope, of procuring for these, good recruits in the several large towns in which they will be stationed. On the receipt of Your reply I would at once commence the movement of the Cavalry to their respective quarters. I regret there shall be this necessity, but I really do not see how it is at present possible to avoid it.'

TO THE QUEEN.

'GOODWOOD HOUSE, *30th July* 1857.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—The large reinforcements that we are at this moment sending off to India makes it almost impos sible to retain our Division and Brigade system to the extent it has hitherto been established. I am extremely anxious to interfere with it as little as possible, as I hope during the winter to train a sufficient number of Battalions to take the places of those now going out on Foreign Service, but meanwhile some modification must take place, and I would, therefore, propose that, as Sir Fred Love is to be appointed Inspector-General of Infantry, and his Division, in which there are hardly any troops, should for the present not be filled up, but that Lord Rokeby should, in addition to his command of the Brigade of Guards, have general military charge of what I should call the Home District, which would comprise a Brigade of Infantry under Lord West, which would be posted between Dover and Shorncliffe. As soon as the number of troops increase and Shorncliffe is again filled, the nomination of a General of Division may be resumed, but at the present moment it is impossible to find troops to replace them, and as General Cameron is now

employed on the Council for Military Education, and General Laurenson is destined to succeed Sir James Scarlett at Aldershot, there is but one small Brigade of two Regiments under Lord West that belongs to what used to be the Shorncliffe Division. As regards Ireland, it may be as well for the present to leave it as it is. We have not many Regiments there at present, but we can just manage to keep up three Regiments of Infantry and two of Cavalry. These are divided into two Divisions, the one at Dublin, the other at the Curragh. The latter will be dispersed during the winter, the Generals going with their Brigades, and I hope by that time the new Battalions will be getting on, and that we shall then again be able to resume the four Brigades of Infantry. Aldershot shall be filled up till the winter as far as practicable, but the Infantry Brigade will for the present, I fear, consist of only two Regiments. What I am anxious to have Your sanction for is that Lord Rokeby should at once take charge of the Home District or Division, and I trust You will not object to it. Next week I hope to be in a position to commence the formation of the new Battalions, but it will be a work of time, as this is not a period of the year when men can easily be got. The accounts from India, though not good, are less bad than I had feared they might have been, and General Barnard not having taken Delhi only indicates that his force is not considerable, but that he can hold his own, as proved by the frequent sorties alluded to, all of which he repelled with great slaughter to the Sepoys. The latter, I fancy, are anxious to break through with the treasure they have found in the town, hence these repeated efforts to get out of the town.

'In China news is good. I came down here for dinner yesterday, stay over to-day, and return to London to-morrow, the dispatches not being expected before then.'

TO LORD PANMURE.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *4th August* 1857.

'I send you a very interesting memo. sent to me by Mansfield. It is so good that I think you might like Palmerston to see it, as no doubt you will talk to him, Mansfield, about it. I got your letter last night, and the two Regiments shall be furnished, one of Cavalry and one of Infantry. But the time has certainly arrived for a portion of Militia to be called out, without which measure it will be quite impossible for us to carry on the duties of the United Kingdom. Besides which it is essential that we should have a force in hand of some sort or kind, and I am now reduced to fourteen Regiments of Infantry all told, which really leaves me in a most pitiable state of destitution. Indeed no time is to be lost, and I hope you will not fail to bring the subject before your next Cabinet Meeting. I have

written you an official letter on this subject, forwarding one I had from Fergusson about the state of his Garrison at Gibraltar, about which he complains very much. We have done nothing as yet about recruiting up the Guards, but seeing the reduced state of our Garrison, and that Guards might be made available to some extent should they be stronger in numbers (at present they are 700 per Battalion), I really think we should make them up without delay to 800 or rather 900 men per Battalion.'

FROM THE QUEEN.

'OSBORNE, *5th August* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—. . . I hope you will seriously consider the Depôt system for the Indian Regiments, which is quite insufficient for its purpose and, on its present footing, ruinous to the Regiments.

'The Regiments now going, of whom we saw the 42nd, 34th, and 54th yesterday, are filled from the few remaining at home, so that these have lost their best men, and we may be said to keep absolutely *nothing* efficient at home. Twenty thousand Militia will not suffice to make up for such losses; 40,000 is the least which ought to be called out. . . .'

TO LORD PANMURE.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *16th August* 1857.

'I would suggest that the only mode of sending out more Regiments to India would be by embodying more Militia and sending out these Militia Regiments to the Mediterranean, where many corps would then be relieved for other services. I cannot advise a further reduction of our home force, which is in all conscience already too much reduced. Why not call out 20,000 Militia instead of 10,000, as at present proposed? By that means the whole difficulty would be overcome.'

FROM LORD PALMERSTON.

'94 PICCADILLY, *6th August* 1857.

'I am sorry that my morning Ride led me to be out when Y.R.H. did me the honour to call here. It is very natural that the Queen should feel anxious that the gap made in our Home Force by the sending so many Regiments to India should be filled up as soon as possible. But it is to be borne in mind that this gap can, as regards the regular Army, be filled up only by Recruiting, and that nothing is gained by forming Nominal Battalions or Nominal Depôt Companies till we have raised the men of whom they are to be composed: and it seems to be the most judicious course to apply the Recruits as they are raised, to make complete and efficient the existing Regiments, the Second Battalions already determined upon and the Depôt Com-

panies already added to the Regiments in India, rather than to divide those Recruits over a wider surface. With regard to the amount of the Militia Force to be embodied, when the Bill authorising that measure shall have passed, our necessary limit will be the amount of money available for the Payment of that Force, and that amount of money again is limited by the small surplus which exists of annual Income over annual Expenditure. If any European danger were to threaten us, we should call Parliament again together and ask for a larger sum to pay a larger Militia Force, and if we made out a sufficient case, Parliament would no doubt give us new Taxes to a sufficient amount, but that state of things happily does not as yet exist.'

About this time it would seem that the Duke had occasion to point out to the Secretary of State for War that he was not always kept sufficiently posted up in information received from the seat of war in India which immediately concerned his own department. Lord Panmure writes in reply:—

'W. O., 23*rd August* 1857.

'I do not leave this before to-morrow week at soonest, and I will arrange so that any military news we get from India shall be wired to Y.R.H.

'You see everything that comes to me at present, and I know of no military information which ought to have been communicated and which has not been so.

'There are many political matters often mixed up with some military details which reach the Government, but these of course are for the action of the responsible Ministers of the Crown.

'Your Royal Highness may, however, rely on receiving information on every point which may eventually form the ground for the Cabinet applying to you for advice and assistance.'

That the Duke was keenly alive to the critical nature of the position is plainly evidenced by the foregoing. Apparently the Ministry still hesitated as to the expediency or necessity of calling out any respectable force of Militia, for on 26 August Prince Albert writes:—

'Osborne.

'Thanks for your good wishes. It is appalling that the new Ministry continue to harden their hearts like Pharaoh. Unfortunately, the plagues came equally on the Egyptians who were not participators of Pharaoh's sin. . . .'

How urgent also was the necessity of keeping up supplies for the Indian campaign, and how dangerous and defenceless had become the plight of the United Kingdom, can be realised by a perusal of the following letter which was addressed to Lord Panmure by the Duke of Cambridge:—

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *29th August* 1857.

'I consider the enclosed letter contains so much of importance that I lose not a moment in forwarding it for your perusal, though I mean to write officially to you on the subject of stores for the Army. From what Somerset says, it is quite clear to me that the troops we have and are now sending out must be supplied with everything from here. Not a moment should be lost in collecting these supplies and sending them out. You will want them there, of that there cannot be a doubt, but even should you not, what does it signify? Send them, and if not wanted throw them away rather than not have them on the spot. Pray do not set this question aside lightly; it is a most important one, and we shall be justly blamed if we neglect these warnings. Don't let us wait for requisitions from the Court of Directors. The time has gone by for that. Let us act on our own responsibility with vigour, and we shall do the right thing and be praised for our forethought. There are several things contained in this letter which ought to be fully considered. Now I would most strongly urge on you the propriety of sending the next three Cavalry Regiments destined for India as also the Artillery *through Egypt and with their horses.* In Cavalry and Artillery we are most deficient, and they are now most needed. Horses are difficult to procure, if they can be procured at all. Time passes, Regiments and Batteries must at once be mounted. Send them through Egypt at any cost or any trouble. What signifies this when an Empire is at stake? I do beg of you to consider this well, for much may depend upon it. Let them send steamers to Suez, and let us send by steam from here to Alexandria. If they object to more than a few Squadrons passing over at a time, arrange this so as to have only two Squadrons in the country at a time. In a month all would be passed through easily, and this force would reach India long before the troops who started by long sea could by any possibility get there. I am most decidedly of opinion that some Engineers should be sent to India. No force is complete without them, and few are there belonging to the Company, so pray send them. I think a couple of Battalions of Military Train should also go, as there is so great a want of land carriage. As regards the troops to be sent out, I quite approve of

three Cavalry Regiments going *with their horses*. I say I also approve of the Artillery as detailed, but I hope you will call out a certain proportion of Militia Artillery to replace those going out, for we are running rather short in this respect, and want some ready to garrison forts and places that will otherwise be left without troops. As regards Infantry, my most decided opinion is that so very large a force has already been sent of that arm that for the moment no more is needed, whereas at home it is *dreadfully wanted*, and in fact till the Militia are fully out and drilled it is quite impossible with safety to dispense with these four additional Regiments. Bear in mind that not alone I have no troops to put in Garrison and give the daily duties, but what is far worse, I shall have no Regiments to aid me in drilling my new Battalions from whence to take any other commissioned officers, etc. In fact, I shall be run so dry that the machine will not work any more. Give me only a little more time to get up the Militia and a few of any Second Battalions, and you shall have the four Regiments of Infantry, but do not ask for them at this moment, for I do not feel myself in a position to give them with safety to the country or the future prospects of the Army. I will prepare them quickly for service, but all I ask is, don't send them for a little time longer, otherwise I cannot properly prepare and keep up the required Reserves.

'As regards the political part of the question, of course that is no affair of mine, but I cannot help observing that Europe is not so well disposed to this country as not to cause some little anxiety, and to be entirely wanting of even the troops for our small Garrison towns is surely hardly prudent. Would it not be right under present circumstances, seeing the denuded state which we are in, to have something of a Channel Fleet, say 10,000 men on board ship, to protect us from insult from without? Russia hates us, will strain every nerve to do us injury whenever she can, will most probably endeavour to make bad blood between France and ourselves. Don't allow her to insult us, and therefore as your Army is gone from home, have a sufficient Fleet to guard against such insult.

'I will call on you to-morrow afternoon between two and three, and meanwhile perhaps you would like Palmerston to see Somerset's letter and to know my sentiments with reference to all these matters.'

The immediate effect of this letter was to accelerate the movements of the Government with regard to sending reinforcements. For to put it plainly, in the Duke's words, 'the Empire was at stake,' and meanwhile politicians were discussing the advisability of sending two companies of infantry from Malta to Aden *dressed in plain clothes*, so as not

to wound the susceptibilities of the Porte and others! The Duke, seeing that if help was to be given it must be given instantly, urged upon Lord Palmerston to obtain permission for troops to pass through Egypt in uniform and accoutred, though their arms and ammunition might be carried in bulk.

FROM LORD PALMERSTON.

'94 PICCADILLY, 14*th September* 1857.

'I have had the honour of Y.R.H.'s letter this morning, and I quite agree with Y.R.H. that if the passage through Egypt is to be made use of for drafts to India on the scale proposed by the Steam Company whose offer Y.R.H. read, the men should go in uniform with their belts on, their arms and ammunition being put up in packages to be carried with them as part of their baggage.

'This large arrangement will require the previous consent of the Porte and of the Pasha of Egypt, and as it will be a matter of public notoriety, and of official consent, there can be no objection to sending the men in uniform as soldiers, though it would probably be better that they should not have their arms in their hands.

'With reference to the smaller and more immediate arrangement for sending a reinforcement to Aden, Y.R.H. may perhaps think it best to detach two Companies, instead of a given number of men, from some Regiment at Malta, and if Y.R.H. were able to specify the Regiment from which these two Companies should be detached, I could by telegraph to our Consul at Marseilles send word to the Governor of Malta to prepare him for Y.R.H.'s official Instruction, and thus enable him to get the arms and ammunition packed up and the plain clothes made for the men in time for the arrival of the next packet. If, on the other hand, Y.R.H. would prefer leaving to the Commanding Officer at Malta the discretion of choosing the Regiment, the Governor of Malta might be told so by telegraph.'

On the following day Lord Palmerston wrote further on the same subject:—

'94 PICCADILLY, 15 *September* 1857.

'Upon thinking the matter over, it strikes me that there might be some inconvenience in sending to our Consul at Marseilles a telegraphic message explaining all the arrangements to be made for the passage of the two Companies through Egypt, because I conclude that the Consul has no Foreign Office Cypher, and the message would be read by all the French Offices through which it would go. I think, therefore, that it would be best that Y.R.H. should write a letter to the General Officer commanding at Malta telling him to get the two Companies ready, to have their

arms and accoutrements and ammunition and baggage made up into packages of proper weight and size to be carried across the Desert, and to have some simple plain dress made for the men, and that these arrangements should be completed so that the two Companies should be ready to embark in the Mail Packet. . . .'

So urgent at this time was the need for troops, and so inadequate were the means at home to produce them, that various parts of the Empire were denuded of their garrisons. This led the Duke of Cambridge to protest to the Secretary of State. He further once again returns to the charge as to the inadvisability of ordering the reinforcements of British troops proceeding across Egypt to masquerade in plain clothes, and quotes in support of his views a most interesting conversation which he had with the Emperor Napoleon III. on the subject.

TO LORD PANMURE.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, 25 *September* 1857.

'. . . I saw Smith[1] to-day. He had been with Mr. Labouchere, and had discussed with him some plans for further diminishing our troops in the Colonies. I do not approve of these plans, and must warn you against carrying them out. We have reduced our forces sufficiently everywhere, and shall run great risks if we go any further in this respect.

'Canada must have two Regiments, Sir William Eyre in his last letter suggesting even an increase to the Canadian Rifles, which, however, I fear it will be difficult to comply with, though I wish it could be done. I would not move a black Regiment from the West Indies until I had a new one, as now proposed to be raised in Canada, to replace it. From New South Wales, again, I would certainly not remove a Regiment, for those vast colonies must have some force merely as a protection to the authority of the Government. I cannot forget the observation made by the Emperor Napoleon, who said, in attending to our Indian affairs, that we should keep an eye to all our Colonies and on no account think of reducing one in them, as a mutiny was a very catching thing, and nobody could foresee how other localities might take the infection. I agree with him, and on this account warn you against any measures to reduce further our Colonial Forces. As soon as one or two corps of the new battalions are formed, I can send them abroad, and then some of the older Regiments can proceed to India in case of your wanting further reinforcements for that country. I also hope you will on no account give way to Volunteer

[1] Robert Vernon Smith (afterwards Lord Lyveden), 1800-1873, at that time President of the Board of Control.

corps, of which I see so much said in the newspapers. These never will answer: they are unmanageable bodies, and would ruin our Army. I consider that the recruiting is going on admirably. I really feel very confident of the success of our efforts. . . . I find it is again intended to send the Sappers by way of Egypt. I have no objection to such a plan, but I do beg of you to insist upon their going in uniform and as soldiers. It will be impossible to answer for the consequences if they do not. Depend upon it, we shall get into a scrape if we try to smuggle them through, as it cannot be done without everybody knowing who they are. The Emperor Napoleon asked me several times, if we did not intend to make use of Egypt for the conveyance of troops, so there will be no difficulty in that quarter; and indeed I feel confident that he will be surprised and not altogether pleased if we make a mystery of it. He likes to be treated with confidence, and it is far better to treat him in this matter as in all others, so pray urge it strongly. I wrote to Palmerston from Chalons to tell him so, but find he is out of town. I shall go to Yorkshire for a few days on Monday, but am always within reach. I feel very anxious about this question of the route through Egypt, so pray take it in hand at once.

'I highly approve of your strong letter to the Directors.'

The splendid achievements of General Havelock during the summer months of 1857 called forth the warm eulogiums of Queen Victoria.

'BALMORAL CASTLE, 22 *September* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I think General Havelock has done so remarkably well, and rendered such valuable service, that he ought to be made a Major-General, by his local and temporary rank being confirmed, as was done in the cases of Generals Airey, Torrens, Rose, Williams, and Windham. The number of General Officers would not be increased by the next vacancy not being filled up, according to the recommendation of the Committee in 1854. I wish you to take the necessary steps for carrying this into effect.'

That the military administration of the East India Company was absolutely incapable of grappling with the great military problems presented by the increased demands of the Army in India is now a matter of history. Sir Colin Campbell's complaints, as the following letters testify, were in consequence both loud and numerous. One point in H.R.H.'s letter to Lord Panmure is of special interest. It appears that Marshal Vaillant, on behalf of the Emperor Napoleon, asked the Duke whether shoes for horses were

wanted for the Indian campaign, as they had a large supply at Marseilles for their Arab horses—an excellent proof of the friendly feeling displayed by the French Government towards this country in her terrible struggle.

TO LORD PANMURE.

'2 *October* 1857.

'I feel more than ever uneasy about the state of affairs in India, from the private accounts I have this day received from the Commander-in-Chief of the three Presidencies. All their letters I have desired Yorke to forward to you, and you will observe from all—that the cry is for new troops, that the Bengal Army has entirely disappeared, that neither the Madras nor Bombay can be trusted. In fact, that these latter tolerate us, but no more, fearing that reinforcements are not far distant which would overawe them. It therefore becomes a matter of the most serious moment to consider how we are to augment and keep efficient a very considerable number of troops beyond our usual establishment. Our Recruiting is going on wonderfully well, particularly for this time of year, and we may say we are getting upwards of 4000 men per month, 1200 in fact per week, which would be at the rate of 60,000 a year. But even these large numbers are not sufficient for the demand, and if it can be further increased it ought to be. I dismiss at once from my mind all the ideas I see started in the public prints about Volunteer corps. If such a system were to be adopted, the spirit of the Regular Army would be destroyed, jealousies would be at once engendered, the Volunteers would do as much or as little duty as they liked, and in fact they would be an armed and a very dangerous rabble. Some gentlemen are coming forward promising to raise 1000 men for a Lieutenant-Colonelcy, others 100 men for an Ensigncy, but none have as yet found anything like the number of men, and I doubt much whether many will succeed in their expectations.

'Two courses now remain for us. The one calling out the whole of the Militia, the other the raising a Foreign Legion. Now, I admit that it would be more desirable to recruit our Army from our own resources and our own countrymen, and I am disposed to think that to a great extent it can be done; but if it is to be accomplished to the large extent now required, the whole Militia of the United Kingdom must in the first instance be put under arms. I am well aware that it is not wanted for home defence. I am also aware that it would entail a very heavy expenditure, but we are in the midst of a great and fearful crisis: great exertions are required to be made by the country, if it intends to get over it. England will get over it, and will make these exertions. Let not the responsible advisers of the Crown hang back. It is by

calling out the Militia only that the whole military ardour of the country will be roused. Once get the Militia clothed and embodied, and the red coat will soon induce the men to volunteer in numbers to the line. I may be told that Lieutenant-Colonels of the Militia will object to this. My reply is, if they do, they are not worthy to fill the honourable positions they occupy. But they will not object. They dare not object; the country would never stand it, and an officer making difficulties on account of his authority being interfered with on such an emergency as the present would be scouted out of society, and would be held up to the contempt which he deserved.

'However, if this is not to be done or thought of, or indeed simultaneously with calling out the Militia, why not raise some foreign Regiments? Begin with two or three, and increase that number if it is found to answer. Now, if this plan should be decided upon, I would suggest that the recruiting for these foreigners should not be conducted in other countries, but in England itself. I am confident it could be done, and the men would come over in hundreds. I would not have Germans, Swiss, or Italians separately, but I would mix them up all together, and I would have the English Army system established, discipline and interior economy, and I would officer these corps by English officers. A few foreign officers might be taken, but none without the highest character as to conduct and intelligence in the armies in which they may have served, and all others should be summarily rejected. Should this plan not be acceptable to you, I would suggest that some foreigners might be taken into all our English Regiments, say at the rate of ten per cent.: these could do no harm, and our men would keep them in their places, but I prefer a few foreign Battalions complete, incorporated with the English Army, as the French have a Foreign Legion always in Algeria, whose conduct and discipline have been invariably good. You might raise this legion as Queen's troops for India, let it serve there regularly, and keep it from falling into bad Indian habits by changing its station occasionally. A Battalion or two at a time to the Cape, Mauritius, Ceylon, and even England if it is thought advantageous; some such step, believe me, will have to be adopted, therefore the sooner it is determined upon the better. As soon as I have filled up the Cavalry Regiments to eight troops, I shall ask you for two or four more Cavalry Regiments, for it is very clear that this force will be specially required for India for a very long time to come. I should also require two additional troops of Horse Artillery, and probably one or two more batteries of Artillery, but I do not press this till I get some more recruits.

'Now I must bring to your notice the wants of the Indian Army. It is clear from Sir Colin's letter that it is deficient

of *everything*, not a spare set of harness in store, no shoes, no ammunition, no man able to make use of the beautiful machinery sent out to make Minie bullets. It is almost incredible, yet from the first I feared it and told you so, but you thought otherwise, relying most naturally on the assurance of the Company. I never thought they or the Governor-General, a complete civilian, could know anything about these matters so purely military, and which they could not understand, and I regret to say I was right; this must, however, be remedied. I would send 100,000 pairs of shoes of the largest size: that is to say, of various sizes, but large ones; the ammunition must evidently go overland; Sir Colin says he cannot get on without, so it must be sent. I would strongly urge upon you the necessity of at once establishing a Military officer as agent for the furtherance of Military Stores both at Alexandria and Suez. Without such agents we should never be able to get on, and the overland route must henceforth be largely used for the conveyance not alone of stores but of men. A regular transit for soldiers should now be established; but first it would have been no gain to have sent men that way, as no transport was established, but it can be established, and it ought to be insisted upon. We have sent harness and guns for most of the Batteries, but it is not enough; pray send large supplies, also plenty of shot and shell. Marshal Vaillant asked me if we wanted shoes for horses, as they had a large supply at Marseilles for their Arab horses; if you are in doubt about their being sufficient in India, take them by all means, for they will do for the Arab horses on the Bombay side. The real fact is that our Army in India should now be treated as a force to be chiefly supplied from home: such being the case, every facility should be afforded to us to know its state; this we are not sufficiently informed of, and time is come when you must speak out to the Board of Directors and insist upon having more power in these matters than has been hitherto the case. This opens a large question which it will be necessary to discuss more fully, for it is my very decided opinion that *two* armies cannot co-exist as they are at present in India without serious injury to the State; but of that more hereafter. Meanwhile, pray supply everything in abundance, and send whatever is most urgently required, particularly the ammunition, and this in large quantities overland. However, I think I have said enough for once. Pray decide the most important points contained in this letter before the Cabinet again leaves London, if such be possible.'

FROM LORD PANMURE.

'WAR OFFICE, 3 *October* 1857.

'. . . I think things are in train to meet all deficiencies complained of by Sir Colin. We must evidently look only

to our own resources, and except camp-equipage suitable for India, we have everything. The Company have sent out flooring for temporary barracks, and *promise* attention to lodgement and sanitary provision for the troops; on the latter I place little reliance, and yet can do nothing.

'The C. of Directors are furious at my letter, and have written an impertinent one, but I have told V. Smith that the time is gone by for ceremony, and kick as they please I will take care of our fine Army.

'I have sent all the letters which Y.R.H. has been kind enough to transmit to me to Lord Palmerston. We have a good consul at Alexandria, and it will be quite sufficient to station a F.-O. and two Captains at Alexandria, so that one may go with each railway cargo to Suez.

'I have sent for "Green Bey," the Director of the Egyptian Railway, who is in London and returning to his post in a day or two, to consult him on taking ammunition through Egypt.

'I send you a memorandum of Hammond's, which will show that the transit is not difficult. I think we may make use of it for troops in their proper dress. We have sent to ask the Porte and the Pasha for leave to use the route, and steamers are ordered to repair to the Red Sea.

'We have called out 10,000 more Militia, *i.e.* 25,000 in all. . . .'

A few days later he writes to the Duke on the subject of embodying the Militia, whereby it appears that the latter's suggestion of calling out 20,000 Militia in place of 10,000, as expressed in his letter of 16 August, had been accepted and indeed improved upon, since Lord Panmure now mentions 25,000.

FROM LORD PANMURE.

'W. O., 6 *October* 1857.

'. . . I think the plan of calling out the whole Militia is as yet premature, and the Cabinet come to the conclusion 25,000 of that force will not only provide for the service of the country, but be sufficient to spread the scarlet force well through the land.

'I have thrown cold water on all schemes of "Gentlemen Volunteers," and I was surprised to see the *Times* so foolish on this subject. I quite agree with Y.R.H. in their utter uselessness.

'Their danger would be greater to their friends than their foes. The proposals of private individuals to raise regiments and companies are visionary, as none have the least prospect of success so far as I can learn.

'There are many objections to raising a Foreign Legion.

'1*st*. You can only do so by calling Parliament together and obtaining its sanction, which would not be so easy.

'2*nd*. The expense is very much more than if you gave a *treble* bounty to men in your own country.

'3*rd*. There are strong political objections against introducing into India a Foreign Legion, who would, when they left your service, remain in the country and probably be adopted by the independent Native Regiments, and at some future time prove thorns in your side.

'4*th*. It will, even suppose the above difficulty overcome, take a long time to bring foreigners to our drill and a competent understanding of our words of command.

'The Cabinet have decided after consideration upon these points not to raise foreign legionaries at present.

'Whenever Y.R.H. has filled up the additional troops, I will submit to the Cabinet the subject of additional Cavalry Regiments. I scarcely think that more Artillery will be required.

'The E.I.C. are to get 4000 spare sets of harness from me, and steps are likewise taken to send ammunition as speedily as may be.

'There is no difficulty in getting any quantity overland, but they will get all the China supply. I have put the shoes in train. Horse-shoes the Company positively decline.

'I quite agree with Y.R.H. that we must know more of our troops in India, and also of the resources of the E.I.C., from which they profess to be able to supply an army.

'I now come to Y.R.H.'s letter of the 5th.

'I am very doubtful as to the policy of sending the Guards to India. Were any glory to be achieved they should have their share, but by the time they get there would be of no use but as a patrol. Moreover, you could not replace them so easily as the line, and I confess that I like to keep the Guards at home and around the Sovereign's person as long as I can.

'The Mutiny in India is no doubt vast, but it will vanish as suddenly as it sprung up; Delhi once taken, the mutineers will melt away. I don't believe that either Bombay or Madras will break out.

'The Regiments which I have asked to be in readiness I do not expect will be wanted, unless it be for Madras, where Lord Harris is much and overmuch alarmed.

'I quite agree that in our arrangements across the desert no *delay must occur in* the transit, and no troops must land at Alexandria till the whole course is clear before them. . . .'

FROM LORD PANMURE.

'War Office, 20 *October* 1857.

'. . . Our recruiting flourishes—2165 in one week! I hear shall have a good pull at some of the Militia Regiments in aining if not roughly assaulted.

'Suppose a man who had been a Captain in H.M.'s Service rings 300 men, would Y.R.H. be disposed to give him a Company?

'Our subs. are generally young and have no right to complain.'

FROM LORD PANMURE.

'Brechin Castle, 24 *October* 1857.

'. . . Your speech, Sir, at Sheffield was exactly what the *Globe* called it, "a word in season," and well spoken too. The effect of it has been to raise up Broadbent and Co. on me again, but I shall submit with excellent grace in expectation of the fruits which it will bear all over the country.

'I am quite satisfied with your refusal to take the Captain with his 300 men. I put the case to satisfy an unfortunate man, and I will now refuse him without committing Y.R.H. in any way. I have told Storks to concur officially in Yorke's proposal to recruit the 2nd Battalion of the Queen's to 1000. In the official letter he only reports it as 601. Y.R.H. puts it at 800 at present.

'The four additional Companies follow as a matter of course. I am glad that all this gives satisfaction at Windsor. Many thanks for keeping your people off the Militia Regiments. If they do not aid as they ought of their own free will, You shall find me ready to fall upon them tooth and nail.

'I will gladly fall in with any scheme which Y.R.H. may desire, to make the distinction you name between our Cavalry. We should retain not fewer than six heavy Regiments with large men and powerful horses for European work. Our lightest Cavalry will be a match for the heaviest of any European Kingdom that I know.'

People nowadays can hardly imagine the fury and indignation which possessed millions of our countrymen when the true story of the inhuman massacre of Cawnpore and elsewhere came to be known.

A terrible spirit of revenge naturally enough arose in our Army and spread among all classes. Lord Canning wrote to the Queen on this topic, and in the following letter to the Duke Her Majesty refers to it:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 30 *October* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—On returning these papers with many thanks, I send you a very interesting letter I received from Lord Canning, which I beg you to return as soon as you have done with.

'What he says about those people who have *not* suffered and entertain such atrocious feelings is very unsatisfactory and very wicked. It's so bad to entertain any hatred of a race on account of a Revolt which is, moreover, *purely* Military. Independently of the unchristian principle of such a feeling—it would be *purely* impossible to hold India in such a way. While punishing with stern justice the most guilty, we should show the Country and Inhabitants at large that we wish to govern them with kindness and impartiality.

'I fear the Cabinet has been dabbling in military details again, for which they seem to have a singular predilection, and for which they are eminently unfit; however, nothing has come to me yet.

'The Fall of Delhi is a great thing, as well as the certainty that Cawnpore and Lucknow are safe.'

The garrison of Lucknow, fortified and provisioned with rare foresight by Sir Henry Lawrence, managed to hold out against enormous odds until it was relieved on 25 September 1857 by Generals Havelock and Outram, an operation which is generally known as the first Relief of Lucknow. In reality, however, this so-called relief was merely an additional force thrown into the town, the relieving force not being strong enough to carry away to a place of safety the women, children, and wounded. In fact, it was not till 25 November 1857 that Sir Colin Campbell eventually rescued those who were besieged in the Residency.

News of the first relief, on being received in England, naturally caused considerable satisfaction, and consequently it was particularly disappointing when the true state of affairs became known, as the following letter from Her Majesty to the Duke of Cambridge shows:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 16 *November* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I have sent the papers from Sir Colin Campbell by Lord Panmure's request back again to him to show to the Cabinet. They are very alarming, and come most

distressingly after the relief and joy experienced at the news of General Outram and Havelock having reached and relieved the garrison at Lucknow. The position is most critical, but we must not despair. It looked so bad several times before, God knows! . . .'

How closely the Queen followed the fortunes of her soldiers is well evidenced in the next two letters.

FROM THE QUEEN.

'OSBORNE, 10 *December* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I return you these very interesting letters, which certainly give very serious cause for anxiety.

'May God grant that Lucknow may still be able to hold out! Don't you think Havelock's Dispatch ought to be published in the *Gazette*? It is the only authentic Account yet received.

'I should like to have a copy of Sir Colin Campbell's letter. How admirably he orders and arranges everything! Pray say everything kind and flattering to him in our name, and express the hope he won't expose himself unnecessarily. On him depends *everything* there *now*.'

The following most interesting letter shows in a very clear light Queen Victoria's kindly and sympathetic appreciation of the deeds of those who were privileged to serve her:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 15 *January* 1858.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—I return you this paper signed. I had yesterday written to Lord Palmerston urging this very thing to be done for that most gallant and heroic officer, Colonel Inglis, and also urging the consideration of rewards for these heroes.

'How I wish I could fly to them and place a wreath of laurels on dear old Sir Colin's and Colonel Inglis' brows!

'We were much pleased with Lieut. Lowe: he seems a very good and sensible officer. Pray let me know when any others arrive.'

CHAPTER IX

H.R.H.'S JOURNAL OF THE MUTINY CAMPAIGNS—1857-59

Objects of Journal. Outbreak of Mutiny. Arrangements for Campaign. Sir Colin Campbell to command. Relief of Lucknow. General Windham's Defeat at Cawnpore. Defeat of Gwalior Contingent. Recruiting at Home brisk. Sir Hugh Rose in Central India. Capture of Lucknow. Campaign in Rohilcund, etc. Capture of Bareilly and Relief of Shahjehanpore. Sir Colin Campbell to be Lord Clyde. Sir Hugh Rose's Successes. Difficulties of Home Government with regard to Indian Reinforcements. Defeat of Tantia Topee. The Campaign in Oudh. Proclamation, India transferred to Crown. Final Suppression of Mutiny.

MOST fortunately for the purposes of this work, the Duke of Cambridge, within a few months of the outbreak of the Mutiny, commenced a Military Journal in which from day to day he recorded the events of the campaign. He had throughout his life been most regular and careful in keeping diaries; from his earliest days, as is evidenced by the fact that the first of the journals which has come under notice commences on 7 January 1832.

This military journal is, however, of peculiar interest, since it may essentially be styled a 'war journal,' and all entries in it deal not only with military operations in which Great Britain was engaged during the tenure of office by H.R.H. as Commander-in-Chief, but in wars waged by other Powers, such as the Italian Campaign of 1859, the American Civil War, and the Franco-German War of 1870-71.

Since the Duke's brief accounts of these wars record most faithfully the position of affairs from day to day, and consequently the available information on which the Commander-in-Chief based his representations to the Ministers of the Crown, it has been thought desirable to reprint them *in extenso*.

It will be noted that, although the Duke became Com-

mander-in-Chief on 15 July 1856, this journal only deals with events from the commencement of the Indian Mutiny in May 1857,—in other words, with the first hostilities undertaken by the nation during the Duke's tenure of office.

MILITARY JOURNAL COMMENCED IN OCTOBER 1857.

It contains private information of all sorts, but is intended to be kept exclusively for Horse Guards purposes.

'18 *October* 1857.

'The object with which this journal is commenced is in order to keep dates of all the principal military events which may take place from time to time in connection with the Army, its arrangement and organisation. It is not intended to write in it daily the events of ordinary occurrences which may take place, but to confine the subjects alluded to to the great events of the day, and any such matter as it may be important and desirable to look back to at future periods. The subject which has chiefly drawn my attention to such a journal is the recent great mutiny in India, which is calling forth all our energies to crush it, and as the events connected with this sad affair are certain to be eventually referred to both in and out of Parliament, it will be well to have notes to turn back to with a view to the refreshing one's memory, and to be prepared with answers to any question which may be put to one from any quarter. It is to be regretted that I did not commence this journal at the time of my assuming the command, but, not having done so, it is well to commence at so important an epoch of our military history.

'After having for some time heard that the state of the Native Army in India was far from satisfactory, and that a bad feeling was rapidly spreading, which had led to open violence on the subject of the greased cartridges, news reached us about the 27 June of a very alarming character. The mutiny was rapidly spreading, the troops at Meerut and Delhi were in open revolt, other Corps were giving signs of disaffection in various directions, by burning their bungalows in and around the various stations and murdering their officers. Orders were immediately given to send more troops to India, and the four Regiments destined for India originally, as reliefs, were ordered to be ready to embark at once. These were the 3rd Battalions 60th and Rifle Brigade, 7th and 88th Foot. It was not till 11 July that we heard of the death of General Anson by cholera, which took place on the march from Umballa to Delhi on 26 May. This sad event has produced a very depressing effect upon all at home. Sir Colin Campbell was immediately sent for and requested to assume the command in chief of the Indian

Army, in succession to the lamented General Anson. He did not hesitate for one moment, but stated that he was prepared to start the very next day by the overland mail, which was telegraphed to await his arrival at Marseilles. Sir Colin accordingly started on the evening of 12 July, accompanied by his A.D.C., and by the hearty good wishes of his numerous supporters and friends.

'Every means were now adopted to prepare troops for India: the two Cavalry Regiments, 2nd and 3rd Dragoon Guards, were immediately put under orders to start at the shortest notice, and two Troops of Horse Artillery, besides six companies of Royal Artillery, were equally selected for service in India. Directions were also given, on receipt of the mails, for the troops destined for China to be sent to India instead, and the China Expedition was accordingly suspended. Four more Regiments of Infantry were also detailed for India, 1st Royals, 1st Batt. 38th and 79th, and 2nd Batt. Rifles.[1]

'By accounts received, it appeared that Sir Patrick Grant had been summoned from Madras to Calcutta to assume the temporary command of the Bengal Army. A wish was expressed that he should be confirmed as Commander-in-Chief, but this could not be entertained for a moment, and indeed Sir Colin Campbell was on his way to the East, and the country approved the selection.

'About 3 August, four more Regiments of Infantry were ordered to India, after receipt of the news that Delhi was not likely to be taken for some time, viz. 19th, 42nd, 34th and 97th, also 1000 more Artillery, of which another troop of Horse Artillery, also 7th Hussars. It was then decided to complete up to the strength Cavalry and Artillery sent out to India, to raise ten second Battalions, to make all Indian Regiments up to 1200, and all others up to 1000.

'General Dupuis was selected to command the Royal Artillery in India, General Windham was selected to succeed General Reid, who was unable to continue the command from ill-health, Sir Hugh Rose was selected to succeed Major-General Scott at Bombay, and Colonels Havelock and Cotton were given temporary rank as Majors-Generals.

'Further troops ordered out: 1st Dragoon Guards, 20th, 54th, 56th, 66th, 72nd.

'The accounts do not improve, though the Madras and Bombay Armies seem likely to hold on and not follow the example of the Bengal. On 22 August we got the telegram telling us of the death of poor Barnard by cholera before Delhi, which took place in a very few hours, and very much in the way that poor Anson died, with but little suffering. We also heard of the death of Sir Henry Lawrence from the effect of a wound he got in Lucknow, which is a sad loss, as he was certainly one of the ablest men in India.

[1] Rifle Brigade.

'Further Regiments ordered out: 7th Dragoon Guards, 8th Hussars, 17th Lancers, 18th and 51st, 94th, 98th, and 1000 more Artillery, of which one Troop Horse Artillery. We have heard of the massacre at Cawnpore, which is most revolting. General Wilson, a Company's officer, was in command at Delhi, which holds out. Havelock obliged to fall back on Cawnpore, which he has retaken, and had pushed on to the relief of Lucknow, which, however, he could not reach in consequence of reduced numbers and sickness. Meanwhile we hear of the arrivals of China vessels containing 90th and 5th, also 37th for Ceylon, and all that can be collected from various parts.

'The telegram which arrived on 28 September was still most gloomy, indeed as bad as it could well be. Heard of Sir Colin's arrival and reception, which was good. It has been decided to call out 20,000 Militia, which are now in the act of being embodied. The recruiting goes on satisfactorily, and every exertion made to improve it.

Another telegram arrived on 11 October. Accounts not very decided in their character, but still a vast improvement evidently taken place in the general state of affairs. Lucknow holds out well, and every hope is entertained of its being relieved, troops continue to arrive from the Cape and from the China Expeditionary Force, Agra safe, Delhi on the point of being assaulted, the Bombay and Madras Armies generally obedient, though among the Bombay troops there are signs of difficulties, which have, however, been very quickly suppressed. Arrangements have been made for making Ashburnham and Beresford Lieutenant-Generals, and for adding to the Indian Staff, besides Windham and Rose, Sir R. Garrett from China, Major-General Mitchell from the Cape, and Colonels Wetherall and Pakenham, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster Generals. Colonel Lugard is appointed Adjutant-General of the Queen's troops in India, and Colonel Greathed of the 8th Foot is named D.A.G. at Bombay. General Havelock is made a substantive Major-General for his services at the head of the Field Force.

'All the Regiments of Cavalry at home are placed on an establishment of eight troops and of a strength of 620 men and 420 horses. Recruiting is going on in the most satisfactory manner, and it is hoped that by the summer the Army will be nearly if not quite complete.

'On 26th another telegram reached us bringing the satisfactory account of the fall of Delhi after six days' hard fighting. The town was assaulted on the 14th, and a lodgement made, but it appears not to have been altogether in our possession till the 20th. No particulars are given, as there was no time to receive official reports, and the news came to Bombay from the interior by telegraph. It is said that 50 officers and 600 men are killed and wounded on our side. The names of most of the officers are given, but without

much certainty as to their correctness. In other respects accounts good; General Outram had effected his junction with General Havelock, and the latter had crossed the Ganges on 19 September without recent opposition. Lucknow still held out well, and the garrison had made several successful sorties. The whole of the 93rd had arrived at Calcutta, also portions of the 23rd and 82nd; further, a wing of the 4th and another of the 95th at Bombay. Some attempts at serious mutiny in the Bombay Army had been speedily suppressed. The Madras Army are perfectly obedient.

'On 12 November we had our next telegram confirmed by the arrival of the mail on the 14th, stating that very great uneasiness was felt for Lucknow, notwithstanding that Generals Outram and Havelock had succeeded in reaching that station and effecting a junction with the garrison, which, however, they had not been able to accomplish without very severe loss, amongst others that of General Neil, who was killed, together with 16 officers and 500 men killed and wounded. The number of women and children sick and wounded in Lucknow was such that the force there could not cut its way out without strong reinforcements being sent them from without, and these, alas! were not at hand. Consequently the garrison of Lucknow, though joined by Outram and Havelock, were now, in conjunction with these two Generals, closely invested and surrounded by the Mutineers. A column meanwhile, under Lieutenant-Colonel Greathed, of the 8th Foot, had been detached from Delhi to clear the Great Trunk Road southwards of that city. It had come up and defeated the Mutineers on several occasions, and was pressing on towards Agra. It is hoped that this column may be directed upon Lucknow, and thus prove of valuable assistance to that garrison. Madras all quiet, Bombay safe, that native troops in various parts uneasy and a good many executions had taken place amongst them. The reinforcements from England are not coming on as fast as expected, though some few had arrived. The 69th Foot have embarked per overland route through to Egypt, also Artillery and Engineers. The transit answers admirably, and no difficulty or irregularity of any sort or kind has as yet occurred.

'The next telegram reached on 26 November, followed by the mail itself on the 29th. This account differs but little from the last, inasmuch as Lucknow continued unaided and still in the same critical position. From them assistance was urgently demanded, but there was no means of sending it for some time yet to come, the troops landing but slowly in the country, and the distances for them to move up country being very great, the means of land transport also *most limited*. The want of railroads is severely felt, and the destruction by Lord Dalhousie of the whole of the transport service for the sake of economy, a most fatal error and now severely felt. Our hopes now chiefly rest on Colonel Great-

hed's column, which has moved to Agra, where on the day of its arrival it defeated an attack of the Mutineers on that station with most *signal success*, though the first attack of the rebels amounted to a surprise not very creditable to the force stationed at Agra, which ought to have been aware of the movements of the enemy. Greathed's column, when somewhat refreshed, for it was said to be worn out with fatigue, was to be directed upon Lucknow by way of Cawnpore as soon as the proper arrangements could be made for such a march. Meanwhile provisions were pushed on under strong convoy to a place called Alum Bagh, three miles from Lucknow, and hitherto this operation had not met with any resistance on the part of the enemy. We hear of many officers being killed at Lucknow, but know no positive details. The 93rd and wing of 23rd were expected to be at Cawnpore shortly with some Artillery, and other troops are following with all possible rapidity. Several corps had arrived, 1st Royals, 19th, 38th, and portion of 42nd and Rifle Brigade; also Royal Artillery. The General sent from England had also reached Calcutta. In other portions of India things continued tolerably tranquil, though Bombay Presidency was still uneasy. Colonel Stewart's column is doing well in Central India. A column under Major England, of the 35th Regiment, had also come up with and defeated rebels with great slaughter. The 94th Regiment embarked in *Austria* steamer have been a second time compelled to put back, the machinery of the vessel having broken down. Upon this it had been decided to send out this corps overland by way of Egypt.

'On Wednesday 9 December, an extra mail arrived with news from Calcutta up to 1st November. I heard from Sir Colin Campbell, who left Calcutta for Cawnpore on 27 October. The news from Lucknow not so bad. The Residency still completely cut off, but the troops there holding out manfully, and it is hoped they have sufficient provision till relieved. Greathed's column, now commanded by Brigadier Grant of the 9th Lancers, had crossed the Ganges and was marching on Alum Bagh, where the force seemed perfectly safe, though it could not communicate with the troops in Lucknow. Troops continue to arrive and are sent on as fast as they can be got away, but the land transport is still very defective. Central India continues much disturbed.

'On Friday, 11 December, the telegram arrived of the regular mail, followed by the mail itself on Monday morning. The accounts are good. Grant's column had reached Alum Bagh in safety, and was there awaiting the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, who with a force had crossed the Ganges on 9 November and was moving towards Lucknow. After forming a junction with the troops under Grant, he would have at his disposal about 7000 to 8000 men, with some heavy guns under Captain Peel, Royal Navy. In going up country

without any escort Sir Colin nearly fell into the hands of the Mutineers, which was a most foolish proceeding on his part. An action was fought on the Grand Trunk Road between Allahabad and Cawnpore by Colonel Powell of the 53rd with his column moving upwards, and the Mutineers from Dinapore stationed at Nardah. The latter had been signally defeated, but Colonel Powell was unfortunately killed. General Windham was at Cawnpore, and was to bring up the reserve for Sir Colin's troops. General Garrett was left in charge at Calcutta. Troops arriving there most rapidly. Thirty-six transports all full were passed off the Sand Heads, the 3rd Battalion Rifles,[1] part of the 2nd Battalion, parts of the 54th, 19th, 20th, 97th, 42nd, and Royal Artillery had all arrived, and had at once pushed on; also the 1st D.G. sent to Madras, and part of the 3rd D.G. and 72nd at Bombay. In Central India there was much uneasiness. A serious action had been fought in the Indore country with loss to our side, but the enemy had subsequently been defeated and dispersed. Colonel Stewart's column doing good service, but troops much reduced in those parts, and 8th Foot consequently sent around by sea to Bombay to reinforce that Presidency. The Delhi Mutineers are to a great extent throwing themselves into Central India, where the Nana Sahib is supposed to be at their head. The King of Delhi was to be tried by court-martial, but it is supposed that his life has been promised to him. Lieutenant Lowe, 74th, A.D.C. to General Wilson, has arrived with the Official Dispatches of the Fall of Delhi, after having gone round first by way of Bombay and Calcutta. I saw him, and he gave me many most interesting details. He is an intelligent and active young man. The 94th Regiment has sailed for Alexandria to proceed overland, and the 68th are now embarking in the *Argo* and *Australian* for Madras.

'On Wednesday, 23rd, we received a telegram from Bombay, confirmed by a further one on the 24th from Calcutta, giving an account of the relief of Lucknow and rescue of the garrison by Sir Colin Campbell, after several days' hard fighting and after suffering considerable losses. Sir Colin himself was wounded, but, very fortunately, slightly. The letters from Bombay reached on the 29th, and from Calcutta on the 31st. Heard from Elphinstone, also from Sir Colin before his advance to Lucknow, and from Lord Canning. It would appear that the women and children, with the sick, were safely removed out of Lucknow and sent to Cawnpore. Sir Colin intended to form a strong movable column outside of Lucknow to watch that place, but details are imperfect, as bands of Mutineers were interrupting the communications between Lucknow and Cawnpore. General Windham was at the latter place in command. The Gwalior Mutineers had threatened an advance upon it, but had retired again.

[1] Rifle Brigade.

Central India still much disturbed. Sir Hugh Rose sent up to command in Malwan. Troops arriving fast at Calcutta, and being sent on as rapidly as they landed. Heard of a fearful fire having broke out on the *Sarah Sands*, with a portion of the 54th on board, about four hundred miles from Mauritius. All hands saved, as also the ship, owing to the extraordinary exertions and excellent conduct of the troops and crew, in fact of all on board. It has been determined to send out two more Regiments overland to India. The 71st and 92nd from the Mediterranean are selected for this duty, to be relieved from home. Things in the Punjaub continue satisfactory, and order is being restored in and around Delhi. Madras Presidency tranquil, and Bombay, for the most part, also.

1858.

'A telegram came in on the night of 5 January, which reached me in the country on the 6th (Wednesday), bringing very uncomfortable news from India. It stated that Sir Colin had succeeded in evacuating Lucknow with the whole of his force, the sick and wounded, women and children, without loss; that General Windham had been defeated at Cawnpore, with the loss of the tents of his Regiments, by the Gwalior contingent on the 27th, that Sir Colin with his troops had then come up and had defeated the same body of Mutineers on 7 December, taking all their guns, stores, and baggage. This telegram was modified to a certain extent by subsequent ones, which said that Windham had gone out to meet the Gwalior people on 26 November, on which day he attacked and defeated them; that afterwards they had turned his right; that our troops, some of them at least, had not behaved well and had retired in great disorder, whereupon the town of Cawnpore was taken by the rebels and destroyed, as well as our tents; that Sir Colin had then come up, had defeated the same people without much loss or difficulty, and that subsequently General Hope Grant had followed up the victory and had taken all their guns, baggage, etc. The latter statement turns out to be the correct one, and though we have no official letter, all the private ones received give much the same version.

'It is clear by the mail which arrived on the 12th that Windham got his people into a great mess, though how he managed this is not clearly stated. He certainly had the best of it on the 20th, but was defeated on the 27th, when his tents were burnt and the civil portion of the Station of Cawnpore taken possession of by the rebels.

'It is further reported that the —— and —— Regiments did not behave well, but had a *panic* and took to their heels, whereas the 64th and 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade behaved nobly, the former having their Colonel, Brigadier Wilson, killed, and six other officers, and the latter suffering less, but

leaving poor Charles Woodford dead in the field. He was a noble-hearted fellow and excellent officer. Sir Colin came up from Lucknow on the 28th, and defeated these same people on 7 December without any difficulty, and this victory was further improved into a complete success by General Hope Grant with the Cavalry, who scattered the flying enemy, taking all their stores, guns, etc. Thus our Cawnpore disaster was retrieved, but the disaster itself is not on that account the less regrettable, and Windham's name has as yet decidedly suffered, though we must first hear his own story.

'We have got Brigadier Inglis's dispatch of the defence of Lucknow from the commencement of the investment of the garrison in the Residency. It is beautifully described by him, and is a most marvellous feat of arms, a weak garrison, harassed night and day, having resisted for eighty-seven days the vastly superior force of our rebellious subjects and army. Some Native troops continued faithful throughout, and deserve the greatest commendation.

'We have also Sir Colin's dispatch of his proceedings for the relief of Lucknow and subsequent retirement from it. This is a beautiful feat of arms, ably planned and most successfully carried out, doing credit to Sir Colin's gallantry and generalship, which must have been of the very highest order. All the troops behaved nobly and distinguished themselves greatly. Hope Grant, Adrian Hope, and several others are specially named. Sir Henry Havelock died from fatigue and exhaustion on 25 November, regretted by the whole Army and deeply mourned over by the country at large. Sir James Outram has been left with a strong Division to watch Lucknow from the Alum Bagh, which is said to be a strong position. The greater portion of our troops had arrived in India, but it is said that men are much wanted. The two remaining Regiments of the Bengal Army had mutinied. Madras was quite quiet, a force preparing to march into Central India, under General Woodburn of the Madras Army. Bombay still slightly disturbed in parts, but the columns under the two Stewarts had done excellent service. These are now placed under the immediate command of Sir Hugh Rose, and are called the Malwan Field Force.

'A mail has again come on this 28 January, preceded by telegrams. It has brought me no letters from Sir Colin, but the accounts come in from all directions and continue very favourable. The defeat of the Gwalior people at Cawnpore by Sir Colin on 17 December was complete, and on that occasion, followed up by Brigadier Hope Grant, the whole of the enemy's guns were taken. The Commander-in-Chief was to move on to Furrukabad and clear the country up towards Agra, so as to make safe the Grand Trunk Road both northwards and southwards. The troops had now for the most part arrived, but men were imperatively wanted, and more

must, if it is possible, be sent. Nothing very new from Central India, but matters there too are progressing favourably, and troops rapidly reaching the Bombay Presidency. Madras too is receiving its troops, and will thus be enabled to push on a strong column towards Central India.

'I received by way of Southampton to-day, 2 February, the missing letters from Sir Colin of the 3 and 13 December, giving excellent accounts of his force and confirming all the reports we had already received. He says little or nothing of Windham's affair, so I presume he is not altogether satisfied. He has had a difference with General Dupuis of the Royal Artillery, and Colonel Harness of the Royal Engineers, and has sent them back to Calcutta. This annoys me much, and I confess I do not think that in some respects matters are going on satisfactorily between the Queen's and Company's Armies, but we must hope that all this may in time be smoothed down.

'General Ashburnham has returned home from India without leave. This I cannot approve of, and it has caused much bad feeling at home, and will produce no doubt violent attacks from the Press. It is most unfortunate and unjustifiable on his part.

'We have been obliged further to reduce the standard for India Recruits; viz. to 5 ft. 3 in. It is an evil, but a necessary one, as men do not come in as fast as we want them. The bounty is to be raised by £1. The Militia do not volunteer as freely as they ought, and this is much to be regretted, for if they do not give men for the Army, they are literally in our way instead of aiding us.

'Received a mail on 15 February, preceded by telegrams, giving most excellent accounts from India. I had four letters from Sir Colin, all Official ones. He had not been well, and therefore I presume did not write very long or fully. He, however, reports officially that after a Court of Inquiry on Lieutenant-Colonel —— of the —— Regiment, General Windham is in his opinion completely exonerated from all blame of the affair at Cawnpore. The letter in the General's favour from Sir Colin is a most handsome one, and highly satisfactory to both parties. The conduct of the Lieutenant-Colonel, on the other hand, was disgraceful in the extreme, and he has as a matter of course been obliged to tender his unconditional resignation, which has been at once accepted. But for him, it would appear that neither the —— nor the —— would have retired when they did, which caused the whole subsequent misfortune. Sir Colin had offered Windham the Lahore Command, which had been destined for General Ashburnham, and Garrett was to take the Sirhind Division held by Windham. Sir Colin further explains why he sent Colonel Wetherall to the Bombay Presidency, and I think he was quite right in having done so. The troops had occupied Furrukabad without opposition after having had a

skirmish with the enemy the day before, in which the rebels were beaten with the loss of some guns. I regret to say that the feud between Sir Colin and the Royal Artillery still continues. It is to be greatly deplored, but I hope in time will wear off.

'By the same opportunity, heard of the taking of Canton on 29 December, after very slight resistance. It appears to have been well managed by the Allied Admirals and General Van Straubenzee. The place was bombarded for some time and then escaladed, and our loss was very small, the only serious casualty being that of Captain Bale, R.N., said to have been a first-rate officer. The force was composed of allied French and English Naval Brigade, several Battalions of Marines, Royal Artillery, Sappers, and the 59th Regiment. The mail starting immediately after the termination of the operation, all details are reserved for the next mail.

'The recruiting for the Army is now going on most briskly, and the men are coming in actually faster than we well know how to dispose of them. A new proposal made by me has been adopted, by which all Depôts are in future to consist of two Companies, only ten forming the Service Companies. I am sure it will answer far better. The Royal Artillery, too, has been to some extent changed in organisation by an arrangement being made to re-establish the "Drivers" as a distinct class for the Field Batteries, short men for this purpose only, as in the Horse Artillery, the rest of the men being denominated "Gunners."

'It has also been determined to raise two new Cavalry Regiments, the 5th Light Dragoons being restored to the Army, and the 18th Hussars being also again formed, the 5th to be Lancers. Major-General Sir James Chatterton is selected for the Colonelcy of the former Regiment, with Lieutenant-Colonel Sullivan of the Greys to command the corps, and having Major Portal of the 4th Light Dragoons as Major, whereas Major-General Byam is to be the Colonel of the 18th Hussars, with Lieutenant-Colonel Knox of the 15th Hussars to command the Regiment, and Major Jenyns of the 13th Light Dragoons as Major.

'On Wednesday, 17 February, another telegram arrived from Bombay, bringing much the same accounts as the former ones, with the only addition that Sir Hugh Rose was getting on well with his column in Central India. Large numbers of troops had arrived at Kurrachee and Bombay from England, and these troops had been at once pushed into the interior and towards the Punjaub, where English troops were much required, though no outbreak had taken place in that direction. It was supposed that Sir Colin would now make a movement upon Oudh, he having effected a junction with a column under Colonel Seaton, which had come down from Delhi, and thus the Grand Trunk Road had been completely opened all the way up to the North-West and the Pun-

jaub. It is thus evident that the Mutiny is fast subsiding, and the rebels being now concentrated in the Provinces of Oudh and Rohilkund, they would probably be completely crushed by an attack on these two Provinces.

'*Friday*, 26 *February*.—A very large and interesting mail has come in to-day. It brings long letters from Sir Colin, dated 15 January, from Furrukabad, going into details as regards his Army and the duties before it. It appears that the General, quite agreeing with the views I have ever enunciated, wants to secure the Grand Trunk Road and settle the old Provinces in the first instance, but that the Supreme Government are bent upon an immediate attack upon Lucknow, which has therefore been decided upon. Sir Colin and Mansfield evidently think this a great mistake, and I think so too, but he is prepared to carry out the orders he has received, and is therefore collecting his forces to make the grand *coup*. He will only have about 12,000 men with him to carry out his portion of the plan, including the force under Outram at the Alum Bagh, while General Forster will move up from the south, starting from Benares with Jung Bahadur, and then the place will be enveloped. The entire force between Benares and Furrukabad amounts to only 22,000 men, which, allowing for the necessary garrisons, is few enough. The troops are all healthy and in good heart and spirits. Sir Colin has had much difficulty in keeping the superior officers in order, and has been obliged to give out some severe orders, but it is hoped that these have produced and will produce the desired effect. He also complains of the Artillery, but this will all come right. The columns in Central India are progressing favourably, and Rose is doing well and moving rapidly on Saugar, which is being closely invested. We have meanwhile promoted Hope Grant to the substantive rank of a Major-General.

'A great change has taken place at home; the Government of Lord Palmerston has been defeated in the Commons on a resolution of Mr. Milner Gibson, brought forward on the Conspiracy to Murder Bill. He has consequently resigned, and Lord Derby has formed a Government. General Peel is the new Secretary of State for War, and Lord Hardinge the Under-Secretary. Both these offices are, I think, very respectably and well filled, but it is impossible to know what will come of it, or how long it is likely to last.

'5 *March*.—A Bombay mail arrived to day. It contains no direct accounts from Sir Colin Campbell, but states that he was still at Futtygarh collecting his forces for his great movement upon Oudh.

'Meanwhile Sir Hugh Rose had effectually relieved Saugar, after defeating the rebels in several minor affairs. The duty seems to have been performed in a very spirited and creditable manner. The Madras column has also been heard of moving up country, and it may be therefore fairly

anticipated that these two columns will now play a useful part in the general operations to be conducted. Troops continued to arrive at Bombay; the 18th and 71st had landed, and were being pushed forward to strengthen the Central column. The whole of the Cavalry force had been mounted and would soon be in the field, also the Artillery.

'The recruiting for the Army is progressing most favourably; last month alone produced 7500 men, which is unprecedented in the annals of our recruiting service. We are therefore rapidly going on with the organisation of our second Battalions, several having already large numbers of men. A similar good result to our new Cavalry Regiments. The volunteering from the Militia is also now excellent.

'20 *March*.—The Bombay mail has arrived, but brings little news; the Calcutta mail due by this same occasion has been lost off Ceylon by the wreck of the SS. *Ava*. Fortunately there are no very great events to record, yet the loss is a serious one. The Governor-General was at Allahabad, where he had been visited by the Commander-in-Chief, who was pushing on all his forces towards the Alum Bagh, from whence he intended to make his final attack upon Lucknow with 120 guns. Sir Hugh Rose was progressing most favourably and pushing on from Saugar towards Jhansi, backed by the Madras column under General Whitelock.

'29 *March*.—We have again letters from India, and I have heard from Sir Colin on the 12th and 17th of February from Cawnpore. Everything was going on most satisfactorily. A considerable delay had taken place in consequence of the necessity for concentration from various quarters, but all was progressing most favourably towards the completion of the great work, and the telegram received this morning equally states that the junction of forces had taken place, that Outram had crossed the Goomtee River and taken up a position on the opposite side of the town to the Commander-in-Chief, who was at the Dilkoosha, and that Franks and the Goorkhas had joined from Benares. The Siege Train also was up, and active operations against the town of Lucknow would immediately commence.

'The Army had been reformed into a Division of Cavalry, one of Artillery, and three of Infantry. Hope Grant with Campbell (Bays), and Little, 9th Lancers, as Brigadier under him, commanded the force. Sir A. Wilson, with David Ward and Barker as Brigadiers, had charge of the Artillery; Outram, with Brigadiers Russell and Franklyn, 84th, had charge of the 1st Division. Adrian Hope, 93rd, and Douglas, 79th, had Brigades in the 2nd Division. Walpole, Rifles,[1] had the 3rd Division with Horsford and Hamilton, 78th, as Brigadiers under him. Colonel Napier was Chief Engineer with Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, Royal Engineers, under him as his assistant. Pakenham had joined Sir Colin,

[1] Rifle Brigade.

Garrett was on his way up to Umballa, Greathed and General Mitchell were gone to Bombay. Rose was pushing on towards Jhansi, having forced the Pass. Whitelock's column was moving forward towards Calpee, which was being attacked by Inglis from Cawnpore. The Commander-in-Chief had seen the Governor-General at Allahabad, where the latter now is. Franks had come up with his column at the proper time. Altogether, nothing could be more satisfactory, and the health of the troops continued excellent.

'The mail from Bombay has arrived to-day, Saturday, 3 April, with dates from Bombay up to 9 March, and telegraphic news from Lucknow up to the previous day, 8 March. The advance upon Lucknow had been most successful, and on the 6th Sir James Outram had with his Division crossed the Goomtee and cut off all retreat into Oudh, the rest of the forces closing up upon the Commander-in-Chief. Rose's column was advancing well upon Jhansi at the same time. The health of the troops was good, and everybody looked hopefully to the future.

'The recruiting of the Army continues to be so satisfactory that only 24,000 men are wanting to bring it up to its new and raised establishment, so that the Government have decided upon sending about 10,000 men of the Militia home to be disembodied. This measure does not seem to find any favour with the force itself, which has been put to great expense in coming out, and has been embodied too short a period to enable it to recover from the first necessary outlay on embodiment. We hear that the 100th Regiment, raising in Canada, is getting on very satisfactorily.

'12 *April, Monday.*—The Calcutta mail came in to-night *via* Marseilles, bringing me four letters from Sir Colin, all dated Cawnpore, and when he was on the point of starting for Lucknow. Everything thus far was going on well, but he evidently thought that Sir Hugh Rose's column could have got up before. In this, however, I cannot agree with him, for Rose has had great difficulties to contend against, and has mastered them with great credit to himself, considering the very limited force he has at his disposal. Sir Colin writes to me about the Commands in the Field and gives me his reasons for the selections he has made. I confess I cannot quite agree with him, and think that he ought to have given a Division to Garrett, who was at Cawnpore on his way up to Umballa, in preference to its being given to Walpole, though I doubt not that the latter is a very good officer. He says further that matters are smoothing down between the Royal and Bengal Artillery. From China we hear that matters continue much the same, and no movement is being made.

'13 *April.*—A telegram arrived, stating that on the 19th Lucknow was entirely in our hands, after several points of it had been taken by storm. Our loss is said to be eight officers, without naming anybody, and not heavy as regards men.

The rebels, to the number of 50,000, had got out of the place, followed by Campbell's Brigade of Cavalry and other troops. Rose had got through the difficult passes and was within thirty miles of Jhansi, his second Brigade closing up on him and having very large bodies of rebels in his immediate front. General Whitelock's column was at Saugar, General Roberts moving on Kotah, which was strong and would probably require a siege.

'The troops at the Cape have been called for by the Governor-General of India to be sent on in large numbers. Orders are therefore given to send two Regiments from home, abroad. The 6th and 7th Foot, 2nd Battalions, will go to Gibraltar and send on the 2nd Battalion 1st Royals and 31st Foot to the Cape, the former probably from thence to China, if required. There being a great want of money, the Government have decided upon sending home 10,000 Militia to be disembodied. This decision is most unpopular amongst the Militia Regiments, and the vexation and annoyance caused by it is not to be told. I think it is a great pity that it should be done, and have strongly advised against it, but with no effect. We really want more troops, and disgusting the Militia service at such a moment is to be greatly deplored, for they may soon all be again wanted.

'20 *April*.—The Bombay mail has come in, but it had no letters for me from Sir Colin, so all I know is what is contained in a most interesting letter to the *Times* from Mr. Russell, giving an account of the whole of the operations at Lucknow up to 9 March. The whole affair seems to have been well managed and was eminently successful, the loss on our side being very small. The death of Major Hodson is deeply to be regretted, as he was evidently a first-rate irregular cavalry officer. Captain Morrison's death too is much to be deplored. The health and general condition of the Army is said to be good. Sir Hugh Rose had succeeded in forcing all the difficult passes between Saugar and Jhansi, but had much work before him and wanted more troops, which it would be very difficult to send him. The Mahratta country was still much disturbed.

'*Tuesday*, 4 *May*.—To-day the mail from India has brought me letters from Sir Colin Campbell, with copy of his dispatch to the Governor-General of the operations for the taking of Lucknow. Nothing can be better than the mode in which everything has been conducted by Sir Colin, or than the conduct of the troops, and it is gratifying to see with what gallantry and endurance the troops behaved. The town appears now to be entirely in our possession, but by some mistake on the part of Colonel Campbell of the Bays, who acted as Brigadier, I am afraid that a large portion of the rebels has escaped and is likely to give renewed trouble in various parts of the country. This is greatly to be regretted. Sir Colin speaks in the highest terms of General Mansfield, and desig-

nates this able officer as the one most suited to succeed him, should any unforeseen casualty happen to himself. The loss on our side does not appear to have been very great considering the vastness and importance of the operation, but we have to deplore the death of many first-rate and most gallant officers, amongst others my poor little friend Colonel Ingram, of the 97th Regiment, who was killed by one of the last shots that were fired in the attack. Mr. Russell's descriptions are most interesting and complete. It appears that we have had a little check near Azimgurh, where Colonel Milman of the 37th went out with a small party to attack a very superior body of the enemy, and was forced to retire with the loss of his baggage and camp, being afterwards shut up in his entrenchments at Azimgurh. Sir Edward Lugard with his Division had been sent to relieve him from his critical position. The force left at Lucknow was to be placed under the command of General Sir Hope Grant, and a Division under Brigadier Walpole was prepared to move on Bareilly and into Rohilkund. Sir Hugh Rose had taken Jhansi by storm, after defeating a large rebel army of 25,000 men, who had advanced with a view of forcing Sir Hugh to abandon the siege. Nothing could have been better than the mode in which Rose accomplished these difficult operations with the very small means at his disposal. Kotah had fallen to the columns under General Roberts, with very trifling loss to our people.

'The accounts so far are good, but it cannot be denied that a very uneasy feeling still exists throughout India, and that a summer campaign to some extent appears inevitable in Rohilkund, Oudh, and towards Central India. It is much to be feared that our losses in men from the heat of the climate will be great indeed if there should be this necessity for continued operations during the hot months of the year. At present the Army was extremely healthy, and in the finest state of efficiency and order.

'The Government have decided upon sending the remainder of the 57th Regiment to India by way of Egypt. The disembodiment of 10,000 Militia is progressing, much to the regret and annoyance of this force, and it is a measure deeply to be regretted in every respect, for the forces we have at our disposal at home are not adequate to our requirements.

'*Saturday*, 15 *May*.—Received a letter to-day from Sir Colin Campbell of 4 April from Lucknow, in which he informs me that the Government have determined upon continuing the campaign in Rohilkund, whither the rebels have retired in large numbers. He accordingly takes with him a strong Division under General Walpole for this purpose, whilst he leaves a considerable force at Lucknow itself, under Hope Grant. Meanwhile Lugard has proceeded to the relief of Azimgurh, where Colonel Milman had met with a reverse.

By telegram we have just heard that this relief has been successfully accomplished. Rose was unable to advance from Jhansi in consequence of the numerous enemies that infest that neighbourhood endangering his advance. General Roberts has been therefore ordered to advance from Kotah towards Jhansi to support Sir Hugh Rose. Altogether the news is not very satisfactory. The prospect of a summer campaign is most serious, the enemy are still hanging about and springing up in all directions, and nothing but the presence of large bodies of troops is likely to keep the country in subjection. Where are the additional forces required for this purpose to come from? It is a great complication, likely to be further increased by the recent unfortunate dispatch and its disclosure, and the subsequent debates upon this whole transaction in Parliament.

'*Thursday*, 20 *May*.—A mail has come in from Bombay, bringing letters from the Army about Lucknow, and I have myself a letter from Sir Henry Somerset. The mode in which Rose had conducted his operations before Jhansi and on the taking of that place are admirable, and reflect the highest credit upon that officer. Unfortunately, his rear being threatened, he was unable to advance as he had proposed upon Calpee, but it is to be hoped that the columns under Generals Roberts and Whitelock will push on to his assistance, and in that case it may be hoped that Rose will be enabled to continue his movement on Calpee, and, defeating the rebels there concentrated, form a junction with the Commander-in-Chief at Cawnpore. General Roberts, it would appear, ought most decidedly to have followed the troops that escaped out of Kotah when he attacked and took that fortified place. His not having done so has given rise to Rose's difficulties, and General Whitelock too, as it appears to me, much sooner and without waiting for any further orders, should have backed up Rose's force from his side. Sir Colin had seen the Governor-General, and the force under Walpole was advancing upon Bareilly. Azimgurh had been relieved by Sir Edward Lugard with little loss. Colonel Milman's affair at that place seems to have been a bad one, and not much can be said in that officer's favour. The general feeling seems to be that the rebellion had been largely suppressed, but that guerilla warfare may continue for a long time to come, greatly harassing our troops.

'At home, the debate on Lord Canning's proclamation and upon Lord Ellenborough's dispatch has been withdrawn after three nights' debate, the recent accounts proving that the Government are in the main right, though wrong in their mode of communicating their sentiments to the Governor-General, not as regards the sentiments themselves, but in making them known to the public. Faults having been made on all sides, it was felt by the House that it would be far better not to come to a Division, and so it is to be hoped that,

for a time at all events, matters will progress smoothly and calmly.

'General Mansfield's rank of Major-General has, on the recommendation of Sir Colin Campbell, been made substantive. Sir Archdale Wilson, Colonels Franks and Russell, 84th, and many other officers, have arrived home on sick leave, and their communications are interesting and valuable.

'*Saturday*, 29 *May*.—I have had letters to-day from Sir Colin up to the 13 of April, from Lucknow. He informs me that he had differed with the Governor-General as to the next move to be made, he, Sir Colin, being for remaining in Oudh and endeavouring to subdue that province, whereas Lord Canning had directed a movement upon Bareilly for the subjugation of Rohilkund. The latter intention was to be carried out, and Sir Colin was then engaged on that operation. With this view, a Division under Walpole was moving towards Bareilly, while columns from Meerut and Delhi were to come down the Ganges to join in the operation. Sir Edward Lugard had effectually relieved Azimgurh, and Sir James Hope Grant had moved into Oudh. Rebellion was still rife in all directions, and desultory risings were taking place in various parts of the country. A summer campaign is unavoidable, and this is much to be deplored on account of the health and efficiency of the troops, which must suffer greatly from the effects of it, though hitherto the Army had continued very healthy. Rose was expected shortly to move on Calpee, Whitelock and Roberts backing him up and securing his rear.

'*Monday*, 31 *May*.—An important telegram has arrived to-day. It brings the sad account of the death of Sir William Peel at Cawnpore from the smallpox, and of Adrian Hope being killed at a fort on the march between Lucknow and Bareilly. Both these are most serious losses and much to be deplored, they being the most rising men in their several professions. Generally, the news is not very satisfactory. Walpole had lost many men on the occasion of Hope being killed, before a fort called Roohya, which he could not take, but which the enemy subsequently evacuated. The force then proceeded on its march, and Sir Colin had entered Shahjehanpore at its head. Columns under General Penny and Brigadier Jones of the 60th are making good their way to join the Commander-in-Chief. It is reported that the former of these officers has been killed. The Azimgurh rebels had escaped and crossed the Ganges; an attempt had been made by a small detachment from Arcot to interrupt their progress, which, however, had failed, and the detachment was driven back with a very heavy loss in men and two guns.

'General Rose had advanced from Jhansi and had defeated a portion of the rebel army in advance of Calpee. General Whitelock had equally defeated a rebel force, and was nearing Rose's column rapidly. Roberts's people were

keeping the rear clear; thus generally the Mutiny was being got under, and yet there seemed a general uneasiness in every quarter.

'I saw this day Sir John Inglis, and Brigadier Little of the 9th Lancers, both of which officers have just arrived. They are already much improved in health, though the latter is badly wounded in the arm. They seem of the same opinion as all the other officers I have seen, that the Mutiny is being gradually rooted out, but that it is a work of time, and that the suffering of the troops will be great during the summer months, if kept permanently in the field.

'*Friday, 4 June.*—I have letters to-day from Sir Colin with full accounts of all proceedings up to 26 April. It is, alas! too true that poor Adrian Hope was killed in an unsuccessful attack on the little fort of Roohya, which seems to have been most unfortunately managed, or rather mismanaged, by General Walpole, who would neither reconnoitre the place nor use his Artillery, but sent on the men to an assault in which they could not succeed. The enemy then evacuated the fort in the night without interruption. Fortunately for General Walpole, he defeated the rebels a few days after; but certainly his conduct was highly disapproved of by the Commander-in-Chief and by the feelings of the Army in general. The concentration of troops from these different points around Bareilly is progressing rapidly, and it may be hoped that Rohilkund may soon be subdued. Brigadier Jones, 60th Rifles, is moving down from the north-west on Moradabad, after twice defeating the enemy. General Penny heads a column from Meerut, and Walpole is closing in from Lucknow. Sir Colin takes the command again in person, Rose meanwhile advancing upon Calpee supported by Whitelock from Banda, and will be further aided in his attack by a small column, under Colonel Maxwell of the 88th, on the side of Cawnpore.

'Meanwhile Lugard is following the rebels of Azimgurh, and has crossed the Ganges in pursuit towards Arcot, where an unfortunate disaster has taken place to a small body that had moved under Captain Le Grand of the 35th Foot, who attempted to cut off Koer Singh, was enticed into thick jungle, and was defeated with the loss of two guns and a large number of his men, he himself being amongst the killed.

'Sir Hope Grant had returned to Lucknow after having scoured a large portion of Oudh with much success. Colonel Campbell of the 52nd Foot has been ordered to Lucknow to take charge of the Infantry of the force there. The troops still continued healthy, but great fears were entertained for the result of the hot weather campaign, and we are to be prepared for heavy losses. Poor Sir William Peel died of smallpox at Cawnpore. His loss is a very serious one, and all lament it.

'17 *June*.—Two mails have come in, but I have only letters from Sir Henry Somerset and Lord Elphinstone. Bareilly has been taken by our troops, and Rohilkund and Oudh are being gradually brought under subjection. Rose had again defeated the rebels in advance of Calpee. The Army seems much enraged with General Walpole for his mismanagement at Roohya, resulting in the loss of poor Adrian Hope and a good many men. It is to be hoped that the troops may now be placed in quarters till after the rains. General Penny, of the Company's Army, has been killed on his move up to Bareilly by falling into an ambuscade. Sir Edward Lugard is clearing the country around Arcot. Sickness is considerably on the increase, and many have fallen victims to it.

'25 *June, Friday*.—Telegram just arrived stating that Shahjehanpore has been relieved by Brigadier Jones, that Lucknow was again threatened by 25,000 rebels, Sir Hope Grant being absent in Oudh; that the Commander-in-Chief was moving towards Cawnpore, etc. This does not sound well, but we must wait for more detailed accounts, as the Bombay news has not yet been telegraphed.

'4 *July*.—The Bombay mail has arrived to-day, Sunday, bringing me letters from both Sir Colin and Sir Henry Somerset, the former up to 10 May and the latter 1 June. There are, however, accounts from the Commander-in-Chief's camp up to 20 May. The news is of a very mixed description, partly good and partly bad. The success of the troops has been everywhere complete. Bareilly was taken with ease after a short action. Shahjehanpore, threatened by the enemy, was relieved without difficulty. Lucknow appeared quite safe. Lugard was clearing the country satisfactorily about Arrah, and Rose had taken Calpee after a severe action, in which he entirely defeated the Mutineers, taking all their guns and baggage, and dispersing the entire force. All active operations were therefore completely successful, and yet the news is bad, for the Army was becoming fearfully sickly from the hard work that it had undergone, and the fearful heat of the sun killing numbers by sunstroke. The smallpox too was raging to a very alarming extent, and many sick were being sent to the rear. Mutinous feelings are also showing themselves in various parts of the country, and there had been a rising in several districts of the Bombay Presidency, especially in the Southern Mahratta country, which is most serious. More troops were much needed, and yet we have none to send. We have heard by this mail of the death of poor young Forster, son of my poor friend Forster, who has died of smallpox at Lucknow.

'From China the news is not over satisfactory. Great uneasiness prevailed at Canton, and more troops were also called for there.

'19 *July*.—Several telegrams have arrived within the last few days, bringing much the same account as that brought

by the mail which arrived to-day bringing letters from Sir Colin from Allahabad to 13 June. He states that the troops have been very sickly owing to the great heat, but that they are getting better. A serious affair had taken place at Gwalior, where Scindia's troops had been attacked by the Calpee mutineers. The contingent went over to the rebels with the exception of Scindia's bodyguard, who remained faithful to their chief. In the Bombay Presidency things are very uneasy, and more troops appear to be much required. General fears are entertained lest the Mahrattas should rise, and indeed an outbreak has taken place in a portion of the country, when the Political Agent was murdered, but the troops sent to suppress it had been successful. Sir Edward Lugard was successful in his operations round Arrah, and that Province was being tranquillised.

'22 *July*.—Good news arrived by telegram this afternoon. Gwalior taken by Sir Hugh Rose on 20 June after four hours' hard fighting. The enemy dispersed in all directions, and pursued by Cavalry and Horse Artillery.

'The forts at the Peiho taken by the Allied Gunboats after some sharp fighting: 138 pieces of heavy calibre captured by the fleets, who were progressing up the river. Weather fine and cool, and the forces extremely healthy.

'27 *July, Tuesday*.—The Calcutta mail has come in, bringing me letters from Sir Colin Campbell from Allahabad of — June. He has taken the title of Clyde, which I think is a very proper one. Things are going on satisfactorily, with the exception of the health of the troops, which was not as good as we could wish. The war was taking the form of guerilla warfare, and would probably last till the next cold season. Whenever practicable, the troops were being housed for the rains, which had not yet set in, being very late. Nothing known about Gwalior, which we have heard of from Bombay as taken on 20 June by General Rose.

'From Canton we hear that General Van Straubenzee made an unsuccessful reconnaissance, or rather attempt to surprise the camp of the Braves, who had assembled in the neighbourhood of that city. The Braves escaped, and the troops suffered much from the heat of the sun. In the north, the Allied Fleets had attacked and taken the forts at the mouth of the Peiho River with all their guns, about 150 in number, and with trifling loss to our people. The weather fine, the fleets healthy, and they were now to proceed up the river.

'2 *August, Monday*.—Received letters from Sir Colin Campbell, now made Lord Clyde of Clydesdale, in which he gives a very favourable account of the state of affairs. Rose's success was complete at Gwalior, the fortress having fallen into our hands the same time as the town. Sir Hope Grant had defeated the rebels in a pitched fight at Nawabgunge, taking seven guns. Rohilkund was tranquil, and the

only province about which there was still much uneasiness was Berar. The troops were more healthy than they had been, and it was hoped that they would now be generally housed for the rains, which are hourly expected. Sir Colin had issued several most complimentary orders to the various Central India columns. He had also expressed strong opinions against the interference of civilians with military arrangements, all of which I highly approve of. The Mahratta country continued tranquil.

'The Government at home are anxious about the state of things in India. They have an impression that large reinforcements of European troops are further required, especially for the Residency of Bombay. This has led to much discussion and inquiry, and it has finally been decided to send to India five more Regiments of Infantry in addition to the four already ordered as reliefs, the reliefs to be suspended for the present. These five are to be taken from our Colonial possessions in the Mediterranean and North America, these troops again to be replaced by 2nd Battalions, made up to their full strength by volunteers from the Militia. If this arrangement can be carried out, it will obviate the necessity of sending Militia Regiments abroad, which had certainly be better avoided if possible. The 6th Dragoons have embarked for India at a strength of 600 men.

'7 *August*.—Accounts continue good. The Central India column of Gwalior has been broken up, and the troops are going as far as practicable into quarters for the rainy season. The letters we have from Bombay speak in more hopeful terms, and no fresh outbreaks have been reported. The sickness is rather on the decrease.

'From China we have very conflicting accounts. General Straubenzee at Canton seems uneasy about his position, and seems to have failed in an attempt to dislodge a large body of Braves that had established themselves in the White Cloud Mountains. Murders are frequent and very annoying.

'In the North of China matters are progressing more favourably. The ascent of the Peiho River had been successfully accomplished, and the expedition had advanced to within twenty-fours' easy communication from Pekin, the results of which had been that two Mandarins had been sent down to meet Lord Elgin, with full powers to treat. Five new Regiments, the 48th, 28th, 3rd, 67th, and 99th are ordered to India, and the 6th Dragoons have actually sailed.

'*Thursday*, 10 *August*.—The accounts from India continue good, the Gwalior Field Force has been broken up, and Sir Hugh Rose is gone to Poona to resume command of that Division, and to seek for rest on account of his impaired health. General Michel has gone up to Mhow to take command of the force there. The troops generally are more healthy and are being sheltered from the rain. We have

heard of numerous deaths, Campbell of the Bays, Hockley of the 8th, Morris, 17th Lancers, etc.

'From China we have to-day, 21 August, a telegraphic communication through Russia, saying that a Treaty has been signed between the Allied Powers and China, acceding to our demands. This news, however, requires confirmation.

'*Thursday*, 2 *September, and* 3, *Friday.*—Had four letters from Sir Colin, all giving very good accounts of the state of affairs. No fresh disturbances have taken place, but in the old Provinces and in Oudh a sort of partizan or guerilla warfare has sprung up which was to be anticipated, and which it will take time to put down. The health of the troops had greatly improved; the rains had set in and were doing much good; the Army was for the most part housed. A strong column under Sir Hope Grant, amounting to 3000 men of all arms, had been directed to move upon Fyzabad and take and occupy that place. Poor Campbell of the Bays died at Cawnpore.

'From China we hear that a Treaty favourable to our views is certainly on the eve of being signed at Pekin, but the particulars were not fully known at the time of departure of the mail. Affairs at Canton were not satisfactory; the population and Braves were very hostile and active, and great fears were entertained of a general attack being made upon our forces. Many murders had taken place in various parts of the town.

'The 12th Regiment, 2nd Battalion, had arrived from the Cape.

'The volunteering from the embodied Militia has not been so successful as we could have wished.

'5 *October.*—Absence from England in Germany for a fortnight and other interruptions have prevented me from continuing my military journal as regularly as I could have wished. Nothing very particular has taken place in India since last month, the hot weather and subsequent rains have prevented the Army from doing much, but they have held their ground well, and are preparing for another cold weather campaign. Meanwhile the guerilla war has been going on, and is entirely in our favour. I received yesterday a large mail from India. Sir Colin writes in good spirits, and says that matters are progressing very favourably in all directions. Sir Hope Grant is doing remarkably well in Oudh, and has occupied Fyzabad without opposition. General Roberts has defeated and cut up the remains of the Gwalior rebels. The troops are again much more healthy. Our reinforcements are now passing gradually and safely through Egypt. The 46th and 91st have already gone through; the 48th had arrived at Alexandria. These corps have been relieved in the Mediterranean by the 8th Foot and 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade, and the 9th and 5th, 2nd Battalion, are waiting to embark.

'Recruiting is going on favourably, and the second Battalions are all filling fast up, some being quite complete. The Militia have given a good many volunteers; not so many, however, as we had expected and hoped for.

'A Treaty of peace very much in our favour has been signed in China. The accounts from Canton, however, continue to be very unsatisfactory.

'14 *October*.—An excellent telegram has come to-day, stating that General Michel had, with the Mhow forces, defeated the remains of the Gwalior force under Tantia Topee, taking thirty guns. From various other parts of India the news is equally good, and the rebellion is evidently on its last legs. Under these circumstances it is most singular that the two disarmed Sepoy Regiments at Mooltan, 62nd and 69th, have broken out in open revolt, in which, however, they did not succeed in making much mischief, but were immediately cut up by the European and other troops in the garrison. It was stated that the Ranee of Lucknow was endeavouring to make terms with our Government on condition of giving up Nana Sahib. This would prove more than anything else the state that matters had come to.

'*Saturday*, 15 *October*.—An overland mail has come in with equally good accounts, though I have personally no letters. From China we hear that things at Canton are rather better. A successful expedition had been made against a village which had fired on our flag of truce. Captain Lambert of the R.E. had been killed, and other casualties had unfortunately taken place on our side.

'19 *October*, *Wednesday*.—A mail is in from India, and I have letters from Lord Clyde and Sir Henry Somerset, with very good accounts. General Michel's success was very complete, and our columns are successful in all directions. The health of the troops also continues to be good.

'*December* 6, *Sunday*.—Nothing very worthy of notice has occurred during the last few weeks, and the mails have contained so little from India that I have not had occasion to notice anything specially in my journal. The season of the year was not favourable to the movement of troops, and everything remained very much *in statu quo*, preparing for the coming campaign. The health of the troops has continued to improve, and the various columns have been taking up the several positions assigned to them in the great drama. In Central India, alone, great efforts have been made by various columns, the whole under General Michel, for the dispersion of Tantia Topee and a large rebel force under his immediate direction, and these have been all signally successful, General Michel having done his work remarkably well, and with the greatest energy, in which he has been ably seconded by various columns under Brigadiers Smith, 3rd Dragoon Guards, Parker, 72nd, and Lockhart, 92nd.

'This day, letters have reached me from Lord Clyde stating

that he had taken the field in person in Oudh on 2 November, and informing me of signal successes against the rebels by column under Brigadiers Horsford and Barker, and by another under Brigadier Douglas. He therefore looked hopefully to the future, and was of opinion that the war would be for the most part brought to a close by the complete subjection of the country at the end of the present campaign.

'The Proclamation transferring the Empire of India to the Crown had been published throughout the three Presidencies on 1 November, and had been well received. It is a well-worded and good Proclamation, and does credit to the Secretary of State who framed it. Lord Clyde is further of opinion that at the end of the campaign several Regiments will be enabled to return home, their services being no longer required.

'20 *December*.—We have heard that matters are proceeding most favourably in India. Colonel Wetherall has taken a strong fort, and Colonel Evelegh, 20th, another, and the principal fort of Amethie has surrendered to the combined forces of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hope Grant, and Brigadier Wetherall. There was an awkward feeling amongst the Europeans of the late Company's service. These men do not in some cases like to be transferred to the Crown. The law officers at Calcutta have, however, decided that the Act of Parliament makes the transfer perfectly legal.

'4 *January*.—We have letters from Lord Clyde, dated Lucknow, 28 November which are most satisfactory. The whole of Oudh up to that city from the south had been cleared of rebels; the Talookdars and Zemindars are sending in their submission in all directions, and there was every hope and prospect that the country could be settled without further bloodshed, except perhaps in the Trans-Gogra territory, where Sir Hope Grant was operating.

'In Central India, however, Tantia Topee was still at large, and it is feared that he may do some mischief in the Province of Kandeish, into which he has thrown himself with a few followers, having by means of great exertion and by assistance from the inhabitants managed to elude our various columns that were endeavouring to surround him. It is hardly likely that he will be able much longer to maintain himself.

'1 *March*.—The accounts in India continue to be so favourable that the rebellion and consequent campaign in Oudh has been announced by Lord Clyde to be concluded, and the Oudh Field Force has been consequently broken up. The country seems to be settling down in all directions, and the only portions still in open mutiny are portions of Central India, where Tantia Topee is still at large. Columns continue to be out to endeavour to arrest his progress. The Nana and Begum have retired into Nepaul, and, at the request of Jung Bahadur, a Brigade of our troops under

Horsford has entered Nepaul with a view to assist in arresting the progress of these miscreants, who are nearly on their last legs and fairly hunted down. The troops are going into quarters for the hot season, and several Regiments are preparing for a return to England. The exact number of corps to return home have not as yet been fully decided upon, but it would appear that the 9th Lancers, 10th, 32nd, 78th, 84th, and 86th Regiments are actually under orders for England. It is thought that more may follow, and my only hope is that too many may not be sent.

'From China we hear that matters still are much as they were. The 59th Regiment has gone to the Cape, where it has arrived in a very sickly state.

'The 58th Regiment has arrived from New South Wales, after an absence from home of fourteen years. It has landed at Portsmouth.

'25 *April*.—The war in India by all accounts may be now looked upon as entirely at an end. All the corps are returning to quarters, and Lord Clyde has moved for the hot weather to Simla, there to recruit his health, which has suffered a good deal from his fall and from hard work. The Regiments under orders to return home are two of Cavalry, 9th Lancers and 14th Dragoons, a Battalion Military Train, and ten Regiments of Infantry, 10th, 32nd, 78th, 84th, 86th, 61st, 64th, 29th, 53rd, and 1st Battalion 60th Rifles. These we may expect in the course of the summer and autumn.

'A Continental war seems now imminent, if not all but certain. England, it is said, will adopt a neutral position. The only orders we have got are to strengthen the Mediterranean garrison, and look to the Channel Islands. Measures are now in progress to effect this. Three additional Companies Royal Artillery, two of the Royal Engineers, and the 2nd Battalion 4th Foot, 2nd Battalion 22nd Foot, and 100th Regiment, are placed under orders as reinforcements for the Mediterranean. . . .

'The war in India and China having ceased, I shall not for the present continue this narrative.'

CHAPTER X

MISCELLANEOUS—1857-58

General Remarks. Beards in the Army. Supply in the Field. Military and Gunnery Schools. Lord Palmerston's Views. The Prince Consort's Views. Army Schools. Changes in India consequent on Suppression of Mutiny. Decision of Cabinet *re* raising British Cavalry Regiments for H.E.I.C. Sir William Mansfield's Memorandum on British Regiments in H.E.I.C.'s Service. Fall of Lord Palmerston's Ministry. Lord Derby's Praise. Lord Panmure's Farewell. H.R.H.'s Memorandum on Distribution of Infantry, and on Infantry Establishment. Question of a Foreign Legion again. The Queen's Letter. The Defence of England. H.R.H.'s Correspondence with G.O.C.'s. Lord Clyde's Title. Amalgamation of Indian Army. Cession of Corfu.

In this chapter it is proposed to deal with a variety of matters of varying degrees of importance, which presented themselves for settlement during the early years of the Duke's tenure of the Command-in-Chief. It has been considered that such an arrangement is preferable to noticing them in their strict chronological sequence amid other subjects, such as those dealt with in the preceding chapters.

It will be in the recollection of many, the keen interest that Queen Victoria took in the general appearance of her sailors, and how, when it was at length decided to allow sailors to shave, she expressed her wishes on the subject with the greatest precision.

After the Crimean War, where all preconceived customs and rules as to officers and men shaving had, under the stress of active service, been permitted to fall into abeyance, the greatest diversity prevailed, and the appearance of some of the regiments on parade at Aldershot and elsewhere on their return from the War can best be left to the imagination.

In consequence, the Horse Guards issued certain orders with a view to securing some sort of uniformity of appear-

ance. Certain commanding officers, however, brought up in the traditions of pre-Crimean days, objected to the new order of things, and endeavoured when possible either to have their men clean shaven or to reduce their hirsute adornments to a minimum.

Hence the following letter from Queen Victoria: the italics are Her Majesty's, and convey neatly enough how she realises the relative importance of the subject in comparison with the gravity of many other matters at the time under consideration.

FROM THE QUEEN.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 6 *February* 1857.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—In the midst of so much that is important, I forgot a trifle, but still which I think ought not to be any longer overlooked. It is that *moustaches* as regards the *Men* and *Officers serving* (I don't mean any of the old Generals!) should no longer be optional, but *ordered* to be worn.

'The effect in the Ranks and altogether is bad when you see some with and some without them.

'I think this should now be done without delay.

'From what I heard this morning from Lord Palmerston, there is to be no further reduction in the Army.

'I hope you will bear Aldershot in mind so as to prevent *useless* attacks, etc., and false impressions. I am sure that *May*, *June*, *July*, and *August* would be the right months for keeping the Camp *full*.'

On 12 January 1857 the Duke took up the question of training a proportion of men in the duties of Supply in the Field, and advocated that Aldershot and the Curragh, the only two stations where we then had the semblance of a force of the three arms assembled for instructional purposes, should, in peace time, be viewed as a school for teaching these duties. He pointed out the unsatisfactory condition of our Commissariat service, and how in the recent war it had been obliged to depend largely on the services of civilians; and he recommended that all such employees in the field should consist of enlisted soldiers, such as were to be found in the French Army.

It need hardly be recorded here how the Government, intent on the reduction of all military expenditure, were

unable to meet the Duke in this respect, and that our Commissariat Staff were once again allowed to become even less than a skeleton force.

Another urgent question of organisation which the Duke brought forward at the same time was the importance of our having some definite and recognised establishments for our Field Batteries. In this matter he showed that the French had proved themselves to be vastly superior to us in the recent Eastern Campaign, both in Bulgaria and in the Crimea.

In February the question of the establishment of a school of Gunnery for the development and general improvement of artillery fire occupied him.

This was commenced in the spring, and arrangements were made at Shoeburyness for gun practice, etc.

The present famous school of Gunnery at Shoeburyness, and its offspring, the Artillery Camp at Lydd, with the various minor Artillery ranges at Okehampton, etc., are the direct outcome of these representations of the Duke after the Crimean War.

Another branch of military education, namely, that of the formation of military schools for the primary education of the N.C.O.'s and rank and file of our Army, at this period occupied the serious attention both of the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief. The determined opposisition shown to the introduction of any such system by the Duke of Wellington when at the Horse Guards has been already alluded to; and how in consequence the work of organising them fell by default into the hands of the Secretary of State for War.

Lord Palmerston held strong views on the subject, and, in conjunction with Lord Panmure, certain regulations were framed which virtually empowered the Army Schoolmasters to classify the N.C.O.'s according to their scholastic attainments, a classification which was to become the basis of the future advancement of these men in their Regiments.

Such a scheme, eminently characteristic of the inherent inability of some of the ablest of statesmen and politicians to appreciate military questions, where discipline is concerned,

and its ultimate effect if logically applied, was naturally received with alarm by all soldiers. The Prince Consort, who, as is well known, had devoted great attention to all matters educational, and whom none could charge with a desire to withhold education from the masses, interviewed Lord Palmerston on the subject.

On 3 February 1857 he writes to H.R.H. giving an account of his interview, and describes how he could not convince Lord Palmerston of the objections of allowing 'Schoolmasters under Regulations from the War Office' to interfere with the discipline of the Army, as would obviously be the case were Corporals and Sergeants to be virtually selected by them in place of by their C.O.'s. Another argument adduced by the Prince seems, however, to have made more impression on this most obdurate of Ministers.

'I showed him that in the *reduced estimates* education figures at £260,000, for which you might keep 10,000 men (which startled him), and that to educate the Army was very laudable, but that the Army was not there to be educated but to defend the country; we might soon be left without men and have only good marks and schoolmasters to repel the French invasion. As to the officers, he told me that he understood Lord Panmure to have decided to leave their education to the H.G.'

Though the question of Army schools was at this period attracting considerable attention, the first introduction of educational establishments for soldiers and their children really took place in 1811, during the Duke of York's second tenure of the Commandership-in-Chief; whilst the normal school for training schoolmasters was established in 1847 in connection with the Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea.

After that time Sergeants had generally been in charge of such establishments; though subsequently, of course, such posts were filled by men who had passed through the normal school. There were four classes of Army schoolmasters, the highest of which was somewhat unwisely made to rank before Sergeants-Major. But this arrangement was altered in 1863 and the Warrant rank of 'schoolmaster' abolished, H.R.H. very rightly maintaining that a school-

master should not rank before a Sergeant-Major and thus intervene between the latter and his officers.

That opposition was not wanting to the efforts which, in the interests of education, were being made at this period, may be readily imagined. Many old officers disliked the idea, and did their best to render the system inoperative. Hence arose the necessity for an order being issued to make attendance at school compulsory in certain cases, a course which was received with much indignation by some of the older Generals, and amongst the Duke's papers is a letter from General Sir George Brown, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, in November 1860 objecting to the Duke's decision that men might be 'compelled to attend school at the discretion of commanding officers'; he wrote as follows:—

'Now it is unnecessary for me to inform you that some few of these Gentlemen (C.O.'s) are more remarkable for *zeal* than for *discretion*. . . . It will never do for corps serving in the same garrison to follow different positions in this respect. . . . If I conformed to the Articles of War, as interpreted by Forster's letter, and compelled everybody to attend school, I know that I should give rise to universal discontent, and if I give my support to the opposite side I should be acting in opposition to your decision. Besides, if you *really mean everybody* is to attend school, you must greatly increase the school accommodation, and double at least the number of your schoolmasters!'

Having reached this point, it will be advisable to carry on the subject until it was considered by a Royal Commission under Lord Dufferin in 1870.

At that time dissatisfaction was supposed to prevail amongst Army schoolmasters; and it was said that the position was not such as to tempt the best candidates. In the course of his evidence before the Royal Commission, H.R.H. stated:—

'I decidedly prefer a man being a schoolmaster who has first been a soldier, because he understands discipline. It is desirable that there should be as little interference as possible with the schoolmaster, but there should be perfect submission on his part, if the necessity arises, and that, I think, you can only instil into the mind of a man who from early life has known what discipline is.'

Lord Dufferin's Commission recommended that attendance

at school should be compulsory for recruits till they had acquired a certain rudimentary knowledge, and that the normal school should be abolished, and schoolmasters for the future obtained from the civil training institutions. When military candidates presented themselves for appointment, they recommended that they should be trained in the first instance at the regimental schools, and afterwards for a short time at the civil establishments of the same nature.

It was certainly inevitable that, as soon as the suppression of the Mutiny in India could be accomplished, a great change should take place, and that this vast territory should be brought under the direct control of the British Crown, a plan which had been advocated by Lord Chatham a century before. The certainty of the coming change, and the pertinent lessons taught by the Mutiny, no doubt caused the Duke of Cambridge to look upon the suggestion of raising more Company troops with supreme distrust, and events have proved that in this case he was absolutely right.

What happened in the issue was somewhat interesting. H.R.H.'s opinion was altogether ignored, and he was not even informed at once of the decision of the Cabinet, a lapse which Lord Palmerston describes as having occurred through 'some inadvertence.'

Mention has been already made of the fact that the Duke did not consider on one or two occasions that he was kept adequately informed of the course of affairs at the seat of war. In August 1857 he had, as we have seen, written to Lord Panmure on the subject. He was now to have another experience: namely, of the Government deciding upon a specific act of military administration without even acquainting H.R.H. of their intentions.

TO LORD PANMURE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 24 *October* 1857.

'You will receive by to-day's post an official letter from me, in which I remonstrate in the strongest terms against the decision come to to raise four European Cavalry Regiments by the East India Company. I had not the least idea of such a decision having been arrived at, having had no official notice to that effect from you. The consequence was that on receiving this communication from the Company, I went over

to Vernon Smith to know what it meant, when he told me that it had been the decision of the Cabinet. I cannot tell you how this has taken me by surprise, and how it has vexed and annoyed me. Recollect that I have ever held the same language, not to allow the E.I. Company to raise any more European troops. The whole question of the E.I.C.'s Army is involved in this decision. If you concede to them this point, they will have gained the day, and you cannot produce any good arguments against their raising other European troops if they saw they required them. I am prepared to raise Queen's Regiments of Cavalry at any standard you like to name. It need not in any way interfere with the ordinary Regiments of Cavalry we have now got. I wrote to you only yesterday that I intended to revise the Cavalry Regiments in general, and put their height on a better footing. If for local purposes you want an extraordinarily small class of man, he shall be got for you, but I beg of you not to let the Company raise these troops, but ourselves. I dislike small corps on principle, and because I am certain that in time they deteriorate; but even that point I will give up, if you will only be firm in your refusal to allow the East India Company to recruit for an European corps.

'I am doubtful, in point of fact, whether these new corps could be raised according to the present Act of Parliament, and further, whether under any circumstances the question should not be first sanctioned by the Crown. Possibly you have already considered this; but should you not have done so, I hope you will, for you know that H.M. feels strongly on these points, and I hardly think she would like new regiments to be raised for the Company without her consent has been officially obtained. But this is more a question of form I only throw out: the question of principle is that on which I base my objection, and from which I cannot go. I am altogether opposed to Company's European troops. I am confident that military affairs in India cannot progress satisfactorily with this double system of an Army, and whatever may be done with the native troops, I protest against any fresh European Regiment being raised by the E.I.C. At the same time, I am quite prepared to raise the number of Regiments required for special service in India either as regular Queen's Regiments, or on the footing of local corps like the Colonial Corps, and I am prepared to make arrangements that you may deem desirable for admitting some of the Company's officers into these Regiments thus raised. I shall not act further in this matter till I receive your reply and views. I cannot tell you how much I feel annoyed and vexed by this business, so contrary to what I had expected and understood.'

'*PS.*—I would beg to add that I know Sir Colin Campbell fully shares my opinions as to the disadvantages of continuing European troops in the Company's service, and that he will undoubtedly support my views as here set forth.'

FROM LORD PALMERSTON.

'BROADLANDS, 25 *October* 1857.

'I must in the first place congratulate Y.R.H. upon your excellent speech, which has given universal satisfaction. I return with many thanks the accompanying very interesting papers, and I quite agree with Y.R.H. that, in making the future arrangements about India, care must be taken that the C.-in-C. in this country shall have all information which may be necessary as to the state and condition of the Royal Troops in India.

'I was sorry to find that through some inadvertence Y.R.H. had not been informed of the decision come to at the last meeting of the Cabinet to allow the E.I.C. to raise some Cavalry Regiments, to consist of men below the lowest standard of height at which Recruits are taken for the Cavalry of the Queen's Army. An application for permission to raise such corps having been made by the E.I.C., we thought that no sufficient reason could be given to Parliament for a refusal to consent; we considered that the raising of such corps would not interfere with the recruiting for the regular Army, and that corps to be so composed, though not fit for the general purposes for which the Cavalry of the Queen's Army are destined, might yet be extremely useful for many local services in India, where Cavalry are greatly required, and we thought it would be better to let such an excellent corps be raised by the Company rather than it should form part of the British Army.

'I am delighted to hear such good reports of the progress of recruiting. I never doubted for a moment that the spirit of the British nation would rise equal to an emergency, and triumph over every difficulty and danger.'

FROM LORD PANMURE.

'TAYMOUTH, 27 *October* 1857.

'. . . I am not surprised at your vexation at the decision of the Cabinet, but I confess that I regret that You should have entered an official protest against it, as after all it is a decision of a collective Government, taken with a full knowledge of Y.R.H.'s opinion, and to which in our individual capacity You and I must bow.

'Sharing in that opinion, I can assure You that I fully stated it, but the Cabinet were of opinion that, under the circumstances, it was better to permit the E.I.C. to raise three Regiments, as Cavalry is the force of all others we require in India. I cannot see that it at all embarrasses the question of the future control of European troops in India, because, whatever is decided, all the Company's European Regiments must conform to.

'This is a question which will require long and mature

consideration, as it develops new feeling and political considerations the more one thinks of it. I do not shrink from my opinion that the military administration of India must be directly from the military authorities at home, but it must be well arranged and the foundations made sure before the present system, bad and hollow as it is, can be broken down. I will send your letter to Lord Palmerston, and let him see the full strength of your objections.

'I have written to Mr. Vernon Smith to look well to his law before he goes too far, but I believe myself that the E.I.C. have full legal authority to raise these men, if sanctioned by the authority of the responsible advisers of the Queen.

'These Regiments will be officered by the large body in E.I.C.'s pay, for whom they must provide, and this could not have been accomplished by Y.R.H. You could only have taken a portion, whereas they will take the whole so far as the forces to be raised admits. They may give promotion to merit, and without creation of fresh patronage to themselves will fill up the corps. This business does not lie in my official administration, and I presume either Lord Palmerston or Mr. V. Smith have informed the Queen of the decision of the Cabinet, and I trust that reflection will reconcile Y.R.H. to that decision.

'I received last night the gratifying news of the fall of Delhi. It has been dearly bought, but the results are immense. At least 5000 men could be immediately sent to Lucknow, and I hope Sir Colin has already arranged his divisions to sweep India from one end to the other. . . .'

FROM LORD PALMERSTON.

'Downing Street, 30 *October* 1857.

'The Cabinet at its meetings yesterday and to-day have fully considered Y.R.H.'s objections to the arrangement by which the E.I.C. are to be allowed to raise four Regiments of Cavalry, to consist of men below the standard fixed for the Cavalry of the Queen's Army, but they have remained of opinion that, under the circumstances of the case, it is advisable to let that arrangement be carried into effect.

'There is a great want of Cavalry in India; as all the Cavalry of the E.I.C. was composed of natives, and but little of it has remained faithful, much good service might be performed in India by Cavalry composed of light men mounted on the small horse of the country, and the Company have the means of organising such a force at once by the European officers of the disbanded Cavalry Regiments. The decision taken on this particular point does not in any way prejudge the determination which may be hereafter come to with respect to the Company's European troops, for, of course, these Cavalry Regiments will follow the fate of the rest

of the European troops of the Company, whatever that may be.

'The Cabinet are very anxious that no time should be lost in carrying this arrangement into effect, in order that these Regiments may be formed and sent out as soon as possible.'

TO LORD PANMURE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 31 *October* 1857.

'Thanks for your letter, which I received last night on my return from the country. I am sorry that you do not approve of my official protest against the raising of the four European Company's Regiments, but having received an official letter from the Company, I could not help sending it officially to you as recording my opinion against the decision, which I was not then even aware was a decision, of the Cabinet, though I heard it shortly afterwards. Such having been my deliberate opinion, I could not do less than state it. Now, however, that I have done so, and that I have heard from Lord Palmerston that the Cabinet here hold by their determination, I have nothing further to say, and have given all the necessary orders for raising the men required from 5 foot to 5 foot 4. As a matter of course, the moment the order is given and my objections have been listened to, if they are considered as not valid, I have nothing further to do than to obey orders, and I must cheerfully do so, having no other object in view but to carry out the service of the country to the best of my ability.

'I take for granted that the Company will know what is to be done with these men, how they are to be drilled, and where to be put into order, but they perhaps forget that Cavalry cannot be drilled in the same way that Infantry are, and that if these men go out as Recruits unable to ride, it will take a very long time for them to prepare and discipline these Regiments for service in the field. But that is no affair of ours. I send you in a box all the letters I have from Sir Colin Campbell. The accounts are on the whole good, and there is but little to remark upon.

'I did not send them before, as I thought it well to send them to the Queen, whence they have only just returned.'

The whole question of the continued existence of the H.E.I. Co.'s British Regiments was now fairly set afoot, and as was inevitably the case when the truth about their status and the natural results of their service became known to the world out of the narrow clique of India, their fate was irretrievably sealed.

The opinions of various officers who were in a position to

give a dispassionate view of the case was called for, and among others that of Major-General Sir William Mansfield, afterwards Lord Sandhurst.

Few who read this scathing condemnation will fail to realise the unanswerable nature of its logic. Nor should it afford much comfort to the modern school of military thought who desire to see a local British Army revived for Indian Service. It may be truly said that short service, with all its evils, at least has saved our troops serving in India from the class of deterioration so painfully exposed by Sir William Mansfield.

MEMORANDUM BY MAJOR-GENERAL MANSFIELD ON THE BRITISH PORTION OF THE SERVICE OF THE H.E.I. COMPANY.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA, 20 *October* 1857.

'I am strongly of opinion that all English Regiments in this country should belong to the Service of the Queen. There is no man, from whatever class he springs, who is not physically a weaker man after ten years' service in India than his comrade who has served in England or in other Colonies during the same time.

'That which may be said of him as regards his physical constitution may be asserted with still greater force in respect of his moral character. He is less amenable to discipline, he is more slothful, and he becomes incapable of prolonged effort; indeed it may be said, without exaggeration, of action altogether, except when he is under the impulse of excitement.

'That which may be declared as an indisputable fact and result of climatic influence on the individual man or soldier applies with all the strength of geometrical progression to a Regiment which, after all, is nothing more or less than a mass of individual men or soldiers, their character and qualities being reflected as through a magnifying glass.

'Thus it makes no difference whether a Regiment be called a Queen's or Company's corps. After ten years passed in India, it is not so good in discipline or efficiency for military purposes as one lately arrived from England.

'The latter is about at its best when it has worked for two years in India, where knowledge of country and climate has been gained, and while former good habits still prevail among the officers and in the ranks.

'But after that time deterioration begins. It may be stopped, and frequently is stopped by a Commanding Officer who has a strong impression of his duty to the State. But

after an interval he vanishes from the scene, and the Regiment slowly but surely succumbs to the influences around it.

'Such commanding officers are not very numerous. Of those who have the will but few have the force of character and lasting perseverance requisite for such a task as the maintenance of discipline in India.

'If what has been stated be true of H.M. Regiments, and no one who has watched the Service in India can doubt it, we may believe that the Regiments of the Company which never return to England labour under a still greater disadvantage. This conclusion is amply borne out in practice. These Regiments during the excitement of war are second to none, but their discipline, as far as I have been able to see, is exactly what I should have expected, and is a sufficient reason for their absorption into the ranks of H.M. Service, and their being included in the general system of relief.

'He must be little cognisant of regimental life who does not attribute full weight to the power of regimental traditions and customs in the mind of a recruit when he is first initiated into the mysteries of his new existence.

'In old corps which have been long stationed in India, all these traditions and customs are fatal to discipline, are encouragements of sloth and debauchery, and tell with terrible force against the military machine.

'What, then, must be their effect in British corps which have never left India, and have none but Indian traditions and the recollections of Indian customs to fall back on?

'Such is the case of English Regiments of the Company, and such are the fatal influences to which these recruits are exposed. These are evils which a very able man may palliate for a time, but to overcome them is beyond the ability of any man, although he may be the best commanding officer who was ever at the head of a Regiment.

'Be it recollected also, that among the officers of the Company's Army, owing to circumstances known to every one, which it is unnecessary to detail here, the principle of allegiance has not the same power as it has in England. They serve a master for pay: but they do not honour that master, or entertain any feeling of reverence for him. There is no particular reason why they should, if they perform the terms of their bond.

'Without, therefore, a thought of disparagement, I would say that the holiness of principle of duty is not understood in India as we expect it to be understood in England.

'If there were no other reason, we have here an ample ground for desiring that every truly British Regiment should be derived from Her Majesty the Queen, and not from a Company, which, whatever its present function, is still considered by the Army a mercantile body with mercantile instincts, and will be so considered for all time.'

In February 1858 Lord Palmerston's Ministry fell, and Lord Derby was charged by the Queen with the task of forming a new Cabinet. General Peel was named to take Lord Panmure's place as Secretary of State for War, and this impending appointment was communicated by Lord Derby to H.R.H. Hence the following letter:—

TO GENERAL PEEL.

'22 *February* 1858.

'Nothing could possibly be more agreeable to me than if you were to fill the important, I may say as far as I am concerned, the *all-important* post in question: it requires the greatest possible *harmony* to work the double office satisfactorily together, and I am confident that no two men could pull better together than we shall do. . . .'

On 1 March Lord Derby from his place in the House of Lords made some eulogistic remarks as to the condition in which the Army was reported to be by his new Secretary of State.

Apparently the Duke had written to his late coadjutor, Lord Panmure, on his relinquishing the office of Secretary of State for War, for on 2 March the latter writes to H.R.H. thanking him for his letter, and alluding to the speech of the Premier of the previous night on the condition of the Army.

FROM LORD PANMURE.

'C. P., 2 *March* 1858.

'I cannot say how much gratified I am by Your Royal Highness's note.

'Lord Derby's testimony to the satisfactory condition of our military affairs was as much due to You, Sir, as to me. It reflects too on all those under our orders.

'Coming from Lord Derby, who was scarcely even known to waste a compliment on a political opponent, this evidence of success can neither be desired by envious partizans nor contradicted by a lying Press. My labours have been most cheerfully performed, and with a single eye to the good of the service.

'I shall never forget the hearty and gracious manner of Your Royal Highness towards me, and I hope that, having ceased to be your colleague, I may long boast of the privilege of calling myself your friend.'

FROM SIR CHARLES WOOD.

'ADMIRALTY, 2 *March* 1858.

'It must have been a great satisfaction to Your Royal Highness to have the admission of Lord Derby last night that he found the Army, under Your Royal Highness's charge and the administration of Lord Panmure, in so much better a condition than he had expected, and I sincerely congratulate Your Royal Highness on this just tribute to the exertions which you have made, no less than on the success which has attended them.

'I hope that the sister service is not behind-hand, and I venture to enclose to Your Royal Highness a short statement on the condition in which the Navy is left.'

After the capture of Delhi and the final relief of Lucknow the war lost much of its absorbing interest, although it continued for another eighteen months, not indeed coming to an end till March 1859. Still, the demand for men continued to be urgent, and the state of the Army generally gave cause for much alarm. Consequently, on 4 March 1858 the Duke sent a Memo. to General Peel showing the exact distribution of the Cavalry and the Infantry at Home, in the Colonies, and in India, and accompanied the same with a lengthy statement.

In this he alluded to the various changes at the time in progress, the results of his repeated and urgent demands for more men. The actual increase of the Army was as follows:

Two Cavalry Regiments were being raised, whilst of the thirteen Infantry Battalions sanctioned, four were completed and the remaining nine in various stages of formation.

Add to this, in the Army Estimates for the year commencing 1 April 1858 provision was made for twelve more second Battalions to be raised, thus completing the number of Line Regiments with two Battalions up to the 25th Foot, inclusive.

The Duke said that if these Battalions could be recruited by the winter it would give a total of 131 Infantry Battalions, of which 93 would be abroad and 38 at home.

As regards India, he was of opinion that none of the sixty Battalions employed there could be withdrawn for a considerable period, and that it was more likely that a

further increase would be required than that any diminution should be effected.

Reviewing the general situation in the Colonies, he stated that these garrisons had 'been reduced to their very smallest amount compatible with the safety of the Empire,' and that it was a serious question whether they should not be increased.

Amongst other examples of prolonged service abroad he mentioned the 59th Regiment, which had been nearly nine years in China, and which had 'suffered desperately from the results of their long confinement in these unhealthy regions.'

He pointed out how the results of our attempts to hold our foreign possessions with totally inadequate forces had resulted in our troops having more severe duties in hand than they could in the long run be called upon to perform, with due regard to their proper discipline and efficiency, 'for it has always been considered that a tour of foreign service of ten years might fairly be exacted from Regiments to five years at home. Should the present conditions become permanent, a further increase of the forces will be absolutely necessary.'

Passing on to the question of the Army maintained by the E.I.C., he urged that it should be amalgamated with the Queen's Forces. 'Such a consummation is very important and urgently called for. The inconveniences, the jealousies, the vexations, the annoyances caused by the double Army are not to be told. They have been doubly apparent since the large increase of the Queen's troops in India, and they are daily more and more painfully felt.' He foresaw that a European and a Native Army would have to be maintained, the latter constituted on a separate footing, but he urged that all European troops should be placed on the same footing, and in furtherance of these proposals pointed out the many disadvantages which had resulted from the dual system.

Amongst these, as regards the rank and file, was the competition in the recruiting market between the Queen's and Company's troops, and as regards the officers, the notorious

unfitness of many to command Queen's troops, due to their want of experience in dealing with the English private soldier.

On 6 April H.R.H. wrote to General Peel on a subject which has of recent years attracted some attention, the desirability of establishing a sanatorium for our Indian Army at the Cape of Good Hope. It must be remembered that this was before the time of the Suez Canal.

Despite the Duke's Memo. of 4 March the new Government were apparently unmoved, and actually selected this time as a favourable one for curtailing expenses by disembodying the Militia, which, under the emergency and stress of the preceding year, had been embodied.

This produced on 11 April a most earnest protest from the Duke, covering ten pages (not given here), in which he strove to bring the Government to realise the total inadequacy of our land forces to meet our engagements, and the general threatening condition of affairs in Europe and elsewhere.

As the Mutiny wore on, the difficulties of our Home Authorities became steadily greater.

On 3 May 1858 a Return of the Infantry Force in the United Kingdom was rendered, and the Duke, in forwarding it to General Peel, alluded to the difficulty experienced in providing four Regiments of Infantry to go to India with a view to bringing home a like number of Regiments that had suffered most in the recent arduous campaigns. He also drew attention to 'the lamentable state in which we find ourselves at the present moment, and to the absolute necessity of taking some steps to increase the available forces of the country.'

In the return in question, the forces at home were shown as 11,208 Regulars (old Battalions); 7172, recently raised second Battalions to the same; 24,356 at Depôt Battalions; and 21,441 embodied Militia—making a total of 64,177; of these 15,143 belonged to Indian Depôts, which being deducted, left a net total of 49,034 men.

Since the second Battalions and Depôts could not be considered in any sense as available troops, the actual effectives at home were only 32,849.

The Duke, after pointing out that it was 'most undesirable to diminish still further the old Regiments still serving at home,' urged that it was absolutely necessary to continue in an embodied state for a very considerable period the Militia Regiments at present embodied, and to pass an Act enabling some of them, on volunteering for such service, to proceed to the Mediterranean or other Colonial Stations. This would give some momentary relief and aid in carrying out the necessary colonial duties.

Failing this, the Duke urged 'the necessity of a further considerable increase to the Infantry of the Army by the formation of additional second Battalions to those at present in the course of formation. The consequence is so pressing that I would beg for an early decision.'

Some weeks later, on 31 May 1858, the Duke, apparently despairing of obtaining any addition to the British troops, Regular or Militia, to carry on the duties of the Empire, wrote to General Peel at length, advocating the formation of a Foreign Legion similar to that which had been raised at the end of the Crimean War.

Nothing, however, was done. Meanwhile the outlook became daily more serious. So on 9 July he once again addressed the Secretary of State in the following letter:—

TO GENERAL PEEL.

'Horse Guards, 9 *July* 1858.

'The season is drawing to a close, and I regret to find that nothing has been done towards the further increase of our available forces. And yet I do assure you, that since my former representations on this subject we are even in a worse position than we were then.

'The last accounts from India are far from satisfactory as regards the health of the troops; more Regiments are called for in the Bombay Presidency, where troubles are on the increase. From China the accounts are equally unsatisfactory, and more troops are anxiously looked for.

'From New Zealand we hear that troops cannot be spared, the Cape had been almost denuded of troops, and I have none to replace those sent, and the Mediterranean garrisons are now as low numerically as it is possible to keep them. At home we are no better off than we were.'

After recapitulating the various measures taken in order

at least to try to mitigate the deplorable lack of troops, he continues:—

'Such being the case, I do most strongly and urgently press upon you for the consideration and anxious deliberation of the Cabinet the absolute necessity of passing a Short Act enabling the embodied Militia to volunteer for service in the Mediterranean and other Colonies. It is really impossible to keep the garrisons of our Colonies up to the lowest strength and at the same time to effect the relief of some corps that have been many years abroad, unless you will adopt such a course, and under the emergency of the case it is the only thing I can suggest.'

The Duke proceeded to urge 'the propriety of raising a Foreign Legion, without which we cannot get on. I would also advise your putting the Germans at the Cape on Imperial pay, where they will take the place temporarily of such Regiments as have been taken from the Cape.' He also advocated the embodiment of several corps of Militia Artillery.

In conclusion he wrote:—

'All these arrangements are absolutely necessary, and I cannot hold myself responsible for the efficiency of the Army unless something be done at once. . . . I am of course quite prepared to maintain these views in the presence of the Cabinet if I am called upon to give an opinion.

'. . . Let me urge upon you the absolute necessity of a supplementary Estimate for these purposes, and let me beg of you to take this matter into your most serious consideration.

'At all events I have recorded my opinions in the strongest manner, that in the present state our armed force is most deficient in number, and that I cannot answer for the consequences if something is not done at once to add to our military forces both at home and abroad.'

So urgent did the need of European troops for India appear, that the Queen addressed the following memorandum to Lord Derby, the Prime Minister, and once again opened the question of raising a Foreign Legion, the objections to which were stated by Lord Panmure in a letter to the Duke on 6 October 1857, which has already been quoted.

'Osborne, 13 *July* 1858.

'The Queen is aware that the Duke of Cambridge has brought before the Government the question of a Foreign

Legion for India. She is anxious to impress upon Lord Derby the importance of giving to this subject the best consideration.

'The demands made upon the Army are enormous, and even the power of sending out to the Colonies some Regiments of Militia, who may volunteer for foreign service, will give us only a few more Battalions for India soon absorbed by the war, adding, however, greatly to our general military weakness. The accounts from Bombay show that new troubles are in store for us, while campaigning in the summer kills our made and matured soldiers, ill replaced by boys sent out from home after a short period of training.

'We have gone exactly through all these phases during the Crimean War, and a Foreign Legion was at last found indispensable, but from its formation having been delayed too long the country had all the expense without any use of it. In the present instance great numbers of European troops will be wanted for so long a time to come that there is no danger of their becoming useless; but it is almost certain that England cannot find the necessary material of men within herself under the system of voluntary enlistment. 80,000 are put down by every military or Indian authority as the establishment in future required by India. Add to this 30,000 for the Colonies, and you reach the figure of 110,000 for permanent service abroad (and this as a peace establishment) which this country could with difficulty keep up and relieve, but which would also leave the Army at home so small that England would be nearly powerless for her own defence or any European emergency. Supposing the case of a war like the last, she would have nothing to send, and have then to hire foreign troops for a European war, as the main force of England.

'The Queen would ask Lord Derby to bring this letter before the Cabinet, not with a view of deciding upon the question itself, but to consider the state of the law about it, and in how far Parliamentary sanction could and ought to be now obtained for the plan should events render its adoption indispensable.

'An increase of mortality, some few disasters, or further defections of Indian Princes, may force it upon us any moment as a last and only resource, and it would then be very inconvenient to have to summon Parliament suddenly again, whilst much time would be lost: under six months no legion could be formed with the best success, so that before nine or ten months it could not well take part in the war; any additional delay after the necessity of the step may have been recognised would lose us probably *a whole year!*

'What might not happen in that interval? France has never been able to do without a Foreign Legion at Algiers, having 500,000 men raised by conscription at home.'

The Duke was always most anxious that General and other officers who held military commands in distant parts of the Empire should communicate directly and privately with him, so as to keep him in touch with what was happening in their commands, and most of these communications he answered personally.

The following is an extract from a letter which he wrote to Sir Colin Campbell on his elevation to the Peerage. It is interesting to know that it was at the Duke's suggestion that this distinguished officer assumed the title of Lord Clyde.

'HORSE GUARDS, 10 *May* 1858.

'. . . And now as regards yourself and the honours conferred upon you. As a matter of course, I shall, and indeed have, recommended that your rank as full General should at once be confirmed; and I am glad to find that the Government have rightly decided to confer a Peerage on you, my dear and valued friend. I congratulate you upon this well-earned honour, and I congratulate the Peerage upon being permitted to take up amongst its members so great and distinguished an ornament as yourself. But as to the title, I think, if I were you, I should wish to be called by the title of Lord Clyde of Lucknow! I think it would be a charming title, associated with that part of Scotland from whence you sprung, and with the great operation in the East in which you have been engaged. If therefore you have not already replied to Lord Derby's communication on the subject, I hope you will do so now in the sense above stated.'[1]

Under the new order of things the position of Commander-in-Chief, with respect to the Army in India, required to be placed on a settled basis. Hence this memorandum from H.R.H.:—

'27 *September* 1858.

'The Commander-in-Chief's position should be, as regards the Secretary of State for India, the same relatively for the Army in India that it is to the S. of S. for War to the Army in general. Every military question that has been hitherto submitted to the Court of Directors of the E.I.C. should in future be submitted to the S. of S. for India, who will then consult the C.-in-C. upon it, and make his decisions after each consultation.

[1] *The Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde*, by Lieutenant-General Shadwell, II. 257.

'The Governor-General of India will, in conjunction with the C.-in-C. on the spot, conduct the business of the Army in India, make appointments as heretofore, etc.; but all great organic changes will in the first instance be submitted by him for approval and sanction to the Secretary of State, who, as before stated, will consult the C.-in-C. upon the military portion of the question.

'The discipline of the whole Army will be carried on by the C.-in-C. in India, subject to the control of the C.-in-C. in England, with whom he will communicate directly on all subjects of detail.

'The European portion of the Army both of the Line and Local will be subject to the same rules and regulations of service; the Native troops will be assimilated, as much as their prejudices will admit, to the discipline of the Army in general.

'All first appointments to the Local and Native Army of India will be made by the S. of S. for India and the Council as directed by Act of Parliament; subsequent promotions will be conducted according to the Regulations to be laid down hereafter on this head.

'Full returns of the Army in India, with amount of Stores, Arms, etc., to be sent periodically in duplicate to the S. of S. for India and the Commander-in-Chief.

'The Recruiting Depôt at Warley to be placed under the direction of the C.-in-C., and the whole Recruiting Establishment conducted under his authority.

'The Academy at Addiscombe to be placed under the C.-in-C. and Council of Military Education in like manner as Sandhurst and Woolwich, but the patronage to remain with the S. of S. for India.

'The embarkation of troops for India to be conducted by the Q.M.G.'s department, under the direction of the C.-in-C.

'The taking up of the transports to be by the S. of S.'s authority.

'To carry out effectually the increased duties on these changes a Deputy Adjutant-General for the Indian Local Army and an Assistant Military Secretary to be added to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, to be selected from Indian Officers.'

On 10 October 1858 the Duke wrote to General Peel most strongly against any continuance of the Indian Army on the lines of the white troops serving in the E.I. Company—in other words, of a separate local army for India of British soldiers.

He pointed that if this were to be carried out, 'The Queen will have two Armies and two distinct heads to them. It will be a most awful mess, and lead to every jealousy imaginable.'

Shortly afterwards he wrote to Lord Clyde respecting the future position of the Commander-in-Chief to the Indian Army.

TO LORD CLYDE.

'1 *November* 1858.

'My position relative to the Indian Army has not as yet been defined. I regret it, as I think it ought at once to be settled. I do not for one moment wish to interfere in any respect in the local command or organisation of the Indian Army; but I wish my position with regard to that Army to be recognised, so that a direct intercourse between yourself and me should be officially acknowledged, and that I should be looked upon as the head of the Army in general for purposes of Discipline, without, as I said before, in the slightest degree interfering with your local authority or power. I am confident that the Army in general would benefit by such an arrangement, and you would act exactly as you have hitherto done under the direct authority of the Governor-General.'

An interesting sidelight is thrown on the great struggle in India by the following minute which the Duke addressed to General Peel.

TO GENERAL PEEL.

'4 *October* 1858.

(*Encloses Letters from Lords Clyde and Elphinstone.*)

'. . . It is very singular that while Elphinstone complains so much of the Enfield Ammunition, Lord Clyde on the contrary finds no fault with it. I cannot at all account for this, excepting that our excellent friend Colin never finds fault with anything Indian, I presume on principle. . . .'

The Duke wrote to Lord Clyde to obtain his views on the proposed amalgamation of the 'Queen's' and 'Company's troops, as those of the Regular Army and local forces in India were respectively styled colloquially.

Lord Clyde replied at length in a letter dated 17 October 1858, in which he urged that any such scheme must be framed so as to do justice to the 'immense body of officers whose late bond with the Company had been assumed by the Crown.'

He further expressed his strong opinion that the Commander-in-Chief in England should be placed at the Head

of the Army in India: 'I repeat that I should consider both forces as forming parts of one Army, owning one head in Y.R.H., and that there should be the liberty of exchange between the officers of the Old Line and the new local forces.'

During the Session of 1858 the question of the retrocession of the Ionian Islands came again to the front, and Mr. Gladstone was dispatched as a Commissioner to ascertain the feelings of the inhabitants of the Islands on the subject. It is a matter of history how he identified himself with the phil-Hellenic Party. But among the various factors which worked towards the policy of abandonment, there can be no doubt that the extraordinary *impasse* arrived at in the attempt to hold adequately the widely scattered garrisons of the Empire with insufficient forces was one of first importance.

The Duke of Cambridge, as has been seen, had stated with perfect frankness to General Peel that our forces were totally inadequate to the duties assigned to them. The retort of a section of the Cabinet naturally enough—in view of their known policy as regards the treatment of our Colonies and general antipathy to all Imperial responsibilities—was to suggest the abandonment of some of the defensive points which called for garrisons.

The Duke, having served in the Ionian Islands for over two years, had thorough personal knowledge of the value and capabilities of Corfu, and on 18 December addressed a confidential memorandum to the Secretary of State, in which he set forth the advantages of holding Corfu, and how, with the addition of certain defensive works necessary to protect it from land attack, it would afford not only a splendid strategic harbour, but a reserve place of arms.

Political exigencies, as has unfortunately too often been the case in our history, were permitted to outweigh military considerations, and after several years of vacillation the Ionian Islands, despite the advice of those best competent to pronounce on their strategic value, were handed over to Greece.

Before abandoning them, the costly defences and harbour

works were ruthlessly blown up and destroyed, so as to render the Islands less likely to excite the cupidity of other European nations.

Nineteen years later (in 1877), when our relations with Russia were so severely strained by the condition of affairs arising out of the Russo-Turkish War, the want of Corfu as a base in the Levant was seriously felt, and led to the hasty and costly occupation of Cyprus, an island possessing none of the natural advantages of Corfu.

Memo. on Corfu.

'18 *December* 1858.

'The military advantages of Corfu cannot in my opinion be overestimated. This admirable military station completely commands the Adriatic, watches the whole Coast of Albania, and must at all times be a wholesome check on Greece.

'In conjunction with Malta and Gibraltar it completes the command of the Mediterranean, and enables this country to neutralise the action of all other Powers in this great inland sea.

'A lengthened residence in this Island has made me thoroughly acquainted with its local capabilities.

'The harbour is magnificent as a safe anchorage at all seasons of the year, and is capable of containing the largest Fleets that could be concentrated there. . . . With these additions, I conceive that a garrison of from three to five thousand men would amply suffice for holding Corfu against any attack that could be made against it as long as the command of the sea rests in our hands, and it is with a view of securing this command that I should hold the fortresses of Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu of such great importance.

'Without harbours which can at all times and seasons be entered, a Fleet is powerless, but with harbours defended by works able to resist a *coup-de-main* the command of the sea is ensured.'

CHAPTER XI

THE 'WHITE' MUTINY IN INDIA—1858-59

Lord Clyde announces Mutiny at an end. Troubles *re* British India Troops. Lord Clyde's Letter of November 1858 explaining Troubles. The Duke's Reply. His Plan of dealing with the Situation. Plan not adopted and Matters grow worse. Lord Clyde's Letters to H.R.H. and Lord Canning. H.R.H. replies. More Letters from Lord Clyde. Sir William Mansfield on Officers of Indian Local Army. Discharged Men for China. Letter H.R.H. to the Queen on the Subject. H.R.H.'s Memo. on Formation of Indian Staff Corps. Extension of Lord Clyde's Commandership-in-Chief in India.

THE Duke's diary of the military operations in India shows that by the month of March 1859 the Mutiny might be considered as being at an end.

Lord Clyde wrote to him on 19 January announcing this, and the termination of the Oudh Campaign as well. The Duke received this letter on 9 March, and sent it to the Queen, who wrote as follows:—

FROM THE QUEEN.

'BUCKINGHAM PALACE, 10 *March* 1859.

'MY DEAR GEORGE,—This letter of Lord Clyde's is indeed *most* important and *useful*, and a *great blessing* at this moment. I wish you to send it to Mr. Disraeli to see, telling him that I had asked you to do so. I think you should have a few copies of it made in order to give to people like Lord Palmerston, etc., as it *puts* the *whole* question in the right light.

'Albert is quite delighted with it.'

On 25 April 1859 the Duke made in his diary an entry to the effect that the troubles in India might be considered as over. But, unfortunately, troubles of another kind were brewing. As far back as 12 November 1858 Lord Clyde, in writing to H.R.H., had first referred to what, through the blunders of our rulers in India, eventually became known as

the White Mutiny. Lord Clyde then acquainted the Duke with the disagreeable news that the English soldiers serving the East India Company had objected to being transferred to the Queen's Service, and on 25 December 1858 H.R.H. gave his opinion as to how the situation should be met.

As an example of the diversity of opinion held by men who might be expected at any rate to understand and appreciate the position of affairs in India, the following letter from Lord Ellenborough, at the time President of the Board of Control, and who had been Governor-General of India between 1841-44, is given:—

FROM LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

'87 EATON SQUARE, 23 *June* 1858.

'I am inclined to think that the Government are disposed to offer their discharge to the late East India Company's soldiers. . . . I cannot reconcile my mind to discharging the men at all, feeling that the law and common sense are equally against their claims—their position not having been really changed in any respect. . . . The whole difficulty arises out of the inconsiderate expressions used by Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons.'

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'CAMP NEAR AMETHIE, 12 *November* 1858.

'I have the honour to inform Y.R.H. that a Claim for Discharge has been put forward by some of the soldiers who enlisted to serve the East India Company. They allege that, having been attested to serve that body, they are no longer bound to Military Service, as they have not sworn to serve the Queen as soldiers. The question is one of much gravity, and was referred by H.E. the Governor-General to the Crown Lawyers at Calcutta at my suggestion. Those Authorities have decided that the 56th Clause of the new Act of Parliament transferring India to the Crown completely sets aside any claims for discharge which the men enlisted to serve the Company may put forward. The Governor-General has decided that the rule given by the Lawyers must be maintained, and has requested me to give the men to understand, kindly but firmly, that the Act of Parliament cannot and must not be trifled with. This of course it will be my duty to do to the best of my ability, and I shall take the earliest opportunity of instructing the applicants for discharge in that sense, and that they must not attempt to set their private judgment against an Act of Parliament, more particularly when it has been explained by

persons competent to do so—viz. the Lawyers of the Crown. Your Royal Highness knows the English soldier well, and how he hangs his military existence on his attestation, and how tenacious he is of the terms of the bond of his enlistment. The matter for consideration appears to me to be how a court-martial would act in case of a soldier being tried, who should put forward in his defence that he was no longer bound by his attestation. The officers composing the court-martial are both judge and jury, they would probably think themselves called upon to examine the terms of attestation, and it is not impossible that they might judge differently from the Lawyers as to the power of an *ex post facto* Act of Parliament. I do not pretend to give an opinion against that of the Lawyers or of the Government. I merely consider the point as one on which the soldier may say that a new rule affecting the bond of a first enlistment, and which seems according to him to be at variance with that careful attention to the consent of the individual which inspires all our Acts of Enlistment and the practice of the country—the latter being most familiar to the Private Soldier—he may say, and I rather suspect he does, that it is very strange that a Man cannot be transferred from one Regiment to another without his own consent—whereas his oath of attestation can be set aside when it involves a change of Service altogether. I will take care to speak to them in such a manner as to preserve good temper, and when I see my way a little more clearly than I do at present, I will address Y.R.H. again officially on the results obtained.'

TO LORD CLYDE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 25 *November* 1858.

'As regards the other subject under consideration, I confess I look upon it in the light of a very serious one, and likely to lead to much mischief if not very deliberately and judiciously handled. I judge from your observations that you concur with Sir William Mansfield in thinking that the law point is a doubtful one, though it has been otherwise ruled by the Law Officers of the Crown at Calcutta. I share these views, and go to the extent of thinking that even if the law is not doubtful, still the equity of the view taken is extremely so, and that rather than that a difficulty should arise, leading to any grave and unpleasant doubt in the minds of the men, I would treat this question exactly as transfers are treated from one Regiment to another in the Queen's Army, ask the men to volunteer a renewal of their services on the receipt of a modified bounty, their former service being, of course, allowed to count towards a pension or discharge, but giving free discharge to all men indisposed to continue their services under the Crown. I believe but a very small number of men would ask to go, and the whole body would have been

satisfied and contented instead of [what] now, I fear, must be the reverse. Any want of discipline consequent on these doubts in the minds of the men would, in my humble opinion, be a very grave evil in our present unsettled rule in the East, and would set a bad example at a moment such as this, when, in all other respects, matters have so greatly mended and are looking well for the future. These are, however, only my individual opinions and not those of anybody else, and I am not aware as yet what view the Government have taken on this question, though I have reason to know that it is before them. I look forward with much anxiety to the next accounts I may receive from you on this subject, feeling, however, the greatest confidence in the judgment and discretion with which you act, now that the matter has been placed in your hands by the Governor-General. . . .'

Lord Clyde in his next letter reports the trouble as less serious.

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'CAMP, FYZABAD, 10 *December* 1858.

'. . . The men belonging to the European Army of the late Company have ceased to put forward any further claims for discharge on account of their attestation, since the transfer of that Army to the Crown.

'But though there is no official demonstration, it is evident an under-current is still at work in some of the corps, as evidenced by letters appearing from time to time in the local Indian papers, which are either written by officers or soldiers who take the same view, viz. that *legally* they are not soldiers of the Crown without their own free consent and a new attestation. . . .'

In this letter Lord Clyde also alludes to the Duke's proposal of 'organising this Army into Corps with corresponding Staff,' and points out that for a long time want of funds will necessitate the most strict economy.

Unfortunately the Duke's solution of the difficulty was not followed, and the views of the Law Officers were accepted instead. These, though no doubt right from a purely legal point of view, were, as events subsequently proved, absolutely futile from a practical standpoint, and their adoption was eventually attended with disastrous results.

On 11 May 1859 Lord Clyde, after using every endeavour to ignore the extent of the evil, was compelled to write to the Duke on 'the alarming state of the Bengal European

troops.' This letter was quickly followed by others of 13 and 14 May, together with a copy of one addressed to Lord Canning on 18 May.

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'11 *May* 1859.

'It was with much regret that I was prevented by the many demands on me from writing to Y.R.H. by the last mail on the alarming state of the Bengal European troops. The news reached me just as the mail was going away, and my attention was completely taken up by the very important business in hand.

'Y.R.H. will have been informed that an extensive combination has been discovered to exist in the ranks of the Bengal European Army to resist their transfer to the Crown without consent. At Meerut the first discovery was made of the existence of this combination, and before it was found out, the combination had made great progress. The troops at many stations had been tampered with, as was discovered from intercepted letters, and it had been undoubtedly determined to proceed to measures of resistance to Authority and intimidation of Government.

'Fortunately at Meerut no overt act had been committed, and I was enabled to take the only means possible for averting an outbreak, the consequences of which no man could tell, considering the present state of feeling throughout the country resulting from the recent general insurrection. It would be disastrous to the prestige of our power if the Native Rulers saw us compelled to act against our own Artillery. Accordingly I have ordered a special Court of Inquiry to assemble at Meerut for the purpose of hearing what the men have to say in support of their alleged grievance, and careful instructions have been sent to General Officers in command of Divisions.

'These measures have been attended with good results. At Meerut the men are behaving well, as also at all other places at present, excepting Allahabad, where Sir John Inglis reports that the men are misconducting themselves, and are beyond the control of their officers. The malcontents will be discharged.

'It is with much concern that I have to report such matters to Y.R.H. Perhaps, however, we may gain experience from them which will compensate for present inconvenience and put a stop to a false step before it is too late. . . . I have seen in the public prints, I do not know with what truth, that there is an intention to add very largely to the local European Army of Bengal. As Y.R.H. knows, I have always been strongly of the opinion that it is impossible, as shown by practice and experience, to maintain discipline in a Local Corps such as we expect in one of Her Majesty's

Regiments. But it did not occur to me that the loyalty of Local Corps might suffer.

'Recent events have shown that we cannot depend on that, and that at any time we are liable to have to meet dangerous combinations against our authority to the prejudice of discipline and the intimidation of the Government.

'It is clear, from what we have now seen, that it is absolutely necessary not to trust to Local Corps, and that we can alone put faith in a discipline which is constantly renovated by return to England and the presence of officers with their Regiments who look on them as their homes. It is therefore subject for deep consideration and inquiry whether, after what has recently taken place, it is expedient or secure to increase the Local European Army, and if, in the largest sense of the term military safety, it has not become a necessity that for the future all European Corps of whatever arm serving in India should undergo the process of relief?

'I have further to bring to the notice of Y.R.H. that the experience of the last few months has shown the great inexpediency of sending out to this country bodies of recruits to be formed into Regiments of Cavalry and Battalions of Infantry. Independent of the ills of climate and the paucity of old non-commissioned officers and soldiers in our ranks, the Bengal Army cannot supply officers capable of forming new European Regiments—for such business they have everything to learn, from the Colonel downwards. Hence the new Regiments make very slow progress, and the officers are, I believe, incapable of obtaining much moral influence over their men. If the intention be persisted in of forming new Local European Regiments for India, I most earnestly recommend that they may be thoroughly formed and instructed in England before they are sent out here. It has been my unpleasant duty to recommend the removal of three old Cavalry Colonels in consequence of their unfitness. But their successors, though younger men and therefore with more energy, are quite ignorant of how British soldiers should be treated, simply because their own education was among Sepoys. This very important point should on no account be overlooked if a Local European Army is to be formed, and as to how it affects us in finding the necessary Commanding Officers.

'I would mention a curious fact in connection with recent events which, to a military man, is of vast importance and significance in the consideration of such subjects. We now know that misconduct about to take place had been the subject of conversation in the Barracks at different times at various stations weeks before the first demonstration took place. Yet no Non-Commissioned Officer, no Sergeant, Corporal, or Bombardier came forward to warn his officer in the old Regiment of Bengal Artillery at Meerut. The first

intimation was given by a soldier recently transferred from the 9th Lancers to the Bengal Light Cavalry.'

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'SIMLA, 13 *May* 1859.

'That Y.R.H. may be fully informed on the steps which I have thought it advisable to take in the management of the Local Indian Forces in the crisis through which they are passing, I have the honour to enclose copies of my first Order, and of the various messages which have been sent to different officers for their immediate guidance.

'As far as it has been possible, the Divisional Officers have been relieved from responsibility.

'The combination of the malcontent troops is known to have spread to nearly every station in Bengal, and it has either manifested itself openly or been actually traced, in Lahore, Umballa, Meerut, Lucknow, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Berhampore, Agra, and Gwalior.

'The first note of unlawful combination was heard at Meerut, but it is clear to me that an arrangement had been made by the ringleaders of the movement to have a general strike at about the same date in a great many stations. Some bad men were prepared to go to all lengths, and the seizure of Delhi was actually proposed and agreed to by the Delegates at a second meeting at Meerut. . . .

'Luckily the disclosures at Meerut were in time to prevent overt crime, and although we may lose a great many men who will be discharged under the orders of Government on their declaring their non-consent to serve the Crown directly, we shall, I hope, be saved the disgrace and calamity of having to *act* against British soldiers.

'What threatened to be dangerous armed resistance has, I trust, been changed into a statement of grievances, sullen perhaps, but nevertheless legal, and one with which we are able to deal. . . .'

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'SIMLA, 14 *May* 1859.

'. . . I also enclose an Extract from the Proceedings of the first day's sittings of the Court of Inquiry at Meerut, which exemplifies in a remarkable manner the view taken by the men of their own case, and the acuteness with which they have been able to put their fingers upon its strong points.

'I beg leave again to draw Y.R.H.'s attention to the fact of the passive participation of the non-commissioned officers and so-called good men of the Bengal Artillery in the evil intentions of the younger and bolder men who were so near the commission of the worst crime. As I have before said, not one of their non-commissioned officers came forward at Meerut to warn their superiors of the discontent which was

brewing in the minds of the men, or of the widespread crime which was in contemplation. Yet we now know that it was the subject of conversation in Barracks weeks before the first suspicion dawned on the officers. It is impossible to overestimate the gravity of this circumstance, the more particularly if we take into consideration the close intimacy which generally prevails between the respectable non-commissioned officers of a troop or battery and their officers, owing to the detached nature of their duties and the constant association of the two classes without the intervention of their superiors, as is so much more the case in a Regiment of the Line.'

LORD CLYDE TO LORD CANNING.

'SIMLA, 18 *May* 1859.

'The enclosed letter, which I have the pleasure to send to Yr. Lordship, will serve to show the wild and dangerous counsels which have been talked over among the malcontents of the Bengal European Army. That even such talk should take place displays a pitch of demoralisation which cannot but give us cause for the most anxious thought. A point on which I have already dwelt in one of my previous letters, taken in conjunction with the evidence afforded by the enclosed letter, leads me, I fear, to a conclusion adverse to the existence of a local European Army in India. I allude to the total absence of active fidelity amongst the non-commissioned officers and old soldiers of the Bengal Artillery. Not one of them came forward to warn their officers of impending danger before suspicions were aroused from other quarters. We know with absolute certainty that open resistance on the part of the Bengal European Troops had been the talk in Barracks for weeks previous to the first ebullition at Meerut. We find that a most mutinous and unlawful combination to intimidate the Government has been general throughout the service, which seems to have been arranged with singular care and forethought, and could not have been managed in a few days, or even in a few weeks. A "general strike," as the men call it, was arranged and determined on. For it, as has been shown by the result of the last fortnight, the combination, as far as original design of the movement is concerned, was perfect. Whatever may now be done, the recollection of this strike and mutiny will never die out in the Indian Local Army. It will very possibly affect Her Majesty's Army also in a minor degree, but in the former, viz. the Indian Local Army, it will live for ever, and be a precedent to which the minds of the men will always revert when they are dissatisfied with their work or the regulations affecting them. I am therefore irresistibly led to the conclusion that henceforth it will be dangerous to the State to maintain a European Local Army. I believe that after this most recent experience, it will be unsafe to have any European forces which do not

undergo the regular process of relief, and that this consideration must be held to be paramount to all others, viz. local conveniences of Establishments, provision for officers, etc. etc. The latter, I hold, must be cared for in some other manner which may render due justice to them; but the time is past when, according to my judgment, any plan can be admitted or carried into execution which should attempt to provide for them by raising a large additional local European force. On the contrary, early measures should be taken for the conversion of the present local European forces, and that they should take their place among the regular regiments of Her Majesty. I include Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, without exception. It has, it appears to me, become indispensably necessary to apply the process of relief and consequent return to England of every European Corps in the country. We cannot afford to have any other considerations than those of discipline and loyalty, which may be constantly renovated by periodical return to England of all Regiments in every branch of the service. The filling up with recruits of regiments which are so tainted as those of the Bengal European Army is only to perpetuate the danger with which we have been lately threatened. In a regiment, tradition is very powerful, and the strike or mutiny of the Bengal European Army will be handed down from generation to generation as long as that Army is allowed to exist. I have thought it right to give Your Lordship the earliest intimation of the deliberate opinion formed by me in consequence of late events. In order to save time I have also communicated this opinion to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge direct. Hitherto I have, as much as possible, refrained from giving opinions on the subject of the numerical proportion of the Local to H. Majesty's forces in this country, conceiving that it was one which would be settled by the Government, and that it was the business of the Military Commander to keep in order whatever forces might be put under his command to the best of his ability.

'I have been most anxious also not to utter opinions which might have the appearance of being adverse to those I believed to be entertained by Your Lordship; but I feel I should be wanting in my duty were I to remain silent now that the strongest conviction has arisen in my mind that from henceforth we should have no local Europeans whatever.'

To these letters the Duke replied.

TO LORD CLYDE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 26 *June* 1859.

'Your letters of 11, 13, and 14 May have reached me with enclosures, giving detailed accounts of the attempted

mutiny of the Local European troops at Meerut and elsewhere and the measures you had adopted to meet this lamentable case. . . . The opinions you express as to the disadvantage of retaining a Local European Army are both important and valuable, and though, no doubt, you had good reasons for not committing these views to paper at an earlier period, I still regret very much that you did not do so, as there was undoubtedly an impression abroad that your views were rather favourable than otherwise to the Local Corps, and as General Mansfield took this line of argument in the Memo. he sent in on the re-organisation of the Indian Army. Of course I lost no time in making your views known to the Government, and I make no doubt they will carry great weight in any arrangements which may hereafter be made. As to myself, you are already aware that your opinion, as now detailed, accords completely with the views I have all along adopted with regard to the European Army in India, and my opinions have been entirely confirmed by all that has recently taken place in India. Local Europeans cannot have the same amount of discipline that is to be found in the Army of the Line. The local officers do not know how to deal with Europeans, and discipline is relaxed by the climate in which these local regiments serve; and though the line Army may, to some extent, be more expensive than a local force, this cost must be put up with in order to obtain the best troops that England can produce. As one of the majority in the late Royal Commission, my views are fully embodied in the report we have made upon this portion of the question. I hope that, after this strong expression of your opinion which we have now got, no additional European troops will be raised for local service. We may be compelled to retain for a time what exists, as the prejudice in favour of local troops is so great. But whatever happens, it is quite clear that no European Regiments can be formed in India itself and that should new Regiments be decided upon, which I do not think likely, these must, in the first instance, be disciplined and formed in Europe. . . .'

And the following correspondence ensued:—

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'SIMLA, 26 *May* 1859.

'I have little more to report to Y.R.H. since I wrote my letter of the last mail. The excitement of the Bengal Army has been allayed for the time being by the opportunity afforded the men of stating their grievances, but every day gives us more evidence that the feeling which caused that excitement is quite general and extends to every corps in the service. The 3rd Madras European Regiment at Jubblepore, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers at Dugshai, the 6th Bengal European Regiment at Huzarreebagh, the 3rd do. at Gwalior, the 5th

do. at Berhampore, have all spoken out, in addition to those corps and stations of which I made mention in my last letters.

'I have thought it right to address Lord Canning on the matter of the future organisation of the Army, in consequence of late events, and I venture to take the liberty of forwarding to Y.R.H. copies of my last letters to His Lordship that Y.R.H. may see I have not failed to urge the opinion out here which I have already had the honour of stating to Your Royal Highness in my letter of 11 May. . . .'

TO LORD CLYDE.

'HORSE GUARDS, 10 *July* 1859.

'. . . The letter you wrote to the Governor-General, copy of which you sent me, is quite in accordance with the views I entertain, and I am very glad to think that you have spoken out unreservedly, for this is certainly not the time for half measures.

'It is impossible for a Local Army to be long continued. It cannot be relied upon. The troops have not that real amount of discipline so conspicuous in the troops of the Line, and the officers do not know how to deal with Europeans. I always felt that this was so, and hence my reason for siding strongly with the majority of the Commission in their recommendation for only one Army and that of the Line. I think the Government at home will certainly not raise any fresh Regiments of Europeans, but will content themselves with having for the present what exists. In time, I should hope that even these will be incorporated into the old Royal Army. I never could admire Mansfield's proposal to raise a large body of local troops with a view to employing the unattached officers. Make use of these officers in any way you like, and doubtless you will find plenty of occupation for them in various ways, but, for God's sake, don't raise men to form new corps in order to appoint these officers to them. Yet such are the suggestions made. It will be fortunate if this danger is escaped by the present mutinous spirit as evinced by all the Local Europeans. . . .'

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'SIMLA, 12 *June* 1859.

'. . . I have little to communicate since the last mail went out. The troops remain perfectly quiet everywhere in expectation of the orders of Government, which will now be published very shortly, conceding discharge to such men who enlisted to serve the Company, but decline the transfer to the immediate service of the Crown. The Governor-General, on the other hand, in conformity with the Act of Parliament will not attempt to attract the men to stay by

the offer of bounty. They are to take their discharge or not, but will not be *requested* to stay. I think that this is the best way out of a very disagreeable difficulty, and that to a certain extent the dignity of authority is thus saved. I take the liberty of enclosing for Y.R.H.'s consideration a copy of the confidential instructions sent to General Officers commanding Divisions in anticipation of the orders of Government.

'Y.R.H. will observe that immediate measures are put in execution for rendering the Troops and Batteries of Artillery effective, as we cannot afford to have our guns inefficient for want of gunners.

'As to the Cavalry and Infantry, excepting the inconvenience and expense of parting with a good many men, thus causing the retention of one or two Battalions which might otherwise have gone to England, India will not suffer. But it is a great grief to me to reflect that any arrangement deemed expedient by Y.R.H. on account of the state of Europe, should be interfered with by the untoward occurrences which it has lately been my unpleasant duty to report to Your Royal Highness. . .'

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'SIMLA, 24 *June* 1859.

'I have the honour to inform Y.R.H. that nothing of importance has taken place in this country during the last fortnight.

'Y.R.H. will probably have heard from other sources that the Bengal European Army is not the only one of the local forces which has displayed a bad feeling with respect to the transfer question. The 3rd Madras Europeans at Jubblepore and another Regiment, the 2nd, I think, have both had their demonstration against transfer without consent. The former was beyond the control of its officers for two days, and the latter yielded to the exhortations of Lieutenant-General Beresford, after having gone the length of declining to cheer on Her Majesty's Birthday.

'The 1st Madras Fusiliers was the Regiment which first spoke out in this Presidency, in November last.

'In Bombay, we have as yet heard of misbehaviour only in a small body of Artillery. But all the best-written letters taking the Soldiers' side of the question have appeared in the local newspapers of that Presidency.

'I trust now to receive the Governor-General's orders in a very few days, which will set the whole matter at rest. . . .'

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'SIMLA, 10 *July* 1859.

'I believe I cannot do better than forward to Y.R.H. a copy of my last letter to Lord Canning, in which the exact

situation of the Local Army and the almost general secession of it are made clear.

'That part of the letter which relates to the declaration to be signed by the men on taking their discharge has been agreed to by the Governor-General. I am about, therefore, publishing a General Order in which I assure the men of my confident belief that in case of their re-enlistment hereafter, they will *not* be allowed to count their former service. In the meantime, I am obliged to call for volunteers from the Royal Infantry to restore the efficiency of the Field Artillery as soon as possible. Sanction for their eventual transfer must come from home. If that be given, I trust very sincerely that their bond for general service anywhere may not be interfered with. In the same manner, I venture to express my earnest hope that any recruits who may hereafter be sent out for the Local Army may be carefully attested for general service. I really do assure Y.R.H. that I think this of the most vital importance. All distinctions should be done away, and for the sake of our own Army, its discipline and efficiency, we cannot endure the recollection of the late combination of the British troops of the Bengal Army to remain without marking it with a stigma which can never be effaced.

'The most effectual mode of doing that is to prohibit any enlistment for the future except for general service, if H.M. Government still considers it expedient to maintain the Local Regiments after what has happened.

'With respect to these Local Regiments, if we except the Artillery, they certainly do not receive fair play. It has been quite impossible to find officers fitted to look after the new Cavalry and Infantry Regiments in the Local Army, and owing to the separation of the two Services it was out of my power to send Field Officers and Adjutants from our Line Regiments to organise the new Corps.

'All the reports of the various inspecting Generals are to the same effect, viz. that the officers who have been brought up with Sepoy Regiments are incompetent from their previous military education and habits to organise young British Battalions or Cavalry Regiments. Even in the old Regiments the men have not confidence in their officers. As an example I enclose for Y.R.H.'s perusal a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, H.M. 13th Regiment, by which it appears that an old soldier of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers travelled twelve miles to consult him, because he had no trust in his own Commanders.

'Altogether, the more the business of the Local Army is laid bare, the more evident does it become that the revolution commenced by the men in the assertion, as they believe, of their rights must be completed by authority from home, that discipline may be restored in the Army at large. Otherwise there will be no safety. This cannot be regarded too seriously, and I respectfully invite Y.R.H.'s most earnest attention to it.

'It is impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the present circumstances, or the danger to which the discipline of our own Regiments is exposed by the spectacle going on before them.'

LORD CLYDE TO LORD CANNING.

'SIMLA, 8 *July* 1859.

'I trust my long silence will not have surprised you; but in truth I have had nothing of importance to communicate, and I have accordingly waited for telegraphic reports of the number of men likely to take their discharge in consequence of your late order, before troubling you.

'It now appears that the Cavalry will go *en masse* excepting such men as were lately transferred from Her Majesty's Regiments. Of the old Regiments of Infantry, at least one half will go, and possibly even more. Of the new ones, I have as yet no reports; but it may, I imagine, be assumed that the bulk will take their departure. In the Artillery also, the move is very general, and I hear of from fifty to seventy gunners going from the various Troops and Field Batteries of which accounts have as yet reached me.

'Thus it appears that the combination, of which we have had so much evidence in intercepted correspondence, has borne its fruit, and that the men of the Local Army have been acting in concert throughout. In my mind, I must accuse the old soldiers of the Bengal Artillery of having been the prime movers and ringleaders in all this bad business. I can never forget the utter absence of information, the manner in which the officers have been hoodwinked, and how the non-commissioned officers have held aloof, giving no warning, uttering no hint, which might prepare their officers for what was impending. Even to the very last, there has been the same conduct. We now find Captains of Troops and Batteries quite surprised at the numbers which are leaving them. To me, the conduct of the old soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Bengal Artillery is by far the gravest part of the whole affair, and gives us the clearest evidence of the most deep-rooted and dangerous combination which I can possibly conceive. The general move of these misguided men, in consequence of Your Lordship's Order, seems to me to justify, in a remarkable manner, the prudence of the mild measures adopted in May; as it is pretty clear that, if violently dealt with, the combinations of the men must have resulted in open Mutiny, and armed resistance to authority in a dozen of our large stations at the same time. What might have been the effect on the country, I believe no man can tell. But that it would have been most disastrous, we may all be very sure.

'In the declaration, signed by the soldier on discharge, he certifies that thirty days have elapsed since he applied for discharge. I think it advisable that, as much as

possible, we should conform to usage, and that this period should not be shortened, while I hope Your Lordship will have agreed with me about the expediency of omitting the last two lines of the declaration, so as to prevent the men running away with the idea that they have only to show themselves to a Recruiting Sergeant at home to recover all the advantages of the Services they are now forfeiting. It is *just* possible that a good many men may change their minds when they have this matter put fairly before them.'

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'SIMLA, 9 *August* 1859.

'I have the honour to report to Y.R.H. that the movement of the discharged men of the Local European Army towards the various sea-ports has commenced. The first batch of 1200 men will embark at Calcutta about the 28th inst.

'The Volunteers from Her Majesty's Infantry Regiments to fill up the gaps in the Bengal Army have come forward with the utmost alacrity, and we need not fear for the efficiency of the Field Artillery.'

On the same date also, Sir William Mansfield, then Chief of the Staff in India, wrote to Lord de Grey and Ripon, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, the following letter, in which is set forth the case of the officers of the Local Army in India.

SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD TO THE EARL OF RIPON.

'SIMLA, 9 *August* 1859.

'In my last letter to you I adverted to the undercurrent of dissatisfaction which I believe to pervade the ranks of the officers of the Local Army in this country. This is showing itself in various modes, altho' the officers behave remarkably well, and themselves make no outward sign.

'There is hardly a newspaper in the country which is not calling on them to agitate, and the ruinous, mischievous discussion about rights, privileges, and positions which have been forfeited, or alleged to be forfeited, by the Services of the Company in consequence of their transfer to the Crown, is continued in the columns of the small Press daily and without ceasing.

'The small Press of India is little else than an organ of the various services, by the subscriptions of which it is altogether maintained. Therefore, altho' the officers may be unseen, we must consider that we are listening to their voices when we read the arguments and exciting articles which are every day put forth. The truth is that the uncertainty of the last two years, in which the officers of the Bengal Army have been placed, is too much for any man,

and therefore for any body of men, to bear with equanimity. They have seen one branch of their Service disappear after another. They are rocked by the waves of a revolution, and an Act of Parliament, designed to give peace, stirs up the depths still more. Every man feels himself to be absolutely powerless, to be the victim of a Legislature which attacks his career vitally; in short, that he is the victim of a revolution, as one of a class which, like the Red Indians of North America, is in the course of being improved off the face of the earth. It seems to me that, amid the debates of Parliament and the Royal Commission which have taken place in the internal regions of London, the real aspect of matters in India, as regards our own countrymen, has very much escaped observation. It is only when we come to work the thing, to adapt practically in execution, that we discover the proposition contained in the Clause of transfer, securing rights, privileges, etc. etc., to comprehend an impossible sequence.

'The very Act of transfer has swept away the so-called rights and privileges which it is declared shall be maintained in all their integrity. And this is the incontestable fact which is daily turned up in the course of our provisional administration out here, whether we are dealing with the private soldier or with the officers of the Local Forces.

'The arguments held by both classes are very much the same, that is, that their monopoly of all Offices, military and civil, political and administrative, has vanished at the very time Parliament has declared that all their rights and privileges shall be maintained. It is surely necessary that the state of things which has been glanced at should be remedied, and that a very considerable body of State Servants should be reassured as to their future fate, that they should know one thing or the other. When I came to Calcutta two years ago, the Sepoy Army having disappeared and the officers being without Regiments, I was asked, as was Lord Clyde, if the vacancies caused by the war, which were then very numerous, should be filled up or not? Both Lord Clyde and I were strongly against it, as, by leaving all the frightful gaps in the Indian Service unrestored, a great progress would have been made, without the lesion of any existing interests, towards amalgamation or absorption, or at all events the hands of Government would have been comparatively free. The ruling powers decided otherwise, and the Regimental Officers were again completed in strength or nearly so, and a flood of Cadets poured on the country to swell the numbers of a service nearly moribund, and which, it was evident, was about to undergo an operation worse than that of the stone at the hands of Parliament. That, however, cannot now be helped. What can be struck out for the future, by way of diminishing the ranks of the Regimental Officers who are occupied in the performance of any sort of duty excepting that of a Regiment?

'In the first place, I would strongly recommend that all India House military appointments should cease, at all events for the present.

'I would advise the adoption of H.R.H.'s plan to offer Ensigncies and Lieutenancies to a considerable number of the junior officers of the Local Army, in Her Majesty's Regiments. Thus without any Legislative enactments, and while you are engaged in framing your measures, a very large and practical absorption would take place, and what is very important, the numbers of the Local Indian Officers would be very greatly diminished by the process of time, and so untie the knots of the Parliamentary guarantee in a remarkable manner.

'I assure you I would not trouble you with my notions were I not cruelly alive to the extraordinary inconvenience, and perhaps worse, of the present situation in respect of the Officers of this Army, and that it is due to them, as well as to the State, that the conditions of revolutionary uncertainty in which they have now been for two years, should be brought to a close.'

It will be as well to complete the tale of the 'White Mutiny,' the name by which the disaffection of the Company's troops came to be known.

On 17 October 1859 Lord Clyde writes to the Duke to report the dispatch of certain units to Singapore for China. He also added that he had telegraphed to Calcutta to endeavour to stop the embarkation of the men who had accepted their discharges, were about to proceed home, and who, in the urgent stress for men for service in China, it was hoped, might be induced to re-engage for two years' war service.

It is an unedifying incident; but is eminently characteristic of the straits in which the military authorities are placed, and the remarkable methods to which British Governments are compelled to resort to obtain and maintain sufficient men under the voluntary system of service to defend the interests of the Empire.

Nor did the incident escape the notice of the Queen, for on 18 September 1859 Her Majesty writes from Balmoral to say that the arrangement for utilising the services of these discharged men of the Indian Local Army had caused her some surprise, and that she is 'curious to know' the Duke's opinion on the matter.

To this the Duke replied:—

TO THE QUEEN.

'NEWTON LODGE,
'BINGHAM, 21 *September* 1859.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—I have received Your letter of the 18th inst. returning me Lord Clyde's letters, and expressing some surprise at the measures proposed for reinforcing the troops in China from the discharged men of the Local Army of India, asking at the same time my opinion upon the measures. In reply, I beg to assure You that I feel quite as anxious about the effect of these measures as You are; but it was a choice of evils, and I could not oppose the arguments used in favour of what has been decided upon. I was present at the meeting of Lord Palmerston, Sir C. Wood, and Mr. Sidney Herbert when these proposals were fully and anxiously discussed. A great necessity had arisen for additional troops in China, we could not spare troops from home, hence they had to be drawn from India. About 10,000 men were to be sent home of discharged men from India at a great expense to the State, whilst our requirements were in an opposite direction. Valuable men were at hand. Were we justified in not making an effort to retain them, if possible? On the other hand, would discipline not suffer even more than it has done by the retention of these men on the very conditions they had all along demanded? Such were the strong arguments pro and con. A middle course was therefore looked for, and I think found, in calling upon the men not compromised by mutiny, but who had simply accepted their discharge when it was offered them by the Governor-General, to accept of a fresh engagement altogether into the Line on receiving a full bounty. The former services of these men are not to count. The men are therefore asked to do what they certainly intended doing for the most part after their return home, only they are asked to do this where the State most needs them, which is in the East, and their return home is thus saved. There is the further advantage in this plan, that it is another severe blow at the Local Army, which it virtually annihilates; another motive for accepting it. I therefore, after due consideration, was satisfied that, under the difficult circumstances of the case, it was the best thing that could be done, and hence my acceptance of it as the lesser evil of the two. So much has been left to the discretion of Lord Clyde and the Governor-General in the mode of carrying out the proposal, that I trust no mischief will result from it. As regards the men of the Local Army who had not taken their discharge, it was felt to be impossible, when making such an offer to the discharged men, to overlook the fact that they had not shared in the general dissatisfaction expressed by the local corps. To them, therefore

a boon was also to be granted; but not the bounty they had asked for, but a year or more of service, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief. Any men of these latter willing to enlist for general service, in contradistinction to local service, which was therefore constituting a fresh engagement altogether, were equally to receive a full bounty. It seems to me that by this means the object we have in view, in no longer localising the Army, will to a great extent be furthered; that the men, though obtaining what they have asked for, a bounty, will do so in either case on completely new conditions, very much to the advantage of the State, and that those men who are not willing to enter upon such fresh engagement have no right to complain, inasmuch as they are advantaged by the additional period of service granted to them. I trust, after this explanation, You will think I have acted wisely in the decision I have come to, in accordance with the strongly expressed wish of the Government. I feel extremely anxious as to the result; but I think the attempt to retain the men could not be altogether resisted, and has been made as little injurious to discipline as it was possible to make it under the circumstances.'

Those men who declined to re-enlist for active service in China, and preferred to claim their discharge, were permitted to return home, and were marched down country in detachments under strict military charge, and steps were taken so that they should not be brought in contact with the Queen's troops at stations they passed through.

The men who had elected to be transferred to the Queen's Service were permitted to reckon two years' service; that is, men who had enlisted for ten years were permitted to claim their discharge after eight years' service. This arrangement met with the deserved censure of Lord Clyde, who most truly pointed out that many of these men who were granted a 'sop' for merely continuing to serve in India under the Crown in place of the Company were undeserving of any consideration or reward, inasmuch as they had mostly remained in India merely to suit their own convenience. Moreover, they had been guilty of the unpardonable offence of being cognisant for months of the mutinous schemes of their comrades, and failed to acquaint their officers with the same. From information contained in the Duke's papers, it would seem that the worst offenders in this respect in the whole of the Company's Service were the N.C.O.'s and men of the Bengal Artillery, who had for

many months been thoroughly well aware of the serious spirit of mutiny abroad, and had without exception neglected to report the same to their officers.

It has been urged, in extenuation of the men's want of loyalty to their officers, that it was to some extent the outcome of the way in which they were habitually treated by them.

Among the Duke's papers are letters showing that in some corps at least there was a profound disbelief among the rank and file in their officers taking any steps to safeguard their interests. Some justification of such a belief is afforded by the complaint that many officers of the Local Army did not even take the trouble to enter a private soldier's 'war services,' 'wounds,' etc., in his 'small-book,' whereas in the Queen's Service the officers invariably did so.

Be the cause what it may, the fact remains that the officers of the Indian Local Army had got hopelessly out of touch with their N.C.O.'s and men.

The inevitable outcome of this deplorable state of affairs was the abolition of the Local Indian Army; and in the following letter to Lord Clyde the Duke expresses clearly his strongly formed conclusions on the subject, as well as the difficulties which he foresaw would have to be surmounted in overcoming the 'Indian' element. Happily, in this instance, the Duke's views eventually prevailed.

TO LORD CLYDE.

'HORSE GUARDS, *August* 17, 1859.

'I have to thank you for your letters of 12, 24 June from Simla, and I am happy to find from them that you think the Mutiny in the Local European Troops is gradually subsiding. At the same time I cannot disguise from you that I think this whole proceeding has given a severe shake to the general discipline of the Army, and that it will be necessary for you and the General Officers in command of Divisions under you to watch this subject with the greatest anxiety and care in order to prevent further or even more serious mischief. It appears to me that Colonel Mackenzie of the 92nd acted with great judgment and tact at Berhampore as regards the mutinous 5th Infantry. Do you not intend to inquire anxiously into the conduct of the Officers of these Regiments, who have behaved so ill, removing such as you find

unfit for service with European corps? I have done my best to put forward your opinion and that of Mansfield, and indeed of every officer who has had experience of late in India, as regards the absolute necessity for getting rid altogether of the Local European Army, but hitherto entirely without success. The prejudices of the Indian Court and Military Services are too powerfully represented in the Council of India to enable me, or any other military man, to cope with them. Governments, whatever their individual opinions may be, are equally forced to side with the Indian views, and all I have hitherto succeeded in obtaining is a sort of half-and-half promise that no more Local European Corps are to be raised than at present exist. This, at all events, is some considerable gain, and I hope by time and patience to succeed in carrying the whole question, but this will require time. The best thing now to be done, as it appears to me, is for you to move the Governor-General to adopt your views. If he does, and is backed by you in submitting his views home, I think it would be an immense step in the right direction and would tend greatly to carry out our project—the more so as I know both Lord Elphinstone and Sir Charles Trevelyan entirely share our views—so pray take the matter up seriously, and see what you can make of it. My opinion is that Regiments whose discipline has been once so seriously shaken as these have been, never can recover it altogether. The volunteering for the Line which you have ordered, I fully approve of. I now must refer to a subject concerning yourself. In a private letter written by you to myself you express a wish to be relieved from the important command you have so ably filled by the beginning of next year. It was my duty to submit that letter to Her Majesty and the Government. After anxious consideration of the selections to be made of a successor for so great and important a post, it has been decided that Sir Hugh Rose's claims for such command cannot be overlooked, and accordingly he will be the officer to command in chief the Armies of India. It is my intention to make a communication to Sir Hugh Rose informing him confidentially of what has been decided upon. Sir W. Mansfield is also an officer of whom the highest opinion is entertained by myself and all those who have the advantage of knowing him. As Sir H. Somerset's period of command will expire at the commencement of next year, it has been thought advisable to select Sir William Mansfield for the chief command of the Bombay Army, and I hope that this selection will be acceptable to you, who I know look upon Sir William as a valuable and personal friend, and one in whom you place the most complete confidence.

'It was not thought possible to prefer Sir William to Sir Hugh Rose, seeing the great services performed in India by the latter during a troublesome but most brilliant campaign; but I hope that the decision come to will be alike

agreeable and satisfactory to all parties, and will be of great benefit to the public service. It will be for you to decide upon the period at which you would desire to return to England, about which there can be no difficulty, as the several officers concerned in the change are all on the spot in India.

'News from Europe I have to-day none to give. Peace continues, but I do not think it is looked upon as very lasting.'

Both the Duke and Lord Clyde exchanged voluminous letters during the year 1859, mainly concerned with the difficult and delicate operation of settling the claims and arranging for the future of the British officers who had hitherto served the Company in various capacities and who were now, in many instances from no fault of their own, without employment and without prospects of employment.

On 17 August 1859 the Duke wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of State advocating the formation of a Staff Corps for India, in which he pointed out that many officers, who had been extra-regimentally employed in civil and military capacities, returned to their regiments with 'energies possibly on the decline.' Subsequently he pointed out that the great difficulty in the way of a satisfactory amalgamation of the Local Army in India and the Line, lay in the system of purchase and seniority, and that there were grave objections to the system of selecting officers above the rank of Major, which would destroy the regimental *esprit de corps* which hitherto had worked so admirably. 'The pushing officer and man of interest would be for ever attempting to bring himself to notice, the really hard-working and modest one would be neglected.' At the same time he recommended that the Line and the existing purchase system should be left intact, the Indian Army being admitted on the seniority system.

In his scheme for the formation of a Staff Corps, which was eventually adopted, the Duke proposed to take the Royal Engineers as a model, and appoint officers in the proportion of 1 Colonel to 2 Lieut.-Colonels and 2 Majors, 12 Captains and 24 Subalterns; a total of 41 for a 'unit'—and 'if more were wanted, say for example, 200, multiply by 5 and keep the relative rank and proportion.'

On 25 September he writes with reference to difficulties with local officers: '. . . No good can really be done till the Staff Corps is decided upon, which I have proposed.'

Lord Clyde having asked to be permitted to resign his command and return to England, Sir Hugh Rose (afterwards Lord Strathnairn) was nominated to succeed him, and on 17 August 1859 the Duke, writing to inform him of his promotion, says: '. . . All I hope is that you will communicate with me freely and confidentially on all matters connected with the service. You are aware that officially it will be always necessary to communicate through the Governor-General.'

At the same time Sir William Mansfield was appointed to the Bombay Command, and the Duke also wrote to him to the same effect.

These appointments, however, did not come into effect until many months afterwards, for, owing to the serious difficulties arising out of the conduct of the Company's Troops as already described in this chapter, Lord Canning made urgent representations to the Home Government that Lord Clyde's services should be retained for a time in India.

In consequence of this H.R.H. wrote:—

TO MR. SIDNEY HERBERT.

'HORSE GUARDS, 26 *December* 1859.

'. . . On principle I am strongly opposed to making any change on what once has been decided upon, and the difficulty is considerably increased by the distance from which the instructions are asked and answers have to be given. But as Lord Canning dwells so strongly upon the necessity and advantage to the public service by retaining Lord Clyde for some time longer in Chief Command in India, I do not feel justified in opposing myself to what he asks, and I should be sorry to take upon myself the responsibility of objecting to a wish so strongly expressed. Under these circumstances I propose as follows: That I should be authorised to write to Lord Clyde and Sir Hugh Rose by to-morrow's mail.

'1. That Lord Clyde should, for the present, retain his command in India at the express request of Lord Canning;

'2. That Sir Hugh Rose should take the command of the Bombay Army on the 1 April, on which day that command is to be relinquished by Sir H. Somerset, but that it is clearly understood that this is only a temporary arrangement, and

that Sir Hugh Rose will, as originally intended, succeed Lord Clyde in the Chief Command in India on his, Lord Clyde's, relinquishing that command;

'3. That Sir Hope Grant will, as ordered, go to China in Chief Command; and

'4. That Sir William Mansfield will go to China as directed as second in Command.

'You will observe Sir C. Wood sanctions this arrangement if it is satisfactory to you. . . .'

That opposition to the complete amalgamation of Imperial and Local Indian armies should be met with in some quarters was of course a foregone conclusion; and that some bitterness should be engendered, was perhaps natural, as the following letter from Sir William to the Duke shows:—

FROM SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.

'BOMBAY, 13 *May* 1860.

'I have the honour to trouble Y.R.H. with a few lines, because at the eleventh hour I have managed to obtain a hasty perusal of Sir J. Outram's Minute, in which he protests against any scheme of amalgamation between the two Services of Her Majesty now constituting the Armies of India. I very much regret that my absence from Lord Clyde's head-quarters has prevented my seeing this protest until now. Had I time to take it to pieces I am sure it would have been in my power to give a satisfactory reply on every particular, viz. of finance, the general question of efficiency, and the temper of the Army. Altho' the post is at this moment going out, I would most respectfully bring before Y.R.H. that when Sir James Outram taunts the officers of H.M. Service with unfitness for the business of India, he has forgotten to mention that till 1854 those officers were rigidly shut out of all employment in India by the close monopoly of the Company's administration. It follows therefore that a class of officers who, except on the day of battle, were studiously excluded from employment, could not at that time be fit for such employment. But the experience of the last six years, more particularly of the last three, when the Bengal Government in its need was perforce of circumstances obliged to come and ask assistance of the Line, has shown, as could not but be expected, that the door of important employment had only to be placed ajar for H.M. Officers, for their fitness to become evident for any duty that could be proposed for them, when the time demanded for local education had elapsed.

'They certainly have not been slow to take advantage of the opening and to prepare themselves for their new duties, and the fact of their creeping from one employment to another, so jealously noticed by Sir J. Outram, shows how they have

been appreciated by the Local Government, altho' the latter has no unnatural leaning to the Local Services.

'But I would venture to take much broader ground and to dwell on the danger of class interests. The very existence of Party and Local spirit displayed in Sir J. Outram, who has, as it were, constituted himself a class leader, shows how dangerous it is for the interests of H.M.'s services, that two distinct classes should be allowed to have an existence in H.M.'s Armies. It is, I am sure, quite idle to maintain that there is any particular advantage to be gained by keeping up a special Service on account of *its presumed love* for India. That *love* for India is a fiction, and has no reality. I observe that there are but two considerations which retain the Local Officers in India, present employment and prospective pension. All other motives have but an existence in the fancy of those who allege them in a statement of a case. However the Army may be constituted for Colonial and Provincial Services, we shall find the same motives at work, and I firmly believe, after the warnings we have had on the danger to the loyalty of local forces, when it is tried by unusual circumstances, that we should omit no means by which the healthy association between England and H.M.'s *English* forces may be preserved for the good of H.M.'s Service.

'I have time to write no more, and I must ask Y.R.H.'s pardon for this very hasty, and, I fear, obtrusive letter, which has been prompted only by the strongest sense of duty. If you should wish to answer Sir J. Outram more in detail, would Y.R.H. give a gracious command that a Copy of his Minute may be sent to me?'

TO SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.

'HORSE GUARDS, 18 *June* 1860.

'I have received your letter of 13 May, and am extremely obliged to you for the valuable information contained in it on Sir James Outram's very disagreeable Minute. We should have been very glad to have had a reply to it from yourself, but as the question of amalgamation of the Armies of India with those of the Line have been so far decided upon, as that they have been brought before Parliament by Sir Charles Wood for debate and decision, I fear that it would be too late to call upon you for further reply to the opinions expressed by the advocates of a Local Army. Anything more monstrous than this report of Sir James Outram I never did read, and I think it evinces an animus which I certainly did not expect from that quarter. The Government have now declared themselves for amalgamation, and thus far the matter is settled; but I fear they will have rather a severe struggle in the House of Commons, where the Indian element is very powerful, which is backed by so much Indian authority, and recently again by a very strong minute from Lord

Canning which has astonished me a good deal, as I had hoped he had latterly taken a more correct view of the state of the case. Still I trust all will end well, and that we shall have a united Army on sound military principles, ready to do everything and go everywhere without narrow feelings of jealousy and distrust. I am glad to find that all difficulties in India have been got over, that Rose had proceeded to Calcutta, that you are placed in orders at Bombay, and that Lord Clyde is on his way home. On his return he will find himself appointed to the Coldstream Guards, in succession to poor Lord Strafford, who is just dead. I shall probably hear from you by the next mail, at which time I think you must have assumed command, and will keep you informed of the progress of the Local Army question through the House.'

It has been necessary to enter into this question of Lord Clyde's retention in India and the consequent delay in carrying out the various new arrangements in that country, since they are interwoven with the events dealt with in the following chapter, namely, the China Expedition of 1860.

CHAPTER XII

CHINA—1860

Events in China, 1857-59. Destruction of Chinese War Junks, 1 June 1857. Bombardment and Occupation of Canton. The Mission to Pekin. Repulse of British Attack on Taku Forts, 1859. An Expedition decided upon. The Emperor Napoleon co-operates. Sir Hope Grant and Sir William Mansfield. Sir William Mansfield objects to serve under Sir Hope Grant. Letters, H.R.H. to Sir William Mansfield. The Employment of a Chief of the Staff. Letter, H.R.H. to Queen Victoria. The Duke's Diary of the War. End of the Expedition. Letter, Secretary of State to H.R.H., November 1860. The Armstrong Batteries in China. Letter, Prince Albert to H.R.H.

THE Expedition against China, which had been temporarily abandoned in the summer of 1857 owing to the exigencies of the Mutiny, now once again occupied attention. Sundry minor operations in the meantime had been carried out.

On 1 June 1857 a British squadron under Sir Michael Seymour had destroyed the entire Chinese Fleet of war junks at Fatshan. The boat attack on this occasion was led by Commodore Keppel, subsequently the well-known Admiral of the Fleet Sir Harry Keppel, G.C.B., who died in 1904.

On 28 December 1857 a combined attack on Canton was commenced by the English and French, and the place was taken on 3 January 1858. The British force engaged consisted of Bluejackets and Marines, with the 59th Regiment and some native Indian Regiments, under the command of Sir Michael Seymour and Major-General Van Straubenzee. Lord Elgin, who had been dispatched as a special Ambassador to the Far East, had in the first instance announced his intention of going to Pekin so as to communicate directly with the Chinese Emperor. However, for reasons unnecessary to enter upon here, he concluded a treaty with the Chinese at Tien-Tsin, which, in the ultimate issue, had but little

effect. One clause of the treaty, and the one to which England attached supreme importance, was the right to send a mission to Pekin. But upon our newly appointed Minister to China, Sir Frederick Bruce, attempting in 1859 to enter the Peiho on his way to take up his residence at Pekin, he was fired on by the Taku Forts at the entrance of the river. The British Admiral, Sir James Hope, thereupon landed a number of Bluejackets and Marines, and attempted to capture a fort on the south bank, but the attack was repulsed with a loss to us of several gunboats sunk and about 500 of our force killed and wounded. This disaster to our arms of course made war inevitable; and, as the cessation of hostilities in India permitted of the drafting of troops from that country, an Expeditionary Force to punish the Chinese for their treachery and to enforce the conditions of the Treaty of Tien-Tsin was decided upon.

Lord Elgin was again sent out, but on this occasion he was to be accompanied by an adequate military force, which the Government decided should be mainly dispatched from India.

The Emperor Napoleon was anxious to take a share in the operations; and it was arranged that he should send out a force under General De Montauban to co-operate with the British troops. The Duke nominated for the high post of Commander-in-Chief of the Expedition, Major-General Sir Hope Grant, who had proved himself a most successful commander in the field in India, and who had already seen service in China.

The following is the first intimation which reached India of this appointment:—

TO LORD CLYDE.

'H. GUARDS, 18 *Sept.* 1859.

'I think it is not improbable that Sir Hope Grant may be selected for the expeditionary Command, he having already on a former occasion served in China, and being a very prudent and able officer; but you had better not name this until you hear further from me.'

On 17 October the Duke writes: 'Grant will be made

a local Lieut.-General so as to give him the command of all the troops in China, including those under Straubenzee.'

Lord Wolseley, in his *Story of a Soldier's Life*, states that both Lord Clyde and Lord Canning were anxious for Sir William Mansfield to be given this command.

From the Duke's correspondence it is clear that Lord Canning, the Governor-General, objected to Sir Hope Grant's appointment on the grounds that Sir Hope was not accustomed to co-operate with foreign troops, and that he was unacquainted with the French language. In a letter to H.R.H. of 16 November 1859, Lord Clyde mentions that:—

'Lord Canning has expressed his intention by the mail to apply to the Home Government with a view of retaining me here for the present, and that he would propose the following plan, viz.—That Sir William Mansfield should go to the Chinese Expedition, Sir Hugh Rose to have Bombay till I embark, and Sir Hope Grant to keep his Division in Oudh until Sir Hugh Rose should succeed me.'

(Sir Hope Grant then to have Bombay.)

The reader may remember that it had been settled that Lord Clyde should vacate his post as Commander-in-Chief in India at the end of 1859, and that he was to be succeeded by Sir Hugh Rose.

Lord Canning's nominee, Sir William Mansfield, had been Chief of the Staff to Lord Clyde during the Mutiny. He was unquestionably a very able man with a notable gift for administration, and more especially for all details connected with finance. In after years he became Commander-in-Chief in India, and was created Lord Sandhurst. He was extremely short-sighted, a defect which rendered his employment as a General in the field at least open to question, whilst his unpopularity with a large majority of the Army is a matter of notoriety to this day. After some correspondence Sir Hope Grant was finally approved, and the Duke, writing to Lord Clyde on 10 December 1859, after referring to Lord Canning's objections to Sir Hope, announces that Sir William Mansfield is to be sent to China as second in command under that General.

Even then the vexed question as to the Command in

China does not seem to have been officially settled. For it was not till 26 December 1859 that the Duke wrote to Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, to inform him that the above arrangement had received the approval of the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Sidney Herbert), and that it was his intention to notify Lord Clyde of the same.

To this on the following day, 27 December, Sir C. Wood writes in reply:—'. . . I think Y.R.H. has come to the right decision. I entirely concur in the view that Lord Clyde should remain only temporarily.' On the same day H.R.H. wrote to Lord Clyde: 'Sir Hope Grant will go to China as ordered in Chief Command. Sir William Mansfield will go to China as second in command in accordance with former directions.'

It was now that an unexpected complication arose, for Sir William Mansfield, although Sir Hope Grant's junior in the British Army, had for nearly two years, by virtue of his 'local' rank, been his senior officer in India; and being a man of great ambition, and imbued with no little belief in his own capabilities, he now objected to 'reverting to his permanent grade' and going to China as Sir Hope Grant's junior, and requested not to be sent at all!

It is both instructive and noteworthy to see how, as is evidenced by the case of Sir W. Mansfield, the practice of departing from the well-understood rules of 'seniority,' and giving officers local, temporary, or other fictitious ranks, more usually than otherwise eventually results in confusion and to the prejudice of the service. Frequently the reasons which prompt a Commander to thus depart from the ordinary procedure and to give special local rank to some favoured individual may appear to be admirable. Yet the inevitable irregularity and uncertainty thus produced more often than not leads to grave complications, and at times even to disaster.

Lord Clyde writes to the Duke about ten days later on the same subject:—

FROM LORD CLYDE.

'Camp Phugwara, *January* 31, 1860.

'With regard to the matter of Sir William Mansfield, I

will mention for Y.R.H.'s information exactly what occurred between myself and the Governor-General.

'When His Excellency heard from home that Sir Hope Grant was to go in Command of the China Expedition he sent for me, and of his own accord pointed out that the officer in command would come in contact with an allied French force, and that no inconsiderable amount of diplomatic experience would be required in order to keep his position such as England would expect it to be. While making this remark, Lord Canning suggested Sir William Mansfield in place of Sir Hope Grant as having more diplomatic experience. I think, and I expressed my opinion to Lord Canning, that as far as handling his troops in the field before an enemy, Sir Hope Grant was quite at home.

'Now the official offer of being second in command under Sir Hope Grant has reached Sir William Mansfield as well as a letter from Y.R.H. to him, which he will of course answer. Before the latter arrived he had already declined the appointment, to my great regret. I gave him my advice to accept it, but I need not set forth his reasons for taking an opposite line: no doubt he will do that himself.

'Y.R.H. will perceive from this statement that I was consulted by Lord Canning, and that I could not do otherwise than give my honest opinion, that of the two I considered Sir William Mansfield to be the best suited for *this particular* service, as the war was to be carried on in conjunction with the French, and as this proximity would require delicate treatment of many questions which might arise between the two allied Generals, so as to avoid any disagreeable collision of opinion, and yet not to give the French General too much of his own way, and thus in any respect to allow the British to be placed in an inferior position; for managing such discussions Sir William Mansfield's power of writing and speaking French would be found very serviceable. In every other qualification, excepting that of diplomacy, in which he has had no practice, I consider Sir Hope Grant one of the best officers we have, and he has always been successful wherever employed in command, besides being extremely popular with those under him.'

Sir William Mansfield's protest to the Governor-General, written on 24 January 1860, was at great length; and in the course of it he alluded to the position which he had occupied as Chief of the Staff to Lord Clyde during the Mutiny, in which capacity he had often come to the assistance of Sir Hope Grant, and on his own responsibility elucidated orders which the latter had received. But the arrangement now proposed entirely reversed their respective positions, Sir William Mansfield, by virtue of his local rank, having origi-

nally been senior to Sir Hope Grant in the Mutiny campaign; and although the most friendly ties subsisted between them, Sir William Mansfield held that the trial was too great a one for any two men to bear, and that the public service might suffer in consequence.

Sir William Mansfield also wrote to the Commander-in-Chief three days later, stating that he was about to proceed to Bombay to await the commands of H.R.H. as to whether he was to remain in Bombay or embark to China.

To this letter the Duke replied to Bombay as follows:—

TO SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.

'HORSE GUARDS, 19 *March* 1860.

'. . . After carefully considering the contents of your letter and the whole circumstances of the case, and after having been in communication with Her Majesty's Government, I have come to the conclusion that it would *now not* be desirable for you to proceed to China; but I must request of you to wait at Bombay till you can take up the Command-in-Chief of that Presidency at present temporarily held by Sir Hugh Rose. The mode in which this will I hope be speedily effected is as follows. I have written to Lord Clyde by this post to request him to return to Europe as soon as possible after the departure of the China Expedition. This I apprehend will have sailed before this post reaches him, and I trust there will therefore be little or no delay in his departure from India. The moment he starts Sir Hugh Rose will at once move up to Bengal to take up the Chief Command in India, and this will leave the Bombay Chief Command at once open for you. . . .'

Having thus made arrangements satisfactory to all parties, the Duke proceeds to give Sir William Mansfield his views on his recent conduct, which will probably be cordially endorsed by all level-headed soldiers.

'. . . With reference to your refusal of the post of second in command of the China force, all I can say is that I make no doubt you acted for the best. I cannot think that the difficulties of the relative position between yourself and Sir Hope Grant would have been so great as you seem to have imagined. No doubt there was a certain degree of delicacy in the matter, but when both parties were on the best terms and had merely thought of the good of the service, I cannot but suppose that these difficulties would never have arisen, or had they arisen would have been easily overcome by a

little tact and judgment on both sides, for which I give both yourself and Sir Hope Grant the fullest credit. . . .'

Events proved that the Duke was thoroughly justified in his determined advocacy of Sir Hope Grant, and in fact no better selection could have been made. Lord Wolseley, who served as a D.A.Q.M.G. on Sir Hope Grant's Staff throughout the campaign, in his *Story of a Soldier's Life* bears eloquent testimony on this point, and sums up as follows:—

'In all the military history of our country, I do not know of a campaign that was better planned or more successfully brought to a conclusion than that which Sir Hope Grant conducted in China in 1860. . . .

'. . . I sincerely hope that every war we shall have forced upon us may be as ably planned and as well carried out.'

Several letters passed at this period between the Queen and H.R.H. with reference to the forthcoming expedition. Writing to Her Majesty on 19 March, the Duke says:—

'. . . As regards the expedition to China, I hope you will support me in my anxiety to make it as powerful and complete as possible. No half-measures should now be resorted to; we want at least 10,000 men for the field, with a reserve of 5000 men to occupy Hong Kong and Canton. . . . I presume that you have been informed that it is proposed to give the command of the expedition to Sir Hope Grant, who was in China with Lord Saltoun, and who has proved himself a most able and accomplished officer in the field in the recent Campaigns in India.'

During the early months of 1860 there was naturally much correspondence between the Horse Guards and the War Office with regard to the preparations for China. The vexed question of a Chief of the Staff again cropped up. The Duke's dislike to the appointment has been already stated, and in a letter written about this time he mentions that it had been found to be 'not a success in Persia.' Mr. Sidney Herbert on 2 April writes:—'A Chief of the Staff is a luxury not wanted for 10,000 men.' This decided the matter so far as the China campaign was concerned.

That before coming to this decision there had been considerable discussion of the subject is evidenced by the following letter:—

SIR EDWARD LUGARD[1] TO MR. HERBERT.

'*Wednesday*, 5 *April* 1860.

'. . . There is no occasion for such an appointment; from my own experience of Chief of the Staff in Persia, and from what I saw of the great inconvenience of such an appointment in India. If the General Officer were Minister or political officer also, he might want the assistance of an officer of rank to whom he could entrust the military details of the force, as was the case in Persia with Sir James Outram and me, but even then I found that it interfered with the legitimate duties of the Adjutant and Quartermaster Generals and did not work well; but in the case of General Mansfield it was worse than useless and often led to serious inconvenience and caused great confusion, and was very objectionable in many ways. Orders were given by the Chief of the Staff and counter orders by the General; decisions given by the Chief of the Staff were not confirmed by the General, and explanations had to be given most detrimental to the public service! I narrowly watched the working of the system in consequence of what I had experienced myself in Persia, and I do not hesitate to state that it complicated the work without one redeeming advantage.

'If a General cannot command his force with the aid of his Adjutant and Quartermaster General, and with any advice he may require from the other General Officers under him, he is unfit for the position. All extraneous work is done by the Military Secretary, all departmental detail by the heads of departments, and an officer interfering between these and the General is simply an obstruction, an extra wheel to the machine, which only impedes.

'I am sure that Pakenham, who has just returned from India, and with whom I often talked the subject over during the Campaign, will tell you the same. It may be convenient for a General Officer to have a Chief of his Staff as (in some cases) saving him trouble and annoyance, but I defy anybody to say that it does not interfere with and complicate the work of the Adjutant and Quartermaster General. I consider that in the field it is of vital importance that the chief of each department should personally communicate with and report to the General (the Principal Medico and the commissaries, etc., etc.), and not through a Chief of the Staff.

'From what you observed to me I think it right to trouble you with all this explanation.'

The following account of the operations in China is taken *verbatim* from the Duke's own Diary:—

EXPEDITION TO CHINA, 1860.

'The uncomfortable state of our relations with China

[1] Secretary for Military Correspondence. The post was abolished in 1861.

became further more embarrassed by a failure on our part in a naval attack on the Taku Forts by our Fleet under Admiral Hope in the spring of 1859. The Governments of England and France thereupon resolved to chastise the Celestial Empire for its breach of faith in not carrying out the Treaty signed by Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, which was the immediate cause of the attack of the Forts by the Admiral, the Chinese having refused to comply with the main stipulation of the Treaty authorising the Allied Ministers to ascend the River Peiho *en route* to Pekin.

'Hereupon early in 1860 a great expedition, both by land and sea, was prepared by the two Governments, our land forces being placed under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Hope Grant, the French force being under the orders of the General of Division Montauban. Admiral Hope continued as the head of the Fleet.

'Our troops were for the most part sent out from India, with some additions from home, and reached their destination in the months of March and April 1860, concentrating at Hong Kong and Canton, where the expedition was in the first instance prepared and formed.

'The troops consisted of two Squadrons 1st King's Dragoon Guards, Fane's and Probyn's Irregular Sikh Horse, 1st Royals, 2nd Batt. 2nd Foot, 1st Batt. 3rd Foot, 1st Batt. 31st, 44th, 60th Rifles, 2nd Batt. 67th, 87th, 99th Regiments, Marines, 8 Batteries of Artillery, of which two Armstrong Batteries, several Regiments of Native Indian Regiments, etc., in all about 10,000 men, well equipped and prepared in every respect. The French force did not much exceed 5000 men.

'After leaving a force at Canton and Hong Kong, and securing Chasan and Shanghai, threatened as this latter was by the rebels, the troops, after much delay on account of the want of preparation on the part of the French, at length moved up to the north and disembarked to the north of Peh Tang river without opposition on 2 August, occupying the forts that are at its mouth. On this, 12 August, an advance was made towards the interior, or rather towards the Taku Forts. Fighting took place on that day and the 14th, and on the 21st the North Fort was stormed by the allied troops and taken after a sharp struggle, the other Forts surrendering in that and the following day. Thus the Peiho River with its defence was turned, and the disaster of the previous year was retrieved. The success of the Armstrong guns, of which there were two Batteries in China, was most complete on these occasions, in which they were brought into action and worked in every sort of position. Of course amendment and improvement is still needed, but the principle upon which it is constructed is sound, and time will make out the various details.

'It was hoped that a peace would, after these signal successes, be speedily signed. The usual treachery of the

The Dining Room at Gloucester House
1860 – 1904

Chinese Government and authorities, however, became soon apparent, and the negotiations already begun had to be broken off, when on 8 September a general advance upon Pekin was decided upon. The last accounts reach up to 24 September, at which period a trap had been laid for our troops, which, however, had ended in the taking prisoners of Messrs. Parkes (Commissioner), Bowlby (*Times* correspondent), Loch, and De Norman, attached to Mission, and Major Brabazon, Royal Artillery, also some French, and in the defeat of the Chinese force which attempted to oppose our advance upon the capital in two engagements on the 18th and 20th, with the loss to the enemy of upwards of one hundred guns. As far as it had been then ascertained the prisoners were well treated, but great anxiety is naturally felt on their account, both on the spot and at home. Lord Elgin had threatened to sack Pekin should any injury be done to these unfortunate gentlemen.

'*December* 15.—A telegram has arrived *via* Russia stating that peace had been signed with China, that the rest of the prisoners have all died, and that the Army evacuated Pekin on 9 November. Heavy indemnities in money are said to have been granted. Of course we know as yet of no particulars.

December 28.—Major Anson, A.D.C. to Sir Hope Grant, and Mr. Loch arrived last night with the China Dispatches. I saw the former to-day, and he gave me many most interesting details connected with the operations. Peace was signed on 25 October, and the ratifications were to be immediately exchanged. The leading features of the peace are, apology for the outrage of the preceding year at the Taku Forts, opening of trade, indemnity of 8 million Taels, cession of Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, to Great Britain, certain points of Chinese territory to be occupied till the stipulations as regards indemnity, etc., are complied with. Previous to this Treaty being signed, the Emperor's Summer Palace was entirely destroyed by the British force as an act of retribution for the outrages committed on our unfortunate fellow-countrymen. This had the desired effect and hastened on the signature of the Treaty. The bodies of De Norman, Anderson, and Bowlby, also of the Dragoon Philips and of the Sikhs, were brought in and buried with great military honours. Pekin was to be evacuated on 9 November; the force destined to occupy Tien Tsin and the Taku Forts for the winter was to consist of 31st, 60th Rifles and 67th Regiments, Fane's Native Horse, and some Batteries of Artillery. The 44th are to go to Hong Kong, the 99th to Canton, the Marines to Shanghai. The 1st Royals, 2nd, 3rd and 87th are to return home direct, also several Batteries of Artillery. The King's Dragoon Guards, Probyn's Horse, and other Native Troops are to return to India.'

Upon the news of the capture of the Taku Forts and the complete collapse of the Chinese defence, the Secretary of State for War wrote as follows to the Commander-in-Chief:—

FROM MR. SIDNEY HERBERT.

'WILTON, 3 *November* 1860.

'I must write a few lines by the messenger who goes up to-morrow morning to congratulate Y.R.H. on the brilliant and decisive success of the operations in China.

'I have asked Sir E. Lugard to send you a private letter I have received from Sir Hope Grant, the enclosures in which show how completely the success is owing to his sagacity and firmness. He assumed a serious responsibility, justly relying on his own military skill, and the result has shown how right he was.

'The first trial of the Armstrong Guns under circumstances of unusual difficulty is also a great and most satisfactory success.

'All arms and all services, non-combatant as well as combatant, have shown themselves fully equal to their work, and Y.R.H. has reason to be proud of the force which has achieved this decisive result. . . .'

The news of the complete success of our arms having been thus received, the Duke sent to the Secretary of State for instructions as to whether a *feu-de-joie* should be fired from the guns in the Tower and the Park.

Lord Palmerston's letter on the subject sheds an amusing light on the technical difficulties which beset the path of the Prime Minister of a Constitutional country such as ours, and further, of the fine border-line between 'Peace' and 'War' which at times separates all communities living in a high state of civilisation when engaged in enforcing their will upon others which live under widely different conditions, and who cannot be said to be capable of exercising the powers of government.

FROM LORD PALMERSTON.

'94 PICCADILLY, 4 *November* 1860.

'Mr. Herbert's Private Secretary came to me this evening at the desire of Y.R.H. to ask whether I thought that the Park and Tower guns ought to be fired to-morrow in honour of the capture of the Forts at Taku.

'I am inclined to think that it might be as well not to fire the guns, because we are not in fact regularly at war with China, and are on the contrary carrying on peaceful relations with all the Ports south of the Peiho—we and the French are only exerting a *friendly pressure* to obtain the exchanges of the ratification of a treaty which was concluded a year and a half ago.'

Lord Palmerston, however, on reconsidering the matter wrote again.

FROM LORD PALMERSTON.

'94 PICCADILLY, 5 *Nov.* 1860.

'Upon thinking again of the question put to me last night, I am inclined to think that, as an extraordinary gazette is to be published of the capture of the Taku Forts, and as the French Government will probably make the most of their *Glory*, it will be best that our guns should be fired upon this occasion and probably at twelve o'clock to-day.'

Among the lessons from the war were the results obtained by the new Armstrong gun, of which two Batteries had been sent out to be tested on service. In view of the enormous strides since made in the science of gun construction, it seems difficult to realise that in the 'fifties' the bulk of the artillery of all the European Powers was still smooth-bore muzzle-loaders, constructed on identically the same principles as had been in use for several centuries. The Duke, on receiving the reports of the behaviour of the new guns in China, forwarded them to the Queen, and received the following reply from Prince Albert:—

FROM PRINCE ALBERT.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 30 *Nov.* 1860.

'I return the Report on the behaviour of the Armstrong Guns in China. They are on the whole very satisfactory.

'The Gun itself seems perfect.

'The traversing screw, against which a prejudice had been raised by some Artillerymen, has proved most useful and ought on no account to be abandoned—in the same manner the minute scientific sight. Both are independent of the general use of the gun.

'The improvement of the vent piece has, I believe, already been suggested here. Lancaster showed me a plan likely to obviate the difficulty; the Prussian plan is also very good in this respect.

'The trail, which is objected to, I believe has already been superseded at home by the block trail of the old pattern.

'The Time fuses seem to have failed in China and will require a revision; they are too important to be left in their present condition.

'The defect in the shells, which seem to have burst unequally, is probably owing to the bursting charge, and might easily be remedied.

'The next defect for field service is the weight of the wagon, which I trust will be altered at once. The suggestions of the officers out there seem very judicious.

'You can communicate these lines to Mr. S. Herbert.'

CHAPTER XIII

THE STRENGTH AND ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY—1858-1863

Struggles to prevent Reductions in Peace Time. The Need of an Army of Reserve. The Inadequacy of the Reserve of Pensioners. Objection to Localising Corps. The Depôt System—Lord Panmure's Letter. H.R.H.'s Memos. on Depôts, 1860. Memo. on Depôt Battalions, 1860. Difficulties with France: Lord Cowley's Warning. Lord Panmure's Letter. The Royal Commission on National Defence, 1859. The Defence Committee, 1859. Grave Deficiency of Men, 1860. Memo. of H.R.H. on same to Secretary of State. Dangerous State of Weakness at Home. Renewed Difficulties with France in 1861. The Question of Coast Defence. Letter to Sir George Cornewall Lewis. The Revival of the Volunteer Movement. H.R.H.'s Views on Volunteer Organisation, 1859. Annual Field Days for Volunteers. The Duke's strong Objection to Paying Volunteers. Letter to Sir George C. Lewis, and reply on proposals for 1863-64.

A PERIOD of peace having again ensued, the Duke of Cambridge, like his predecessors, was once more engaged in attempting to preserve the Army from wholesale destruction and in endeavouring to improve its still faulty organisation. There can be no question that after the close of the Crimean and Mutiny Campaigns, the Army had again relapsed into a dangerously weak condition; and, as in the three years which have now elapsed since the close of the South African War, a class of critic arose who demanded reduction, believing in their ignorance that war on a large scale was never likely to occur again, at any rate so far as this country was concerned.

Reduction and consequent economy is ever a popular measure after the close of a great war. It is in fact the inevitable reaction after a period of great excitement; and as, during the continuation of a big war taxes must necessarily be high, it is only natural that a people should desire

and expect reduction when the blessings of peace are once more restored. The Government of the day is of course sorely tempted to give way to popular clamour; and in such cases it becomes the duty of the military representatives to impress upon Ministers, in the strongest manner, the extreme danger involved in pursuing such a course. The Duke throughout his career was by no means backward in impressing this precept; and on each successive Secretary of State, at the 'estimates' period, he lost no opportunity of emphasising the military requirements of the day.

We have seen how, in the early fifties, he had agitated for a better and more modern organisation, and how, during the period of which we are speaking, some necessary reforms had in fact been effected, largely owing to his unceasing efforts. But much still remained in an unsatisfactory condition; and the recent wars had demonstrated, amongst other things, the urgent need of an adequate reserve.

How imperfectly the idea of a reserve was then realised is well shown by the proposal that pensioners would suffice for the purpose, a delusion which the Duke at once dispelled. In the following memorandum he also points out the disadvantages of a territorial system of enlistment; and he shows the difficulty, which has since been felt, of approximating the large and small recruiting areas. But this is again evidence that H.R.H. had carefully considered these problems in all their bearings long before they came within the scope of practical politics.

MEMO. ON ARMY OF RESERVE, DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1859.

'I see no reason to object to the proposal made for taking men into the Army of Reserve who have been discharged by purchase, or for some modified physical defect, before completing their ten years' service. Some limit should, however, be fixed as to their length of service in the Army, say seven or five years, below which their services should not be accepted for the Reserve.

'There cannot be a doubt that the men should form a force to be engrafted upon the Army, and not be added to the Pensioner force. It is the Army that wants augmentation in time of pressure during war. The Pensioners should be made available as far as their physical powers will admit; but to be a Pensioner a man's constitution must be broken,

whereas the Reserve men are to be active men and quite fit for hard work. Besides, the men would no doubt prefer the feeling that they belonged to the active Army, and probably the connection with their own Regiment in which they have served will be most acceptable to them.

'The great difficulty that arises is how to drill these men when called out. The localising the Depôts is a plan to which I greatly object. In the first place it is impossible to carry it out, from the want of barrack accommodation in the various districts of the country, and it would take years, with a very large outlay, to build the barracks that would be required. In the next place, though no doubt there may be a considerable attraction to men of one locality serving together in the same corps, there is a great objection to it, especially in our Army, for the bad moral effect it may produce. We have many very unhealthy and bad stations for troops, as, for instance, Hong Kong and the West Indies. Regiments stationed there suffer greatly. A large call for recruits comes from these stations. The consequence will be a very bad moral effect produced in the locality where the Regiment is raised, and an utter inability to obtain men to complete such corps. In war an equally bad effect would be produced in the event of a Regiment being much cut up and requiring large drafts of men to complete. I have always understood that this effect during war was felt to be so unfavourable during the great wars of the Empire in France, that Napoleon gave up drawing Conscripts for Regiments from certain localities, and now the French Army, I understand, is replenished generally from the Conscripts from the entire country and not localised. Again, in voluntary enlistment such as ours, where the division of the country into districts is not known, and where no quarters are distributed according to population, there are many portions of the country which produce few, if any soldiers, whereas there are others, such as London and Liverpool and the manufacturing districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire, where the great proportion of the Army is drawn.

'How, then, are these Regiments to be completed or kept up, not connected with these favourable localities for recruiting?

'Take for instance the Highland Regiments, some of our very best corps. It would be impossible to keep them up if they were to be recruited from local connection only, there being a great many more Englishmen and Irishmen in these corps than Highlanders.

'Again, the feeling of partisanship engendered by local connection carried to any extent would be fatal to our system. It would produce the worst possible feelings between different corps, and the religious element, now so happily blended, would entail the most unfortunate results.

For these reasons I am strongly opposed to even an attempt being made at local connection, which, I further believe, would not at all add to the number of Reservists we at present enlist into the Army. I would therefore, as far as practicable, engraft the Reserve men on the Depôts at present existing, leaving to each their distinctive uniform and Regiment, and merely drilling them in bodies; and I would move some Depôt Battalions into certain central stations, where barracks would have to be provided or smaller ones increased.

'The district men would either have to be concentrated or drilled alone in smaller bodies under officers to be detached for this duty. The payment ought to be made by District Paymasters to be appointed.'

As regards the Depôt question alluded to in the above-quoted memorandum, the Duke on 4 January 1858 had addressed the following letter to Lord Panmure, the then Secretary of State for War.

TO LORD PANMURE.

'ST. JAMES', 4 *January* 1858.

'I send you herewith two memoranda which I have drawn up, the one on the subject of Artillery Organisation, the other on the organisation of the Depôt Battalions: the first of these two I have already discussed with you, and I believe your views coincided with mine to a great extent. I trust, therefore, you will have no difficulty in acceding to my proposals. With reference to the second, I think it is absolutely necessary to make some change in our present Depôt system, and I am convinced that what I now propose is far better than what we have at present. You will see my reasons for the change, and as it can be easily effected, I hope you will concur in my suggestions. We shall get into trouble, if we do not mind, with the large number of young officers we have at present with the Depôts; it is extremely difficult to look after them properly, and they get into very bad habits and are very unmanageable. When at Windsor I hinted the subject there, and I think no difficulty would be made in that quarter if you approve. Should you do so, the new plan should be adopted at once, commencing with the new Battalions, when these go abroad. I received your letter last night, and shall now act upon your sanction for the Mediterranean reliefs.'

On 10 May 1860, in writing to Mr. Sidney Herbert, who had in the meantime become Secretary of State, he expatiates more fully upon the subject and criticises the whole

Depôt system, pointing out many of the defects which our most recent military reformers have dwelt upon.

MEMO. FOR MR. HERBERT.—DEPÔT SYSTEM.

'HORSE GUARDS, 10 *May* 1860.

'I think it would be a great misfortune to make any change in the present Infantry organisation of the Army. In theory, no doubt, it is easy to make out that double or treble Battalions would work better, but in practice, the present uniform system in operation, every corps being worked as a single Battalion, is I think a very great advantage, and is, moreover, peculiarly adapted to our variegated service. It has been suggested that a modification might take place by withdrawing two Companies from the Service Companies and adding them to the Depôts, thus leaving the Service Companies at eight Companies and having Four Companies at the Depôt. In this case a consolidated Depôt Battalion would consist of three Regiments, thrown together under competent Field Officers as at present, instead of having Depôt Battalions of five or six Regiments thrown together, each Depôt of two Companies only. I am wholly opposed to this change, and for this simple reason, that I think in such an arrangement the *esprit de corps* of Regiments would be seriously interfered with. For with four Companies at the Depôt, officers and men would have to be stationed for very considerable periods at the Depôt; no less than twelve officers, of which four Captains and eight Subalterns, being permanently with the Depôt Companies, and these moreover serving under the command of an officer not belonging to the Regiment to which the Companies belong. A large amount of force both in officers and men would thus be wasted, for as to ever making a Depôt Battalion as efficient as a Regiment, that is out of the question, be it constituted as it may. Whereas by leaving the present Depôt system undisturbed, these consolidated Battalions are merely looked upon as schools of instruction through which officers and men pass prior to embarkation for their Regiments on Foreign or Colonial service; and as regards the men, prior to their joining their Headquarters at home. In fact, with the exception of one steady and well-selected Captain, who has charge of the Records and details of all descriptions, no officer or man should continue for more than a few months at the Depôt. Orders have just been given by me, directing that all Ensigns of Regiments at home should join at once their Service Companies, and that these Depôts should have three Lieutenants told off to them in preference to any Ensigns.

'Directions have also been given that, as far as practicable, all Regiments abroad shall have three Lieutenants at

their Depôts, and that the whole of the Ensigns shall be sent out when the period arrives for sending out the Drafts of Regiments.

'The real fact is, that though these Depôts are made as available as it is possible to make them, by consolidating them into Battalions, there is no doubt whatever, that excepting in cases of extreme emergency, they ought to be placed altogether out of the account of available force for defence. They constitute the unavoidable lumber of the Army; and the great object to be attained is to make them in every respect as efficient and as little objectionable as possible. This I believe to have been accomplished by the present system, where the Depôt, a non-effective force, is kept as low as possible, and the Regiments themselves are maintained up to their full strength both in officers and men. The uniformity of system now adopted for Indian, Colonial, and Home service is an immense advantage, and I should be indeed much indisposed to interfere with it. The whole system is daily improving and being consolidated, and I should therefore hope that no change would be attempted on it, as I feel the strongest conviction that, by adopting some judicious internal regulations which are at present being carried out, and by judicious handling, the present system will be found in the long run to work more smoothly and better in every respect than any other system that either has been tried before or that is likely to be devised.

'It is said that the present system may answer for Regiments on foreign service, but that when at home the Depôts of Regiments should join their respective corps and perform the home service as one body.

'This, however, is an erroneous view of the case. For, in the first place, Regiments are so short a time at home to what they are abroad that it is not worth while to change the whole system as constantly as would be found necessary if such a plan were adopted, and in the next place, the inconvenience of moving Depôts of Regiments about from place to place on home service at every change of quarters, is so great that it would be deplorable to revert to it again after the present system has been found, on experience, to answer so much better.

'No doubt all Depôts are distasteful to Commanding Officers of Regiments, but with a foreign and colonial service like ours it is impossible to do without them, and the present mode of dealing with Depôts is far less objectionable than any other that ever has been or that could be adopted.

'A system of second Battalions for all Regiments is advocated by many most experienced officers. But on consideration it will be found to be impracticable, and it can hardly lead to efficiency. For if carried out, one half of the Army would have to be at home, one half abroad, an amount of force for home service which the country would never stand,

and one which would inevitably again lead to some Depôt system whenever both the Battalions happened to be abroad at the same time. Besides, the home Battalion would always have more or less the character of a large Depôt, as all recruits and inefficient men would have to be borne on it, thus greatly impairing its efficiency as a corps, whereas now every Regiment is efficient, whether it be at home or abroad. In spite, therefore, of the prejudices of Commanding Officers, and the strong opinion of many very distinguished officers against the present Depôt system, it apears to be established on the best principles which, under the circumstances of the case, could be devised.'

The following memorandum presents a graphic picture of the Depôt system as it existed in 1860 as compared with that which was formerly in vogue:—

Memo. on Depôt Battalions.

'The old Depôt system was as follows:—Regiments were composed of ten Companies. When at home the whole were concentrated as one Battalion; when abroad six Companies formed the Service Companies, and *four* the *Depôt Companies* under one of the Regimental Majors. These Depôts were isolated and scattered all over the country in remote country quarters.

'The present system is quite different. All Regiments are composed of twelve Companies. Of these ten form the Service Companies both at home and abroad, and *two* form the *Depôt Companies* of the Regiment. These are always kept distinct, and are never supposed to be concentrated with the corps. The Two Company Depôts, however, of several Regiments, varying from three distinct corps to six, are formed into Depôt Battalions under selected Field Officers, with a full Staff of Adjutant, Quarter- and Paymaster, besides Medical Officer.

'The great advantage of the present system is that, whereas formerly the Depôts were acknowledged as temporary second Battalions when Regiments were abroad, and thus became the refuge for the idle and inefficient of every description, the present Depôts are really training schools through which all young officers and recruits must pass before joining their regiments.

'The Service Companies are thus always kept strong and efficient, drill is carried on upon a good sound and established system. There being no change of quarters, there is no interruption of drill; one uniform system is established throughout the Army, and all regimental irregularities are easily discovered and checked at once. In case of emergency,

it is always possible to form a Battalion of tolerable strength, equal to perform Garrison duties, from one of these consolidated Depôts, which never could be accomplished with the isolated and badly organised Four Company Depôts; and the Orderly Room details are strictly carried on under most competent Staff Officers, which were most inefficiently performed by a raw and inexperienced acting Staff.'

These Depôts, however, as can be gathered from the Duke's remarks, found no favour in the eyes of many of the old régime. Thus General Sir George Brown, the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, who was notorious for his powers of adverse criticism, which he was wont to express as openly and freely to his military superiors as to those under his command, writes as follows in November 1860:—

FROM SIR GEORGE BROWN.

'. . . I saw seven of your *precious* Depôt Battalions . . . not tended to improve my opinion of them as Military Institutions. The arrangement may be indispensable for Regiments abroad, but why extend it to Regiments at home? The Regiment is the best school for young officers and men!'

The Duke's remarks on the system of 'second Battalions,' one at home, and one abroad, which was advocated by 'many most experienced officers' at the time, will well repay perusal.

Viewed in the light of the experiences of the last twenty years his remarks are especially striking, for the greater part of the energies of our Headquarters Staff, as well as of the Staff and units of the whole British Army at home, have been during that period devoted to attempting to combat and overcome the difficulties created by the subsequent adoption of the system of 'linked' or 'second Battalions.'

It is not proposed to argue whether the adoption or the non-adoption of the second or linked Battalion system was or was not the best that could have been adopted in the circumstances, but it is certain that all our difficulties of late years have been directly attributable to an attempt to render possible a system whose working, even in peace time, depended upon the exact balance being struck between the number of Battalions serving at home and abroad.

So much for the organisation of the Army during this

period. Let us now consider the Duke's efforts towards maintaining a force of a strength consistent with our national requirements. The next few years of his Commandership-in-Chief are mainly remarkable for the unceasing fight he had to wage in the interests of the nation and the Army against successive Secretaries of State on this vital point.

In 1858 a regrettable state of tension arose between England and France. In the January of that year an attempt was made on the life of the French Emperor by the Italian Orsini; and one of its results was the adoption of a very menacing attitude towards this country by some of the officers of the French Army. England was denounced, and perhaps with some justice, as being the lair of assassins, who were sheltered by the extremely lax system under which the dangerous characters who found a haven on our shores were treated.

Lord Cowley at that time was our Ambassador in France; and he addressed a letter to the Duke calling attention to the somewhat critical state of affairs and to the necessity of taking all military precautions. This letter was forwarded by H.R.H. to Lord Panmure, the then Secretary of State for War, and elicited from him the following reply:—

FROM LORD PANMURE.

'WAR OFFICE, 26 *Jan.* 1858.

'I return Y.R. Highness, Lord Cowley's letter. We are quite alive to the state of feeling towards us in France, but we are also aware how utterly without foundation the charges brought against this country are.

'While quite prepared to make the most searching investigations for any breach of our laws on the part of those whom we harbour, or more correctly speaking who come to our shores, we must maintain the high position which we so proudly occupy of giving shelter to the unfortunate—of which shelter there is not a *party* who now attacks us who have not from time to time, availed themselves.

'I will return Burgoyne's papers in a day or two.'

Public attention was again called in 1859 to the strength of the French fortifications in their Channel Ports, and to the

corresponding weakness of our own in this region. A Royal Commission was accordingly appointed to inquire into the whole question, though it was many years before it reached a tentative settlement. In this case, however, 67,500 men and 2645 guns were assigned to the defences of our fortresses, dockyards and arsenals; and subsequently the report of the Commission was considered by the Defence Committee.

The latter body at that time consisted of one of the Lords of the Admiralty, the Quartermaster-General, two Artillery and two Engineer Officers, the whole under the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief. The constitution of the Committee had been changed since the Duke of Cambridge had assumed office as Commander-in-Chief,[1] with the result that the Inspector-General of Fortifications was no longer a member, it being considered absurd that a man should be called upon to criticise some of his own proposals. The duty of the Committee at that time was simply to scrutinise the proposals, and report to the Secretary of State with a view to guiding him in making his decisions.

As regards the report in question, the Defence Committee accepted generally the proposals of the Royal Commission, though they were of opinion that too large a proportion of troops had been allotted to the defence of the fortresses, etc. The Duke himself thought that a movable army of 100,000 men in the United Kingdom, irrespective of garrisons, was needed—an idea which was subsequently developed in the recently adopted and yet more recently abandoned Army Corps scheme, save that, even counting the Militia and the Volunteers, there were not enough guns to carry out the scheme of the Commission. He also held that the Militia and Volunteers were not sufficiently trained to manœuvre in the field, a dictum whose truth at the time, or indeed now, no one will venture to deny.

The Committee concluded by unanimously submitting to the serious consideration of the Secretary of State and Her Majesty's Government the inadequacy of the regular military forces to meet the important requirements of the general

[1] Duke of Cambridge's evidence before 'The Select Committee on Military Organisation, 1859-60.'

defence of the country. Deducting the force required for the Garrisons as proposed, little or no available force would be left of regular troops for service in the field, the necessity for which would not be diminished by the existence of the fortresses which had been recommended by the Royal Commission.

The lamentable deficiency of men at this period is again shown by the memorandum which the Duke addressed to General Peel, the then Secretary of State for War, on 26 November 1860. In stating that 10,000 men were possibly wanted in Ireland, he pointed out that these could not be provided without 'entirely denuding' of troops some of the most important towns in England.

In this memorandum, which was dated 26 November 1860, the Duke thus summarised the situation:—

'To my mind nothing can be more lamentable than the state of things. . . . I am strongly impressed that in the present state of the world, England ought never to be in so deplorable a military position as she is at present for the want of troops, more particularly Infantry. I am well aware that it is a most difficult matter to find a remedy, as any additional force must require increased expenditure; but, on the other hand, the question we have to put to ourselves is, Are we justified in leaving matters in such a condition? I think we are not, and therefore I feel bound to bring the subject to serious notice.'

Again in another memorandum to the Secretary of State on the estimates of 1860-61, he adverts to the same subject. The total of men for this year is 87,455, a reduction of 13,969, which only allowed, counting the seven battalions of Guards, 37,505 men for the whole of the United Kingdom, a state of affairs which once more induces him to warn his political chief of the danger incurred.

'I have no hesitation in saying frankly and unreservedly, that I consider this force *totally inadequate* for our present work and requirements.

'I consider that great danger would result to the State from such an arrangement.'

In the autumn of 1861 our relations with France again became somewhat strained; and we find the Duke writing to

the Secretary of State on the advisability of strengthening our harbours and arsenals so as to render them secure against any sudden descent of an enemy.

TO SIR GEORGE C. LEWIS.

'GEDLING, NOTTINGHAM, *October* 8, 1861.

'. . . I quite agree with you that it is absurd to defend the coast of England, and that the great Dockyards and Arsenals are the only things we have to look to. At the same time there are parts of the coast which cannot be quite overlooked, and these must be attended to. For instance, Newhaven in Sussex, where a landing could easily be effected, and where there is a small port of disembarkation just opposite the French coast. I would certainly have a work there, and I hope you will allow it to be proceeded with. Then again I think the mouth of the Humber and of the Mersey are points which cannot be altogether overlooked, as they are the great emporiums of our trade. The Clyde again would be another point. As for Aberdeen, I say nothing in its favour, and I have still less to say for the Scilly Islands.'

An outcome at any rate of the fears of French aggression or invasion in 1859, was that attention was called to the inadequacy of our home defence, and to the necessity of organising and reviving a force of Volunteers for the purpose. After the close of the Napoleonic wars, the Volunteer force, like the Militia, was allowed to fall into disuse. But after the Duke of Wellington's *exposé*, already alluded to, of the absolutely defenceless state of Great Britain in 1846, and the serious prospect of war with France in 1859, the subject began to cause some anxiety. At this time (1859) nearly all our available regular troops were required for service in India, and the Militia was in an unsatisfactory and attenuated condition. It was then that the modern Volunteer movement began; and in the following memorandum the Duke expressed his views upon the subject:—

MEMO. ON VOLUNTEER ORGANISATION, 1859.

'A Volunteer force, to be effectual, must be subject, as far as practicable, to military discipline, as otherwise no dependence could be placed on it at the hour of need, and the military authorities, under whose direction the force would have to be placed, could not rely with certainty on its

assistance and co-operation when required for Garrison or Field duty. At the same time there cannot be a doubt that the service should be made as little irksome to the men as possible, and the object to be attained is therefore clearly to give the force to be enrolled such an organisation as to combine, as far as practicable, efficiency, with the least amount of trouble or vexation to the parties forming it.

'The simplest mode of obtaining these appears to be:—

'1. To make the Lords-Lieutenant of Counties responsible for those persons who propose to raise either Regiments or Companies of Volunteers.

'2. To make the officers to command such Regiments or Companies responsible for the men they enroll in their corps.

'3. To oblige all the men to take an Oath of Allegiance, by which they would further bind themselves to be forthcoming on their services being required for permanent or other duty, and to obey the orders of their superiors when called out for duty.

'4. To arm the force with the same description of arms and accoutrements from the Government stores; or, should they arm themselves, to insist upon all the men furnishing themselves with the same description of weapons, and more especially with muskets or rifles of the same calibre.

'On looking over the old papers connected with the Volunteer corps which existed during the Great War, it would appear that those corps were under no such regulations, and that consequently their appearance, when called out, could not be depended upon. This was undoubtedly a great error in the organisation of the force which then existed, and one that I should on no account advise or recommend for imitation. All the minor details would have to be worked out under the authority of the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief; the Government would, however, in the first place have to decide upon the principles to be adopted.'

In May 1859 a Circular Letter was accordingly dispatched to the Lords-Lieutenant of Counties which authorised the formation of Volunteer corps.

But it was not until 1863 that a new Volunteer Act was passed enabling the Sovereign to call out the Volunteers when invasion seemed imminent.

It may be mentioned here that a strong movement was made to organise the Volunteer force independently of the military rulers of the country. Against this the Duke most stoutly protested, and with success. Some years later an attempt was made to introduce a system of delegates from

corps to put forward their views on matters connected with the management and payment of Volunteer bodies. This also the Duke strongly objected to, representing to the Secretary of State the grave objection to large organised bodies of armed men being permitted to act as civil associations.

With the rapid increase of the numbers and organisation of the Volunteer force came the idea of massing them together annually for big reviews.

The result might easily have been predicted by any military man—these assemblages, for they were worthy of no more serious designation, often under commanders with little or no experience of manœuvring large bodies of men, with Staffs hurriedly appointed for the day and not seldom wholly untrained, and with Divisions, Brigades, and Battalions all thrown together haphazard for the occasion, could result in nothing but the most appalling chaos.

An example of this was afforded in 1861. The Duke had all along expressed his dislike to these exhibitions of our military or rather unmilitary institutions; and on 21 February 1861 he received the following letter from the Secretary of State with reference to the impending Annual Review:—

FROM LORD HERBERT.

'. . . Lord Ranelagh has changed the site of his proposed field day from Croydon Downs to Brighton Racecourse. I saw him some weeks ago and told him that, although the good results of these annual performances are very doubtful beyond amusing the Volunteers, the Government would not forbid it, provided every corps had the permission of the Lords-Lieutenant duly conveyed to us, and that a programme of the performance was given in beforehand for the use of an officer appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to watch and report on the proceedings; in short, that the course taken last year should be adhered to.

'He understood this, urging that the Volunteers require some annual sham fight or field day to keep up their military likings. . . . There is a good deal to be said against these spectacles; but at the same time, if conducted in a decent and orderly manner, they do serve to keep up the military spirit of the Volunteers. . . .'

The Review took place and, as the Duke justly foresaw, led to no little confusion.

H.R.H. shortly afterwards was a guest at a banquet given to him by the City of London Rifle Brigade Volunteers, and took the occasion to explain his views on the subject of these and similar large sham fights and on the higher training of the Volunteer Force. A report of this speech is to be found in the *Times* of 15 April 1861. He severely criticised the recent Volunteer Field Day at Brighton, and strongly urged the necessity of more drill for the Volunteers before attempting such manœuvres, on the basis that it is impossible to teach a person to run before he can walk. He refuted the popular fable that 'the Horse Guards,' meaning of course himself, was opposed to the Volunteers, and assured them that he was most anxious to improve them in every way and to get them to Aldershot, where they would have the advantage of working with regular soldiers. At the present time, when the whole question of the future existence of the Volunteers is under consideration, and after over forty-five years' experience of the force, it is most interesting to note that, from the very first, the Duke was strongly opposed to any system of payment and consequent compulsion to attend drills, etc.

For many years past any educated soldier who ventured to point out the doubtful value of the Volunteer force for use in the field—for the only possible object for which it had been originally raised, viz. to resist invasion—was certain to be held up to public execration and contumely.

The nation, thanks to the South African War and other recent experiences, is, however, now better equipped in the matter of military knowledge. Still it is an open question whether it will acquiesce in the logical outcome to which such knowledge points; and it is beginning to dawn on the masses that, in the event of an invasion, the troops of our enemy will most assuredly be formed of the *élite* of their armies, and that our Volunteers are not sufficiently trained to cope with troops of such a type with any reasonable prospect of success.

In view of the statement of the Secretary of State for War, presented to Parliament in his memo. of 4 August 1904, in which he precisely lays down the saving he counts upon effecting by the abolition of a portion of the Volunteer

Forces of the country to be £300,000, the following letter of H.R.H. of 1862 is prophetic:—

TO SIR GEORGE C. LEWIS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 16 *March* 1862.

'With reference to our conversation of yesterday on the subject of the Volunteers, I feel very strongly upon it, and am confident that great mischief will arise if a money payment per head be granted to them. Such an allowance would cost the country at least £300,000 per annum, which money would be far better spent on the Regular Army or on the Militia, which latter force has of late been a good deal thrown into the background, and very unjustly so, for after all it is the main force we shall have to rely on *permanently* as our Reserve in times of war. Besides, if ever you give money for the Volunteers, the whole character of the force is changed, it cannot any longer be looked upon as an independent force, or rather a force maintaining and supporting itself, and it must necessarily come more under Government supervision and control. You will require to have your own officers to look after the outlay of the money to be expended on the corps. Attendances will become more or less compulsory on the members of corps, and, in short, it will completely change the whole organisation and system of the present Volunteer Service. Besides, you may depend upon this, that for every pound you thus spend on the Volunteers, Parliament will call upon you to make corresponding reductions in the Estimates for the Army; the very worst thing that could happen, for nothing would be so dangerous to the Empire as a system of allowing the Volunteers gradually to take the place of the Army. On all these grounds, I hope you will most strenuously resist all pressure put upon the Government for this expenditure. There is another point I want to bring to your notice: the Volunteers of Glasgow having, as it would appear by the papers, sent *Delegates* to London to stir up an agitation on this subject in Parliament and in all other Volunteer corps. Now I hold this to be a most *dangerous* precedent, and one that should be put a stop to at once by your authority. If you once admit the principle of armed bodies, like the Volunteers, agitating publicly for certain rights or advantages to their body and sending *Delegates* about the country to promote their views, this would be the most alarming position which could possibly be taken up by a vast armed body of men, and I would ask you where this is to end? Armed bodies of men have, in this country, never been allowed to become deliberative bodies, and whenever it has been attempted it has at once been put a stop to by Government, indeed I may say by the laws of the land. Therefore,

for Heaven's sake, do not allow this most dangerous precedent to creep in quietly and without notice. Put a bold face upon it and stop it at once. I strongly advise such a course in the very interests of the Volunteers themselves. The system upon which this body has been formed and hitherto conducted has been a most admirable one; but now these new views are tending in a very different direction, and there is no doubt that they ought to be controlled, before committing any further mischief in this direction. There is yet time; but the occasion is a pressing one. Forgive me for expressing myself warmly, but I feel strongly, and I see great danger ahead if something is not done to put a stop at once to what is going on.'

FROM SIR GEORGE C. LEWIS.

'War Office, 17 *March* 1862.

'The best answer which I can give to Y.R.H. is, to say that the Cabinet on Saturday decided not to make any additional grant to the Volunteers.

'I understand that Lord Elcho is likely to bring forward the question in the House of Commons.'

The following letters and memorandum which the Duke addressed to Sir George Lewis, the Secretary of State for War, on the Army Estimates for 1863-64, throw an interesting light on the existing state of affairs, and show how continuously H.R.H. had to struggle against the mischievous reductions which were annually proposed owing to the exigencies of political expediency.

TO SIR GEORGE C. LEWIS.

'Gloucester House, 6 *December* 1862.

'I send you my Memo. on the estimates of force for next year, which I hope clearly expresses the views I entertain on this important question, and may be of use to you in the discussions which may arise on the subject. Perhaps you would let Lord Palmerston see it and the other members of the Cabinet who were present at our War Office meeting the other day.'

FROM SIR GEORGE C. LEWIS.

'War Office, 17 *December* 1862.

'Would Y.R.H. allow me to communicate to you a suggestion which has been made to me, for effecting a further reduction in this year's Estimates?

'Perhaps Y.R.H. will favour me with your opinion upon it.'

TO SIR GEORGE C. LEWIS.

'APETHORPE, WANSFORD, 19 *December* 1862.

'I have received your letter with a suggestion enclosed for the further reduction of the Estimates for this year, upon which you ask me to give you my opinion. With every disposition to look favourably upon any plan which can reduce expenditure, I must strongly express my dissent from this proposal. Virtually it amounts to a reduction of 10 *per cent.* in the whole of the horses of the Cavalry and Artillery, for if no horses are purchased this year, it is an admission that they are not required. Consequently next year you cannot fill up these vacancies, or, if you do, the purchase money for horses for next year's Estimates will have been *doubled*, which would be equally objectionable. Now, if a positive reduction of horses is intended, it had better be effected in a direct manner and not in that roundabout way, by reducing so many horses per Regiment and Battery. Such reduction would, moreover, have the advantage of being evenly distributed, whereas the non-purchase of horses altogether would most probably be very unequal in its results, some Regiments and Batteries continuing fully horsed, others very much the reverse, and on that account very much less efficient. I hope, however, that no reduction of horses will take place. I assure you that Regiments of Cavalry and Batteries of Artillery are as low as they can be with a view to efficiency, and I am confident, if further reduced, the troops would not and could not be maintained in the efficient state which they are in at present. Besides, it is an immense advantage having a certain proportion of horses bought every year. By this means the supply always flows on in its regular channel without interruption, and the relative and proportionate ages of the horses in Regiments and Batteries is maintained. I hope therefore you will *not entertain* this proposition, to which I entertain a very decided objection. If it is your wish that further reductions should be made, I will again go carefully over the various items in our Estimates and see what can be done, however difficult it may be, but if the necessity exists, it must be done; only I would wish to look into the case a little more in detail. You will remember that I have proposed the saving of 400 horses by dismounting permanently one Regiment of Cavalry, the relief for India. I return to London to-morrow and will call upon you the first spare moment I have, to talk over this and various other subjects with you.

'*PS.*—On reading carefully over my letter again, I do assure you it is my *decided opinion*, that if you carried out this *most unfortunate* proposition, you would, by the reduction of 1400 horses in the course of the year, render

quite inefficient both your Cavalry Regiments and Batteries of Artillery. I cannot therefore too strongly beg of you not to entertain this proposal, which I cannot help thinking must have originated in the brain of some gentleman totally unacquainted with military matters.'

In the memorandum on the Estimates for 1863-64, alluded to in the preceding letters, as regards the Artillery the Duke states that one-third of the Batteries will be at home and that two-thirds will be distributed between India and the Colonies; and he points out that great difficulty will be experienced in carrying out the reliefs of the latter. The usual practice in that arm had been that half of their period of service should be done at home and half abroad. But, owing to the greater demands now made for foreign reinforcements, such an arrangement was no longer possible. For the future the proportion would be two-thirds abroad against one-third at home. This plan would be attended with some disadvantages. Five years at home after ten abroad would hardly admit of Batteries on their return home being brought up to the state of efficiency demanded for European service. But in any case no reduction could possibly be made.

The establishment of Royal Engineers was not equal to the demands which were made upon it, whilst of Cavalry there were only thirty-one Regiments, three of which were Household and not available for foreign service, except in case of war. Thus, even including the three new Indian Regiments there only remained twenty-eight Regiments to perform the ordinary duties both at home and abroad. Of these also, four were heavy Regiments, not suitable for Indian or colonial service, but of course necessary in the event of European war. With eleven Regiments in India, there consequently remained thirteen at home to relieve them; but the proposal to dismount one Regiment in order to find the Indian drafts was characterised by the Duke as a most pernicious one. In conclusion, he showed that our establishment of Cavalry was in no way in excess of Regiments for an Army of 127,000 men, the force which was to be maintained, exclusive of India. Turning to the seven Battalions of Guards, the Duke stated that he regarded

them as a reserve of the Line Infantry, who at all times were maintained in a state of efficiency and in immediate readiness for service. Hence again no reduction could be contemplated here.

The Line Infantry was to consist of 141 Battalions, including nine which had been added from the late Indian Army. Of these forty were at home, forty-five in the Colonies, and fifty-six in India. The Infantry was also supposed to be in the proportion of one third at home to two abroad—the very lowest number for home which could possibly be admitted, and one which left nothing in hand when ordinary requirements had been met. Yet recent history, in the shape of the Crimean, Mutiny, China, and New Zealand Campaigns, showed how suddenly calls might be made on our Army. For some years past we had not been able to reach the standpoint of one-third at home to two-thirds abroad, and there were seven Battalions short of this ideal. Moreover, at least eight of the forty-seven Battalions at home would necessarily be for a considerable period of each trooping season on the high seas, and consequently for the time unavailable for sudden calls. There should indeed be fifty-five instead of forty-seven for home service. So all ideas of reduction were out of the question.

The Secretary of State appears at this time to have been contemplating a reduction of fifty men per Battalion in seventy Regiments, 3500 in all, and it was also hinted that a still further reduction of fifty men was within the bounds of possibility.

Again, on 20 January 1863, the Duke addressed Sir George Lewis as follows:—

TO SIR GEORGE C. LEWIS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, *January* 20, 1863.

'With reference to our conversation of yesterday on the subject of the Estimates, I do hope you will *pause* before deciding on so large a reduction as 100 R. and F. per Battalion.

'As far as my memory carries me, it was proposed at the meeting of the members of the Cabinet at the War Office, that Regiments should be reduced by 50 men a Battalion, or from 900 R. and F. to 850 R. and F. To this

I made no objection. It was further suggested by yourself that a further reduction of 50 men per Battalion might become necessary, but this was only thrown out and, I certainly fancied, *not* decided upon. The further reduction would make a very large one indeed in men, and I think it would really be *too large*. Companies would be reduced to 66 men, and though, by adding some men from the Depôt to the Service Companies, I could make up the latter to 70 men a Company, I certainly do think that, for our wants, that is *too low a figure*, particularly as regards the *home force*, which I have shown in the Memo. to you is as low as it is safe to put it, even at present, and yet this would be largely reduced if you strike off so many men. I do hope, therefore, that not more than 50 men per Battalion will be struck off, and you will then have your Battalions at 850; 730 for Service Companies and 120 for Depôts.

'Recollect that you thought two Infantry Battalions would be coming home from India, whereas only *one* is coming. Bear also in mind the large reliefs we require for India and some of our Colonies, and our home force dwindles down to nothing. If, therefore, further reductions are called for, pray take it off something else rather than *men*. At all events, I hope you will consult Lord Palmerston on this subject before it is finally settled, and that he should see my *Memo.*, which I think you told me you had not yet circulated. I cannot think the state of the world in general justifies so large a reduction of men as that contemplated by reducing each Battalion of Infantry by 100 R. and F.'

CHAPTER XIV

STRENGTH AND ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY—*continued*

1864-1866

Lord de Grey succeeds Sir George C. Lewis. The Duke's further Efforts to prevent Reductions. H.R.H.'s Memo. on Estimates for 1864-65. War of 1864 between Austria and Prussia and Denmark. Recruiting Difficulties. Letter to Lord de Grey on Recruiting. State of Ireland and Canada. H.R.H. appeals to the Prime Minister against Reduction. Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The Duke's Memorandum of the Creation of a Reserve, 1866. General Peel's Views on the same.

BEFORE the Estimates for the following year were presented, Lord de Grey (afterwards Lord Ripon) had succeeded Sir George Lewis as Secretary of State for War. So it was to the latter that H.R.H.'s next memorandum on the Estimates was presented. In the United Kingdom the available forces were 76,467, as against 71,763 in India and 58,739 in the Colonies, a force which was barely sufficient to meet our ordinary requirements. The memorandum covers much of the same ground as its predecessor of the year before. But its recommendations will perhaps be more clearly realised by an opportunity of reading it in its entirety.

MEMORANDUM FOR LORD DE GREY—ESTIMATES 1864-65.

'HORSE GUARDS, 5 *Dec.* 1863.

'The period of the year has now arrived when the annual Estimates for the ensuing year are under consideration, and when it has therefore been customary to give the details for the proposed Establishments of the Army for the next financial year. In doing so on the present occasion, I would beg to draw the attention of the Secretary of State for War to my Confidential Memorandum sent in on the 5 Dec. of last year, 1862, to the late Sir George Lewis.

'In that memorandum I have gone into considerable detail, and I have little to add on the present occasion to what I then stated.

'The requirements of the service and the duties to be per-

formed by the Army are much the same now as they were last year, with this exception, that the demands upon us are rather increased from what they were then.

'I consider that the Establishment proposed for last year must be looked upon as barely sufficient to meet the ordinary Requirements of our Service, and that any unusual demand upon them would therefore require additional means in order to meet them efficiently.

'Taking this view as the basis upon which this Memorandum is framed, I will now proceed to enumerate such details as I think it necessary to dwell upon.

'The amount of force at the present moment serving at home amounts to 76,467 rank and file of all arms.

'There are 71,763 rank and file in India, and 58,739 in the Colonies, making a grand total of 206,969 rank and file.

'I do not think it possible for anybody to assert that our home force can be considered as in excess of our requirements. On the contrary, it must be admitted by all that the Force is unusually small. The reasons why it is so reduced at present I shall presently explain, and it is to be hoped that it may ere long be again increased by accessions from abroad, without requiring any permanent addition to our Establishment. Otherwise no doubt the duties required of it in the shape of relief and for home defence could not be performed by so small a body of troops.

'The force of Artillery at home consists of 91½ Batteries, which is very much what it was last year. No reduction of this force could possibly be made, but it is hoped that by dividing the first Horse Brigade into two Brigades, and by the addition of two Batteries to one of these Brigades, as formerly proposed, the necessary relief of Artillery in India may be this year commenced.

'The necessity for making these reliefs is pressed upon me more and more by every mail I receive from India, and it is asserted that nothing will lead more to real amalgamation than the gradual relief from home of the late Local Brigade of Artillery which has been recently added to the Imperial Establishment.

'The strength of the Artillery in India remains as last year; that in the Colonies is also the same, with the exception of an additional Battery in New Zealand, called for by the war which has recently broken out there. The three Batteries which will shortly become available on the evacuation of Corfu I propose to move to Malta, there to join the headquarters of their own Brigade, which will then be concentrated in that important fortress. This addition to the Artillery force at Malta I hold to be indispensably necessary. It has frequently been asked for, and the necessity for granting it has been clearly demonstrated, but it was impossible hitherto to find the means of giving it, which now, however can be accomplished.

'*Engineers.*—The Royal Engineer force is so fully employed, and so much in request on the numerous large works now proceeding in various portions of the Empire, that no alteration of Establishment, or reduction of Companies, can be thought of.

'*Cavalry.*—The Cavalry force I propose to leave exactly where it was last year.

'It might appear to some that this force is in excess of our requirements at home; but when we take into account that it has to furnish reliefs for eleven Regiments permanently quartered in India; and that, moreover, it constitutes the *whole Cavalry force* of our Army, it cannot be said to be at all in excess of what is required.

'Take the case of Canada, where at this moment there is a considerable force of Infantry and Artillery quartered in consequence of the Civil War now raging in America.

'By all the rules of war at least three Regiments of Cavalry ought to be quartered in that country, but I have not pressed for their removal there, as I knew it must add greatly to the expense sending out Cavalry to that Colony either with their horses, or in a dismounted state to be horsed in the Colony, and hence I felt it better to keep them in hand and efficient at home, ready to be despatched at a moment's notice, should the emergency arise.

'To reduce the establishment of Cavalry Regiments is impossible without rendering them extremely inefficient for taking the field.

'At this moment there are 16 Cavalry Regiments at home, exclusive of the Household Brigade. Four of these 16 are heavy Dragoon Regiments not suited to service in India. One Regiment is on passage to India, and the return Regiment will be kept dismounted till the next Regiment proceeds to India, as was arranged last year. Consequently there are only 12 Regiments at home to relieve the 11 Regiments serving in India.

'*Infantry.*—The Infantry force at home at the present moment, consists of 44,685 rank and file including the five Battalions of Guards, as against 50,000 last year, but of this force 14,636 belong to the Depôt Battalions, and are consequently only available for home defence.

'Of Service Battalions of the Line at home, there are at the present moment only 34, as against 40 last year; it is therefore evident that the diminution of Infantry forces is very considerable, and that the proportion of Battalions serving at home to those serving abroad is very far below what it ought to be, if my proposition of last year be considered as the due proportion, namely, that one-third of the number of Battalions should serve at home to two-thirds abroad. In fact, at the present moment we have only 30,049 rank and file of Infantry at home, including the seven Battalions of Guards, who are available for foreign service.

'Certainly this is a most unsatisfactory state of things and one calling for most serious consideration, were it not that the circumstances which have produced them are, to some extent, exceptional, as I will presently explain, and may be hoped to be of short duration.

'I pointed out last year that five Battalions of Infantry would be annually required to proceed as reliefs to India, and I suggest that, in addition to the one-third of the number of Battalions at home, we ought to have a margin in excess of this force, in order to meet the constant contingency of distant reliefs. This year's experience proves how right my anticipations have been, and how necessary it is at all times, if possible, to have a small additional force always at command.

'Scarcely had we sent out the five Regiments to India, weakening the home force temporarily to this extent, when news arrived of the war in New Zealand having broken out, and more troops being again required in China.

'It was therefore decided to send on two Regiments that were to come home on being relieved in India to New Zealand, to send another Regiment to New Zealand from Ceylon, which was to have gone on to India, thus detaining a Regiment in India and sending a fourth Regiment from India to China.

'Therefore two more Regiments were put under orders to India, and have since embarked.

'Consequently seven Battalions have gone to India instead of five, as intended, and we have only to expect three to return home on relief instead of five as anticipated.

'This proves how liable we are at all times to sudden and unexpected calls upon us, and how essential it therefore is to keep in hand some force as a Reserve, in excess of the one-third, which is the number I have endeavoured to lay down as the ordinary force at home.

'The result of all this is, that even when these three Battalions return home, we shall even then have but 37 Battalions at home instead of 47, the one-third spoken of above.

'It is true that giving up the Ionian Islands will ere long place four more Battalions at our disposal; but these will be required for some pressing Colonial Reliefs, which will hardly be completed before the next batch of reliefs will have to embark for India, and even should they have returned before that period, the Battalions at home even then will only come up to 41.

'Again, if we look to the strength of Regiments in rank and file: last year we made a considerable reduction in this respect, but it is impossible this year to reduce Battalions by a single man; indeed it has been proved that, with the present reduced strength of 800 rank and file per Battalion, including its Depôt, it is next to impossible to send out Battalions in an efficient state for service abroad.

'On this subject I have sent in a separate paper to the

Secretary of State, giving full details of the difficulties I experience in keeping Regiments complete for service, more particularly with regard to the working of the Ten Years Enlistment Act.

'I can therefore come to no other conclusion than that it will be absolutely necessary to add to the present year's Estimates the number of the men required for the Regiments in New Zealand, in excess of last year's Establishment; the whole number is, after all, not considerable, about 1000 rank and file; but I consider it impossible to reduce any other branch of the service to meet the demands thus suddenly made upon us. Indeed, but for the hope I entertain that the emergency will not be of long continuance, I should feel compelled to represent the necessity for a further increase to our Infantry force, not only in Establishment, but in Battalions; but knowing how undesirable it is to make any addition to our force, and trusting that all large demands upon us are to some extent temporary, I for the moment will not press the point further on your attention.

'As regards the Military Train, Army Hospital, and Commissariat Corps, portions of these have been sent to New Zealand. A corresponding increase of force at home is required in these corps equally with that of the Infantry, for the general utility and admirable working of these corps cannot be too strongly pointed out; but for the same reason that I abstain from pressing for an increase to the Infantry, I equally abstain from doing so for the corps now alluded to.

'In conclusion, I have only to remark that the state of the world in general does not warrant the expectation that reductions in our Military Forces can with any degree of safety be contemplated for some time to come, and the only question is whether we do not run considerable risk in leaving our Establishments at so low a figure.

'These, however, are questions for Her Majesty's Government to decide, and I can only point to them as justifying me in the reasonable and moderate demands I have made for the Estimates for the present year.'

After the memorandum above-quoted was written and before the Estimates had been presented to Parliament, the war of 1864, in which Austria and Prussia were engaged against Denmark, had somewhat changed the complexion of affairs, and the Duke consequently wrote the following letter to the Secretary of State:—

TO LORD DE GREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 2 *February* 1864.

'The news received last night and confirmed this morning of the passage of the frontier by the Allied Armies of

Austria and Prussia, and consequent invasion of Schleswig, induces me to write to you, entreating of you the necessity for immediately adding to the strength of our Establishments, by recruiting up our Regiments to at least what they were last year, namely, 900 R. and F. You must remember that we are at this moment on the most reduced Peace Establishment that it is possible to be on, and that we are far below our ordinary strength of Infantry at home. Without in the slightest degree presuming to interfere with or even to know the intentions of the Government, but simply on military grounds, I cannot but think that the present strength of our forces at home at so important a European crisis places us in a position of very considerable disadvantage when compared with that of the other great Powers of Europe, for this obvious reason, that whereas the Armies of all the other States are Conscript Armies and can be therefore increased with the greatest facility at the shortest notice, our men are raised by voluntary enlistment, and the means of augmenting our force to meet any emergency is consequently very limited. All I would ask is that Infantry Regiments at home should all be recruited up, at all events, to 900 R. and F. per Battalion, leaving the Cavalry and Artillery for the present untouched.

'Look at what the Continental Armies have just accomplished. Within the last month the Prussian troops have been placed partly on the war footing, and within a fortnight a Corps of Austrians and Prussians of at least 50,000 men have been transported and are at this moment on the Eider, with heavy reserves prepared to follow should the necessity arise. It may be said that the French are doing nothing and that their position and ours, as great European Powers, is to some extent identical. Outwardly they show no symptom of preparation, but I venture to say, that their organisation is such that *within one fortnight* they could collect and mass a large Army on the Rhine, besides having an available force at hand for other contingencies. Now, if we look to what we can do, we literally can do nothing but call out our Militia and recruit up as fast as the labour market will permit us to obtain men.

'As to calling out Militia, that cannot be thought of till war actually arises, but the obtaining of men, as a natural precaution which it is easy to adopt, without attracting the slightest attention to the circumstance, by merely giving orders to recruit up our Regiments irrespective of the present Establishments, up to say 900 or 1000 R. and F. As I feel that this is a question of the deepest importance to the interests of the country, and as it is right that both yourself and myself should guard ourselves against withholding the present state of our resources in men from the other members of the Government, I would beg of you to let Lord Palmerston either see this letter or that you should

accompany me to see him, and discuss this matter more fully with him. I am certain you will forgive me for bringing this subject so prominently to your notice, but it is of such importance that this must plead my excuse.'

With a voluntary Army, the recruiting difficulty is an almost perennial one, and the year 1864 was no exception to the rule. In the December of that year the following correspondence passed between H.R.H. and the Secretary of State, from which it will be seen that the Duke had then, as always, no other desire than that fresh light should be shed on this complex problem, and that he was quite alive to the necessity of introducing some change into the unsatisfactory state of things which then prevailed. The Mr. Galton alluded to by Lord de Grey was at the time assistant Under-Secretary of State.

FROM LORD DE GREY.

'STUDLEY ROYAL,
RIPON, 14 *December* 1864.

'. . . With respect to Recruiting, General Enlistment, etc., I have no objection whatever to offer to Y.R.H.'s proposals, and will leave it to Y.R.H., after consultation with Sir G. Wetherall and others, to have a scheme prepared which can be considered when I return to London.

'For the purpose of this inquiry, and in order to avoid discussions which might have no practical result, Y.R.H. will perhaps consider that the principle of the Ten Years Act is to be maintained intact.

'Y.R.H.'s idea about a house for the Lieut.-General of Aldershot is excellent. Pray let Sir R. Airey see Belfield about it. The Queen has sanctioned the arrangements for the Estimates, which will now therefore be adopted as the basis of our calculation.

'We shall of course write from the War Office to the Horse Guards about the reductions; but I should be glad to know whether Y.R.H. would like me to propose the union of the Depôt and Service Companies of Regiments at home, or would prefer that the suggestion should come from yourself.

'The orders on this subject should be given without delay, I think, but I shall not have any letter written about it until I know Y.R.H.'s wishes as to the mode of proceeding.'

TO LORD DE GREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 21 *December* 1864.

'I have had two meetings on the subject of recruiting, and I think I now would ask you after all to have the Committee we originally intended, for I see that without such Committee we cannot enter into any details. The matter stands thus—General Crofton, who was good enough to be present at our last meeting, entered very fully into the subject, of which he seems to be complete master.

'1. Without interfering with the Ten Years Enlistment Act, which I told him you had decided upon maintaining, he is extremely anxious to propose that the option should be given to men to enlist for either ten years or twenty-one; he declares that many men will come for twenty-one years, who will not run the risk of being discharged after ten, and that thus many valuable men are lost to the service. Colonel Graham is disposed to take the same view. It is for you to consider whether the alternative might not be offered to men with advantage, putting it in this way: "You may enter for ten years, but if you prefer it, you can be engaged for the full service of twenty-one years."

'2. All seem agreed that it would be very questionable policy to introduce a compulsory Reserve Force clause into the Ten Years Enlistment Bill. Men do not like these uncertain prospects; they like to consider themselves free agents after serving their time.

'3. All are agreed that inducements must be held out to the ten years men to remain in the service other than those now offered. General Crofton asserts that if every man after ten years were to get 2d. additional pay the men would remain, and we could get rid of fresh bounty and kit, with the exception of 5s. or 10s. to drink the Queen's health, and that this saving of expense, in addition to the saving of cost in the raising of new men and the transport from the Colonies and India, would counterbalance the additional expense of 2d. per day to all men after ten years' service. Colonel Graham fully concurs, and so does the A.-G. and myself. However, this, being a matter of calculation, would have to be gone into, and I wish the committee to go into this thoroughly.

'4. General Crofton thinks the Pensioners could recruit in Districts for the whole Army, and that the Line ought to be restricted to recruiting at Headquarters. I have my doubts upon this point, and so have Colonels Horsford and Graham. It is dangerous to run risks when our Recruiting is so bad, but I should be prepared to make the experiment in one or two localities to be selected for the purpose, say, for instance, Leeds or Bristol, or any other town to be named. This again, however, is a subject for adjustment and consideration, and would require the attention of a Committee

which I now propose. I should say that the best mode of forming it would be to have the A.-G. to preside, and to make Horsford and Graham members on the part of the military authorities, and General Crofton and Milton on the part of your office. All are anxious to do what they can to mend matters without adding to expense, and I therefore do not think that the question could, in the first instance, be in better hands. I name Mr. Milton merely because he was named by you in your official letter, which has been for the moment suspended because he was Secretary to the Royal Commission which sat on the subject, and because he is a good financial man, to go into the financial part of the question. General Crofton could represent the Pensioners, Colonel Graham the Recruiting Department, and Scarlett and Horsford the Military Authorities. I really think some good might be done in this way. It is high time that the subject should be fully discussed and considered, for by the enclosed return which I have made out, you will observe that the Recruiting for the Army does not keep pace with the casualties that occur, and that every month we are gradually getting lower and lower, and are actually minus 1500 men in the last eight months. So that unless we can induce men to re-engage more freely than they have yet done, the Army will at last and by gradual process dwindle to nothing.

'The real fact is that the labour market is so good, and employment so constant and abundant, that men cannot be induced to enlist or remain in the Service. The authorities who understand this subject declare that the 2d. a day after ten years will do all that we require: ought we not then to try it, if we find, moreover, that no additional expense is thereby incurred, or at all events that the expense is so trifling that it cannot be compared with the object to be attained? I would therefore urge on you the propriety of forming this small committee, and confine their deliberations very much to the limits I have suggested above. They need call no evidences: these have been all called before the Royal Commission, and we possess their opinion in a printed form already. All that I would ask them to do is to give advice as to the best mode of mending matters from what they are at present. I could not get hold of Sir G. Wetherall, who had returned to Manchester, but I have asked the A.-G. to write to him and to favour us with his opinion, which I doubt not I shall get in a few days.'

In the last letter of Lord de Grey's, which has been quoted, some reference is made to the ever-recurring question of reducing the Army, and on 20 December 1865 he enlarges upon this point. To return so continuously to this wearisome subject is perhaps irritating. But it is, none the less, instructive as showing how eternally political con-

siderations interfere with military efficiency, and what false economy is this continual policy of reducing in peace time, and augmenting in war time at enormous expense, when the expenditure of thousands at first might easily obviate the subsequent sacrifice of millions.

Unfortunately these paltry shifts and continual alterations in the strength of the *personnel* of the Army ever form the larger part of our military history in peace time.

FROM LORD DE GREY.

'STUDLEY ROYAL, RIPON, 20 *December* 1865.

'I have the honour to inform Y.R.H. that the Cabinet at their last meeting agreed to the following arrangements for the reduction of the Infantry next year. All Regiments at home except the first for India and the first for the Colonies to be reduced to 10 Companies of 68 rank and file each.

'The first Battalions for India to stand at 12 Companies and 840 rank and file.

'The first Battalions for the Colonies at 12 Companies and 760 rank and file as now.

'The Battalions to come home this year from India to be kept for the year at 10 Companies of 60 rank and file.

'The first Battalions to come home from the Colonies to be reduced to the home strength of 10 Companies of 68 rank and file on the 1 April next.

'The Captains to be put on half-pay, the Subalterns to be allowed to remain as supernumeraries on full pay until absorbed.

'Y.R.H. will see from this that I have very nearly carried through your last suggestions, with the exception that, in order to get the reduction required, I have been obliged to keep the Regiments to come home from India at a low strength; but as they are of necessity very low, when they leave India, and are three months at sea, I do not think this will matter.

'I have written to tell the Queen the nature of the measures proposed, and as soon as I get H.M.'s sanction I will write officially to Your Royal Highness.'

Three weeks later the Duke endeavours to persuade the Secretary of State to stay his hand by pointing to the somewhat dangerous state of affairs in Canada owing to the Fenian menace, and to impress upon him how difficult it is, after having once reduced, to persuade Parliament subsequently to agree to an increase.

TO LORD DE GREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 10 *January* 1866.

'You are well aware from the numerous conversations that have taken place between us on the subject of Army reductions that, though I certainly do not advocate such reductions, as I consider our Army to be at the present moment on a complete peace establishment, I am fully prepared to assist the Government in carrying out the reductions deemed essential, in such a manner as to meet the wishes of the Government, and to injure as little as possible the public service and the interests of individuals. I have, however, been so much struck by an account I read yesterday in the *Times* of the Fenian organisation in America, and of the determination of this party to do something in the direction of Canada, that I feel called upon to direct your official attention to this point. I am, of course, not aware what information the Governments are in possession of as regards Fenianism and its ramifications, whether in America or in Ireland; but if the statements of the *Times* correspondents are at all reliable and borne out by anything that is known to the Cabinet, I cannot but think that the present moment is not a favourable one for making any reductions at all in the Army. Nobody knows better than you do that reductions once made are not easily made good again, in an Army enlisted as ours is by volunteers from the general body of the nation, and in which we have no conscription to fall back upon. I have heard it said that many of the Constabulary are leaving that force. If this should be the case to any extent, their places, or the duties required of them, will, to a great extent, have to be supplied by the troops. Already the duties imposed on the Army in Ireland have been largely increased since the commencement, or rather development, of the Fenian movement in that country. Would it be prudent under such circumstances, which are likely to be of some duration, to decrease considerably the establishment of Regiments serving at home? It is my duty to point out to you, for the information of the Government, my anxiety on this account, leaving it to yourself and your colleagues to judge of the importance or otherwise of the information which may have reached you on the subject referred to.'

The general state of affairs in Ireland also gave cause at this period for some anxiety, and apparently the loyalty of some of our regiments was doubted. It was consequently proposed to vary the roster, and only to send to Ireland those corps which were above suspicion. The Duke very properly protested against so pusillanimous and mischievous

a proceeding, and proposed the more straightforward and courageous one of letting matters take their course.

His representations on this subject were forwarded by Lord de Grey to the Prime Minister, Lord Russell, who expressed entire agreement with the Duke's arguments.

TO LORD DE GREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 *January* 1866.

'With reference to the question you have put to me as to the Regiments of Infantry to be sent to Ireland, I most strongly advocate and would urgently advise no deviation from the ordinary roster of Regiments. Whether a particular Regiment has more Englishmen serving in its ranks or more Irishmen, does not, in my opinion, make any sort of difference as to the loyal disposition and good conduct of the men. Composed as our Army is of a proportion of English, Scotch and Irish in *all* corps, it never would do to show the slightest want of confidence in any one particular Regiment. All corps I think ought to be implicitly trusted till they have shown themselves unworthy of such trust, and I hope, therefore, that without reference to how the corps is composed, each Regiment will, as hitherto, be sent over in regular succession to Ireland according to roster. The Regiments all know how they stand in the books, and consequently any deviation from it would be immediately discovered by the corps concerned, and would at once lead to comments, the consequences of which I hold to be very unfortunate to the best interests of the service. I think the selection of any particular corps for specific duties in the command in which it may be serving is a very different thing from the selection of certain Regiments for service in Ireland, which duty has hitherto been conducted entirely by roster. I hope, therefore, that you will allow me to proceed in this matter in the ordinary manner, a view in which all my Headquarter Staff most fully and completely concur.

'*PS.*—I need hardly add that it is entirely in the competence of the General Officer commanding in Ireland to quarter the troops sent to him wherever he likes, and that consequently he can hold in reserve or place in the most disaffected districts the corps he considers best qualified for the duties required of them.'

FROM LORD RUSSELL.

'CHESHAM PLACE, 24 *January* 1866.

'I have received a letter from Lord de Grey respecting the roster for Ireland, enclosing a letter from your Royal Highness.

'I agree entirely with Y.R.H., and hope that no change may be made in the roster.

'Perhaps it may not be necessary to send two Regiments directly, but whenever it is necessary, I think the roster should be adhered to. The disaffected in Ireland spread reports of Fenianism in the Regiments at the Curragh, but I suppose these reports are knowingly false.'

The Duke, in answering the Prime Minister's letter, took the opportunity of appealing to him against the proposed reductions, pointing out at the same time the gravity of the situation both in Canada and Ireland. His efforts, however, were of no avail.

TO LORD RUSSELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 25 *January* 1866.

'I have received your letter of yesterday's date, and in reply to it rejoice to find that you agree with me in the view I have taken as regards the adherence to the roster, for the movement of the troops from this country to Ireland.

'One Regiment has been ordered to move, and I understand from you that a second is not to go till I receive further instructions from the Government. I do not believe in any disaffection amongst the troops in any station, though no doubt you will find isolated cases of Fenians in many corps; but I believe that even then these men would do their duty if called upon to perform it. The fear of their comrades would prevent their committing themselves by more than words. I hope you will forgive me if I bring to your notice that, considering the very bad feeling we know to exist in Ireland, and which is rather on the increase than otherwise, and requires the presence of very considerable bodies of troops; considering, moreover, the anxiety felt in Canada on the subject of Fenian Raids; I think the moment is a very unfortunate one in making any reduction whatever in the Army. It is impossible to foresee whether the services of the troops may not after all be called into request both in Ireland and in Canada, and though I trust such may not be the case, still I have a strong conviction that all the Regiments ought to be kept in point of numbers in a very efficient state, which the reduction contemplated must naturally diminish. I am aware that you have already been informed of my opinion on this subject; but I feel bound again to draw your attention to the subject, as I think Fenianism is becoming from day to day apparently more alarming and serious.

FROM LORD RUSSELL.

'CHESHAM PLACE, *January* 26, 1866.

'I am sorry not to agree with Y.R.H., but I see no cause, either in regard to Ireland or in regard to Canada, against the contemplated reductions of the Army.'

The Austro-Prussian War, however, again put a somewhat different complexion on the state of affairs. So the Duke addressed the following letters to Lord Hartington, who in February 1866 had become Secretary of State for War:—

TO LORD HARTINGTON.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 6 *May* 1866.

'The state of the Continent makes me feel, in common with the rest of the world, most anxious, and obliges me to look carefully into the state of the Army.

'I cannot hesitate to say that, looking at what is going on around us, I think our Regiments are extremely low in strength, and I would again urgently press upon you the absolute necessity for placing corps on a stronger establishment, should war on the Continent actually supervene. I am perfectly aware that it is the wish of the Government and of the country to avoid becoming mixed up with these Continental difficulties, but still we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that a state of war amongst our neighbours must be a source of anxiety to all other powerful States who, like ourselves, must have great interests at stake in every part of the world, and who may have to speak authoritatively should certain eventualities arise out of the confusion of European politics. At present our Regiments are so low in strength that none of these on home service can be considered efficient for active service, and I think therefore that, should a Continental War break out, it would be essential that all corps at home should be placed on a more satisfactory footing. Our means of obtaining Recruits are limited, as you know, when compared to what exists in Continental States. We ought therefore to take advantage of such means as are at our disposal. We have now the larger portion of the Militia assembled for purposes of drill. From these men could be procured and facilities afforded to us for obtaining them. I wish you would authorise these facilities in the case of those Regiments, at all events, requiring men, and for the Army at large, should the increase in the strength of Regiments be contemplated. The summer months are our worst period for recruiting; the matter therefore requires early consideration, and on this ground, if on no other, I think it right to bring the subject to your notice. I trust you will also hasten the assembling of the Commission on Recruiting. No time is to be lost in finding out the means of retaining the services of the ten years men, and assisting recruiting in general. I am most anxious not to press you unnecessarily on the subject, but I owe it to myself to point out to you our exact position in the face of the threatening complications which are arising around us. You must

further bear in mind that Ireland, though quiet for the moment, is far from tranquil, and cannot be left without a strong Garrison, and that our American Colonial Possessions cannot spare any troops for at all events some time to come.'

TO LORD HARTINGTON.

'HORSE GUARDS, 15 *June* 1866.

'I had a good deal of conversation with Clarendon yesterday on the subject of our enlistment and other matters connected with the defence of Malta and Gibraltar. I told him I had given you a Memorandum on the subject of what seemed to be our immediate wants. He requested me to urge you strongly to bring this subject before the Cabinet to-morrow, and he led me to conclude that anything that would be proposed to you with reference to these matters would be strongly supported by himself. I hope, therefore, you will not hesitate in the present critical state of Europe and our own unpreparedness to draw the attention of the Government to the subjects referred to in my Memorandum, which embodies the first requirements. Depend upon it that, if we leave matters as they are at present and do nothing to place our establishments on a better footing than they now are, should anything serious happen to ourselves in the general scramble, the public would never forgive us for not having warned them and done the right thing in the way of precaution, in time. It is to protect ourselves from attacks that will be made upon us, should we not take these necessary precautions, that I feel so anxious that no time should be lost in placing the true position we are in before the Cabinet, and I hope therefore you will not hesitate to urge at once some decided action in the direction I have indicated.'

It has already been shown how, in 1859, the Duke had already considered the question of a reserve for the Army, and that long before it had become a question of practical politics. Indeed, generally speaking, the Duke was during the late fifties and sixties far in advance of the times, and it is extremely unjust to say that he was opposed to all reforms and changes. It is true that he very properly resisted the introduction of hastily considered and ill-matured innovations. But he was on all occasions only too ready to welcome any changes which really seemed likely to increase the efficiency of the Army whose welfare he had so much at heart.

He is generally credited, and by some who should have known better, with opposing the introduction of short service and reserve, and of doing all he could to oppose Mr. Cardwell in bringing about this most necessary innovation. But at this time, 1866, we find him advocating that men should be permitted to go on 'unlimited furlough' after having served seven years with the colours, in order that they might help to form a reserve, a plan which is nothing else than the germ of the future system of short service and reserve, credit for the introduction of which has generally been attributed to Mr. Cardwell alone. But here we have incontestable proof that the plan had been advocated by the Duke before either Mr. Cardwell, or the subsequent forward school of military thought as represented by Lord Wolseley, had probably considered the subject seriously. The memorandum in question is presented below; and, in addition to its bearing on the question of a reserve, it contains some admirably sound remarks about the Militia, all of which would equally well apply to-day.

MEMO. FOR GENERAL PEEL, 1866.

'Without attempting to compare our military organisation with that of Continental Armies, inasmuch as our conditions of service are in every respect so dissimilar that no sort of parallel can be drawn between them, I yet think that recent military events require our immediate attention, not alone because other nations are endeavouring to assimilate their military institutions to the altered spirit and necessities of the age, but because, situated as we are, we are even in a worse position in this respect than our neighbours for this simple reason, that whilst they are in a position to expand their forces at the shortest possible notice through the powers of the conscription, we have no sort of Reserve to fall back upon with the exception of our Militia, and thus we require time and vast expenditure to bring up our establishment from a state of peace to one of war.

'It is to this point, therefore, that our attention should at once be directed; and to meet the case it appears to me that there are two objects which it will be necessary for us to attain; the 1st, To form a body of men to the extent of about 40,000, which may be relied upon as the Reserve of the Army; the 2nd, To make the Militia force more available as a support to the Army, not by local connection but for general purposes, than it is at present.

'During peace it should be our first object to keep up our Cadres of Regiments, Battalions, and Batteries, though the actual rank and file may be of diminished strength, provided we have the certainty that our organisation is such that it is capable of easy and certain expansion. At present we have no such certainty, and indeed we may fairly say that our expansion means are *nil*. How then is this force to be created? I am anxious that we should have the means of bringing up every Regiment, Battalion, and Battery to a war footing by the formation of some Reserve force of 40,000 men.

'This would, as far as my estimate goes, give 1000 men per Battalion of Infantry, 600 or 700 men for each Regiment of Cavalry, and an average of 170 men for each Battery of Artillery, exclusive of those in India, leaving a further margin for the other necessities for an Army to take the field.

'What we must endeavour to ascertain is how this force could be obtained *at once*, and with the least amount of cost to the State.

'I think that the plan hinted at for allowing men after seven years' service in the ranks, if at home, to go on unlimited furlough, might fairly be tried, and would probably produce a certain number of men.

'I think, further, that all men purchasing their discharges should be compelled to serve in the Reserve for a certain number of years.

'Another mode of increasing this force would be to make it compulsory in all cases of future enlistment for a man to serve in the Reserve Force who refuses to re-engage for a second term of service, and bounty to be offered to those men now willing to re-engage who are at present in the service. These methods would not, however, at once give anything like the number of men required by my calculation, and I therefore think that, in the first instance, at least a strong appeal ought to be made to the Militia, calling upon every Regiment to give a quota of men according to their proportional strength, who, whilst continuing to serve in the Militia during peace, are ready to join the Army at once in war, not alone for the purpose of home defence, but also with a view to make up the strength of Regiments, Battalions, and Batteries serving abroad.

'It may become a question for consideration whether, in case this system answers, it might not be well to continue that as the proper Reserve Force for the Army, but that may become a subject of after consideration.

'Having thus sketched out the mode of obtaining an actual and reliable Reserve Force for the Army, I next turn to the Militia; and as regards this important branch of the service, I think it is capable of great improvement,

and requires to be brought into closer contact with the Army than it is at present. Local interests and influences ought, I think, to be set aside, and all difficulties should be removed which tend to make it, as it is at present, a sort of competing force with the Army. One great move in this direction would be to bring Militia Regiments to a certain extent annually in contact with the Army by concentration for drill, say for a fortnight, in our main camps of exercise. This would materially assist in producing a military spirit throughout the Militia service; it would develop the efficiency of the officers and the drill of the men, and would lead to that spirit of emulation which is the life and soul of the military profession. It would be a matter for consideration whether every Militia Regiment should not, in addition to its commanding officer, selected for local or county reasons, have an efficient field-officer, whether Lieut.-Colonel or Major selected from the half-pay of the Army, to whom the general efficiency, drill, and organisation of the Regiment, in conjunction with the Adjutant, might be permanently entrusted. The position of this officer need not necessarily interfere with the legitimate duties of the commanding officer whenever the Regiment is embodied for either drill or permanent duty. This officer might be placed in charge of the Reserve men of the Army belonging to the Militia Regiment, and might be held responsible for their efficiency and for their being forthcoming when required. As there are a large number of field-officers, more particularly Majors, of youth and activity on half-pay, the expense of such an arrangement ought not to amount to any considerable outlay, as a small addition to their present half-pay ought to meet every requirement.

'The position of Lords-Lieutenant as regards the Militia Force will have to be considered as bearing on this point; but this, being a question of policy, is one that must be decided upon by the Government, and cannot be treated of in these remarks.

'I have not in these suggestions referred to the Volunteer Force, as I consider its constitution to be so peculiar and exceptional that I do not think we should be justified in disturbing the principle upon which it has been established, and which has thus far been attended with so much success.

'Simple as the views are here expressed, I cannot help thinking that they form the groundwork for deliberation, and as such I place them in your hands.'

The new Secretary of State, General Peel, to whom the foregoing memorandum was addressed, and who came into office in July 1866, was also not backward in realising the extreme importance of creating a Reserve; and in the November of the year he assumed office he addressed to

the Duke the following admirable letter in which, unlike many politicians, he aimed at creating a system which would endure, and not merely, as a matter of expediency, suffice for the exigencies of the moment. It will be observed that in principle, and at times in some details, General Peel sketches out the scheme which was subsequently adopted by Mr. Cardwell.

The Duke's attitude, as will be seen from his reply, was an extremely fair and open one. He was prepared to admit the good points of the scheme; but he was properly averse from rushing headlong into ill-considered changes, and it would have been well if, in subsequent years, succeeding War Secretaries had always had such sound advice to rely upon.

His Royal Highness was averse from reductions until a new system was in working order, and in this desire he was undoubtedly right. He was desirous of obtaining the advice of certain General Officers who had exceptional experience in the matter; and, generally speaking, he was most anxious that all possible light should be turned on the subject before a decision was finally come to.

In a tentative manner, the subject of a Reserve for the Army was dealt with in the following year (1867) by the Reserve Forces Act[1] and the Militia Reserve Act;[2] measures which will be dealt with in detail when the important subject of Short Service and a Reserve is considered as a whole in a future chapter.

FROM GENERAL PEEL.

'War Office, 30 *November* 1866.

'I will be at the Horse Guards to-morrow at one o'clock; but before we discuss the organisation of an Army of Reserve in a committee or the presence of others I should like to convince Y.R.H. (which I trust to be able to do) that the plan I propose is the best adapted, if not the *only* one, to enable you to keep up your present *number of regiments* on a peace establishment. Unless I can secure not only Y.R.H. *concurrence*, but warm support arising from conviction of the truth of the statement I am about to make, I should despair of success, as I *foresee* that this plan will be warmly opposed by

[1] 30 and 31 Vict. c. 110.

[2] 30 and 31 Vict. c. 111.

two directly opposite parties on directly opposite grounds. It will be opposed by what I call the extreme *War Party* on the ground of its reducing the establishments of regiments (or at all events the numbers) on their return from Foreign Service, and allowing men to quit the ranks (although not the service) before the expiration of their term of service. This party would have all our regiments kept up to the same establishment, and always have a standing regular Army irrespective of reliefs required for Foreign Service, and if this was *possible*, I might probably agree with them. But after forty years' experience of Parliament, I venture to say that such a proposal, even if agreed to in a moment of panic, would not last for two years *after* the panic had subsided. I want to legislate for the future, and with some prospect of being able to lay the foundation for an Army that might be raised at once, in event of a prospect of war, to some reasonable dimensions. Now I know that Y.R.H. will understand the argument which I am about to use, although I dare not mention it to others. I am looking more to the *future* than the present. Even next year, the number of regiments *at home* will be greater than the *proportion* required for reliefs, and I feel certain that, if peace continues, this proportion will increase every year. There is a very strong feeling in the House of Commons, and I believe in the country, that our Colonies ought not to be an expense to us, and that they ought to keep up their military establishments, and the instant the burden is thrown upon them they will reduce those establishments to the lowest possible ebb. I am still afraid of the Colonial Ministers pressing reductions in the number of regiments at the Cape or in the West Indies, and of this I am *certain*, that the Indian Government, the instant their railways are constructed, will greatly reduce their European force. I *know* this to be in contemplation. Now I ask Y.R.H. to consider what the effect of this will be. I shall have *next* year two regiments only in excess of the proportion for the reliefs. If the establishment of some regiments had not been reduced, this would have caused an excess of some two or three thousand men over the numbers voted for the present year. It would have been very easy to defend this addition, and the excess in the proportion might not have been observed; but when it comes, as it very rapidly will do, to twenty regiments instead of *two*, I ask Y.R.H. if you think that the House of Commons would consent in time of peace to add 20,000 men to the numbers voted for the British establishment, and whether they would not call for a *reduction of regiments*? Now this is exactly what I want to *prevent*: I want to have cadres of regiments that could be filled up *at any time* from the First Reserve. I think permitting men who have completed their tour of foreign service to join the First Reserve would be a very popular thing in the country, and would have the effect (with other measures) of stimulating

recruiting. My object is to keep up the *number of regiments* without keeping up a large standing army.

'So much for the first opponents to the plan.

'The second Party will be the extreme Peace Party, who will violently object to an Army of Reserve that may be employed abroad. They will say that it will be an *inducement* for a Government to go to war, or at all events to maintain a position and hold language to other nations that may lead to a war. Now I freely admit that this plan would place us in a very different position as to our military resources to be employed abroad to what we are in at present, and it is exactly what I intend it *should do*. If, when the Prussians and Austrians entered Holstein as they *said*, only with the intention of preserving peace, we *could have said*: "Well, we highly approve of this, and *we will send* 50,000 men and our Fleet into the Baltic," the gross robbery that was afterwards committed would never have been perpetrated. I am the last person in the country who wishes to see us engaged in war or interfering with our neighbours, but we shall rapidly descend into a very insignificant position if we cannot ensure being listened to with respect at all events.

'I know the difficulties I shall have to encounter from Military Men, Lords-Lieutenant and Quakers; but if I can really *enlist* Y.R.H. to take up the case with me, and fight it out against all opposition (not to details, for I will give up any of them), to the principle of having a reserve of forty or fifty thousand men, and to keep up the number of regiments, I will set to work with Y.R.H. with a perfect conviction that we shall succeed. Lord Longford is one of the extreme *Military Party*, and asks for things that are perfectly *impossible*.

'I shall be satisfied with the best that *can be obtained*.

'If Y.R.H. should ever reach the end of this long appeal to you for earnest *co-operation in* carrying out what I believe would be a great scheme, I would venture again to request that we might talk it over *together* and be perfectly agreed, *before* we call in others. I am quite ready to consider other questions bearing on this. Would it be better, for instance, instead of a quarter of a pound of meat and shell-jackets, to raise the pay of the soldier twopence a day? If men are enlisted for twelve years, whether the relief should be every eight years instead of ten, which would give two-thirds service abroad and one-third at home?'

TO GENERAL PEEL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 *December* 1866.

'I have considered very fully our conversation of Saturday and the two Memos. herewith returned. I have also carefully read the Debate in Hansard on the introduction of the Limited Enlistment Act by Lord Grey into the House

of Lords, more particularly the speeches of the late Duke of Wellington and the present Lord Derby, then Lord Stanley; and I have satisfied myself that we ought to act very cautiously before extending the objections then made to that Act, and which experience has, I think, proved to have been more or less correct. The Duke of Wellington based his vote objecting to the Bill on the ground that the old soldiers would not leave the Army, and implied that if he thought the result of the measure would be the reverse of what he anticipated and feared, he should decidedly oppose the measure. We have now discovered that the Ten Years Enlistment Act has had a very different result from that anticipated by the Duke, and the consequence has been that we have lately had a Royal Commission to consider the subject of Recruiting for the Army, and particularly with reference to the Ten Years Enlistment Act. Such being the case, would it be prudent for us to extend rather than diminish the objections to that Act by allowing the men to leave the ranks on unlimited furlough after seven or eight years service? Such a step would add to the difficulties already created, and would require more extended Recruiting for the Army, and that, moreover, at a time when we find already a great difficulty in procuring Recruits, and are endeavouring to devise measures for inducing men to re-engage more largely than they seem now disposed to do. I could not take upon myself the responsibility of solving this grave problem without taking further military advice. I feel that my first duty is to do nothing, and advocate no measure, which would in any way impair the efficiency of the Army. I am not satisfied that the measure proposed may not produce this result. I therefore shrink from the decision of so important a point without eliciting the opinion of officers in whom I can place implicit confidence. In France the question of reorganising the Army and increasing its numerical strength is now under consideration. In that country the will of the Emperor is supreme and is unfettered by any constitutional check, and yet he has collected around him all the Marshals of France and other leading Generals of the Army to aid him with their counsel and advice. If such a step be necessary in a country swayed by the will of one man, how much more is it so in a free country like ours, in which such freedom of thought exists on all subjects? Our only chance of success is to carry the Army and Militia with us, as well as Parliament and the country, in what we propose to do. I do not feel at all satisfied that we shall enlist the feeling of either of these Forces, more particularly the Army, unless our opinion should be backed by the weight of such military authority as I should wish to bring to bear upon it. Should you object to a Commission or a Committee? against which I admit that many arguments might be used. Would you, at all events, permit me to put certain leading questions confidentially to the follow-

ing officers, as coming from myself, and upon which I would like to elicit their opinion?—Generals Forster, Lord William Paulet, Sir Hope Grant, Sir George Wetherall, Sir James Scarlett. The three former as my executive officers, and the two latter as old Adjutants-General, would bring with them the weight and experience of the positions they have all so satisfactorily filled for a number of years. The questions I would wish to put to these officers are the following:—

'In what manner would you form a Reserve Force to supplement the Peace Establishment of the Army, connecting such a force as much as possible with the Militia, and taking into consideration the financial part of the question as bearing upon its acceptance by Parliament?

'Could a system of unlimited furlough be applied, for obtaining men for this force from the ranks of the Army, and what conditions should be attached to such furlough?

'To what extent and in what manner could men of the Militia be made available for the Reserve Force? On the result of the replies received from the officers stated above, I am quite ready to adopt my own conclusions. If, therefore, you should concur in my request, I would at once proceed to elicit the information I require. As regards the question of Establishments referred to in these Memoranda, my views are decidedly in favour of larger Establishments and more uniform ones than those we have at present, and to this extent I fully agree with the opinion expressed; but if it is a question of keeping up Cadres of Regiments with reduced Establishments as against larger Establishments and the disbandment of Cadres or Battalions or Corps, in that case I do not hesitate to pronounce in favour of maintaining the Cadres and having reduced Establishments, however much I otherwise deprecate them. However, Establishments depend in a great measure on the existence of a Reserve Force to fill them up. At present we have no such Reserve Force, and the very reduced Establishments we now have are, I think, very dangerous. The moment I have a good Reserve Force really in hand I should not mind the lowness of the Establishments, but I think it is a great mistake to reduce the Establishments to the extent now done, until we actually possess the Reserve Force; and therefore at the present moment, with Ireland on our hands, with England not in a position to be entirely denuded of troops, as it now is, with the world in a very uncomfortable and excited state, I think our Establishments of Regiments ought to be decidedly *increased*, and on no account diminished, for literally at this moment, should matters go wrong in Ireland, we have *nothing* but a very badly organised Militia to fall back upon, and this could not be brought into the field for several weeks at the very earliest. I am afraid that my letter contains much that you will hardly anticipate after the conversations we have had on these subjects; but reflection convinces me

that we are dealing with a subject of such vast importance that one false step may produce the most lamentable results. It is to guard myself against giving you injudicious advice that I think it better frankly to communicate to you my views, which I am quite prepared to discuss with you to the fullest extent.'

FROM GENERAL PEEL.

'WAR OFFICE, 20 *December* 1866.

'I have read with great attention the various recommendations contained in the answers of the officers to whom Y.R.H. applied, and am sorry to say that I can hardly extract one practicable suggestion from them. I must exclude altogether any proposal for lengthening the term of the first enlistment beyond the twelve years recommended by the Royal Commission, also the application of ballot to raising the Militia; and I am afraid we must confine ourselves to the consideration of how far the system of granting furloughs can be adopted without injuring the Army. The Royal Commissioners recommend that the Secretary of State for War should have power by enactment to commute the last five years' service of a soldier for service with the Militia or Reserve, which is going far beyond what I propose. I should like to talk the subject over with Y.R.H. with the view of appointing a small committee to consider my proposal and to work out any details in connection with it that may be necessary. But no time must be lost about it. I must be prepared with some scheme to submit to the Cabinet early in January. I have taken extracts from each of the papers which I now return to Y.R.H., and should like to point out what I consider the objections to them. I do not think that my proposal is at all affected by anything I have read in these papers. If Y.R.H. can look in here any time to-morrow or mention any hour at which I can call upon you, I will not fail to do so.'

CHAPTER XV

FOREIGN WARS—1859-71

General Remarks on Foreign Wars and on War Preparations. H.R.H.'s Diary of War, 1859. American Civil War. The Trent Affair. Danger of England being drawn in. H.R.H. on War Preparation. Selection of Generals. Necessity for a War Committee. H.R.H.'s Diary of American Civil War. Wars of 1864 and 1866. Their Effect on our Military Institutions. H.R.H.'s Diary of Franco-German War.

It is proposed to devote the present chapter to the various wars undertaken by civilised Powers, other than Great Britain, between 1859 and 1871. They will naturally only be dealt with from a very broad standpoint, and the narrative of events will be taken *verbatim* from the Duke's Diary. In some instances they produced little or no effect on the ordinary military routine in Great Britain and her Colonies, whereas in others, notably in that of the American Civil War of 1861-64, the course of hostilities more than once narrowly escaped involving this country in war, and were the cause of grave anxiety and considerable war preparations by our Government. Happily in every case war was averted, but the effects of some of these great struggles, especially those of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and of the Franco-German War of 1870-71, were far-reaching; and whilst they exercised enormous influence on the military conditions hitherto prevailing in Europe, they were not without some little effect on our own rulers and their army methods. It will be noted throughout, and more especially in the chapter dealing with Army Organisation during the same period, that the Duke never lost an opportunity of directing the attention of the Secretary of State for War, and through him of the Government, to the dangerous weakness and general condition of unpreparedness of our own army as each successive emergency arose. But, unfortunately for

the nation, no ministry had the courage to face the facts of the case fairly and squarely, thus justifying the statement made by the Duke of Wellington in 1838 to which allusion has already been made.[1]

Events, however, come to a climax after the Franco-Prussian War, and from that time may be said to date the first really determined efforts on the part of the Government of this country to bring our Army more into harmony with the modern methods of organisation existing on the Continent.

H.R.H.'s Diary of the Principal Events of the War of 1859 between Austria and the Allied Forces of France and Sardinia.

'War has broken out on the Continent between the French and Sardinians on the one hand, and the Austrians on the other. It is my intention from time to time to give the course of military events.

'The Austrians crossed the Ticino on 29 April 1859 and established themselves on Piedmontese territory. The French at once commenced the passage of the Alps under considerable difficulties, and also embarked troops largely from Marseilles and Toulon for Genoa. The French are divided into five Corps under the immediate command of the Emperor, with Marshal Vaillant as Major-General of the Army. They are commanded respectively by Marshals Baraguay d'Hilliers and Canrobert, Generals MacMahon, Niel, and Prince Napoleon. The Guard are under Reignaut de St. Jean d'Angélis. The Austrians under Marshal Giulay with the Corps, Count Stadion, Benedek, Zobel, etc.

'The French and Sardinians amount to about 200,000 men, the Austrians are supposed to be of about the same strength. The French concentrate about Alessandria holding towards the north the line of the Sesia. The Austrians are in force at Pavia and Piacenza.

'Affairs of outposts commence the war. No attempts are made by the Austrians to make a dash at Turin, owing, it is thought, to the immense quantity of rain that has fallen rendering the country impassable.

'The first serious affair takes place at Montebello on 22 May. Count Stadion's Corps makes a forced reconnaissance, takes Casteggio and Montebello, and surprises Forey's Division, French and Sardinian cavalry under General Sinnay. The fighting hard on both sides; but the French and Sardinians hold their ground and the Austrians retire again

[1] Chap. iii. p. 35, *Apsley House MSS.*, Letter to Sir Willoughby Gurdon.

in the evening, not pursued by the French. Heavy loss on both sides.

'Garibaldi with his volunteers enters Lombardy by Arona to establish himself at Varese; raises the neighbouring country and, after a severe contest, takes Como; General D'Urban is sent against him and succeeds in forcing him back into the mountains.

'*June* 3.—The Austrians made an advance with a view, it is thought, of covering their retreat; Garibaldi is said to have again entered Como, the Austrians retiring themselves from Varese. The French have evacuated Casteggio, Montebello, and Voghera, which is occupied by the Austrians. The Corps of General Niel is at Novara, where the Emperor is said to have established his headquarters. It appears to me probable that the Austrian Army will retire upon Mantua and Verona.

'*June* 5, *Sunday*.—Heard to-day that a great battle was fought yesterday, Saturday, at Magenta, and that the Austrians were completely defeated with the loss of many guns, 15,000 men killed and wounded, and 5000 prisoners. French loss estimated at 2000. This seems altogether incredible, but so it is reported from Paris and Turin.

'*June* 6.—To-day very different accounts have come in. It appears that the fighting has been desperate on both sides, that the Guard had to stand unsupported for two hours, and that MacMahon was made a Marshal of France for having, as stated in the telegram from Paris, "*saved the day*." Further, the Austrians took one gun, the French *two only*. Also from Vienna we hear that it was only the Corps Clam Gallas and Edward Lichtenstein, the two last arrived from Germany, who were engaged, the whole of the rest of the Army of Count Giulay being still intact and concentrated between Pavia and Piacenza. Milan has been undoubtedly evacuated and Victor Emanuel proclaimed King of Lombardy, but it does not seem as if the Emperor and King had entered Milan, and this still strengthens me in the conviction that, as stated by the Austrians, the contest was renewed on Sunday, and that it is going rather more in favour of the Austrians.

'*Tuesday*, 7.—We heard nothing all day from Paris, but from Vienna in the afternoon we hear of yesterday, Monday, 11.30 P.M., that the Austrians had gained the victory. This, however, requires confirmation, but, strange to say, there is no news still from Paris, and this looks most suspicious.

'*Wednesday, June* 8.—The Emperor and King of Sardinia entered Milan this morning, which proves that the victory on the side of the Allies was so far complete that they have gained their point. Details are still wanting, but it does not appear as if any further battle had been fought after that of Magenta.

'*Sunday*, 12.—The details of the battle have now reached us from both sides. It is clear that the battle was a most

severe one and the issue doubtful for some time, but that it ended ultimately with the success of the Allies. The French, having rapidly concentrated their forces from the right to their left, crossed the Ticino at Turbigo under MacMahon on 3 June. The following day at ten the Guard attacked the position of Buffalora, which they carried after a heavy loss, and were able to maintain themselves there in spite of their isolated position till MacMahon came to their rescue by attacking Magenta, which was carried and lost several times. The Austrian Corps engaged were at first very feeble, and consisted at first of a portion of the 1st Corps, Clam Gallas, and the 2nd Corps, Edward Lichtenstein. Towards the afternoon the 7th Corps, Zobel, came up, and at five in the evening the Corps of Prince Schwarzenberg. Two Corps and a half of the Austrians were not engaged at all. Nothing can exceed the want of strategy of Count Giulay, who seems to have been completely deceived by the French, and to have had his right flank completely turned. The Austrian troops fought most bravely, but were sent into action much fatigued after incessant marching, some for twenty-four hours, and without having had anything to eat. They were thus cut up in detail, but still they fought nobly. The French suffered nearly as heavily in killed and wounded as the Austrians, and the carnage must have been perfectly frightful. Had the Guard been more severely pressed, and been repulsed, the position of the French Army would have been a most perilous one. As it was, MacMahon decidedly saved the day. It is stated that neither Canrobert's Corps nor the Sardinians could come up in time to render the necessary assistance in the second line, which had been expected from them early in the day. Canrobert's Corps did good service, however, later in the day. The Emperor is said to have been somewhere near the Guard, and there is a story current that he was nearly taken prisoner on the Milan road.

'There has been another sharp engagement at Melegnano between Baraguay's Corps and Benedek's, in which the latter was forced to retire after severe fighting, on which occasion the Zouaves lost 500 men. The Austrian Army has evacuated Pavia, Piacenza, Ancona, Bologna, and Ferrara, and is retiring behind the Adda, probably to the line of the Mincio.

'*June* 25.—We heard to-day that another great battle had been fought yesterday on the right bank of the Mincio, that it had lasted from five in the morning till nine at night, and that the Austrian Army commanded by the Emperor in person had been defeated and had retired across the Mincio to the position it had occupied before its advance. The loss on both sides is said to have been very heavy, and the Austrians are stated to have lost many guns, prisoners, and standards.

'*June* 26, *and subsequent days.*—The news of the great battle of Solferino is most fully confirmed. It appears that on the morning of the 23rd, the Emperor of Austria decided

upon attacking the French before they reached the positions on the right bank of the river. He accordingly moved his whole Army across that night, consisting of two Armies, the 1st under Wimpffen on the left, and the 2nd under Schlist on the right. The French forestalled this movement, to a certain extent, by breaking up early in the morning on the 24th and making a forward movement before the Austrians had got thoroughly into their new positions. Both parties thus met to some extent unexpectedly before Solferino, the key to the Austrian position. The Sardinians were on the left towards the Lake of Guarda; 1st Corps, Baraguay d'Hilliers, next, supported by the Guard, 2nd Corps, MacMahon on the right of the 1st in front of Cavriana, the 4th, Niel, on the right again in the plain, and Canrobert, the 3rd, on the entire right of all towards Mantua. The Austrians had two Armies, nine Corps in line, the 1st Army on the left under Wimpffen, the 2nd under Schlist the right, holding the strong positions. Benedek's Corps, the 8th, was opposed to and I believe drove back the Sardinians; Stadion's, 5th, was at Solferino supported by Clam Gallas, 1st, and Zobel, 7th, towards Cavriana. Of the 1st Army, Schwarzenberg's Corps, 3rd, and Schuffgolch, 9th, were in the plain towards Medole, the 10th under Wirna, and the 11th were to the extreme left watching Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, who was not near at all. These Corps were not engaged, and had evidently been sent far too much to the left; and the 2nd Corps, Lichtenstein, returned to Mantua and did not come forward at all. The French Cavalry in large masses was in the plain and connected the Corps of MacMahon and Niel. Such being the disposition, the French made their attack on Solferino, and after fourteen hours' hard fighting, after frequent repulses at last succeeded in carrying the formidable position, breaking through the ranks of the Austrians who, however, managed to effect a very orderly retreat, which proves how fairly contested was the day, and how nearly the battle was balanced in the scales. Had the Austrian centre at Solferino and Cavriana been vigorously supported, and had the left of the Austrians not been so absurdly extended, I have no doubt that the French would have been defeated; as it is, they have a right to the victory and to all the advantages arising from it, which are certainly incalculable. The loss on both sides is fearful. The French are known to have 20,000 men *hors de combat*, the Piedmontese 5500, the Austrians 16,000, thus proving that it was mainly by the sacrifice of life on the part of the victors that they carried the day.

'*June* 27.—The Austrians have crossed the Mincio, and the French are now preparing to follow them, the Sardinians investing Peschiera on the extreme left of the line. The 5th Corps and Prince Napoleon's completed its junction with the Emperor.

'*July* 9.—We were startled to-day by hearing of an

Armistice having been asked for by the Emperor Napoleon and consented to by the Emperor Francis Joseph. It was signed yesterday, 8th, by Marshal Vaillant, General Martimprey, and General Rocca on the one side, and Generals Hope and Mensdorff on the other. It is to last until 15 August, and the Armies are to remain in their present positions.

'*July* 11.—We were further startled by hearing that a meeting was to take place at Villafranca between the two Emperors this morning at nine o'clock.

The news contained in the above lines has proved correct. An Armistice was at once agreed to at Villafranca after the meeting of the Emperors, which was subsequently followed by the Treaty of Zurich, by which Lombardy was ceded to France, which latter Power made it over to Sardinia. Thus Northern Italy becomes united under the King Victor Emanuel, with the exception of Venetia, which remains a province of Austria. There are other provisions of the Treaty, which, however, has proved more or less ineffectual, inasmuch as the provisions, such as they were, have never been really carried out, with the exception of the cession of Lombardy, which has been made over, as intended.'

This ends the Italian Campaign of 1859.

The desperate struggle between the Northern and Southern States of America, which commenced in 1861, very nearly involved this country in war. From the first, it was evident that the Northern party did not entertain very friendly feelings towards Great Britain, and our statesmen watched closely the course of events, and as a precautionary measure our small force in Canada was gradually strengthened.

As early as 16 May 1861 the Secretary of State, Lord Herbert, wrote to the Duke, 'The Government are of opinion that we might well, and at once, send another Line Battalion to Canada,' at the same time asking him to name a Regiment for this purpose.

Shortly after this it was decided to send more Regiments, and on 4 June Lord Herbert writes about 'the Battalions under orders,' and adds that it is important they should go as soon as possible.

The same day arrangements were made for increasing the stock of rifles, accoutrements, and ammunition in the Armouries in Canada.

Sir Fenwick Williams, the General in command in Canada,

wrote to the Duke in June on the condition of affairs there, and the latter sent his letter to Lord Herbert, who, in returning it, alludes to a Battery of Artillery having been sent out, and adds, 'This American effervescence will pass away, tho' what he [Sir F. Williams] says is true, that the end of their difficulties will be the beginning of our own. I think the sooner we can commence operations with the New Brunswick and Canadian Forces the better.'

Thus, on 31 August 1861, the Secretary of State, Sir George Lewis, who had succeeded Lord Herbert, writes that 'Lord Palmerston wishes that arrangements should be made for sending three more Regiments to Canada.' This by the way would seem to have been one of Lord Palmerston's ready methods of enforcing attention to his views, since only a brief time before he had desired the Secretary of State to have 'three Regiments in readiness to proceed to Smyrna,' where there were some diplomatic differences which required arrangement. It is only fair to remark here, that nothing could more clearly condemn any system of organisation of the British land forces than the impossibility, under existing conditions, of thus at short notice despatching 'three Battalions,' or even one, on such a mission as was indicated by Lord Palmerston.

It is a fact that upon the small expedition to Ashantee being decided upon in 1896, there was not a single Battalion at Aldershot, or indeed in the whole Army serving at home, able to take the field without calling up the 'Reserves,' which was obviously impossible. Not only was this the case, but when a 'special service' Battalion was decided upon and 25 men each called for from eleven of the Regiments considered to be most efficient for active service, it was found most difficult to obtain even that small number among the 777 men who formed the nominal paper strength of the Battalions concerned who could fulfil the simple qualifications demanded, viz. 24 years of age and with not under five years' service. In the outcome, by means of taking various 'employed' men such as mess or canteen waiters, officers' servants, field officers' grooms, and such like, in fact the few men who were by regulation especially exempt for being

taken for the annual Indian drafts, the various corps thus called upon succeeded in mustering the required total number. That the evils and defects of the old long-service system were many is not disputed. But that the system introduced by Lord Cardwell abolished all these it is idle to contend. It certainly provided us with a Reserve; but at the expense of rendering every Battalion on home service utterly unfit to take the field. Hence Lord Wolseley's apt simile of 'squeezed lemons.'

On 21 September Sir George Lewis expressed his opinion that 'the American Government are becoming a little more reasonable,' and for a time matters seemed quieter.

Suddenly in December 1861 came the startling news of the seizure of the Confederate delegates when on board the British steamer *Trent* on the high seas by the too zealous captain of a Federal frigate.

It was at once realised that nothing but the unconditional and immediate release of the delegates, and full and complete apology and reparation on the part of the Federal Government, could avert war. For once public foreign opinion was on our side, and the Secretary of State writes to the Duke, upon whom the stress of the military preparations fell, on 4 October, that 'the French disposition is kindly, and they will support our demand for reparation at Washington.'

Fortunately for the United States, their President, Mr. Abraham Lincoln, had the wisdom to see that to go to war with a first-class naval Power like Great Britain would ruin the prospects of his side, inasmuch as it would render any further blockade of the coasts of the Southern States impossible.

Meanwhile, preparations for strongly reinforcing Canada were undertaken. On 7 December the Duke writes officially to the Secretary of State, reporting the immediate embarkation of an additional force of 10,000 men, with Artillery, and requesting authority to raise the Battalions under orders to 1000 rank and file each, and the Depôts for the same to a strength of 200 rank and file, so as 'to keep the Service Companies complete should hostilities actually break out.' This arrangement was to be applied also to all Regiments

already serving in Canada, and the Royal Artillery under orders for service, was likewise to be put on a war footing. He further suggests the calling out of certain portions of the Militia for permanent duty.

The Duke also addressed this letter to the Secretary of State:—

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 7 *December* 1861.

'I send you two letters just received from Sir Fenwick Williams. I called myself at the War Office in the hopes of finding you there, but you were gone. From this letter you will observe how badly they are off for arms in that country. The 30,000 stand sent in the *Melbourne* will increase the supply to5 2,000, but from Sir Allan Macnab and the Canadian Minister whom I saw to-day, I find that more than 100,000 men will require to be armed. Under the circumstances, I would earnestly entreat of you to forward a further supply of arms for at least 50,000 men, and I should prefer them being all Enfields to having any smoothbores, as suggested by Sir Fenwick Williams. If these arms cannot be got up the St. Lawrence, let them be sent by way of St. John, and thence by land. I have seen Sir George Wetherall, whom I requested to come up from Manchester. He is full of information, and I would wish you to see him. I have asked him to call upon me at ten o'clock to-morrow, Sunday. If you could let me know at what time you could see him, I would direct him to call on you. I have seen Lord de Grey. He informs me that more tonnage is to be taken up, and that the troops held in readiness are to embark. The question of Chief Command is uppermost in my mind, and after seeing the Canadian gentlemen to-day I feel convinced that, however popular Sir Fenwick Williams may personally be, he does not inspire any confidence in the Colony. Under these circumstances, it really becomes a matter almost of necessity to send out some General Officer senior to him to take the Chief Command. The only names that present themselves as possible are Lord Clyde or Sir George Wetherall; the latter has most experience of Canada, but he is a very old man. Lord Clyde would probably be most acceptable to the public. Would it not be well, therefore, for the Cabinet to decide what they will do in the matter? Sir Richard Airey has great experience in Canada, but probably he would hardly be of sufficient standing to supersede General Williams. He might, however, be employed in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick should you decide upon sending Lord Clyde or Sir George Wetherall in Chief Command to Canada. The more I inquire as to the capacities of General Officers, the less I like them. . . . As

you have decided upon these additional troops going, I should be disposed to send these four General Officers, Sir Norman Franks, Lord William Paulet, Major-General Russell—an excellent officer—Major-General Rumley.

'The Guards will form a separate Brigade. For this command I should select Major-General Lord Frederick Paulet. I really do not think it at all signifies that two General Officers should be sent who are brothers, provided they are both good men. I will consider as to who could be made Chief of the Staff, and should you decide upon not sending anybody out to supersede General Williams, we must do the best we can for him by giving him a very competent man as Chief of the Staff.

'*PS.*—In the present state of affairs it would be a great advantage to all the departments if the War Committee were again assembled that used to meet in former days. Would you ask Lord Palmerston to agree to this proposal and call us together for Monday week should there be any decisive necessity?'

The following letter shows that the Duke's suggestion that the War Committee should resume its sittings was accepted by the Secretary of State for War:—

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, *Sunday.*

'I have sent to Sir George Wetherall, and hope he will call on you to-day. I shall be most happy to attend at the War Office at two o'clock to-morrow, Monday.

'I think the meeting of the War Committee will be very valuable to expedite all matters connected with our American difficulties.'

The incidents arising out of the American Civil War partake of a somewhat different character from the other foreign wars which are dealt with in this chapter. For, as has been shown, in this case we were very nearly being drawn in also. A few remarks, then, with regard to the effect of the civil strife in America on our military policy in England will be more necessary than in the case of other foreign wars.

It will be observed that the Duke was by no means easy in his mind as regards the qualifications of our available Generals at that time; and that in the postscript of his letter to Sir George Lewis he alludes to the great advantage which would be derived if the 'War Committee was again

assembled that used to meet in former days.' This scientific consideration of war problems has always been with us a thorny question, and various expedients have at different times been tried. But none of these hitherto have borne the test of war very satisfactorily.

In this particular instance before us, at any rate, the spirit of the country was thoroughly aroused, and for some days it appeared as if war were inevitable. But on 8 January 1862 the Secretary of State writes to H.R.H. and encloses a copy of a telegram from Lord Lyons of 27 December 1861, in which he said he had received 'a very long note from Mr. Seward, announcing that the four prisoners will be delivered to me when and where I please.'

Thus terminated one of the most serious crises in our history, and looking back at the various phases of the great struggle between North and South, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the very existence of the former, and the consequent marvellous modern development of the United States of America, rested, in all human probability, on the nature of the reply of Mr. Abraham Lincoln to England's ultimatum.

It may be incidentally mentioned that considerable satisfaction was evinced in England at the prompt manner in which the *Trent* Expedition, as it was popularly styled, was despatched.

In the *Morning Post* of 12 January 1862 a leading article was devoted to this subject, in which the credit of the military arrangement was given to the Duke, who had thus ordered and arranged for the rapid despatch of 10,000 men with thirty guns, and who had especially gained the confidence of the public by showing 'no favouritism' in the composition of the Staff.

H.R.H.'s Diary of the Threatened War with America, 1861.

'On 27 November of this year, 1861, accounts reached England of the forcible seizure of Messrs. Slidell and Mason, two American citizens of the Southern Republic, on board the British Royal Mail steamer *Trent*. These gentlemen

were on their passage to England as envoys from the Secessionist party of the South, the Republic being divided in feeling and interest and carrying on a civil war, the North for Empire, the South for independence.

'This outrage could not be tolerated by the British Government or people, and the law officers of the Crown having been consulted, who declared the seizure illegal, the Government lost no time in at once demanding satisfaction, and the restitution of the captured parties.

'Under these circumstances it was deemed necessary, with the least possible delay, to strengthen our naval and military forces on the North American Station, and the following military arrangements were at once carried out.

'The *Melbourne* was freighted to carry out 30,000 stand of arms, a Battery of Armstrong guns complete, with men and other stores of every description. Colonel Mackenzie was ordered out in her to act as Deputy Quartermaster-General, Colonel Lysons to go out to organise the Canadian Militia, and Colonel Gordon of the Royal Engineers to act as second in command and take general charge of the works necessary to be carried out to secure the frontier of Canada against an aggressive enemy.

'These were soon followed by further field Batteries of Artillery, the whole of the 10th Brigade, Garrison Artillery, three companies of Sappers, the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards and 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards under command of Major-General Lord Frederick Paulet, the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade, 1st and 2nd Battalion 16th Foot, 1st Battalion 15th, 2nd Battalion 17th and 96th Foot, and two Battalions, 1st and 3rd, Military Train; these troops embarked in rapid succession, 800 rank and file per Battalion during the middle of December, and all got off well and in good order.

'Major-Generals Russell and Rumley are added to the Staff of North America in addition to Major-General Napier, who had been serving there as Deputy Quartermaster-General, and is now succeeded by Colonel Mackenzie. Lieut.-Colonel Connolly was raised to Deputy Adjutant-General, and Colonel Wetherall was selected for Chief of the Staff to Sir Fenwick Williams, who is in Chief Command, Major-General Doyle commanding under him at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and in New Brunswick.

'An addition of two Batteries of the 15th Garrison Brigade were also ordered to Bermuda to reinforce the garrison of that important fortress and naval station.

'The first four Battalions named, besides the *Melbourne*, were ordered to try to make their way up the River St. Lawrence as far as either Bic or the Rivière du Loup, whence the move by rail up to Quebec is very easy. The season being a very mild and open one, every probability existed for the operation being practicable, but in the event of failure all the vessels making the attempt were to fall

back upon Halifax, and thence to St. John's, New Brunswick, whence a road was to be opened along the frontier of Maine to Canada. A large staff of officers and non-commissioned officers were at the same time sent out to assist Colonel Lysons in organising the Canadian Militia.

'Early in January we heard of the safe arrival of the *Persia* with General Russell and the 1st Battalion 16th Foot at the Rivière du Loup, whereas the *Australasian* with the 1st Battalion Rifles having got into a violent snowstorm and gale from the northward, after lying for a day and a half off Anticosti, put back to Halifax and had safely arrived there. I regret the latter circumstance, feeling confident that, with a little more perseverance on the part of the captain, he might have made his way up the St. Lawrence as easily as the *Persia* appears to have done. Other troops with General Rumley, chiefly Artillery, were rapidly arriving at Halifax.

'The spirit of the people of Canada is excellent. The greatest enthusiasm and loyalty prevail; the Militia is being called out and drilled, and it is hoped that the defence of these valuable colonial possessions will then have been secured.

'*January* 8, 1862.—The news reached us that peace was secured, inasmuch as the American Government had decided upon giving up Messrs. Mason and Slidell to our Government, thus virtually putting an end to all cause of war. It has been decided thereupon to alter nothing in our arrangements, to leave the troops in Canada now sent out there, but for the present not to send any more.

'Towards the middle and end of January we heard of the safe arrival of the troops. The *Australasian* with the Rifles on board tried to reach the St. Lawrence, but getting into bad weather she lay thirty-six hours under Anticosti and then returned to Halifax. The *Persia* at the same time, with the 1st Battalion 16th Regiment, made her way up to Bic and succeeded under great difficulties in landing her troops, but was obliged to start off during the operation, taking with her 100 men of the 16th and all the heavy stores, and leaving the whole of her boats and their crews, which could not get back to the ship after landing the troops. She got safely to Halifax. On her way she fell in with the *Adriatic*, having the Grenadier Guards on board, which vessel was going to try the St. Lawrence, and turned her back. The *Parara* was less fortunate. She made the attempt and got up to within twenty miles of Bic, after having been nearly lost on a sandbank at the entrance of the river on 4 January. Fortunately the weather, which had been thick and bad for ten days, cleared, and she got off without injury. She then proceeded up the river, but twenty miles from Bic got into such a floe of ice that she with difficulty was able to put back, and at length she

reached Sydney, Cape Boston, on January 7, where she put in for coals. We were under considerable alarm on account of this ship, all sorts of rumours being about that she was lost. Fortunately these proved unfounded, but the anxiety for some days was great. The *Melbourne* also put into Sydney for coals, and was directed to proceed to Halifax.

'All the other ships arrived safely excepting the *Adelaide*, with the headquarters 15th Foot on board, and the *Victoria* with the 96th. Both these put back to England from stress of weather much damaged, but proceeded again after repair.

'The whole of the arrangements at Halifax appear to be most admirably conducted by General Doyle, assisted in New Brunswick by General Rumley. The transports are sent on to St. John's, New Brunswick, where the troops have all been safely landed. The road called the Madawanka Road has been opened and organised by General Doyle in a highly creditable manner, and the troops are now rapidly passing along it by detachments on a perfectly organised system. The 62nd Foot have led the way, followed by detachment 16th, then by the Rifle Brigade, and then by the Guards. These troops go by sledges from Frederick to Woodstock, and thence on to Rivière du Loup, thence by train to Canada. Hitherto this service has proceeded without intermission and without accident. We have accounts of a large portion of these troops having reached their destination.'

No entries are made in the Duke's Military Diary of the events of the Danish War of 1864 nor of the Austro-Prussian campaign in the summer of 1866, presumably because neither of these induced our Government to increase our military armaments or to alter the disposition of our troops.

But it is undeniable that these two wars, brief as they were, eventually exercised considerable effect on our military organisation. The Danish war caused an undoubted feeling of disappointment and mortification throughout the country. It was felt and felt truly, that for almost the first time in our history as a nation we had stood by unmoved and allowed a small and friendly nation to be unjustifiably attacked and overwhelmed by two powerful neighbours, actuated by selfish motives and a spirit of aggression. All the same, the enormous numbers of men put into the field by Prussia, or ready to take the field, came as a rude awakening to a nation accustomed to view Continental wars from the standpoint of the comparatively small armies of the early part of

the nineteenth century. The fact that our extremely small long-service Army, possessed of no reserves beyond the good-will of the Militia, was totally unable to take a decisive share in land operations on the continent of Europe, in view of the masses of men which short service and a reserve system rendered available to our neighbours, came as a disagreeable surprise to a generation which still lived on the traditions of the Peninsular War and of Waterloo, albeit these were imperfectly understood. For it took many years to make the public realise that even in the Napoleonic Wars a British Army, unless acting in conjunction with Continental allies and foreign subsidised troops, was too weak to carry out a great Continental war by itself.

The Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866, known as the Seven Weeks' War, came as even a greater surprise to this country. All of a sudden the fact became patent to the whole nation that Prussia, by means of a perfect organisation, based on a small peace establishment which could be rapidly expanded for war service by calling up the Reserves, had been able to overwhelm and crush in a few weeks one of the great European military Powers, which had directed less attention to this important and vital subject; also to the developments of modern firearms. But the lesson of the War of 1866 which took greatest hold of the popular imagination was the unquestionable superiority of the breechloader over the muzzle-loading rifle. The famous Prussian 'needle-gun,' whose performances on the battlefields of Bohemia in the summer of 1866 caused such a profound impression on all military nations of the day, was, under the actual experience of war, found to possess other attributes than that of merely being a relatively more quick-firing weapon. A distinguished Austrian, Count Hans von Wilczek, who served in the war of 1866, not as an officer but in the ranks of his regiment, has described to the present writer how it was not the terrible rapidity of the needle-gun fire that overwhelmed them, but the fact that the needle-gun was 'always ready,' and that, upon the Austrians attempting to ram home a fresh cartridge, the Prussians were awaiting them with rifles already loaded and shot them down.

A very similar experience on an advanced scale was that of our men in South Africa, when the Boers, armed with a clip-loading magazine rifle, were able to replenish their magazines by one motion in place of the complicated and cumbrous single-charging arrangement of the British rifle, since happily abandoned.

Among the many and far-reaching results of the Seven Weeks' War, and one which brought home to the nation our military inability to take a share in Continental warfare, was the annexation of the Kingdom of Hanover to the Crown of Prussia. This, as all the world knows, had been an appanage of the British throne since George I., son of the Elector of Hanover, came to rule over us, the last British monarch to occupy the Hanoverian throne being King William IV. By the operation of the Salic Law, upon Queen Victoria's accession, the throne of Hanover passed to Her Majesty's uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, fifth son of George III.

Readers of this book will recall how, when the Duke of Cambridge's father for some years stood in direct succession to the throne of Hanover, it was deemed desirable that the son, as the possible ultimate sovereign, should spend his early years in that country. With these early transactions and his close connection with the kingdom, the exceptional interest taken by the Duke in the course of events of the 1866 campaign may be easily imagined. After the disastrous battle of Königgrätz, the Duke, foreseeing what would inevitably occur, wrote to Vienna to implore the King of Hanover, his first cousin, to make any terms he could with the victorious King of Prussia, else he would inevitably lose his throne. Events proved that this warning was only too well founded.

In connection with the great Franco-German War, as will be seen, the Duke kept a most complete if very condensed record of the main occurrences of that famous struggle, which, although not adding to the knowledge of the campaign of those who have studied military history, may be said to afford to the general reader a most clear and accurate account of the complex movements of the

huge hosts of Germans and French between the months of July 1870 and January 1871.

The Duke had, as is evidenced by his correspondence, for many years been greatly impressed with the perfection of the Prussian military organisation, and had some years before the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 urged that we should send a military attaché to Berlin to study the Prussian methods. But it is undeniable that the astounding rapidity of the Prussian mobilisation and the marked and decisive superiority their army showed in the field in the opening engagements at Spicheren and Wörth on 6 August 1870 over the French, came as a surprise to him as well as to many others. Hence a few days after the news of these German victories reached England he wrote to Lord Strathnairn on the subject, who replied as follows:—

FROM LORD STRATHNAIRN.

'45 Lower Brook Street, 10 *August* 1870.

'. . . Y.R.H.'s surprise at the decided defeats of the French troops is very natural. I venture to enclose to Y.R.H. a private letter which I was writing to Lord Grey when I received Y.R.H.'s letter. It explains and assigns the cause for what would otherwise be almost unaccountable, the successive serious reverses of the French troops. I do not believe that they have in any way deteriorated. The state of the Emperor's health renders him *inefficient* for the chief command in the present very difficult circumstances. . . . One shortcoming which is quite one of the responsibilities of the Generals and officers in command of Corps d'Armées, Divisions, and bodies of troops is difficult to be understood—the entire want of vigilance and of information of the movements of the Prussians.

'The absence of combination and connection between the different Corps d'Armées, etc., is remarkable.

'Three weeks ago Count Bernstorff told me that so little had Prussia contemplated immediate war that the Army was not mobilised or prepared for the field. Three weeks were necessary to prepare them. In this time the Emperor, from 16 July to 6 August, when the Prussians first attacked at Weissenburg, might have taken possession of the greater part of the German Provinces on the French side of the Rhine and taken up favourable positions for disputing the passage of the Rhine by the main body of the Prussian Army, an operation which must have been attended by the

difficulties which are inseparable from masses of troops with large matériel and stores crossing a river like the Rhine.

'A serious diversion by the French Fleet against the Prussian coasts would have prevented Counts Bismarck and Moltke from moving from the North of Germany the force, with which the entire inaction of the French Naval Expedition enabled Prussia to reinforce the army across the Rhine in great numerical superiority to the French.

'I venture to think that I have the advantage of sharing Y.R.H.'s opinion in what I say as to the danger which would attend our Eastern policy and menace the security of our Indian possessions should Prussia become mistress of Germany, and France be reduced to a second-rate Power.'

The Franco-German War came upon us at a period when the condition of our military forces was seriously occupying the attention of the Government, and further when, for the first time in our modern history, the public from various causes, some of which have been alluded to in our remarks on the campaigns of 1864 and 1866, seemed to take more intelligent interest in the progress of military affairs than heretofore, and to realise at length that to obtain military efficiency in war it is necessary to make adequate preparations in peace time. The terrible disasters which overtook the French armies in rapid succession, and the manner in which the highly organised and more numerous German troops carried all before them, undoubtedly created a profound impression on the public mind.

It was at length realised, at any rate to some degree, that our land forces were totally inadequate, either for offence or defence, and that we were incapable of taking any part in Continental warfare under modern conditions.

It was in these circumstances that national pressure was brought to bear on the Government to make our Army more efficient. It was singularly unfortunate in the interest of true Army Reform that at such a moment the ministry should number among its members a strong proportion of the so-called Peace Party.

In these unfortunate circumstances the measures taken, as subsequent events have shown, were alike inadequate in their conception and indeterminate in their nature.

H.R.H.'s Diary of the War between Germany and France, 1870-71.

'During the month of June, or rather towards the end of that month, it became known that the Prince of Hohenzollern had accepted the candidature of the throne of Spain. The knowledge of this event gave great offence to the Emperor Napoleon and the French nation, and immediately most energetic remonstrances were made at Berlin against the candidature of the Prince. The King of Prussia repudiated having had anything to do with these negotiations, beyond the fact of having given to them his assent after they had been entered into by Prince Leopold with Marshal Prim and the Spanish provisional Government. At the same time, being anxious to avoid further troubles from arising out of the circumstances, he assisted in inducing the Prince of Hohenzollern to withdraw from the project, which it was hoped might bring this delicate question to a peaceful solution. The French Government at first seemed satisfied with the diplomatic triumph they themselves declared they had obtained. Soon after, however, they changed their tone, the Duc de Grammont, Foreign Minister of France, declared in the Chamber, backed by the Prime Minister, Monsieur Emile Ollivier, that France would not be satisfied unless the King of Prussia formally renounced the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern not only for the present, but for all time to come. To this demand the King of Prussia demurred, and Monsieur Benedetti, the French Ambassador to the Court of Berlin, having been sent to Ems to negotiate directly with His Majesty, having been supposed to have received some slight from the King of Prussia, by his refusal to see him with the object of communicating further on the subject, the Emperor Napoleon and his Government declared themselves insulted, and on 15 *July* declared war on the King of Prussia.

'His Majesty at once accepted the challenge thus made to him, called upon the rest of Germany, including the Southern States, to rally around him, mobilised the whole of the Prussian and North German armies, and by the 1st of August was ready to take the field, supported by Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt.

'The French Army, under the personal command of the Emperor Napoleon, took up an advanced position covering the French frontier with his headquarters at Metz, from the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers on the left to the Swiss frontier on the right along the banks of the Rhine by Strassburg, Colmar, etc., the right wing of the French being under the immediate command of Marshal MacMahon, the left under that of Marshal Bazaine; Marshal Lebœuf, Minister of War, being Major-General of the Army. The French were

divided into Corps, some of which were on the immediate frontier or in support.

'The Prussian Army was pushed forward as rapidly as possible towards its own frontier, with its right towards Trèves and its left on the Rhine. The King of Prussia took the command in person, with General von Moltke as Chief of his Staff, and the Army was divided into three distinct bodies, the 1st Army composed of two Corps under General Steinmetz being on the right, Prince Frederick Charles with four Corps in the centre forming the 2nd Army, and the Crown Prince with four Corps and the Southern Contingents forming the 3rd Army on the extreme left.

'The French, though first in position, were so unprepared for rapid movement in advance that they remained stationary in the positions they originally took up. On 4 *August* the advanced Division of Marshal MacMahon, under General Abel Douay, was attacked by the Crown Prince at Weissenburg, was completely routed, and General Douay was killed. It seems to have been a complete surprise, the French having been attacked when the men were at their dinners.

'The Crown Prince lost no time in following up this success, and on 6 *August* attacked Marshal MacMahon's entire Corps in its position at the entrance to the Vosges Mountains, and after a severe action, which lasted during the entire day, defeated it and drove it with great loss through the mountains in the direction of Lunéville and Châlons. The next French Corps to Marshal MacMahon was General de Failly, and it is assumed that the latter General ought to have given immediate support to the former. There cannot be a doubt that such ought to have been the case, and De Failly's incompetence is naturally most severely commented upon. He is said to have made a very feeble effort to move to MacMahon's assistance, but he did not arrive in time and had to withdraw without fighting, and is said to have allowed his Corps to get into as great disorder as the defeated Corps at Wörth, which, passing through to Nancy and Lunéville, did not stop to reorganise till it reached Châlons.

'Meanwhile the rest of the French Army under the Emperor and Marshal Bazaine retired upon Metz, followed by the first and second German armies under General Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles respectively, after having on 6 *August* defeated General Froissard's Corps on the *Spicheren Heights* near Forbach. This was a most severe action, in which the Germans lost heavily and carried a position which to all appearance ought to have been impregnable. The Prussian armies came up with the French again before Metz at *Hernay*[1] *on the* 14*th*, when the French army attempted to retire under the guns of that fortress, but were prevented from carrying out this intention. A second action with the like object in view was fought at *Vionville on*

[1] Battle of Colombey.

the 16th, and finally a third action took place at *Gravelotte on the 18th*, which ended in the complete defeat of the French Army and its being driven into and under the guns of Metz, where it was from that day shut in by the 1st and 2nd Prussian Armies. The Emperor Napoleon had managed to escape before these actions took place and joined Marshal MacMahon at Châlons. The losses on both sides were exceedingly heavy, and there seems every reason to suppose that, under good leadership, the large bulk of the French Army ought to have succeeded in cutting its way out.

'The two Prussian Armies around Metz were now placed under the leadership of Prince Frederick Charles, and a new Army, the 4th, was formed under the Crown Prince of Saxony. This force advanced from Metz towards Sedan, whilst the Crown Prince of Prussia followed Marshal MacMahon to Châlons and, finding him moving towards Sedan, followed him up by forced marches in a like direction. Marshal MacMahon having collected his scattered forces, and having been joined by a large force of Gardes Mobiles and troops of the Line sent from Paris to Châlons, also by De Failly's Corps, received peremptory orders to make a flank march towards the Belgian frontier with a view to attempt to disengage Marshal Bazaine and the Corps around Metz from their perilous position. The movement was at all times a difficult and a dangerous one, more particularly with partly raw and partly very dispirited troops, and was consequently extremely distasteful to Marshal MacMahon. The Emperor also did not like it; but so strong were the orders which reached from Paris that it was ultimately decided to make the attempt. The march was a painful one, and the discipline of the troops frightfully shaken, and being much pressed by the two Corps under the two Crown Princes, a battle was fought on *the 31st* at Beaumont, when the Crown Prince of Saxony barred the advance of the French towards Metz, and in which the French were entirely defeated; and again on the *1st of September at Sedan*, where, the Crown Prince of Prussia having come up by forced marches and having surrounded the entire French Army and cut them off from their communications with France, no alternative was left but the *surrender of the whole French Army at Sedan on the 2nd*, including the Emperor Napoleon. MacMahon was severely wounded early in the day, General Ducrot was prepared to carry out as next senior officer the intentions of the Marshal, but General de Wimpffen produced an order from the Government at Paris entrusting the Chief Command to him, and he having only arrived the day before had no knowledge of the actual state of things, and was the officer who signed the unfortunate and quite inexplicable capitulation under the authority of the Emperor. The whole French Army, 150,000 men with 500 guns, laid down their arms and were taken off as prisoners of war to Germany. An interview took place

between the King of Prussia and the Emperor Napoleon before he proceeded to Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, which has been assigned to him as his place of residence.

'The Crown Princes' two armies, 3rd and 4th, at once rushed upon Paris, which they reached about 18 September, and at once invested the town, headquarters being established at Versailles for the King and the Crown Prince of Prussia, the Crown Prince of Saxony's Army occupying the Northern and Eastern sides of the city. Meanwhile the Regency in Paris was deposed on the news of the capitulation of Sedan reaching the capital. The Empress providentially escaped to England, where she was joined by the Prince Imperial from Belgium, and a Government of Defence was formed, at the head of which General Trochu was placed as Governor of Paris, with Messrs. Jules Favre, Gambetta and other Republicans as its members. This Government decided to prolong the war as long as the German armies remained on the soil of France. The siege of Paris was from this period continued till the end of the contest, and no very marked incident took place with the exception of two large sorties, one on 29 November under Generals Trochu and Ducrot, which threatened to be serious for the German armies, but was ultimately driven back with heavy loss, and the second on 19 January in the direction of Versailles, which, however, proved a complete failure, though the fighting for a time was hard. The severity of the winter has added greatly to the sufferings of both armies.

'Meanwhile *Strassburg* was besieged by a German Corps under General Werder, and after a gallant resistance under General Uhrich capitulated towards the end of September. The Army of Metz made several feeble and unsuccessful efforts to break through the investing forces of Prince Frederick Charles, but failed, and at length, on 29 October, Bazaine capitulated with the whole of his forces, amounting to 173,000 men. The whole of this force was transported as prisoners of war to Germany, including three Marshals of France, Canrobert, Bazaine, Lebœuf, and 6000 officers—another fearful catastrophe.

'Monsieur Gambetta as War Minister was making prodigious efforts to create new armies in the field. One was called the Army of the Loire, under General D'Aurelle de Paladines; another of the North, under General Faidherbe; and a third of the Vosges, under General Garibaldi. The first of these in November, after having been driven back near Orléans, made an advance movement, drove back Von der Tann's Bavarians and a Prussian Corps under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, retook Orléans, and tried to press towards Paris, but was checked and ultimately driven back by the Corps of Prince Frederick Charles hastening down from Metz, brought to a stand in a very hard-contested fight with the Prussian 10th Corps at Beaune la

Rolande, and was ultimately completely routed by the combined armies of the two Princes, evacuating Orléans. The Provisional Government, hitherto and since the investment of Paris established at Tours, was compelled by these events to retire to Bordeaux, where it remained till the end of the war. The great effort made by the Loire army to relieve Paris was thus brought to an end, and General D'Aurelle de Paladines was replaced in the command of that army by General Chanzy, who collected the army at Le Mans, and there re-formed it for further operations. In the North, General Manteuffel with the 1st Prussian Corps and the 8th, the latter under Groeben, operated towards Amiens and Lille; they were opposed by French Corps under General Faidherbe. Several engagements were fought, resulting in the taking of Amiens. A great battle was fought at a later period in the neighbourhood of that town, when the French made a most vigorous onslaught on the Germans with the view to the relief of Paris from the Northern side, and a drawn battle ensued, but the French ultimately retired upon Lille. This produced the second great sortie from Paris in January towards Versailles, headed by Generals Trochu and Vinoy, which, however, was driven back by the Prussians, with great slaughter to the French.

'Meanwhile General Chanzy had made another great effort towards Vendôme. He broke forth from Le Mans with apparently every prospect of success, but General Bourbaki, with several corps of the Army of the Loire, having moved towards Belfort and the French-German frontier, Prince Frederick Charles was enabled to concentrate all his forces, including those of the Duke of Mecklenburg, to crush Chanzy. This he accomplished in a series of brilliant engagements between Vendôme and Le Mans. Very severe fighting ensued, and after many hard-fought contests, Chanzy was completely routed and had to evacuate Le Mans, leaving the whole of the South open to the victorious Germans.

'Bourbaki operated towards Belfort with a view to raise the siege of that fortress. He was gallantly opposed by General Werder, who with the 13th Prussian Corps, chiefly Baden troops, were stationed between Dijon and Belfort. A very severe action ensued there, but Werder held his own against very superior forces and entirely defeated the French. So great was the danger for the German troops that General Manteuffel had been sent down to reinforce Werder at the head of the 2nd and 7th Prussian Corps. Garibaldi was forced to evacuate Dijon, the siege of Belfort was continued, Bourbaki was completely routed, his troops dispersed, and 80,000 men were driven across the Swiss frontier, where they laid down their arms to the Federal troops, and were sent into the interior of the country.

'These great successes on the part of the Germans and

the entire want of success of the French, combined with famine, which began to press the inhabitants of Paris, led to the offers of capitulation, which was ultimately agreed to, after some negotiations, in the middle of February. The French troops in Paris laid down their arms, the forts thereupon were occupied by the Germans, and the negotiations for peace commenced at Versailles. The German terms were very hard, the cession of Alsace and part of Lorraine, including Metz, but excluding Belfort, which had also capitulated, and the payment of five and a half milliards of francs, equal to two hundred million sterling. The French Constituent Assembly had, during the Armistice which was agreed to pending these negotiations, been elected and had assembled at Bordeaux. Monsieur Thiers was elected head of the Republic, and was authorised with Monsieur Jules Favre and others to carry on these negotiations. Peace was signed on the above terms on 16 February; the German troops entered that portion of Paris near the Champs Élysées as part of the stipulations on 27 February; the terms were ratified by the Assembly at Bordeaux, and on 1 March the German troops again evacuated Paris. It was a dangerous proceeding, but it went off without accident, and thus this painful and severe contest was brought to an end. The severity of the contest was terrific, the losses on both sides, both in officers and men, tremendous, the humiliation of France complete, and the exhaustion of the country fearful, both in material and men. The chief results to Germany were the establishment of the German Empire under the King of Prussia, and the placing of Germany in the position of the most powerful European State.'

CHAPTER XVI

NEW ZEALAND AND ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGNS—1860-70

The New Zealand Rebellion. Sir R. Napier and the Proficiency of the Soldier as a Man-at-Arms. Necessity for a Campaign in Abyssinia. Sir R. Napier appointed to command. Correspondence between H.R.H. and Sir R. Napier. The Fall of Magdala. Her Majesty's Tribute. H.R.H.'s Diary of Events of Campaign. Complaints as to Cost of Expedition. Lord Napier's Reply. Lord Napier and the British Soldier.

In March 1860, whilst our forces were still engaged in China, a rebellion broke out in New Zealand, which was suppressed in 1861 by troops dispatched from Australia; but two years later, in May 1863, hostilities recommenced, and much desultory fighting ensued. In October of the same year Lord de Grey writes to the Duke, 'the news from New Zealand is certainly very serious. I have not as yet received any official dispatches.'

On 20 November 1863 General Cameron defeated the Maoris, and their king surrendered shortly afterwards, on 9 December.

But on 29 April 1864 occurred the disastrous repulse of the British combined Naval and Military Force at the Gate Pah, Tauranga, where the British losses amounted to some 24 officers and 100 men killed and wounded, no less than 10 officers being killed.

On 25 February 1865 General Cameron severely defeated the Maoris. It was not, however, till four years later that they eventually settled down.

Among minor hostilities conducted during the decade of 1860-70 by British troops was the Mohmund Expedition of 1863-64 to the Umbeyla Pass on the NW. Frontier of India, and the Expedition to Bhootan in 1864. These were ex-

clusively carried out by the Government of India, and need no further reference here.

In 1867, however, an important expedition was dispatched to Abyssinia. Owing to the geographical position of this country, the troops which took part in it were mainly dispatched from India, and hence the Duke's share in organisation and arrangement for this was less than it would have been under more normal conditions. The command was given to Major-General Sir Robert Napier, an officer who had distinguished himself in the Mutiny, and had subsequently commanded a Division in China with marked success.

Lord Napier of Magdala, as he became after the successful termination of the Abyssinian Expedition, was unquestionably one of the really great men among the many able and successful generals of the last century. Since the whole story of the capture of Magdala and release of the British prisoners centres around this distinguished officer, it will not be out of place here to give a few particulars of his career prior to the Abyssinian expedition.

He was pre-eminently a soldier of fortune, having gone out to India at an early age and served continuously under the Honourable East India Company.

After the Mutiny, as has been already mentioned, he served in the China Campaign of 1860, and about this time the Duke writes and expresses a wish to make Sir Robert Napier's acquaintance on the first occasion he may come to Europe. This he did in 1864. In 1865 he was given the command of the troops in the Bombay Presidency. Lord Napier's name will ever be handed down in India as one of the pioneers in the endeavour to make the lot of the British soldier, condemned to serve in the East, a more endurable one; for he always took a wide and comprehensive view of all that pertained to military service, and recognised that his duties as a commander of British troops meant something beyond the mere disciplining and feeding of the men committed to his charge. On the occasion of his return voyage from England to India in 1865, he, with the aid of introductions furnished by the Duke, was permitted

to inspect the fortifications at Antwerp and to see certain barracks as well as 'the general *ménage* of the regiments.' From Suez he writes to the Duke describing his experiences in Belgium, making sundry reflections on the subject of 'encouraging the British soldier to become a proficient man-at-arms,' an object which, oddly enough, had somehow been lost sight of for many years, in the general anxiety to convert every recruit into an automaton whose movements were to be regulated so as to conform to those of his comrades on all occasions.

FROM SIR R. NAPIER.

'SUEZ, 13 *November* 1865.

'. . . The gymnasium and *salle d'escrime* were also very good, and their exercises might be followed much more in our Army than they have been. Y.R.H. has done much towards this end, but there appears a deep-rooted objection to let our men test the value of their arms by constant practice in the individual use of them. We are told that the men would get infuriated with each other, and mischief would follow. I confess I have never been convinced of this; our men, who furnish the best boxers, wrestlers, and quarter-staff players in the world, when in their own counties, are seldom taught that self-reliance on their individual skill and efficiency which gives confidence in every situation similar to that of the swimmer who boldly strikes out for his life and feels confidence to the last, even in mid-ocean.

'I believe that a party of our soldiers broken up would be much more easily destroyed than a party of our Frontier tribes, every man of whom would probably disable one adversary before succumbing. . . .'

The first allusion to the possibility of an expedition to Abyssinia is contained in a letter from Sir Robert Napier to the Duke, obviously written at a time when he had no idea of being sent in command.

It will be remarked that Napier from the first predicted it would be a very costly business, and also that a considerable force would be required.

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'POONA, 23 *July* 1867.

'. . . There has been some communication between the Home Government and that of Bombay regarding the possibility of an expedition to Abyssinia. It is to be hoped that the captives may be released by the diplomatists at any

cost of money, for the expedition would be very expensive and troublesome, and if not a hostile shot is fired, the casualties from climate and accidents will amount to ten times the number of captives; still, if these poor people are murdered, or detained longer, I suppose we must do something. I enclose for Y.R.H.'s approval a short Memo., which I have sent to the Governor, as I believe that some proposals for a much smaller force have been made. It is quite possible that, all being smooth, a very small force would do what is wanted, but it is exactly when a force is small that things do not go smoothly. I therefore thought it best to submit my views. . . .'

Before, however, this letter reached the Duke, the Government had come to the conclusion that an expedition to Abyssinia was almost inevitable, and had telegraphed and written to the Governor-General to that effect, and it is obvious that it was recommended that he should seek the advice of Sir Robert Napier. Hence the following:—

TO SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 *August* 1867.

'The Secretary of State for India has, I believe, telegraphed to the Governor of Bombay, and will write to him by to-day's mail such instructions as he thinks right, with reference to a possible expedition to Abyssinia, which has not as yet been decided upon, but which may eventually become necessary. As no delay ought to take place in the preparation of the transport, I trust that the necessary stores may be ordered from home to be taken by the Bombay Government for collecting or preparing them to the extent that may be deemed advisable; and in this, as in all other matters, you will no doubt give the Government of Bombay your best assistance and support, as indeed in all such matters as may relate to the military information or preparation which may be deemed necessary under the difficult circumstances in which we are placed. I can give no opinion upon any plan of operations till I hear what your views may be, which I believe are on their way to England, but I attach much importance to an early decision one way or the other, as our prestige in the East would suffer from any further delay in the release of the unfortunate prisoners. I hope you will keep me fully informed of all the military arrangements you may have advised.'

TO SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'HORSE GUARDS, 17 *August* 1867.

'I leave England for Germany to-night, so I have only time to write you one line to say that I have seen a copy

of the dispatch that has been prepared by Sir Stafford Northcote to go by the next mail on Monday, and in which he directed the Governor of Bombay to propose at once the Abyssinian Expedition, placing you in command of the troops. No better selection could have been made. I rejoice to think that the Government should have quite agreed with me in the officer to be appointed to so important a post.

'Sir Charles Staveley is to be your second-in-command, and a more valuable officer than Sir Charles you cannot, I think, have.'

In order to render Sir R. Napier's letters more intelligible to the reader who may not have all incidents of this interesting campaign in his mind, the Duke's short and clear summary of the history of the expedition has been placed first.

H.R.H.'s Diary of the Abyssinian Expedition, 1867.

'On 16 August of this year the British Government, under Lord Derby, decided upon a declaration of war against Theodore, Emperor of Abyssinia, who for a succession of years had been engaged in unjustifiable conduct towards our Consul, Mr. Cameron, and various other envoys, including Mr. Rassam, sent by us to demand the restitution of European captives in the Emperor's service. The cruelties perpetrated and the indignities offered to these captives was such that the British Government and people felt they were forced to support the dignity of the Empire by insisting on their release at the point of the bayonet. Sir Robert Napier, since created Lord Napier of Magdala, was selected to conduct the military operations, and associated with him diplomatically was Colonel Merewether, at that time our Resident at Aden. It was decided that the Expedition should be looked upon as an Indian one, and full powers were given to the Bombay Government, in conjunction with Sir Robert Napier, to make the necessary arrangements, subject always to the supreme authority of the Governor-General of India, Sir John Lawrence, and under the more direct authority of the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Northcote. It was decided, after much consideration, that the force to be sent from India should consist of about 10,000 men, chiefly natives, but having a good sprinkling of European Corps to give consistency and tone to the whole Expedition. Accordingly the 1st Battalion 4th Foot, 33rd, 45th, and 26th Regiments were gradually dispatched from Bombay for Annesley Bay, where the landing was to be effected, and these Corps were supplemented by the 3rd Dragoon Guards, three Batteries of Field Artillery from India, and by a Company of Engineers from home. The force was preceded by a reconnoitring party, consisting

of Colonels Merewether, Phayre, and Wilkins, who landed on 2 October; and Sir Robert Napier landed on 3 January 1868 with the bulk of the force. Transport animals to a large extent were purchased in Egypt, the various countries on the Mediterranean, and large quantities of animals for transport service were also sent from India. The latter from the first turned out excellent, but the former were to a large extent very inferior, and it was a long time before this most important portion of the service could be got into working order, the loss of animals in the meanwhile being excessive. Senafé, on the coast, was made the base of operations, a railway was constructed as far as the mountainous country, and a military road had to be formed up to the capital of the Emperor of Magdala. Sir Robert Napier conducted these difficult and dangerous operations with great prudence and perseverance, the labours of the troops were excessive but crowned with complete success, the natives were generally friendly to our advance, but everything to feed and supply the army had to be brought up from the rear, and the operation was therefore one requiring immense skill and the most perfect management. In all these respects Sir Robert Napier proved himself a most consummate General, and he was well supported by Sir Charles Staveley as second in command, by General Malcolm, the other General of Division, and by the several Brigadiers and officers and men under his orders. Colonel Petrie of the Bombay Artillery was commanding the Artillery, Colonel Wilkins, the Engineers, Colonel Phayre was Dep. Q.M.G., Colonel Thesiger, D.A.G., Colonel Dillon, Military Secretary, while Commodore Heath had charge of the Fleet, and was ably assisted in the transport service by Captain Tryon of the Royal Navy. After a succession of advances, though without any actual contest, the force, or rather a small party of it, was brought into the presence of the enemy four hundred miles from the base of operations, and on 10 April, being Good Friday, the *battle of Arogee* was fought, in which our arms met with a complete success. Theodore, who had moved out to attack our force on its near approach to his capital, Magdala, was completely routed with heavy loss to himself, whilst inflicting very slight injury on our troops and, being followed by our force, shut himself up in Magdala itself, whence he endeavoured ineffectually to escape. The prisoners in his hands, the object of our advance and expedition, having been released by him on April 11, uninjured, *Magdala was stormed by us on 13 April*, and was taken without loss, and amongst the slain was found the Emperor Theodore, who had destroyed himself on finding that his cause had become hopeless.

'After making various complicated arrangements for the disposal of Theodore's army and for the settlement of the country with respect to the several claimants to the vacant throne, all of which he accomplished with consummate

ability, Sir Robert Napier at once retraced his steps to the coast, taking his posts and garrisons with him on the return march, and succeeded in bringing the whole of his force back to Senafé in time for embarkation, previous to the setting in of the bad weather, which would have most probably put an end to his power of movement, and would have obliged him to await the autumn before bringing the expedition to a close. As it was, the whole of the troops were embarked and forwarded to their destination, partly to India and partly to England, by the end of June; and Sir Robert Napier having himself returned to England, was received with acclamation by the public, was created Lord Napier of Magdala, and is now considered as one of the ablest Generals in our service. Our success has been complete, and though the expenses have been heavy, the moral effect produced by this enterprise has been such as to raise our prestige largely, not alone throughout the East, but also amongst the nations of Europe.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'POONA, 24 *August* 1867.

'I was informed yesterday by His Excellency the Governor of Y.R.H.'s telegram regarding my commanding the expedition to Abyssinia. I am duly sensible of the honour done me and the confidence placed in me by Y.R.H. in regard to so difficult and important an undertaking. I am also fully alive to the responsibility attending the charge of a large body of troops operating in a country of which we know so little.

'The great and indispensable condition is carriage; the collection and organisation of the necessary quantity in a limited time being the difficulty.

'As the orders are now issued, it is impossible to say what our prospects really are, but I have advised the collection and transport of all that we can obtain in India, notwithstanding its cost, as we are certain of what we can find in India, whereas the estimates of supplies from foreign countries are not always verified.

'I trust that between what we can get in India and supplies from Egypt and Persia, we may get enough to admit of our advancing from the coast of Abyssinia in January.

'Colonel Merewether, who has been a little way into the interior, but not actually on the high lands of Abyssinia, thinks that the camel of the low country of Abyssinia and of Egypt cannot bear the climate, or find the necessary food, in Upper Abyssinia.

'If this is the case, it deprives us of a considerable resource, but we hope it may not be so; I have dwelt on this important point as Y.R.H. has yet to learn how much hinges upon it, and how necessary it is that we should not throw our troops beyond our means of feeding them. Our first point, then,

and first difficulty, is procuring carriage; our next, to find a place to collect it in, where it can be fed and protected.

'Colonel Merewether has made some examination of the coast, but has not acquired any absolute information of a good place, though he is in favour of a point called Baken, from an island of that name between Amphilla and Annesley Bay.

'A reconnoitring party will proceed about the 10th prox., viz. as soon as the monsoon will permit, to examine the coast there, and find out a good place for a Depôt, healthy and with water. On this being determined, with a sufficient amount of carriage obtained, an advanced Brigade will be placed to cover the Depôt and the collection of carriage, and to establish a post on the tablelands, with a road connecting them. As soon as this is ready and carriage prepared, the main body of the expedition would land and, I hope, be able to advance in January. I calculate on making a good Depôt at Antalo or Sokota, about 250 miles from the coast, from whence to act against Theodorus. If the present governor or rebel in possession of the province can be made friendly, it will make the position comfortable.

'There are very long lines of operations, and nothing but our superiority in arms and the possession of carriage would justify them. Of course when once hostilities are declared, we must carry the undertaking out at any cost. It has been thought desirable that the declaration of war should be conveyed by Her Majesty's Government, and I understand that Mr. FitzGerald has telegraphed to that effect. . . .'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'POONA, 27 *September* 1867.

'As regards the general plan of proceedings, the matter has been complicated by the following points:—

'1. The possibility of the English Government ultimately deciding not to proceed with the Expedition.

'2. The difficulty and delay in getting pack carriage and consequent uncertainty of being ready.

'3. The absence of any known place of rendezvous for organising our cattle, and the complete committal of ourselves to the expedition by landing on the coast to find such a place.

'It would be very inexpedient to have our force waiting in Abyssinia inactive and consuming its provisions, whilst carriage was being collected, with the possibility of not having sufficient to enable us to proceed; this has obliged me to act with the greatest caution, as I am resolved not to commit a large force without the means of moving it.

'Happily, thanks very much to the energetic aid given in England, our prospects of carriage are now very good, and I hope ere long to see them without doubt.

'The party for reconnoitring the coast proceeded on the 16th inst. under instructions. . . . The officers forming the Reconnoitring Party are of good experience and able, and I trust a satisfactory decision will have been arrived at. I have been tenacious of my own views in respect to this matter, as I was apprehensive of being committed to a line of country which had not been examined by eyes experienced in the wants of troops in large bodies, and of which the accounts, intended as recommendations, were most unsatisfactory.

'The cattle which will shortly arrive on the coast, and on which our fortunes will depend, will require a guard, and a Native Force proceeds on the 4th proximo to cover the formation of the first Depôt. A Native Infantry and a Native Cavalry Regiment, Mountain Battery on mules of four guns, two Companies of Sappers, and a Division of Land Transport to take charge of pack animals as they arrive. I have also ordered a Company of Sappers from Aden to join, with materials for making landing piers, etc.

'This will all be in Egyptian territory, and I hope they may find a camp at an elevation that will be healthier and cooler than the coast.

'The next six weeks will be busily employed in equipping and preparing the Regiments that are to go, in landing and organising the pack animals, and in the transport of supplies. As far as our experience and abilities go, we are endeavouring to provide for every contingency.

'The appliances that we ask for may appear great, but if we were merely to march an Army over that 400 miles of mountains and back, without thinking of any enemy, we should require everything we ask for, except the guns and ammunition. . . .'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'POONA, 13 *October* 1867.

'Since I last wrote to Y.R.H., the preparations for the Expedition have been steadily progressing.

'All ammunition, commissariat, and medical stores are arranged for mule carriage.

'The Field Batteries will go as far as they can on wheels, and then I hope to carry at least a half-battery of Armstrong 12-pounders and a half-battery of R.H.A. on elephants, so that if we arrive at the south of Abyssinia, where there are large plains and plenty of Cavalry, we may have some Artillery on wheels.

'All the corps that are named for the service are busy in getting prepared and making themselves acquainted with their new mountain equipment. A small supply of breech-loaders, kindly lent by the Commodore, has enabled me to have the Regiments drilled in their use. The enthusiasm amongst the Native troops to go is so great that one Regi-

ment, the 10th, called for Volunteers to complete its strength, and could have marched with double its complement. I tell them all they will have plenty of hard work and hardship of various kinds before they return.

'The public have had so many letters of Colonel Merewether's, that they are imbued with the belief that a flying detachment could run over four hundred miles with the greatest ease, but these delusions quickly vanish when the realities are approached.

'I have heard from the Reconnoitring Party of their arrival at Aden, and their departure for Annesley Bay, where they will, I have little doubt, find a landing-place to suit us.

'An advanced force of Native troops have gone on to cover the formation of a Depôt on the coast, where we can organise our Land Transport; one Cavalry, one Infantry Regiment, a Mountain Battery, two Companies Sappers, and a Division of the Land Transport, with about 400 mules and spare drivers for the mules that are expected from Egypt and Syria.

'I do not propose to send any more troops until I am satisfied regarding the carriage and supplies, beyond the necessary protection; it would be useless to send troops to wait there and eat expensive supplies. I hope the preparations will enable me to send on another Brigade early in November.

'The point on which I am least satisfied is the organisation of the Land Transport, which, unfortunately, the Governor and his civil advisers were alarmed at, and endeavoured to secure a cheap irregular system, which, as I knew, would never bear scrutiny, and a proper military element is being introduced, but much time has been lost. . . .'

TO SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 9 *November* 1867.

'I have received your letters of the 27 September and 13 October. Nothing can be more satisfactory than all your arrangements seem to be for carrying out the Expedition to Abyssinia. We are to have a winter session of Parliament to get the sanction of Parliament for this war, and I hope nothing may be said to mar the arrangements now in progress. The English papers have, I think, been writing very foolishly as regards this war. No doubt it will be a difficult operation, and it cannot be denied that we know little or nothing of the country in which our troops are to operate; but I have no idea that the difficulties are likely to turn out insurmountable, and I should hope that the fears expressed as regards the badness of the climate are much exaggerated; and I am happy to find that your letter bears out to the fullest extent the views I have myself entertained in this respect. Your main difficulty, I believe, will be the want of roads, but against this you have guarded

to the best of your ability by preparing everything for mule carriage, which will enable you, therefore, to proceed in your operations without being dependent on roads such as are required in European campaigns.

'The landing-place seems by telegraph to be satisfactory, and the real point that I believe will give you the most trouble will be *to catch your man*. I don't think you will have much real fighting, but you will have great difficulty in bringing him to stand, and it is to be feared that he may do some serious mischief to his unfortunate captives. This, however, is not to be helped, and we would therefore make the best use of our time to prevent such a catastrophe, if possible. I am glad that you have carried your point with regard to keeping the organisation of the expedition entirely in your own hands. I see by his letter that Mansfield and the supreme Government are very angry about it, but I must say I think your arguments are unanswerable, and it is a great advantage that all the arrangements should rest with the officer who is destined afterwards to carry them out. I am glad to find that you are satisfied with the support given to you by the Home Authorities; I know that Sir Stafford Northcote and the Indian Council have been most anxious to meet your wants in every respect, and, as far as I can judge, they have done so with promptitude and with great effect. The purchase of mules seems to be progressing favourably, and I hope they will be collected and landed at the time when you will require them. At least such are the reports we are getting from Egypt. The question of a Reserve of Europeans seems to me to be best solved by having a couple of Regiments at Malta, fully prepared for service in Abyssinia should you require them; they can easily be pushed on down the Red Sea, and we can fill up their places from home. I rejoice to hear that there is so much enthusiasm for the expedition amongst the Native troops. The Europeans are sure to like the prospect of a campaign, but that the Natives should equally like the service in the field is really gratifying, and evinces a sound and good military spirit. . . . The two Mountain Batteries of guns with their equipments are already on the voyage. I look forward with the greatest interest to the accounts I shall receive from you of your future proceedings. You may at any time rely on my most zealous support and co-operation, and all your wants shall be fully and powerfully backed up by me: I can assure you that the Government at home have the fullest confidence in your ability and discretion, and I think you will find no sort of difficulties in that quarter.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'BOMBAY, 14 *November* 1867.

'. . . All our troops are ready: I had to ask for a few

Volunteers owing to the heavy drinking after the re-engagement bounty and the twopence a day. I regret that Sir William Mansfield insists on my giving bounty to soldiers to volunteer for field service! All the soldiers want to go, and the enforcement of bounty is to be greatly regretted; the men never thought of it, and our Native Army has volunteered in great numbers without thinking of bounty; all that is being given is the cost of changing uniform, a mere trifle.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'BOMBAY, 28 *November* 1867.

'The results of the reconnaissance have been just what any one acquainted with similar countries would have foreseen. The difficulties melt away at once under proper handling.

'The routes to Senafé and Teconda on the high land have been surveyed, and Senafé preferred. . . . The work has been heavy—our greatest inconvenience has been slow inter-communication—the first order should have been a telegraphic cable from Bombay to Annesley Bay; it would have saved a great deal of money—its own cost!—already. We are always three weeks behind the "facts," and it cripples our action very much. Still, I do not think matters are often conducted with so few *contretemps* as we have hitherto had, and I trust we shall very soon bring all into order. When it is considered that action is being taken from opposite sides of the globe for an expedition on a perfectly new field, at a third point, I think our progress has been very great. . . . I cannot avoid the feeling that the soldier is lowered very much if he is admitted to require a bounty to volunteer for the field. It is quite a different matter when the question is to induce him to adopt the profession of a soldier. He has not then adopted the cloth; other modes of life attract him, and it is necessary to put him in an equal social position to that of his class in life; but when once he has become a soldier, I desire to include him in all the honourable feelings which influence his officers.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'BOMBAY, 19 *December* 1867.

'. . . The official reports from Abyssinia have all been sent to Y.R.H. up to the latest dates, so that I have nothing to add except that, having made every representation to the Government of Bombay regarding the necessity of pushing forward the equipment and transport, I sail to-morrow, or rather, go on board to-morrow and sail on the 21st. I expect to be twelve or fourteen days on the voyage, as the *Octavia* is slow.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'ZOULLA, 4 *January* 1868.

'I arrived here yesterday; Commodore Heath was kind enough to accommodate me and my staff in the *Octavia*.

'Affairs here are now in good order.

'The Commissariat and Land Transport have been reinforced and are working well; there is much mortality amongst mules and ponies, owing, it is now believed, to local disease.

'We are, in consequence, moving all the mules that we can to the upper line in order to get them out of the infected country, and are employing camels and bullocks below.

'As we have some spare shipping now, I am sending to bring in a supply of camels. The Cavalry lost 130 horses, but at Senafé, where they now are, the disease has ceased.

'Accounts of the station at Senafé most satisfactory; some forage is supplied from the country, and as soon as we can make a further advance we shall open more supplies; but I am completing the supplies at Senafé before making any advance. Every day's experience convinces me that it is the only way to make real progress: to keep pace with our resources!

'The poor prisoners are in God's hands. We will do all we can without running unwarrantable risks.

'The troops are all in excellent health and the best spirits, and all working with heart and soul for the general good.

'I must write a short letter by this mail.

'I thank Y.R.H. for your kind support. I will try and justify it.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'ZOULLA, 19 *January* 1868.

'The official reports which I have sent to Y.R.H. will give information of our proceedings.

'I may say that, although terribly crippled by the epidemic amongst the mules, I have every hope of success this year. The task has indeed been a difficult one.

'Our first and greatest difficulty was want of communication; we ought to have had a telegraph. The space to the high land is a desert of 63 miles, with scanty supplies of water and no forage, with a steep pass of little width and a general gradient of 1 in 40. We have overcome this now, and I hope by next mail to inform Y.R.H. that a convoy of 100 carts of provisions has reached Senafé. The Mountain Batteries are excellent, the "Norton's" wells most valuable.

'The railway to Koomela is getting on now rapidly; the locomotive is at work. The telegraph will, in ten days, be open to Senafé.

'The troops are in excellent health and spirits, and all matters seem favourable. The time is admitted to be short, but I think we shall not mind the rains. I will answer Y.R.H.'s questions regarding the Native troops in my next letter. I am greatly indebted to the Home Government for their prompt compliance with my requisitions, and though they have made some mistakes, the Bombay Government have done all in their power to correct them.

'I trust Y.R.H. will pardon a hurried letter by this mail. I have to express my gratitude for Y.R.H.'s confidence and support.'

TO SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 *April* 1868.

'. . . Your letters of 7 February and 8 March have reached me, and all the communications, official and non-official, sent to Johnson by Colonel Dillon, an excellent officer and most valuable correspondent. As far as matters have gone, nothing can exceed my admiration of the manner in which you have conducted your forces. You have had a very hard task to perform. You have been pressed both from home and by the eager spirits that surrounded you to push forward; but you have steadily kept in view the objects of the expedition. You have well weighed the importance, the absolute necessity, for the safety of your force, to keep up your communication with Zoulla and Senafé, and to lay in your supplies; and you have resisted the dangerous temptation of neglecting these essentials for the more agreeable prospect of coming face to face with your enemy. This is a great and truly noble act of abnegation, and I have no doubt you will reap your reward in complete and entire success. This is my prayer, and I think the country should be and will be grateful to you for the prudence and sound judgment upon which all your decisions have been based. We are anticipating from day to day some decided information as to what has occurred on your coming near to Theodorus and his army. Will he fight, will he retreat, or will he withdraw still further into the interior, taking his prisoners with him? This is the great problem to be solved. I hope he will fight. I had rather he did not treat, though that would be better than the third alternative put—that of *withdrawing* with his prisoners. In the latter case I fear we should be in a great fix, for to pursue him into the interior would be almost a hopeless task, I fear, and would be ruinous from a financial point of view. It becomes daily more clear to everybody that, so far from your force being too large, it is almost too limited for your requirements. Certain it is to me, that had 1000 or 1500 men been sent, as was at first suggested by some, the whole of that force would by this time have been starved to death or cut to

pieces. The failure of the Commissariat train has been the great drawback of the expedition; and for this you are certainly not responsible, for you predicted what would happen if your recommendations were not adopted. The want of supplies in the country itself and the hardness of the roads were the other great drawbacks which have far exceeded what would have been anticipated, and it is marvellous to hear what has been done by the force under your command, considering all the difficulties you have had to contend against. I think you have just grounds to be proud of the Army you command, and I think the country may well be proud, not alone of its Army, but specially of its *General*. Thanks for all the photographs you have sent me from time to time; they are very beautiful. Your giving copies of these to the foreign officers attending the expedition was quite right, and I highly approve of your having done so. I shall not enter further into any of the details of your operations, as I should only unnecessarily occupy your time and attention. But having the fullest reliance on your sound judgment and talent, I wish you and your brave followers every success, and I pray God that we may have early news of your entire success.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

[*Undated, but written from a Camp five marches from Magdala, about 7 April* 1868.]

'I have to inform Y.R.H. that I have advanced the force to this place, five marches from Magdalla. The whole force available for the attack of the place is now concentrated within a few miles.

'It consists of the following troops:—

33rd Regiment, ...	703
4th K.O., ...	560
23rd Bengal Pioneers, . . .	750
27th Bombay N.I., Belochees, . .	324
Wing 10th Bombay N.I., . . .	217
3rd do., ...	300
	2854
Wing of 45th, ...	385
	3239

'But the Wing of the 45th and detachment of the 3rd Bombay N.I. are not up, and may not be up, so that the effective Infantry will not be much over 2000. Two Batteries of Mountain Guns, Rocket Battery, four guns of G., fourteen Armstrongs, and two eight-inch mortars. Of Cavalry, I shall have only about 350 effective out of all the Native Cavalry, and so many more have been absorbed in postal detachments.

'The 3rd Dragoon Guards would be especially useful; they will be near, but I fear not arrive in time.

'If they and the 45th and det. 3rd N.I. arrive, they will give me a sufficient force for a second column of attack and secure the investment. I shall wait for them if possible. Everything is going on well. The prisoners are so far safe, but we cannot communicate with Theodore—no one will take a message. So I trust that, soon after this reaches you, we shall have informed Y.R.H. that we are in possession of Magdala. Our distances have hitherto been proved much greater than reported, so that we may be a day or two longer in arriving. I trust Y.R.H. will excuse an informal line. Everything is gone to the next ground, and I have only now become aware that it is the last day of the mail.

'My headquarters are at Goolsi; at Sautarra, the commander, Sir C. Staveley, with 2nd Brigade. They come on to-morrow. I have omitted to mention three Companies of Sappers over 100 strong each.'

On 26 April the news arrived in England of the Fall of Magdala and rescue of the British prisoners. Sir John Pakington, on receipt of the same, at once wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM SIR JOHN PAKINGTON.

'52 Grosvenor Place, S.W.,
26 *April* 1868, 8.30 P.M.

'I have been met on my return to town, a few minutes since, by this glorious news.

'I cannot express my pleasure, nor how heartily I congratulate Y.R.H. I find a note from General Forster on the subject of firing a salute. Y.R.H. is a far better judge than I am whether this triumphant close of a most extraordinary Expedition comes within the rule; but I cannot doubt it. If not, it is a case to make a rule, and if Y.R.H. approves of firing the guns I will cordially support it.'

The Duke wrote to Sir Robert Napier by the following mail.

TO SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'Horse Guards, 1 *May* 1868.

'No words can describe to you the gratification I felt last Sunday on the receipt of the telegraphic intelligence informing us of the Fall of Magdala. I congratulate you from my heart on this happy result to your labours and those of the gallant troops, both European and Native, who have been so ably led by their distinguished Commander. The death of

Theodore during the assault has relieved you of a great embarrassment, and the release of all the captives unscathed has been a most happy realisation of all our objects and wishes. Nothing can exceed the admiration with which I regard the whole conduct of the expedition, and the country has indeed been fortunate in having found so able a General to carry out the national interests. Her Majesty is greatly pleased, and expresses herself to me in the following words:—"I earnestly congratulate you on the brilliant success in Abyssinia, which is an immense blessing. Sir Robert Napier deserves the greatest praise for his conduct and the admirable way in which he has conducted the whole affair." I am sure these expressions of the Queen will be gratifying to you, and I therefore cannot do better than transcribe them for your satisfaction. The Queen has at once marked her sense of approbation of your conduct by conferring upon you the Grand Cross of the Bath. I wait with anxiety the Dispatches containing the detailed accounts of your operations, which I presume we may now daily expect. Hoping that you will have no difficulty on your return march to Annesley Bay, and that the whole of the expeditionary force may have left Abyssinian soil by the end of May.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'Camp Deldee, 29 *April* 1868.

'I have this evening received Y.R.H.'s kind letter of 3 April, and hasten to express how grateful I am for Y.R.H.'s most flattering and cordial approbation and support. I must beg Y.R.H. to excuse me for not having written since the fall of Magdala and the recovery of the captives, but I hoped ere this to have sent my dispatch. The delay in collecting all the necessary reports, and the flood of new duties and responsibilities which came upon me with the removal of Theodore from the scene, will, I hope, be accepted as my apology.

'The disarming and safe removal of the vast number of people who were assembled at Magdala, all of whom, as far as the men at arms were concerned, would have been a curse to the country, embarrassing to us if let loose with their arms, was a necessary measure. Having rendered them defenceless, it was equally necessary to provide for their safe-conduct to the several provinces to which they belonged, or where they could find their lives secure.

'In addition to these the released Abyssinians, many of whom were men of family and influence, were helpless; some were crippled from having been in fetters for ten or twelve years, others had become enfeebled in intellect from their long confinement and the frequent fears of death; they had to be provided for and escorted for some distance on their way to their homes. It was a most remarkable exodus!

'On the same day, Theodore's widows and families had to be prepared to march with us. Hardly had this been settled when the Queen of one section of the Gallas came to my camp to claim at once friendship and the possession of Magdala, but as the rival and more powerful Queen of the other section announced her intention of paying me a visit on the same errand, the first lady made a hasty retreat. I had intended to make over Magdala to the Wagshum Gobazze, the most powerful man in this part of Abyssinia, but his Lieutenant was not strong enough to hold it. I therefore rejoiced at the opportunity of committing it to the flames.

'The extrication, at length, of my own force was accomplished with some trouble, owing to commissariat difficulties. Even the Abyssinian wounded had to be carried away by our own people, and it was with no small feeling of relief that I saw the last man removed and my rear-guard in movement to quit the place before I turned my horse's head towards the Bashilo.

'We are now, I am happy to say, eighty miles on our way towards Annesley Bay, the Second Brigade under Staveley are two marches in front, with the released captives under his charge; and of the Abyssinians none now remain except Theodore's widow and her young son, who march with us. She is a young woman whose history has been very unhappy. Theodore conquered her father, Oubie, King of Tigré, and imprisoned him till he died. The daughter was forced to marry Theodore, and soon ill-treated. So I suppose she is now happier than ever she has been. The doctor who attends her, she being ill, describes her as a very quiet, sensible woman, very grateful for kind treatment. At Antalo she branches off to her father's native country of Semin; the son, whose life would not be safe here, will leave the country with me.

'Thus Y.R.H. will see that I have had a great deal to attend to. I hope the people of England and Y.R.H. will be satisfied with what has been done, and that the honour of England has been fully vindicated.

'The troops are wonderfully well. Some increase of sickness after so much fatigue and insufficient nourishment was to be expected, but it is comparatively small, and we have now plenty of sick carriage. The wounded are doing well. A few bad cases must end fatally—the total number is very small, under thirty—owing to the terrible effect of the Snider, before which nothing can live. All our attention is turned to the arrangements for getting to Zoulla by the end of next month, and out of the country as soon as possible.

'It would be difficult to do full justice to the conduct of the troops of all arms, including our friends of the Naval Brigade. The liveliest zeal and devotion have been manifested by all. Of the Staff Officers generally, of all grades, I cannot speak too highly. I can only say what I feel most

deeply, that as long as the Army of Great Britain is animated by such a spirit as I have found in those under my command, our country can never lose its pre-eminence.

'I must ask Y.R.H.'s pardon for so long a letter, but my pen has insensibly run on. . . .

'We hope to reach Zoulla on 25 May, or by the 30th at latest. We do not expect the rains till 15 June.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'CAMP ADABASU, 10 *May* 1868.

'I have to thank Y.R.H. for your most kind letter of 1 May.

'It makes me very happy indeed to learn the favourable opinion of Her Majesty, and I rejoice that I have been able to fulfil Her Majesty's wishes and to release the poor people whose lives hung upon a thread. I cannot say too much for the admirable conduct of the force which I have commanded.

'Every one has worked with the utmost zeal, and I trust the national liberality will be extended to those who worked patiently in the rear in maintaining the springs which kept our wheels in motion.

'I trust Y.R.H. will permit me to say how much I owe to Y.R.H.'s kind and consistent support and encouragement.

'The excellent equipment sent from England has in every case proved of the greatest value, and Y.R.H.'s determination to send the full company of Royal Engineers has been fully justified by their excellent services. The 'Norton' wells have been of great assistance, the signals were in constant use, and the photographic apparatus is now sending Y.R.H. its results. The steel guns are a great success, and are invaluable for mountain work.

'We have had a most distressing march for the troops—storms almost daily; but there are very few Europeans sick, and generally the sick-list is very small. Now, I am happy to say, we are near our journey's end, and I hope everything will be embarked before the end of next month.'

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'CAMP SENAFÉ, 28 *May* 1868.

'I have much pleasure in informing Y.R.H. that the greater number of troops have either reached Zoulla or are on there way there: I have only now on the high lands two companies of the 4th King's, the Beloochis, the Naval Brigade, and two steel guns. I leave, with all these as a rear-guard, to-morrow, the 29th, and hope we may reach Zoulla safely on the 31st or 1 June.

'There have been some floods in the pass, but I think we

shall have a few days' interval. Every precaution has been taken to prevent troops being in the channel of the pass after dark, or when rain threatens, and as the mornings are generally fine, I hope all will get down safely.

'The letters which I have received lately strongly urge my going home for a short visit, and I propose to go as far as Suez, and there hope to receive information whether Y.R.H. would approve of my coming to England for a short time before returning to my command at Bombay.

'I shall have the honour to transmit, or, if I visit England, to lay before Y.R.H. a report by a committee of officers of the Expedition of the experience gained during the campaign on various subjects relating to the equipment and treatment of troops in a campaign of the nature of this one.

'We have carried about one hundred and fifty sick and wounded, including those from the muleteer and camp-followers.

'The constant rain and exposure, coming upon men who had had insufficient food, threw a number into the hospitals during our return, but there are not many bad cases: not a single sick man, however humble his position, has failed to have carriage provided for him.

'If I carry every one safely through the pass, I shall consider my task accomplished.

'I trust Y.R.H. will pardon my repeating how valuable has been Y.R.H.'s kind support and encouragement in all things connected with the Expedition.'

For his brilliant services in this most remarkable Expedition, Sir Robert Napier was raised to the Peerage with the title of Lord Napier of Magdala. It may be remarked that he adopted this spelling after his capture of Theodore's stronghold. Prior to that it was commonly spelt 'Magdalla.'

Lord Napier of Magdala, on the completion of this splendid achievement, returned to his command in Bombay.

When the British taxpayer was presented with the bill for the campaign, he was somewhat dismayed at the cost incurred. There were not wanting critics who endeavoured to strike a monetary balance between the value of the lives of the rescued captives and the cost of the Expedition, totally oblivious of all questions of our national honour and prestige. Moreover, such critics forgot to reckon the cost an initial failure would have entailed. It is but a truism that we almost invariably enter upon a war with insufficient forces and after inadequate preparation, and that, in the outcome,

millions have to be spent to repair the shortcomings which the timely expenditure of thousands might have obviated. But in this particular case we had a commander of an expeditionary force with sufficient strength of mind to refuse to embark upon a most hazardous enterprise until he had got all he wanted in the way of transport, etc., and until all preparations had been made to his satisfaction. Well would it have been for our prestige, and also for our pockets, if all expeditionary commanders in our history had possessed equal force of character.

Others, again, complained of the enormous force employed and the excessive amount of transport, whilst others yet again grumbled at the small amount of fighting and casualties incurred!

Lord Napier, on hearing of these and other complaints, wrote to the Duke:—

FROM LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

'POONA, 21 *April* 1869.

'. . . I am quite unable to understand why the expenses of the Abyssinian Expedition were not sooner known; there should have been no difficulty in getting an approximation had it been called for.

'The causes of the great expense may be stated as follows:—

'1. The lateness of the period when the war was determined on.

'2. The want of an electric cable.

'3. The delay of the Bombay Government in not immediately establishing a good postal communication, so that we were a month nearly in getting intelligence.

'4. The delay in preparations at Bombay being vigorously forwarded, not avowed; but really in the hope that the victories of the rebels, or negotiations, or the news of our preparations, as confidently promised by General Merewether and the sanguine party, would cause the release of the prisoners and the collapse of the expedition.

'5. The delay of the Bombay Government in sanctioning the transport corps, and the faulty way in which it was commenced; this influenced expense in every way.

'The expense of the train, the loss of animals, the loss from bad drivers; both in the treatment of animals and in their desertion, dismissal and replacement by others. The delay unavoidable or otherwise, of the Bombay commissariat in sending supplies.

'From the two causes above mentioned the expense of the Expedition was increased by its being delayed, and by our having to buy our provisions in Abyssinia and carry them at great cost by the native carriage, while our own carriage existed and cost money, and our own supplies arrived too late and had to be returned.

'The delay in Bombay in sending our transport animals, which were costing from 250,000 rupees and upwards a month in Bombay, for many weeks, instead of being sent to us where we wanted them; in consequence, we had to buy carriage in Abyssinia and Arabia, to buy and bring camels from Berbera.

'All our steam transports were kept condensing water, our sailing vessels could not get out of the Red Sea during the monsoon, and were idle.

'Had the Bengal Government sent troops to relieve ours, instead of sending them to Abyssinia, the expense would have been much less.

'I suppose these causes of extra expense are always represented in every campaign, and that their sum would not form so large an item as may be supposed. The real causes of the expense are the lateness of the time of commencing, the transport of army beyond the sea, with all its carriage, and the distance of the point to be reached in a mountainous country.

'Opinions may differ as to the value of the life saved; none should differ as to the value of the honour of England, and I hope we shall not exhibit a spectacle of lamentation at having preserved it, because of the price being more than we estimated. I daresay there will be plenty of criticism, and I wish I could be present to meet it—"*Les absents ont toujours tort*"—but I trust there will not be honest defence wanting. If I could get home in time, with propriety as regards my command, I would do so.

'The experienced officers who were there know that we had not a man too many, that any insult or opposition, which we could not have stopped to avenge, would have caused our withdrawal with discredit.

'Non-combatants who had everything found for them, and all who remained quietly out of fire, thought the way easy and the enemy harmless. But those who had to carry their own burdens, and those who had to provide for every want, felt that they had done a difficult thing.

'Those who led the advance against the enemy at Arogee; the experienced Staveley and Cameron and Milwood, knew that they had not at all child's-play. Those who led the way up the precipice of Magdala did not desire any more fire against them than they experienced, and I certainly considered it better to drop shot and shell to crush opposition, rather than to drop a single man unnecessarily, to be carried 400 miles over the mountains on our return.

'I can't expect Y.R.H. to read this long letter, but some one may abstract it.'

Reference has already been made to Lord Napier's care of and devotion to the interests of the men serving under him, and to his constant endeavour to raise their social status, and see that they were treated with more consideration. Hence it will come as a surprise to some to learn that, when the question of the abolition of flogging in the Army came before Parliament, he was among those who wished to retain the power. But his wish was a qualified one, and few people who have had experience of dealing with bad and savage men, either in or out of an army, will deny the truth of his views. At the same time he again calls attention to the want of better barracks and places of amusement.

FROM LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

'MAHABLESHWUR, 29 *April* 1867.

'. . . For the bad soldier who wantonly raises his hand to strike or insult his superior officers, I am satisfied that the lash is the best punishment. The cases compared to the numbers of the Army are very few. For such men, corporal punishment and three or four years in India are better than the longer sentence of penal servitude, but whilst we are precluded from keeping the men in India, the severest sentences of penal servitude must be enforced.

'As the question of corporal punishment is now under discussion, I have ventured to trouble Y.R.H. with so much on the subject. Generally, the behaviour of the soldiers is very good; there is very little crime amongst the mass. The discomfort of bad barrack accommodation, the absence of places of amusement to go to, with change from the barrack-yard, and the heat of the climate in the hot months, make men willing to throw up all their past service to get away, even when they are good men. For a bad man, what punishment is it to discharge him with ignominy if he only gets out of the service that he desires to quit?

'The condition of the soldier must be made more desirable before discharge will be a punishment. . . .'

Corporal punishment was, however, abolished, being only retained for offences committed by men in prison, where, by the way, it applies equally to civilians and soldiers.

Writing in the following year to the Duke, Lord Napier admits that, since its abolition, there had been no increase

H.M.H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge
1869.

in the crimes of violence which had caused him to consider its retention desirable; and he again pleads for better accommodation and amusement for the men. Evidently he held the opinion that a large amount of the insubordination was due to men being disgusted with the monotony of Indian life.

FROM LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

'POONA, 26 *July* 1869.

'. . . A Return of Crimes *since* the abolition of Corporal Punishment does not show any increase in crimes of insubordination and violence, a result I should not have expected. . . . We are under disadvantages in this Presidency as regards soldiers' accommodations; beyond shelter for their heads they have very little, there is not a station that is well provided with places for working or for amusement, as are the stations in England, but we want it a great deal more.

'It is difficult to convince those who are not acquainted with soldiers how much their conduct depends on their being comfortable in their barracks and not driven elsewhere for amusement. I gave a few small prizes to men of this station to compete in reading for the Penny Readings. I was astonished at the good taste and judgment of the pieces selected and the style of reading; twelve men competed. . . .'

In his last letter to the Duke, before relinquishing the command of Bombay, he alludes to the steps he has taken to interest and occupy the men.

FROM LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

'POONA, 20 *July* 1869.

'I have little to inform Y.R.H. of by this mail. . . .

'I have endeavoured to introduce here, and to stimulate at other stations, every rational means of occupying the men's minds and their time, and the society here have very kindly come forward to assist me, so that we have weekly entertainments for them in the Rooms purchased for the Industrial Exhibition. I shall, I hope, be able to make a satisfactory report before I leave Bombay of the present condition of Regiments as to conduct and discipline. . . .'

This question of bettering the condition of the private soldier in India has been gone into at some length here, since it is one that is often alluded to in the Duke's letters to

various people; yet it appears to have been met with but little practical response, so far as can be gathered from letters H.R.H. received, until the period covered by these letters of Lord Napier. It is gratifying to think that here, at least, enormous advances have been made in late years throughout the service in general in the manner of interesting and occupying the men by the encouragement of sports, games, and other pastimes.

CHAPTER XVII

MISCELLANEOUS—1859-1869

Attack on Staff. H.R.H. on the Value of Aldershot. Military Rank for Medical Officers. Lord Palmerston on Soldiers' Headgear. H.R.H. promoted Field-Marshal. The Question of Canadian Defence, 1862. A Point of Finance. Treasury *versus* Army. The Situation in Canada, 1864. Military Attachés. Russia and China. The Overland Route *versus* the Cape, 1863. The Defence of Aden. Sir Richard Airey and the Q.M.G.-ship. Views of H.R.H., Q.M.G., and A.G. Sir William Mansfield becomes Commander-in-Chief in India. The Fenian Troubles. Discussion *re* the Movement of Troops. The Question of the Retention of Gibraltar. Sir John Burgoyne on the Subject. Tributes to H.R.H. from different War Secretaries.

BETWEEN 1859 and 1869 there are various matters of interest, which hardly form part of the consecutive story of the Duke's life, and have little connection with the great subject of the strength and organisation of the Army during this period. These, therefore, may perhaps be more fittingly dealt with in a separate chapter. The subjects which it is thus proposed to deal with are numerous, and in the main have little or no connection with each other. So the following chapter will necessarily be a somewhat unscientific grouping together of diverse matter.

The first subject which merits attention is an attack which was made on the Staff at the close of the year 1859 by Mr. Ellice, who was, it appears, prompted in this matter by Sir George Brown, to whom reference has already several times been made in preceding chapters.

TO MR. SIDNEY HERBERT.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, 25 *December* 1859.

'I return herewith Mr. Ellice's letter to Gladstone. The letter in part contradicts the memorandum, but it is clear that he intends to make an attack on the Staff in the coming

session. I am sorry for it, as these attacks, coming from such a quarter, certainly must do harm, and throw doubts in the public mind about our acts and motives which it would be well to avoid. I could much wish to have a full explanation with Mr. Ellice on this subject, as I think I could prove to him that he is in error in most points that he alludes and objects to. I am afraid my friend Sir George Brown prompts him in many things stated by him, as he is very opiniated and very bitter. And yet Brown at heart is a very good fellow, and I cannot help liking him, but he is not just, and allows his feelings to run away with him. We have got the return of the Staff for which Mr. Ellice moved, and I will now add to it, in accordance with your suggestion, a comparative return of the troops for 1853 and the present period, when I think we shall demonstrate that the Staff is not a bit too large for our increased number. Ellice is altogether mistaken if he thinks we want to add General Officers. We do nothing of the sort, and if a temporary Major-General is recommended he is taken from the top of the list of Colonels, and would be a substantive Major-General long before his period of service had expired. It is preposterous to go back to the Staff we had before the War. It was to the want of a Staff that most of our misfortunes were to be attributed at the outset of the War. Is it really wished by Ellice that we should again fall into this fatal error? I can be no party to such a plan, and I trust you share my views. I have so lately written fully on this subject that I shall not repeat my arguments in this report further than to say that, if it had not been for Aldershot, I do not think it would have been possible to have kept up and reorganised our Army; that I do not believe it is half as unpopular a place as he is anxious to make out, certainly not amongst the officers; that without the accommodation furnished by it we could not put up the Army required at home; that the conduct of the troops at Aldershot is admirable, and there is no difficulty whatever in keeping up the discipline there; that it is the healthiest station by far in the United Kingdom; and that I do not believe the neighbourhood is demoralised by the presence of the troops. All these points we can prove by figures if it should be required. I carry out in the strictest manner the five-years rule for Staff employment, and allow of no deviation in this respect, tho' Mr. Ellice seems to think this is not the case. . . .'

The vexed question of military rank for Medical Officers had again come to the front in 1861, and the Secretary of State suggested another amendment to the recently issued Medical Warrant, for reasons put forward by the officers of that department.

To this the Duke replies:—

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'I think the demand made on the part of the Medical Profession is a most unreasonable one, and I do assure you that the inconvenience we found in the old arrangement of relative rank, when the Medical Officers ranked according to the date of their commissions with Field Officers, was very great and constantly arising. Besides, the Admiralty found that it was impossible for their regulations to be assimilated to ours with any regard to discipline in their service. It was on this ground that the last change was made, and I should be very sorry to see this again put back to what it was. . . .'

Lord Palmerston's letters are usually admirable, and replete with sound and homely common sense. The one which is here presented is extremely interesting as showing that so long ago as 1861 Lord Palmerston pronounced that the cumbrous and unworkmanlike outfit of our soldiers was little conducive to efficiency or activity. Much has recently been done to remedy this state of affairs; and at manœuvres now troops wear the new service dress. But for many years after Lord Palmerston had spoken, manœuvres were carried out in tunics. When, some few years ago, the red serge was introduced for the Line, and the Brigade of Guards were given permission to adopt also an easier costume at manœuvres, they elected to wear their tunics!

Truly it is most difficult to overcome military prejudices.

FROM LORD PALMERSTON.

'94 PICCADILLY, 12 *Nov.* 1861.

'. . . There is another subject which seems deserving of Y.R.H.'s attention. When Y.R.H. or any other sportsman goes out shooting, whether in winter or summer, carrying no other load than a double-barrelled gun weighing about eight pounds, and intending to walk leisurely only a few hours, the lightest possible wide-awake is put upon the head, and a loose jacket and trousers leaves the limbs as free as possible. But when a soldier of the Guards is ordered upon a long and fatiguing march, or has to make all the bodily exertion required on the field of battle, as if his tight clothing and his musket, knapsack, ammunition and other things, weighing probably about sixty pounds, were not sufficient restraints upon muscular exertion, he has to carry on his head a great Bearskin cap, weighing, it is said, about two pounds four ounces, whereas a far lighter headgear, even if made of bearskin, would answer every purpose, and

relieve his head and brain from the heat and pressure of the present head-dress.

'I would venture to submit for Y.R.H.'s consideration that a very light cap, partly bearskin if that must be, but smaller and lower than the Artillery busby, would be a great relief to the men of the Guards, and that, after such an improved head-dress had come into use, everybody would wonder that the present high and heavy cap had ever been worn.'

On 9 November 1862 H.R.H. was promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal.

On 11 November he wrote to the Secretary of State:—

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'I am just going off to Osborne, but before leaving London I must write you a line to say that I am very much gratified at finding my name in the *Gazette* as a Field-Marshal, and that I feel very much obliged to you for the kind interest you have taken in the matter.'

The question of Canadian Defence is a complex one; and it is no nearer a solution to-day than it was in 1862. But in the latter year, and again in 1864, the subject was in especial prominence owing to the continuance of the American Civil War. The Duke's letter to Sir George Lewis also contains some interesting allusions to the Army Estimates and to the Ionian Isles.

FROM SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'War Office, 4 *June* 1862.

'I return the letter which Y.R.H. had the kindness to send me.

'I am afraid that we must not expect the Canadians to make any great exertions for their own defence until the actual hour of danger arrives. They reckon upon being defended by England, and in the event of their not being defended by England (which they would prefer), of being incorporated with the United States.

'But at present they do not contemplate independence, with its responsibilities and obligations.'

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'Gloucester House, 29 *December* 1862.

'I am anxious to draw your attention to the present state of feeling in America, and to the evident disposition of the

governing classes to turn the tide of popular discontent at the want of the success of the Federal troops against Great Britain; I don't say they will succeed in this, for I hardly think they will have power left for any vigorous efforts; but still it is right that we should not be blind to what is evidently the will of the Government, namely, to produce irritation in the public mind against this country. The question then arises whether, under these circumstances, we are justified in leaving the defences of *Quebec* in the unsatisfactory state which the recent Commission on the Defence of Canada reports them to be: I am well aware that it is not a popular subject at this moment to bring forward any expenditure for Colonial Defence, but still that is not the point for us to consider only. We must ask ourselves whether there is not a certain amount of danger and risk in leaving Quebec as it is, seeing the bad feeling which certainly pervades the American mind as against this country. Granted even that no great attack may be made by the Americans upon us, may not, at the end of the war, bands of men make a dash at our Canadian frontier with the object of making mischief and bringing on a collision;[1] and should we not look very foolish then if we had done nothing for Quebec when it had been officially brought to our notice that the fortress is in a very unsatisfactory state?

'There is another point to which I am anxious to draw your attention. In the large Army Estimates we annually present to Parliament it is not shown what our *repayments* are, either from India or the Colonies. I am well aware that, as all these sums are paid direct into the Imperial Exchequer, they cannot be credited in your Estimates, which must be completed within themselves. But I cannot imagine why a paper should not accompany the Estimates showing the total amount of the sums thus received, which, now that we pay the Indian Depôts and receive a capitation allowance from the Indian Government, must, in the aggregate, be very considerable. Again, all the outlay in barracks and works appears in the Estimates. None of the money received for sales is allowed to appear. I am in hopes that a good many small barracks may be got rid of, especially in Ireland. It is not fair that the produce of what they may realise should not equally appear. The Treasury, I doubt not, will not like any plan of the sort, but I think it just and fair towards the Military Departments, who have been so constantly accused of extravagance, that their interests should be looked after in this respect in the manner I suggest. At all events, I think it right to throw out the subject for your serious consideration.

'I am rather disposed to think that the cession of the

[1] A curiously prophetic remark, justified by the Fenian Raids on the Canadian Frontier in 1866, and again in 1870.

Ionian Islands is not, after all, so easy of accomplishment as it was at first thought, and I most seriously hope that they will certainly not be given up, unless they be handed over to what may be considered a stable government, and with certain provisos that they should not be occupied by any other of the Great Powers of Europe.'

TO LORD DE GREY.

'STRELITZ, 9 *September* 1864.

'I have received the accompanying Memorial from Sir Fenwick Williams, which has followed me to Germany, and which I think of so much importance that I at once send it on to you. I must confess that I enter very fully into the feelings and hopes, as expressed, of the memorialists. I do not see the vast danger to which our troops are supposed to be exposed by the mode in which they are quartered in Canada in time of actual peace, because I think the means of concentration by railroads are so great that I think the officers in command at out-stations would have abundant time to move upon their supports before any harm could arise to them. At the same time, the total withdrawal of troops from entire districts—and these, many of them, the most loyal and well-affected—must produce a very damping influence upon the feelings of those districts. Indeed, I really think that politically it would be a great misfortune to carry out this policy, for it must have a very depressing effect upon the very best disposed portion of the inhabitants of those Provinces. I have often heard it argued that Canada is of no use to us, and why, therefore, retain it? I confess I cannot share these views. The very loss of Canada would, in my judgment, have a very depressing effect on the prestige of our Empire. Great countries cannot afford to lose their prestige, and we are no exception to this rule; therefore I say, retain Canada as long as you can do so without coercion; and as the inhabitants of Canada are most loyal and have no sort of wish to separate from the Mother Country, let us avoid doing anything to drive them into another and less satisfactory frame of mind. Besides, it would appear from Sir Fenwick Williams' letter that it would actually be attended with considerable expense in barrack accommodation, which would have to be increased if all the troops, with the exception of one Regiment, were removed from Upper Canada. Under these circumstances, I would strongly advise that orders should at once be sent out to Sir F. Williams, leaving it to him, in conjunction with the Governor-General, to distribute the troops in Canada as he may think most prudent and best, throwing upon him the responsibility of their security and easy means of concentration by means of railroads, and thus evincing every desire on the part of the Home Government to support the Colonists in their

reasonable representations, provided they would exert themselves on their part to support the Imperial troops by a good system of Militia, supplemented, wherever possible, by a considerable body of Volunteers. . . .'

In the sixties the question of Military Attachés was in its infancy. Thus in 1860 we find Lord John Russell writing to the Duke and proposing that an Attaché should be appointed to Berlin for six months, who, if he was found to be useful, should remain on for a further period. The subject therefore was hardly regarded in our own case at that time in a sufficiently important light; and, in view of the celebrated Stöffel reports, it is a matter of history that it was not so in France either.

Two years later we find that the Duke had realised its import as regards the growing importance and power of Prussia. His foresight in this respect is especially remarkable, as popular opinion before the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 predicted the success of Austria, and before the Franco-German War of 1870-71 that of France. Yet the Duke realised what Prussia was doing long before any of the great wars, or even the war of 1864, had taken place.

FROM LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

'FOREIGN OFFICE, 29 *May* 1860.

'I wish to send a Military Attaché to Berlin, to be appointed at first for six months, and to remain if he is found useful. Perhaps Y.R.H. knows of some officer who speaks German well and is capable of seeing and reporting what he sees in a plain, sensible style.

'We could afford him about £400 for the six months, and £700 if he were to stay a year. Of course the employment might open the way to further service.

'I trust that Y.R.H. will excuse my giving you this trouble.'

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 20 *October* 1862.

'. . . I hope you will let the question as to the Military Attaché at Berlin stand over till you come up to town. I am certain from what I know of Germany, and Prussia in particular, that it is far more important to have a Military Attaché there than Lord Russell seems to think. I propose to try to see him about it and explain my views. But I agree with you that the expense of this post must *not* be thrown

on the War Department. It is a *political* and not a mere military appointment, according to my view of the case. . . .'

On 8 March 1864 the Duke raises the whole question of Military Attachés, and very clearly points out that, however earnestly our Ambassadors might try to send us reliable military information, they, being laymen, were only too likely to miss important points.

It is interesting to know that H.R.H.'s efforts on this occasion were not without avail. For on 13 April 1864 Military Attachés were appointed to Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

TO LORD DE GREY.

'Gloucester House, 8 *March* 1864.

'In the present most disturbed state of Europe, when military operations and preparations are going on in so many States, I think it really would be of the greatest importance that we should have a Military Attaché at all our principal Missions, such as Berlin, Vienna, Copenhagen, St. Petersburg, etc. Indeed I think it would be well to extend this system even to America. I do not ask for Commissioners; these would be objectionable very likely, and might appear compromising to the Government, but Military Attachés to the Missions would be able to obtain information for us on military subjects which we could not otherwise acquire. We are extremely ill-informed, I think, on purely military subjects at present, and yet it is essential to know all the details of the movements of the troops, the amount of progress attained towards a war footing or otherwise in the several armies concerned, the firearms and artillery arrangements of the various Armies, and, in short, a thousand and one subjects which are both valuable and important to us to be made acquainted with. If at any time a Commissioner were required with any force, of course these Attachés would be so employed; but this is not the object I have in view. With all the care and attention that may be devoted by the Ambassadors or Ministers at the various Courts to obtain reliable information, these gentlemen, being civilians, cannot acquire half the military information which it is essential for us in the present critical state of affairs to possess, and I cannot therefore too strongly urge this question upon Lord Russell and yourself.

'I would take care to select officers of not too high rank so as not to attract any particular attention.'

From the following letter to Sir George Lewis it appears that, even as early as 1863, Russia already had designs on China.

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 3 *January* 1863.

'Though no doubt you have already seen the dispatch of General Staveley's, I consider it of so much importance that I beg to draw your attention to it.

'You will observe that it is stated on authority that a Russian force is expected from the Amour River Settlement, and that this force is to aid the Imperialists. This is a very serious state of things, and no doubt will act very inconveniently to our interests and not be favourable to our views, either politically or commercially. I think at all events, if this be true, that our force in China should be increased rather than diminished, as has been hitherto intended.

'I think that we ought to assist the Chinese by every means in our power as regards officers and non-commissioned officers to drill their troops. At present nothing very definite has been settled in this respect, and I think it will be desirable to give General Staveley instructions on the subject. Would you let me have this dispatch back when you have done with it?'

The importance of being able to send troops rapidly to India can hardly be over-estimated; and the Duke in 1863 tried to impress upon the Government the urgency of the subject. Very truly he pointed out that probably India was saved to us during the period of the great Mutiny through our power of being able to send out troops rapidly from home. He was met by a qualified refusal on the score of expense, though the question was a much greater one than Sir George Lewis seems to have supposed when he said that it 'was scarcely of any importance during peace.' The real point was that it was essential that the principle that we could send troops through Egypt should be established in peace time, in view of our having also to do so in all probability in war time.

There is also a very interesting letter to Sir William Mansfield, then Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, on the defences of Aden. The state of affairs there now appears to be much the same as it was when the Duke wrote.

There is still not sufficient barrack accommodation to hold a strong European Regiment, although, owing to the weakness of some Regiments which have recently served there, it has been possible to accommodate complete units. This result

has also been rendered more easy on account of the recent distracted state of the Aden hinterland. For the past two years it has been found necessary to maintain a garrison in the hinterland; and it has also been necessary at somewhat frequent intervals to dispatch columns from Aden to take part in various small but troublesome expeditions against recalcitrant tribesmen in the vicinity. Still, though matters, owing to these exceptional circumstances, have rendered it possible of late to maintain a strong battalion at Aden, the barrack accommodation remains much the same as it was in 1863.

The unpopularity and unhealthiness of Aden as a station for European troops is notorious throughout the Army; and it is interesting to find that the salutary rule that white regiments should not serve at that most unpleasant spot for more than one year was due to the initiative of Sir Robert (afterwards Lord) Napier. In the second of his letters given below, he draws a vivid picture of the cadaverous appearance of the Europeans who had served there for over a year; but his representations met with little attention at the hands of the Indian Government. In the end, however, he carried his point, and the British Army in consequence owes him a debt of gratitude.

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 5 *January* 1863.

'I am anxious to draw your attention to a question which I consider of great importance—that of the transit of our troops going to India through Egypt. I feel persuaded that we are suffering in influence in the East by the French troops going in large numbers to Cochin China through Egypt, whereas ours all now go around the Cape. During the Mutiny I believe India was *saved* to us in a great measure by the rapid transmission of our troops through Egypt. The importance of that line for our Indian possessions is therefore obvious. I believe the Pasha of Egypt is not at all unfavourable to such a scheme, and as regards our Army, it will be of enormous advantage to us, as Regiments will be much sooner available again, both ways, after a short voyage, than they would be as at present, owing to the long one around the Cape. If it should be deemed objectionable to pass all our troops through Egypt, I would

propose that the annual reliefs of Regiments should go through Egypt; the sending of drafts should be, as at present, by long sea around the Cape. I am very desirous to have the experiment tried this year, if possible, with the five Regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry that it is intended to send out to India, and I hope you will do all to further the scheme with the several Departments concerned in the arrangement. Politically, I am certain that the advantage to us of such a scheme will be great.'

FROM SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'War Office, 5 *January* 1863.

'All arguments of a general nature, both military and political, seem to me in favour of sending our troops to and from India by way of Egypt.

'It seems to me to resolve itself simply into a question of expense, and I am afraid, from what I hear, that it is cheaper to send them round the Cape than by the Red Sea.

'The saving of time is of scarcely any importance during peace. I have had the question under consideration, and I have given directions to obtain from the Admiralty an estimate of the comparative expense. As soon as this is obtained, and I am able to form a provisional opinion, I will not fail to communicate again with Your Royal Highness.'

TO SIR GEORGE LEWIS.

'Gloucester House, 9 *January* 1863.

'I requested Lord de Grey to draw your attention to the very able minute of Sir W. Mansfield on the subject of the transport of troops through Egypt. I rejoice to think the subject has been taken up in India as well as by us at home. The question of expense appears to me to be all in favour of the route through Egypt; for remember that you have so many more men available all the year round by shortening the voyage so considerably, to and fro, than you could have when the troops are sent by long sea around the Cape. Besides, the offer of this agent of transports made to Sir William is a most favourable one. I hope therefore you will strongly advocate a trial being made this year. I send you a very excellent letter from Mansfield on the state of the fortifications at Aden, which he has been to visit. Sir Charles Wood has seen it, but has not decided what to do about it. When you are both in town I am anxious that we three should hold a meeting on the subject connected with the defence of Aden and the transport of troops through Egypt. I shall also be glad to see you upon some other matters if you will let me know when I am likely to find you at the Office.'

TO SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.

'HORSE GUARDS, 19 *January* 1863.

'I have to thank you for your letter of 11 December, written immediately after your return from Aden. I am much obliged to you for putting me in full possession of your views as regards this important post, upon which the uninterrupted communications between the Mother Country and India by the overland route *mainly depends*. I entirely share your views on this subject, and you may rely upon my using my best exertions to forward your wishes as to getting something done. I have already impressed the subject strongly on the two Secretaries of State for India and for War, and I hope that, as the question has been taken up warmly by the Government of Bombay, a decision may ere long be arrived at. The question of an adequate garrison for Aden has long attracted my attention. I felt that one Battery of Artillery and the wing of a European Regiment was not an adequate force of Europeans, even in conjunction with a much larger Native force, to garrison a fort so isolated, so important, and so easily assailed. I had therefore on former occasions suggested the propriety of increasing the European portion of the garrison, and it was on this account more particularly that I objected to your proposal of adding a *Native Battery* of Artillery to Aden, and strongly urged the advantage, and necessity indeed, of a second *European* Battery. I hope you have now convinced yourself, by personal inspection, that my views in this respect were correct, and I gather from your letter that such is the case. Aden is a place at which, at any moment, the French may come into collision with us, and I think that this, of all places, ought consequently to have a considerable European garrison to cope with them. I hope to see the garrison of Aden consist of an entire Regiment of Europeans, besides two Batteries of European Artillery, and any amount of Native troops that you may think necessary for the ordinary routine duties of the place. I should like to have your views on this subject. As regards the transport of troops through Egypt, it is singular enough that I am pressing this subject on the consideration of Government when your able minute on the same subject arrived in England. I share your views so fully with regard to this all-important matter that I cannot tell you how gratified I am at finding that your views and mine are identical in this respect, and I will do all in my power to press forward this subject on the authorities at home, and only hope that you will not rest in your endeavours to do the same on the Civil Government in India.

'I am very glad that you propose to make a lengthened tour of inspection in a portion of your command not hitherto visited by a Commander-in-Chief. These periodical visits are most useful and valuable.'

Four years later Sir Robert Napier writes on the subject of the Aden Garrison; and, as the following letters show, he finally gained his point.

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'20 *April* 1867.

'The preparations for the overland reliefs have been vigorously taken up here, and I have sent Sir Hope Grant a copy of a minute which I sent to the Government here on the subject of annual relief of the Aden Regiment, which will be very easy when the reliefs come through the Red Sea. I am very sorry to find that proposals are made by the Government of India to defer this excellent measure. We shall be ready to do our part here.'

Writing on 23 July 1867 to H.R.H., Sir Robert Napier says:—

FROM SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

'I . . . am very glad that the plan of relieving Aden troops annually has met with Y.R.H.'s approval. I am sorry to say that the Government of India have made objections, which, however, will not bear examination, and show that they have not rightly considered the question. The overland transit of troops has evidently so occupied their minds as to leave no power of admitting another idea. It cannot cost anything to drop one Regiment at Aden and pick up another; the only point of difficulty is the detachment at Hydrabad on the Indus, which is there for the sake of shelter, but which will move to Aden when its barracks are ready. Until then, as there is always a Regiment going up the Indus, it is only necessary to make that one the Aden Regiment. If the Hydrabad detachment was to be brought to Bombay, a three days' steam from Kurrachi, it would be better than to adhere to the present plan. The cadaverous appearance of the 109th shows that we have kept the Regiment in a bad climate (Aden) until its stamina is gone. It cannot matter to India whether the Regiment which it gets comes from Aden or Suez.'

The difficulty of filling adequately the most important post of Quartermaster-General has always been felt. To perform those arduous duties satisfactorily requires an officer of exceptional qualifications and the possession of a business-like turn of mind. A General Officer may be excellent in the field, and endued with the highest military qualities, and yet be wholly unsuitable for such a post.

In this connection the Duke very rightly points out that he would have no great difficulty at any time in filling

adequately the purely military and comparatively plain-sailing post of Adjutant-General.

But the Quartermaster-Generalship is a different matter. An indifferent Adjutant-General would probably not very largely affect the efficiency of the Army, though it would be more serious now that Mobilisation has partly also been placed under his control; but an indifferent Quartermaster-General in war time might easily result in spelling disaster. At the time of this correspondence Sir Richard Airey possessed all the necessary qualifications, as well as having in addition all the purely military ones, which fitted for this high office; and consequently the Duke was most disinclined to part with him.

TO LORD DE GREY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 8 *November* 1864.

'I have been carefully reconsidering in my mind all the arrangements we discussed yesterday as regards the new appointments.

'All seems to me to be perfectly satisfactory, with one exception, but that one is so important that I must again revert to it.

'It is quite true that the late Lord Herbert said in the House of Commons that the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General were to be changed every five years.

'I think, however, it was distinctly understood that the change was not to be insisted upon if it were likely to be detrimental to the public service. . . . I am certain the loss to the public service, if Airey goes, will be most serious, and indeed I think it of such vast importance, that I deem it right, not alone on my own interest, but upon far higher grounds, that of the public service, to appeal to you to allow Airey to remain Quartermaster-General, at all events for some time longer, and till a good deputy has worked himself sufficiently into the office to enable matters to go on smoothly. I say nothing as regards the Adjutant-General, as I can always find an officer for that post more easily. . . .

The Secretary of State, however, after consulting with his colleagues, was unable to comply with the Duke's request, and a new Quartermaster-General was appointed.

In the following letter the Duke informs Sir William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst) that he has been selected for the great post of Commander-in-Chief in India; and he also enlarges in a characteristic fashion on the duties and scope of that exalted office.

TO SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD.

'HORSE GUARDS, 17 *November* 1864.

'With reference to the letter I have received from you by a recent mail, and to one which I had from Sir H. Rose expressing a wish to be relieved of his command in March next, it has been my duty to consider what steps should be taken to fill up the vacant appointment, and I have now the satisfaction of announcing to you that I have Her Majesty's commands to intimate to you that She has, on the recommendation of the Government, selected you as Sir Hugh Rose's successor in the Command-in-Chief of the Army in India and of the Bengal Presidency. I am confident that you will in every respect justify the high opinion that is entertained of your great ability and experience, and I am sure that the most cordial good feeling will continue between yourself and me. It is of the highest importance that we should have the most unreserved intercourse on all military subjects; for as the Commander-in-Chief at home can directly interfere but little with the Commander-in-Chief in India in his official communications, it is essential that, privately and confidentially, everything connected with the European troops in India should be fully and unreservedly discussed between them, by which means alone the same system can be thoroughly carried out in India which is established at home. It has always struck me that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be as much as possible near the Governor-General. I have frequently suggested this to Sir H. Rose, but I regret to say that, from one reason or another, he found it difficult to comply with my recommendation.

'I hope, however, that you will agree with me in the necessity of carrying out these views; at the same time I do not wish, on any account, to curtail more than is absolutely necessary the inspectional movements of the Commander-in-Chief. These, I know from experience, are most valuable, and the more you can see what is going on with your own eyes, the more rejoiced I shall be. A little difficulty has presented itself from the circumstance of Sir Hope Grant being senior to yourself. I have therefore, by Her Majesty's permission, written to him to offer him the Quartermaster-Generalship of the Army at home, in succession to Sir Richard Airey, whose period of service in that capacity has expired, leaving it, however, to Sir Hope Grant himself to accept of the appointment or, if he prefers it, to remain at Madras. By this means all supersession is obviated. In a subsequent letter I will write to you further what steps have been taken to fill up the Bombay Command. In conclusion, let me congratulate you on attaining so high and honourable a post.'

Already, in 1866, questions as to the scope of the Commander-in-Chief's powers were beginning to arise; and as

illustrative of the change which subsequently took place in the respective functions of the political and military chiefs, it is interesting to note that, thirty-nine years ago, it was a matter for discussion whether the movement of troops should, or should not, be submitted to the Secretary of State for approval.

As regards the merits or demerits of the actual point at issue, Sir John Pakington's letters show how easy it is for an amateur who does not understand all the intricate details of a technical question to blunder. Few questions, as regards military administration, require a greater variety of complicated calculations and considerations than does the movement of troops; and these this particular Secretary of State seems very imperfectly to have realised. The Duke's reply is interesting as giving proof of how earnestly he was in the habit of considering all questions of military administration which came within his jurisdiction, and how well he had in hand all the parts of the complicated machinery for which he was responsible.

It is also instructive to reflect on his contention that it was equally the business of the Commander-in-Chief, as of the Secretary of State, to see that all military affairs were conducted economically. The reputation of the one, unless, as was the case in later years, his office was reduced to a nullity, was equally involved in the matter of economy; and it is at least open to question whether the subsequent complete assumption of detailed supremacy on the part of the Secretary of State, which has been the predominant feature of later War Office History, has on the whole made for economy.

The British officer is not, as a rule, backward in taking responsibility, or in carrying out the duties which it entails in a satisfactory manner. When he is given financial responsibility he is, as a rule, equal to the demands which are made upon him; that he is a soldier does not necessarily make him a spendthrift. But take away the responsibility and attempt to safeguard his actions by a minute system of irritating supervision, and then the British officer, like any other individual similarly situated, naturally

cannot take the same interest in working for economy as if he were trusted to act in a reasonable and responsible manner.

FROM SIR JOHN PAKINGTON.

'1 *February* 1868.

'I have been induced by my late conversation with Y.R.H. on the subject of movements of troops, and by the letters which have passed between the Horse Guards and War Office, both last January and now, on the same subject, and by Colonel Wetherall's memorandum, forwarded to me by Your Royal Highness, to consider seriously the present state of this question. I must beg Y.R.H.'s permission to write to you frankly upon it.

'I must say in the outset that I read with some regret the concluding paragraph of Colonel Wetherall's memorandum; Colonel Wetherall's statement of facts is valuable.

'The opinions of an officer in his position should not, I think, be given unless required, and cannot influence the decision of such a question.

'I trust I need not assure Y.R.H. that I am incapable of advising any course that would be "most derogatory to Y.R.H." On the contrary, I sincerely desire, in fulfilling my duties, to support your high office in all its proper functions; and I therefore desire, and especially now, when the system of double government is shortly to be debated in the House of Commons, that no fair point of attack should be left open.

'Y.R.H. will not, I am convinced, think anything derogatory that is consistent with a fair Constitutional view of the relative position of the two offices.

'The question at issue seems to me to be very simple: it is only whether there is anything in the movement of troops at home so peculiar as to exempt it from the financial control of the Minister who is responsible for the expenditure of the Army?

'The Foreign Reliefs are, as Colonel Wetherall states, always submitted to the Secretary of State; the movement of troops at home cannot, he says, be conveniently so submitted, but he does not appear to me to be successful in establishing this view. The Home movements were under the control of the Secretary at War previous to the changes of 1856; and General Peel, in his letter of 23rd of last January, expressed his wish that Y.R.H. would suggest some mode of reverting to that arrangement.

'Let me again assure Y.R.H. that I look at this question only in its Financial and Constitutional aspect; and I venture to submit that the table of the movements of troops in 1867 which Y.R.H. was so good as to enclose to me, with Colonel Wetherall's memorandum, affords some proofs that the

Quartermaster-General's Department is not always sufficiently economical in its arrangements.

'I find in that table that the 80th Regiment remained at Portland only from February to July, and the 40th Regiment at Devonport only from April to November. There are other cases which I will not mention, because they arose from the demands caused by the Fenian disturbances.

'I have thought it my duty thus to state openly, but I trust respectfully, to Y.R.H. the views which my reflections on this subject have led me to form, and I have thought it better to do so in the shape of a private letter. It will thus be more open to free discussion.

'I am sure Y.R.H. will not misunderstand my motives. I shall be ready fully to consider any opinions you may do me the honour to express; and I will conclude by saying that it will be a relief to me, and I think it may be an advantage hereafter in Parliament, if Y.R.H. will kindly consent to consider the suggestion offered in General Peel's letter of last year on this subject.'

TO SIR JOHN PAKINGTON.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 *February* 1868.

'Your letter of the 1st gives me great concern, for I see with deep regret that you take a view entirely opposed to mine with reference *to the movements* of troops in the United Kingdom. I must exonerate Colonel Wetherall entirely of the sentence to which you take exception. That sentence was put in by *my express direction*, and it contains my feelings and views to the fullest extent. The fact is, that it will be impossible for me to carry out the command of the troops at home if the suggestions now put forward are to be carried out. It would be placing the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in a worse position than the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, in Canada, or in any other possessions of the Crown. All internal moves of troops are conducted by these officers, and must be so conducted in the interest of the public service; and though the Government, in concurrence with the Commander-in-Chief, decide upon the amount of force to be apportioned to each command, whenever the troops are there, their distribution and movements rest entirely with the local Commander.

'I only claim for myself, as Commanding the Troops at home, the same confidence to be reposed in me as you repose in all the subordinate Generals; and I think that any attempt to change this arrangement would be most detrimental to the public service, would be indeed quite impossible of execution, and would seriously impair the position of the Commander-in-Chief, casting upon him the imputation that he could not be trusted with the public interests on a point

on which all his subordinate Generals were allowed to act on their own responsibility.

'The general apportionment of the Army rests with the Government, in concurrence with the Commander-in-Chief; therefore the main features of expenditure on this head are all decided by Government through the Secretary of State. This is right and proper, and maintains the Constitutional principle. The internal movements of troops and their stationing are points of discipline and depend upon the everyday requirements of the Service, and must therefore be purely military questions, upon which the Commander-in-Chief can alone decide, except in cases of great emergency for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, when any extraordinary measure of precaution or exceptional movements are carried out under the directions of the Home Secretary or Irish Government. The quartering of troops is a far more intricate question than you seem to suppose. Regiments coming from India, China, or distant Colonies, for instance, cannot be quartered in every station. They must be placed where they are to be kept together, where they have an opportunity of being re-formed, where they are not likely to be detached, such as Portsmouth, Plymouth, Dover, or Shorncliffe. For drill purposes they are concentrated at Aldershot. When in a fit state for detachment, they go to the Northern District, Channel Islands, etc. These are all very grave questions in which discipline and every variety of military consideration are and must be involved, and which must therefore rest exclusively with the Military authorities and cannot be treated as a financial question alone by the Civil Branches of the War Office. Hence it may be deemed strange by the outer world why Regiments are sent on to other quarters on landing; and yet all these moves have a meaning, and every one is decided upon, after much consideration and reflection, by *myself* as Commander-in-Chief, and not by the Quartermaster-General's Department as such. And in making these arrangements I can assure you that the financial question is never lost sight of by me. On the contrary, it always has a *large share* in the decisions come to; but I combine the financial question with the purely military one, and balance as far as possible the importance of each. Now the movements of the 80th and the 40th are perfectly explicable. They were both made by my directions. The 80th came from Plymouth on its way to Aldershot, and knowing it had to go on there was landed and did duty for a certain time at Weymouth and Portland. The Portland duties are very heavy, and distasteful to the men. Therefore no Regiment is kept there longer than can be helped. When more troops were required for Aldershot, it came to the turn of the 80th to go on to that station, and on it moved without any additional public expense, as it went exactly over the same ground that it would have done and no

more, than had it gone direct from Plymouth to Aldershot. This, therefore, was no additional expense to the public. The 40th was obliged to be sent by *sea* from Portsmouth to Plymouth as we required a Regiment there, and had either to send it on or one of the Regiments landing from India; and of the two it was deemed that the 40th was a more efficient Regiment to go there than a Regiment just coming from India. When the 40th went to Plymouth there was not an idea that so many troops would be required to be moved to the Northern District. These exceptional moves upset all our arrangements and calculations. Regiments had to be moved from Aldershot to the North, they being the most efficient at our disposal. Other corps had to be sent to Aldershot to replace them. For this purpose, the next most advanced in drill and discipline had to be taken. It came to the turn of the 40th, and we wanted the quarters they occupied at Plymouth for another corps more recently landed. Consequently the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade on landing from India went on to Plymouth, and the 40th were ordered to Aldershot. The same vessel that took the one down brought the other back, and consequently no additional expense was incurred for the public, the only difference being that, owing to the Fenian difficulties, which nobody could foresee in the summer, the 40th were moved to Aldershot six months sooner than had been intended, or than they would have done, but for these difficulties.

'I have gone into these details in order to make the subject clear to you. There is not a single other move made that cannot be explained in a similar manner.

'I am most anxious to discuss this question with you most fully in all its details, and am quite prepared and most anxious to give you, as Secretary of State, any explanations you may ask for or require. But that is a very different thing from having these moves overhauled by the Clerks of the office, to whom these explanations cannot be made, and whose interference would therefore become a great hindrance to business and very detrimental to the public interests.

'Depend upon this, that the Military Departments are not disposed to be extravagant, and nobody less so than the Commander-in-Chief, whose interests are much more on the side of economy than the reverse in such matters. Hoping for a further full discussion.'

FROM SIR JOHN PAKINGTON.

'WAR OFFICE, 4 *February* 1868.

'I have had the honour of receiving Y.R.H.'s note this day. . . . I must beg leave to thank Y.R.H. for the kind tone in which you have expressed your dissent from my views as to the arrangements for the movement of troops in the United Kingdom.

'I think there are reasons which make it very desirable that we should, if possible, find some common ground on this subject in which we might concur, and I shall gladly avail myself of Y.R.H.'s permission to talk it over with you.'

FROM SIR JOHN PAKINGTON.

'52 Grosvenor Place, 10 *February* 1868.

'I have considered the Horse Guards paper on movement of troops with Colonel Wetherall's memorandum attached, which Y.R.H. gave me last Friday, and I have made inquiries in the War Office as to the practice with respect to those papers. I find, as I expected, that the real difference between Y.R.H.'s views on this subject and those expressed in our respective letters by General Peel and myself, is much less than it at first appeared.

'The misunderstanding seems to have arisen, in part, from the arrangements within the War Office; the information of movements from the Quartermaster-General's Office have not been sent on with any regularity to either the Secretary or the Under-Secretary of State, and appear to have been regarded by those who received them as guides for the direction of letters rather than for any other purpose.

'As regards the form of words used by the Horse Guards in these communications, I would only suggest to Y.R.H. whether you would object to have the word "proposed" inserted where I have written it in the paper I return, and to have, if practicable, *the date* of the proposed movement stated in the first paper sent.

'It might also, perhaps, be more convenient if the letters were forwarded by the Quartermaster-General with greater punctuality. I have before me the two papers relating to the movements of the 74th and 92nd Depôts last month. The first, giving notice of both movements, is dated *January* 5, and was received 16 January; the second, intimating day of departure, is dated 27 January, and was received 29 January.

'I will, of course, see that the practice within the War Office is corrected; and if Y.R.H. does not object to the slight changes I have suggested, I really think that neither for Parliamentary nor other objects need more be required.'

FROM SIR JOHN PAKINGTON.

'War Office, 11 *February* 1868.

'I have just had the honour of receiving Y.R.H.'s letter. I must now apologise for *my* mistake as to the date of the notice for moving the Depôts of 74th and 92nd.

'I find it *was* dated 15*th*; but I read it repeatedly as 5th, and in fact never read it otherwise till I showed it to Lugard, who suggested that a mark which I had taken for a bracket was intended for the figure 1!

'I thank Y.R.H. for your compliance with my suggestions. I see no occasion for any change in the mode of sending in the Reports, and they will now be passed on to the Under-Secretary of State.

'I will fix next Saturday at twelve for a War Office Meeting, if that time will be convenient to Y.R.H.'

Towards the end of 1868 the question of the exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta assumed some prominence, and in October the Duke had occasion to write to the Queen on the matter. General Grey, Private Secretary to the Queen, was a most ardent supporter of the project, and urged his views on every possible occasion. In a letter of no less than sixteen quarto pages, 1868, he writes to the Duke that 'the Queen has allowed me to see Y.R.H.'s letters on the subject of Gibraltar,' and sets his opinions forth at full, and again on 19 November he, although at less length, reiterates them. In support he quotes his brother, Admiral Grey, upon the comparative value of the two places as a naval and military station.

FROM GENERAL GREY.

'Windsor Castle, 19 *November* 1868.

'My brother the Admiral came over here to-day, and I took the opportunity of speaking to him on the subject of Gibraltar and Ceuta. He was, as I told Y.R.H., for ten years Captain of the Port at the former place, and had every opportunity of making himself thoroughly acquainted with the comparative advantages of the two places as a military and naval station.

'Without the slightest hesitation, he gives the preference to Ceuta over Gibraltar on every consideration that makes it desirable for England to possess a station at the entrance of the Mediterranean; and he tells me that all the most distinguished Admirals who served up the Mediterranean during the time of his residence on the Rock—amongst them Sir William Parker, Sir Charles Napier, and Sir Richard Dundas—entirely adopted his views after examining and considering the question on the spot.

'He entirely confirms all I took the liberty of pointing out to Y.R.H. of the *utter inutility* of Gibraltar to us as a Naval Station were we at war with Spain—of the whole anchorage being commanded at point-blank range from the ground I mentioned. But he adds that, at *all* times, Gibraltar is a bad anchorage, where no Fleet could lie in safety, and exposed as it is to the north-west wind, that it can scarcely be called a port at all. While it is most inconvenient as a watering-place—and there is no wharfage where more than

one ironclad could lie for the purpose of coaling at a time —on the other hand, he says, Ceuta, "Great Bay," on the Mediterranean side of the promontory, might be made another Portland, affording, were a breakwater constructed, for which there is every facility, secure anchorage for our whole Navy, with any extent of wharfage we might require. I have always heard that Lord Nelson, when in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, invariably preferred to lie in Tetuan Bay in preference to Gibraltar.

'My brother also confirms what I said of vessels passing through the Straits without intending to touch at Gibraltar. They *always prefer* keeping the Barbary shore, especially in coming down the Mediterranean.

'There could be other minor advantages resulting from the exchange. Even at Gibraltar we depend largely upon the Moors for supplies of provisions, especially meat; and the possession of Ceuta would enable us to operate much more securely and effectually against the Pirates of the Riff.

'My brother is so strongly impressed with the expediency of making the exchange that he tells me he has written to Lord Stanley (of which I was not aware) very much in the terms in which I have ventured to write to Y.R.H. His own rather forcible expression on the subject is in answer to those who argue for its retention on the ground of the vast sums spent on the fortifications:—"and when you have spent thousands more, and made it the Engineer's wonder of the world, you will find it of no more use, unless *you could get it under weigh*!"

'I am aware that many distinguished officers—generally those who are not personally acquainted with the place, or who have not given it a consideration further than as regards the strength of Gibraltar as a fortress, without asking themselves a question as to the uses to which it is to be put, or who have, in my opinion, a very mistaken opinion of what really constitutes the "prestige" of England—are opposed to its surrender. And I fear that in deference to their feeling—for it is more a feeling than an opinion—the golden opportunity now offered of securing a *better* station for England, and at the same time of conciliating a proud people, will be lost.'

The Duke, however, refused to listen to these persuasions, and replied as follows—and few will deny the correctness of his views—on the matter:—

TO GENERAL GREY.

'Horse Guards, 22 *November* 1868.

'I am grieved more than words can express at the contents of your two letters on the subject of our possession of Gibraltar.

'I confess myself unconvinced by your arguments; and whilst I have no wish to underrate the importance of the Spanish national feeling on the subject, I must honestly say that I attach more importance to the British feeling on this subject than you do; and I hold that the possession of such a stronghold as that of Gibraltar for the last 164 years by this country weighs a great deal more in my mind than any amount of Spanish pride which can be brought forward in opposition to it. On the military importance of Gibraltar, I cannot compare it for a moment with that of Ceuta: the advantage seems to me to be altogether with the former place; and as to the naval portion of the question, upon that I do not feel justified to offer any such decided opinion, though I should have thought that if naval men really took so decided a view adverse to the Old Rock as you suggest, they would have put it forward on many occasions within the period of 164 years of our possession, when possibly some arrangement might have been made with much more prospect of success than seems to me likely to be the case at present. One or another of the two ports at the entrance to the Mediterranean you admit yourself to be indispensable for the security of our maritime power; and if I am correct in this I have not much fear of any change being easily effected, from the fact that the Spaniards will not, I think, be easily disposed to provide the means for making the exchange contemplated, and, even if so disposed, I doubt their being able to raise the vast sums of money which will be requisite for carrying it out. But above all, though it is impossible to predict what may not happen in these days, I doubt extremely whether the people of England will readily agree to a proposal which would deprive this country of one of the brightest jewels of the Crown, or would consent to deprive themselves of a possession so dearly purchased, so gloriously defended, and so highly valued now for over a century and a half.

'With every regard for your opinions and those of your brother, the Admiral, I regret I cannot agree with them.'

On 15 January 1869 Sir John Burgoyne wrote to the Duke, enclosing a copy of a memorandum which he had addressed to Lord de Grey on the subject of Gibraltar.

FROM SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

'15 PEMBRIDGE SQUARE,
BAYSWATER, 15 *January* 1869.

'With reference to the questions that have been raised on the subject of Gibraltar, Lord de Grey, taking an interest in it from having been Secretary of War, has requested from me an opinion on the points that are so much discussed.

'I have written to him in consequence, and consider it a duty to communicate a copy of my letter to Your Royal Highness.'

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE TO LORD DE GREY.

'15 Pembridge Square,
Bayswater, 15 *January* 1869.

'In reply to your note respecting Gibraltar, I may premise that some weeks ago, and before the present animated public discussion about it had arisen, I communicated to Lord Stanley that, in case any question regarding that place was pending or should arise, it might be desirable that, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he should ascertain and have a knowledge as to how far the real value of the place may not have been altered by circumstances of the present times.

'The substance of my memorandum to Lord Stanley was to the following effect.

'That there was a popular prestige about our tenure of Gibraltar that was now, in some degree, fallacious.

'Gibraltar thus was generally considered as a key to the Mediterranean, without which we might be easily excluded, or to or from which our passage would in time of war be under great disadvantages.

'This to a certain extent was true till of late years, but it is now a problem how far Steam Navigation and the rifled and increasing power of Artillery have altered that condition and taken from it some of its value.

'Before the general introduction of steam, the sailing-ships of the day, with a contrary wind, had a lengthened and troublesome zigzag passage into, and still more so out of, the Mediterranean, frequently having occasion to approach, and even at times to take shelter under, the very Rock.

'Steam-power, wherever it is used, which is now very generally, has remedied that, and such vessels can now always pass freely and unmolested, so far as the Rock itself is concerned; and as regards the shelter it then afforded to vessels, once within its precincts, against an enemy's fire, that advantage is now to a great extent lost by the longer range of modern Artillery.

'For a place of refuge, it can only be classed as an open anchorage with a very small port, all within the range of the great power of the present Artillery from the surrounding land, if the war is with Spain; or, if the war is with any other State, subject to the great reduction in power of affording protection, even to the fire from shipping, common to all open roadsteads.

'It is apprehended that Gibraltar has no commercial or other value than that of the military and naval warlike

service: the extensive system of smuggling habitual to this place would not, it is presumed, be considered worthy of encouragement or, even if otherwise, will be annulled by the anticipated speedy removal of the heavy duties in Spain which render it lucrative.

'It may be added that resumed possession of Gibraltar by Spain would give that country no additional advantage over us in case of hostilities, to what she at present possesses. Subsequent to my submitting these cursory remarks privately to the Foreign Secretary, as perhaps worthy of inquiry and consideration, Admiral George Grey has proclaimed to the whole world in his letter to the *Times* his views of the imperfections of the place, and of what he conceives its worthlessness, which is perhaps to be regretted: it has given rise, however, to a public discussion, and, as is not uncommon on such occasions, led to many exaggerated statements.

'I was myself asked to reply to the Admiral, but declined, not feeling that I could conscientiously oppose all the particulars in his course of argument.

'Notwithstanding the truth that there may be in the above particulars of the depreciated value of Gibraltar in those important points, many arguments may be advanced in favour of retaining it, the most essential of which is as a Coaling Station between England and the Mediterranean, and any question as to abandoning it becomes a matter for grave consideration.

'As a Coaling Station and Port of Refuge and Supply, with its Telegraph and Railway communication to Great Britain, it is, no doubt, of undiminished value during peace; and it is yet to be proved by experience to what extent its properties may be reduced by war; till when, differences of opinion will exist on that point, as well as on the means that might perhaps be devised for its remedy.

'The idea of accepting Ceuta as a compensation for the loss of Gibraltar has probably been started in desperation, to provide some substitute for the indisputable requirement for a station in that vicinity, for which it appears to me to be thoroughly inadequate and objectionable; it has every disadvantage of Gibraltar, and many others in addition; it would be equally or more exposed in times of war, quite inferior in strength for self-defence, would require an enormous outlay for strengthening and for all the conveniences that exist at Gibraltar, and would embroil us irrevocably with the Moors.

'It has been suggested that perhaps Minorca might be taken as a substitute for Gibraltar, but that would also be objectionable; its cession would be equally offensive to the dignity of Spain, it does not divide the distance so equally between Great Britain and Malta, it is out of the direct course, and it would be looked upon with great jealousy

by France from having always notoriously been considered an important naval station to overlook Toulon and the Gulf of Lyons.

'In power of self-defence Gibraltar has been *improved* by the new Artillery. The Gibraltar Shield, which has been so much criticised, had its name from being among the first places for which a few of such articles were made for trial; but there is perhaps no place in the world where any perfection in such cover is less needed. As a basis for land operations the Rock is of no value whatever, it would be as difficult to get out as to get into it, and there is no inducement to enter into a campaign in that part of Spain.

'Although at your request I have ventured upon these opinions of my own, the *naval* authorities are really the proper ones to be consulted on the whole matter.'

Peculiar interest will attach to the foregoing letter of Sir John Burgoyne, especially for those military and naval men who have been concerned in the problem of the defence of the Rock during the last decade, whilst his opinion that the naval authorities are the 'proper' ones to be consulted has been singularly borne out in the present scheme for entrusting the main defence of the Rock to the Royal Navy.

Sir John's judicial exposition of the possible decreased value of the Rock at the period of his letter (1869) will appeal to all those who have found themselves quartered at Gibraltar, and have asked themselves the same question. Briefly, it is unquestionable that in those days the popular idea of the value of Gibraltar was a fallacious one, in the sense that it was founded on a misapprehension of the true objects of holding the famous Rock.

But Sir John's arguments in favour of the retention are remarkably sound, and almost justify the saying that the principles of strategy are immutable despite the changes and advances in the science of warfare, both offensive and defensive. For Sir John most properly viewed the Rock as a strategic point affording a suitably-placed coaling-station or link in our system of world strategy. Also as a magazine for supplies of all sorts, and as an important centre for our 'communications'—all this was written before the world dreamed of the appalling power afforded by torpedo attack and submarines, or of the enormous strategic value of the modern developments of electrical communica-

tion by means of telephones and 'wireless' messages. The advent of the torpedo induced us, so far from abandoning Gibraltar, to construct immense moles by which the open and unsheltered roadstead was converted into a haven, secure from torpedo attack and affording shelter for a score of our largest battleships, as well as ample commercial wharfage —unduly ample, in the opinion of many, for the small trade of Gibraltar. Further, enormous docks are under construction; one is indeed already completed, in which our war vessels can be refitted and damages can be repaired. By means of the modern applications of the telephone, and a perfect system of locating all objects within range from batteries securely placed high up the Rock, an accurate fire can be now directed on every such point. The new harbour itself forms an ideal station for destroyers, torpedo-boats, and submarines to issue from and patrol the Straits.

As a set-off, alarmists have pointed out that the extreme range of modern Artillery will enable the new docks to be bombarded from the distant hills in Spain. Possibly so; but to accept this as a notice of dismissal from the Rock, as Admiral Grey sought to prove it was in 1869 under parallel circumstances on a miniature scale, 'the whole anchorage being commanded point-blank from the Spanish mainland,' would be to argue that in future and for all time no risks must be run in war; also that the British artillerymen would be content to submit tamely to such a bombardment without taking steps to render it an extremely unpleasant task for the enemy.

It was fortunate that at this epoch in our history we had a Commander-in-Chief in H.R.H., and a famous Engineer officer in the veteran Field-Marshal, Sir John Burgoyne, who did not hesitate to view the question of Gibraltar from its proper Imperial standpoint. Although, naturally enough, among the Duke's papers there is no further allusion to the opinion of naval experts on this question, we may rest assured that the Government of the day had no lack of sound advice from those representing the senior service on this important matter.

The extremely cordial and friendly relations which up

till now had invariably subsisted between the Duke and his political chiefs, although at times there were of course differences of opinion, will have been realised by those who have read the preceding chapters of this work. But how cordial those relations were, and how much impressed each holder of the Secretaryship of State for War was with the Duke's ability and desire to work in harmony with them, can perhaps better still be appreciated by a perusal of the following letters of farewell, which were addressed to him by General Peel, Lord Herbert, Lord de Grey, and Sir John Pakington, and also the letters which Lord Hartington wrote to him on assuming and resigning office.

Lord Panmure's farewell on quitting office in 1858 has been already given in Chapter X.

General Peel also, on the termination of his first term of office, writes in a similar strain.

FROM GENERAL PEEL.

'8 Park Place,
St. James's Street, 22 *June* 1859.

'I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude for the great kindness Y.R.H. has always shown me, and I assure Y.R.H. that my only regrets on quitting office arise from the cessation of that constant and confidential communication which rendered the transaction of business with Y.R.H. a source of the greatest pleasure to me. If I have failed in doing all I could wish for the Army, it has arisen from circumstances over which I had no control. From Y.R.H. I have ever received the most valuable assistance in carrying on the duties of the War Department, and I shall always bear my humble testimony to Y.R.H.'s great merits as Commander-in-Chief. The assurance of your private friendship is the greatest favour you could confer upon me.'

In June 1859 General Peel was succeeded by Mr. Sidney Herbert (afterwards Lord Herbert); and on the occasion of his relinquishing his post he wrote to the Duke a very grateful letter of thanks for his cordial co-operation, adding, 'I shall always bear my humble testimony of Y.R.H.'s great merits as a Commander-in-Chief.'

Mr. Sidney Herbert towards the end of 1860 found the strain of the House of Commons too severe, and was given a peerage on 1 January 1861. On 3 January he wrote to

the Duke to thank him for his congratulations on his peerage and sympathy with him in his illness.

FROM LORD HERBERT.

'Y.R.H.'s most kind and friendly letter has given me great pleasure. Certainly our official intercourse has been of a character to make a lasting impression on my mind, and I shall remember it to the last day of my life with the greatest satisfaction.'

On 21 July, seven months later, he wrote the following from Spa:—

FROM LORD HERBERT.

'I have been very ill this week. I have therefore placed my resignation in Lord Palmerston's hands. . . . I need hardly say how much I have felt the necessity of taking this step, the regret for which is greatly increased by the reflection that it will terminate my official connection with Y.R.H., which your invariable kindness to me has ever made most agreeable, and of which I shall ever preserve a most grateful recollection.'

FROM LORD DE GREY.

'1 CARLTON GARDENS, 15 *February* 1866.

'I cannot leave the War Office without troubling Y.R.H. with a few lines in order to express my deep gratitude for the great and unvarying kindness which I have received from Y.R.H. ever since I have been connected with that Department.

'It would have been impossible for me to have conducted the administration of the War Office if Y.R.H. had not been pleased to extend to me the most constant and ready assistance, and if I had not felt that you would permit me at all times to have recourse to your advice, and to enjoy the benefit of your great experience.

'It has been my endeavour to secure the harmonious working of the two military Departments, and in the furtherance of this important object Y.R.H. has invariably aided me, so that I hope I leave the relations of the Departments in a perfectly satisfactory state.

'But there is yet more for which I have to thank Y.R.H.; for I trust that I am justified in believing that you have placed in me a degree of confidence to which I shall always look back with pride and gratification. Y.R.H. knows that I have never shrunk from expressing my own views freely upon all questions with which I have had to deal, or from taking the course with respect to them which appeared to me to be right; but my frankness has always been met by Y.R.H. in the most cordial and, if I may venture to say so,

friendly spirit, and it is a source of the greatest pleasure to me to think, when I look back over the period during which I have been Secretary of State for War, that there has never been the slightest interruption of that harmony which the public service imperatively requires between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief.

'My obligations to Y.R.H. are great, and the recollection of your kindness and confidence will always be cherished by me as one of the most valuable memories of my official career.'

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'War Office, 7 *February* 1866.

'It is not easy for me to express the deep sense which I feel of Your Royal Highness's kindness in communicating to me the manner in which you regard my appointment as Lord de Grey's successor at the War Department. I am fully aware of the loss to the public service which will be the result of Lord de Grey's removal, and I know that, after so long a period of confidential and cordial intercourse, the inconvenience of the change to Y.R.H. must be extreme. I also feel that my past services in the Department have not earned for me such sudden and unexpected promotion, and that the responsibility of the office which I have undertaken is one which I would gladly have avoided for some years to come. Having, however, been informed that Y.R.H. had been pleased to express your approval of the proposed arrangement, I felt that I could not decline to accept this appointment offered to me by Lord Russell, and Y.R.H.'s kind and generous expressions of friendship and confidence in your letter of this morning give a reason to hope that as far as the future relations of Horse Guards and War Office are concerned, the good understanding which has existed since I have known anything of them, will be maintained.

'I can only assure Y.R.H. that, while it will be my most anxious endeavour to do my duty to the Army, with the management of which I am about to become so closely connected, it is my earnest hope that I may be successful in retaining the personal friendship with which Y.R.H. has been so graciously pleased to honour me.'

FROM LORD HARTINGTON.

'5 *July* 1866.

'I will have the honour of calling on Y.R.H. to-morrow afternoon, after we come back from Windsor, to thank Y.R.H. for all the kindness and assistance which you have extended to me while I have been in office.'

FROM SIR JOHN PAKINGTON.

'Grosvenor Place, 6 *December* 1868.

'I thank Y.R.H. most sincerely for your kind letter, which I received in the country yesterday morning.

'I confess I regret being obliged to give up the seals of the War Department before I have completed the changes and Reforms I have commenced. But whenever I might have been called upon to resign, my strongest feeling of regret would have arisen from the termination of my official connection with Y.R.H.

'I have to thank Y.R.H. for most kind and valuable assistance and co-operation throughout my tenure of office, and I cannot too highly appreciate the spirit in which Y.R.H. is always ready to believe that others are animated by a sense of public duty, and thereby prevents those differences of opinion which must from time to time arise in a connection so close and constant, from causing even momentary inconvenience.

'I do not myself expect ever again to hold high office. But I trust Y.R.H. will long retain the position you hold with so much advantage to the Army and the country.

'And I hope you will allow me to add that I shall never cease to regard you personally with the warmest feelings of gratitude and esteem.'

CHAPTER XVIII

MR. CARDWELL BECOMES WAR SECRETARY

Mr. Gladstone's Government comes into office. Mr. Cardwell new War Secretary. His Memo. to Mr. Gladstone. Purchase and Recruiting mentioned. H.R.H.'s Memo. to Mr. Cardwell on lack of Reserve and Reductions. Begs that Cadres be retained. Army Estimates, 1869-70. Reduction of Colonial Garrisons advocated. H.R.H.'s Letter and Memo. on subject. Lord Northbrook's Committee. War Office Act, 1870. Horse Guards and War Office. Question whether H.R.H. should give Evidence before Northbrook Committee. H.R.H.'s views on Chief of Staff. Further Correspondence as to Removal of Horse Guards to Pall Mall. H.R.H. and Mr. Cardwell.

On 1 December 1868 Mr. Gladstone received a communication from Her Majesty informing him that Mr. Disraeli had tendered his resignation, and desiring him to form a new administration. On 4 December he accordingly proceeded to Windsor; and three days later he announced the names of those who had been appointed to office. Mr. Cardwell, who had in previous administrations been Chief Secretary for Ireland, and Secretary of State for the Colonies, was nominated to the War Office; and His Royal Highness, in writing on 10 December to Sir William Mansfield, then Commander-in-Chief in India, alluded to his appointment in the fellowing terms:—

'Mr. Cardwell is the new Secretary for War, a most gentlemanlike man, with whom it will be pleasant to act. I confess, however, that I am under considerable apprehension that large reductions of establishment may be contemplated. . . . We have not a man or officer more than we really want or require. . . .'

The Duke's apprehensions were not ill-founded, for the new Government's accession to power was marked by an all-pervading desire for economy. The new War Secretary had no previous experience of the War Office, although

he appears already to have devoted some thought to Army matters, and to have formed some very decided opinions thereon. He held that increased efficiency and diminished expenditure were amongst the most important administrative questions which the new Government would have to consider—a standpoint which, it may be mentioned incidentally, almost every War Minister before or since has, with varying degrees of success, endeavoured to reach. At any rate he addressed in this sense a memorandum to Mr. Gladstone, which he had prepared before he actually became Secretary of State for War, since it bears the date of 3 December. It is reproduced *in extenso* in General Sir Robert Biddulph's work, *Lord Cardwell at the War Office.*

In this communication Mr. Cardwell maintains that the system which was hastily reorganised during the Crimean War had since then remained *in statu*, despite the recommendations of the Committee which, in 1860, had examined into its working. No definite principle, he contended, had been laid down for its guidance; and he then reverted to the War Secretary's position, and the exceptions, already alluded to in an earlier chapter, which had been made in his patent, with the result that finance was divorced from discipline, the one under the Secretary of State, and the other under the Commander-in-Chief. But the keynote of his future policy cannot be more tersely summarised than in his own words:—

'I contend for the principle of plenary responsibility to Parliament on the part of the parliamentary head of the Department; and consequently, for the absence of all reservations, express or implied, from the authority of that office.'

He also in his memorandum refers to the system of Purchase. Nine years before Mr. Cardwell's entry upon the scene a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of the Duke of Somerset, had recommended that officers should be selected for the command of Regiments; and it was subsequently contended that if the system of Purchase were touched at all, it would be better to abolish it altogether.

In this particular memorandum, Mr. Cardwell concluded by enumerating the subjects which he thought would be

inevitably brought forward in parliamentary discussion; though at the same time he protested that he did not raise them from any ulterior motive of his own, but merely because he felt sure that they would raise themselves. The subjects in question may be enumerated thus:—

1. The appointment and promotion of officers, including purchase, seniority, selection and education.

2. Recruiting, and a consideration of the merits of a long and short service system; alteration in the number of men serving in the Colonies; and a consideration of whether, after short service in a 'first army,' men should not pass as reservists into a second.

3. Inducements to be held out to officers and men in the way of civil employment on retirement; and whether the distinction between the Guards and the Line should be preserved.

Thus it will be seen that, of all the subjects to which Mr. Cardwell called attention, there was nothing which could really be called a novelty; and readers of the earlier chapters of this book will recollect that most of them had already been discussed by the Duke of Cambridge years before. As a matter of fact they merely embodied the ideas which at that time were being expressed by the public and the press, for the simple reason that the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 had been instrumental in awakening the general interest of the people in such matters; whilst the newly reformed and extremely Radical House of Commons of 1868 was clamouring for changes in these and other matters.

The new War Secretary took an early opportunity, in a private letter of 20 December, of informing His Royal Highness that a 'retrenchment of expenditure' would be expected by the Cabinet and the House of Commons; whilst at the same time he expressed an 'earnest desire to make that retrenchment in the way most conducive to the interests of the service.' On accepting office he asked the Prime Minister to appoint Lord Northbrook as Parliamentary Under-Secretary—a position which the latter had already held. Lord Northbrook, as well as being an exceptionally able administrator, was a man of the most engaging

personality and manners; and very often, when some difficult points arose between the Duke and Mr. Cardwell, the latter requested his second in command to go personally and see the military chiefs and smooth matters over—a task which he generally managed to accomplish. Having succeeded in obtaining Lord Northbrook's assistance, Mr. Cardwell appointed a small committee under his chairmanship to inquire into the existing arrangements for the conduct of business.

In the meantime the Duke also took an early opportunity of laying before his new political chief a statement as to the condition of the Infantry establishments, in the course of which he pointed out that 'as at present we have nothing in the shape of a proper Reserve Force to fill up our battalions in an emergency, it can hardly be thought prudent or wise to diminish this force still further till some regular system has been devised and adopted to meet the very peculiar requirements of the present state of the world'; whilst, if reductions were to take place, he strongly advocated a reduction of Establishments rather than of Cadres.

MEMO. ON INFANTRY ESTABLISHMENTS.

'HORSE GUARDS, 22 *December* 1868.

'The establishments of Infantry Regiments in the British service are at the present moment very varied, and must at all times chiefly depend on the exigencies of the service at the period at which they are made. Of recent years, and since considerable reductions have been made, our Home Establishments have been kept extremely low, the first Battalions for foreign service alone having been recruited up to a limited extent, whilst our Battalions in the Colonies and in India have had an increased and special Establishment allotted for each. Up to within the last two years, from the period of the conclusion of the Crimean War, all our Line Battalions have been on an establishment of twelve Companies both at home and abroad; those actually serving at home have been complete in their twelve Companies, whilst those abroad had and have now ten Companies with the Service Battalions, whilst two Companies remain at home as a Depôt. In 1866 the Home Battalions were reduced to ten Companies, those abroad continuing as before at twelve. The reason for making this change was that, whilst it was thought essential to maintain intact the Battalions serving in India and the Colonies,

where the duty falls heavily on officers and men, and whilst it was equally necessary to maintain a reserve of officers and a sufficiency of men to complete up the Battalions serving abroad, reduction could more easily be made in the Battalions on home service, and thus a saving could be effected with the least injury to efficiency. The result of these arrangements is that we have at the present moment the following establishments:—

(1) Battalions serving at home, ten Companies with 600 rank and file.
(2) Battalions next for foreign service, ten Companies with 700 rank and file.
(3) Battalions in the Colonies, twelve Companies with 800 rank and file, of which 680 rank and file are 'Service' Companies, and two Companies, 120 rank and file, 'Depôt' Companies.
(4) Battalions in India, twelve Companies, 910 rank and file, of which ten Companies in India, and two at the Depôt.

'Having thus explained our present actual position, let us now consider the object of these establishments, which are simply (*a*) to keep our Battalions abroad efficient for service, so as to be available on an emergency; (*b*) to keep up good and efficient Cadres at home, to be readily increased on the necessity arising, or in the event of threatened hostilities in any quarter of our vast possessions.

'And here it must be observed, that it becomes a matter for very grave reflection to what extent you are justified in reducing your Home Establishment. In Continental Armies the facilities offered by the Conscription meet the difficulty in a very simple manner. Battalions of four or five hundred men on a reduced Peace Establishment are easily increased to 1000 or 1200 by calling up the Reserves, which are always within easy reach, and which are bound by law to be at their homes when needed. In an enlisted army like the British, the case is far different. No men are kept in hand to be poured in upon the Battalions on an emergency ensuing. We can only rely on those men we have with the Colours in an embodied state, and though an attempt has of late been made to create a Reserve Force, partly on the Pensioner system, and partly in connection with the Militia, these arrangements have not as yet been sufficiently long in operation to justify any great reliance on their success.

'Under these circumstances, it would appear that no considerable reduction of force could at present be attempted without the risk of impairing efficiency to a very serious extent, and that all our efforts should be directed towards the creation of such a permanent Reserve Force as would enable us to reduce our Cadres to the greatest extent for Home Service whilst giving us the means of filling them up rapidly and surely on the emergency arising.

'There cannot be a doubt in the present state of the world, and more especially of Europe, that, should troubles arise, they are likely to come upon us suddenly and when we may least expect them. All recent history leads us to this conclusion. Such was the case on the breaking out of the Crimean War, which found us completely unprepared for so great a contest. Such was again the case in the Italian Campaign of 1859, and more recently in the great German contest of 1866. Even our great Indian Mutiny came upon us quite unexpectedly, so that we have two instances affecting the very existence of our Empire, the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny, in which the absolute necessity for instant vigilance and the power of rapid increase of our forces have been clearly and palpably demonstrated. It is to meet such sudden contingencies that the great Continental Powers have of late largely increased their already enormous means of military power, and though the position of this country is very different and our objects dissimilar, still it would be impossible for us entirely to overlook what our neighbours are doing in this direction without taking warning ourselves in time. Hence the great importance of this most difficult and delicate question; and when it is considered that the whole of our Infantry of the Line at home amounts to only 49,291, of that in and on passage to and from our Colonial possessions to only 31,144, and of that in and on passage to and from India to 44,196, making a grand total of 124,631, and that at present we have nothing in the shape of a proper Reserve Force to fill up our Battalions in an emergency, it can hardly be thought prudent or wise to diminish this force still further till some regular system has been devised and adopted to meet the very peculiar requirements of the present state of the world.

'It will be observed that no reference is made in the foregoing observations on our Infantry Establishments to the subject of a decrease in the number of our Battalions, as it would evidently be most disastrous to our efficiency to diminish the number of Battalion Cadres we have at our command, whilst a reduction of Battalions would at the same time seriously affect the interests of a large body of officers, who would have to be placed on half-pay without hope of employment. If therefore reductions must be effected, they must be produced by lowering the establishments of Battalions, however much such a measure may have to be regretted for the reasons stated in the former part of this paper.'

As regards the vital question of the reduction of Establishment as against the reduction of Cadres, the foregoing memorandum of His Royal Highness seems to have effected

its object; for Mr. Cardwell, in writing to Mr. Gladstone on 9 January on the subject of decreased expenditure in Army matters, proposes to retain the Cadres, but to reduce the Establishments. In the same letter he also proposes to reduce the forces kept up in the Colonies from 50,000 to 26,000; and at the same time he advocates that the discipline of the Militia should be placed under the War Office, and that it should be officered largely by half-pay officers of the Army—a suggestion which, although unquestionably sound in theory, has hitherto in a large number of cases proved of doubtful advantage. It may be remarked that at the present time it is in a sense being carried into effect by compelling retired officers in certain cases to serve in the Militia.

Mr. Cardwell also proposed to weed out inefficient Volunteers, and improve the Volunteer training. Quite recently it has been sought to carry out this principle thoroughly—a course which earned for two recent Secretaries of State considerable unpopularity. On 9 March Mr. Cardwell moved the Army Estimates, one of the principal features of which was the reduction of the forces maintained in the Colonies. The idea was not a new one. So far back as 1860 the House of Commons had advocated the reduction of Colonial garrisons, in order that the burden at home might be appreciably reduced and the spirit of self-reliance inculcated into Colonial polity. From thenceforward this had become a settled policy; and in 1866 notice of this principle had been given to the Governor of the Cape, and afterwards carried into effect. Canada, however, remained the one notable exception, mainly on account of the Civil War in the United States and the Fenian menace. Still, in 1867, 3500 out of 16,000 were withdrawn; and Mr. Gladstone's Government now proposed to reduce the Canadian garrison to 6000 men. It was maintained that Canada with 30,000 or 40,000 armed men of her own would be much stronger and more independent than she had ever been before. In pursuance of this policy the Estimates allowed for a reduction of 15,000 men in the Colonies; though, as the numbers abroad were reduced and those at home in consequence increased, the total force at

home would not be weaker than before, in spite of the reductions effected in Establishments.

That the policy outlined above was sound in theory, and that its application at the time was demanded, few will deny. But that it was attended with some disadvantages the course of subsequent history has amply proved; and some of these were foreseen by the Duke, and pointed out by him to the Secretary of State in August of the same year.

It is idle to deny that the Canadian local forces have not been a success—although the comparatively small number sent to the South African War acquitted themselves admirably—as is only too well exemplified by the recent unedifying wrangle in Canada; and it is equally certain that the policy of denuding the Cape of Regular troops laid the foundation of the unfavourable situations in which we found ourselves at the opening of the Kaffir and Zulu Wars in 1877-79, and the disastrous position when the two Boer Wars broke out. Moreover, it is interesting to note, as an example of how, in matters of military organisation and distribution, nothing is new, that the most forward school of military thought in our own day has advocated the keeping up of large forces in South Africa, and even in Canada.

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 3 *August* 1869.

'Without entering into the political question connected with our military occupation of the Colonial possessions of the Crown, which I trust no statesman will ever overlook, as being of the most vital importance to the general interests of the Empire, I am anxious to point out that I conceive the employment of the Army in the Colonies to a considerable extent is of great advantage to both officers and men, as giving them an amount of experience in various matters which they could not otherwise acquire.

'Our Colonial Service brings with it many varieties of duties, and teaches both officers and men to adapt themselves to every exigency which may and does arise.

'It is true that a large portion of our Army is employed in India, and that that great Empire to a considerable extent furnishes within it all that is here contended for; but still I assert that much experience can be gained in the other possessions of the Crown, quite distinct from what may be

acquired in India, and that, moreover, in a climate more beneficial to health than our Indian possessions. Assuming, therefore, that on general military grounds the advantage is greatly in favour of our troops to a fair extent serving in the Colonial possessions of the Crown, in addition to their service in India, I would now wish to point out specially the cases of Canada and the Cape as being parts of the Empire in which, in my opinion, Imperial troops should always be stationed.

'As regards the former station, Canada, it does seem to me that the Canadians have a perfect right to say that, whilst their internal organisation is so peaceful and happy that Police alone would do the necessary duties to maintain tranquillity and order in the Dominion, some permanent Military Force must be kept up in the Colony to occupy the fortified post of Quebec, and the proposed ones at Montreal and Kingston. . . . Whilst Canada should be called upon to use every exertion to have a large force of Militia and Volunteers on a really efficient footing to form the main portion of its defensive force, which duties it is quite willing and ready to undertake, it does appear to me that a small and compact permanent force ought always to be maintained by the Mother Country to furnish the ordinary garrisons absolutely necessary to occupy the fortified works, and to be the nucleus upon which the Local Forces can form—such permanent force being paid by the Mother Country, and not by the Colony.

'As regards the Cape, putting aside altogether the view that troops are to be maintained there for Colonial purposes, I hold that it is impossible for us, on Imperial grounds, to allow that Colony to fall into the hands of any other country but our own, as it must ever remain the great sea-route to our Indian possessions, and in war would probably be our only route in that direction—the one through Egypt being so liable to interruption. If I am right in this, Imperial interests demand our firm occupation of the soil, which cannot be safely accomplished without a sufficient permanent force. But I have another reason why I conceive it to be of vast advantage, in a military point of view, that the Cape should at all times be amply garrisoned. We have beyond the Cape, and in its vicinity, the Colonies of Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, Ceylon, Mauritius, and St. Helena, all places where the climates are tropical, and some of them far from good. And yet these cannot with safety be denuded of troops. The Cape forms an admirable support to these Colonial garrisons. The climate at the Cape is excellent; and whilst troops cannot be stationed for very long at Hong Kong or Mauritius, for instance, or even at Ceylon or the Straits Settlements and St. Helena, without serious detriment to their health and discipline, these drawbacks can easily be mitigated by an interchange of stations

with the Cape, which has been always looked upon as our great sanatorium, and the restorer of health and strength to those portions of the Army unavoidably quartered in the less salubrious stations. To send Regiments direct from England to such distant stations for short periods would be enormously expensive, and would, in my opinion, not work half so satisfactorily or so well as the present system of an interchange of troops with the Cape; and I trust, therefore, on these grounds alone, and without reference to any local requirements, a reasonable reserve force may always be maintained at the Cape, which, if deemed advisable, might be more concentrated than has hitherto been the case.

'As it happens that both Canada and the Cape are excellent climates for Europeans, I need not hesitate on this account to make the recommendation I now put forward. Another great question remains to be considered. If the respective Colonies of the Crown, or any of them, are to find their own means of permanent defence, how is the connection between the Colonial Forces and the Military Authorities of the Crown to be kept up? No doubt the Colonial Governors are, by virtue of their commissions, Commanders-in-Chief over the Local Forces, as representatives of the Sovereign; but still they do not really represent the essential military link, which I deem to be necessary, and which, as in the case of the old East India Company, was always maintained by the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's troops serving in India, who in those days was at the same time and invariably the Commander-in-Chief also of the local forces of the Company.

'I trust that this subject may receive the fullest and most serious attention, as I otherwise fear we should be creating a local force which at any moment might become troublesome and dangerous to the local representative of the Crown, and which in time of a general war would be in the singularly anomalous position of not being necessarily under the authority or direction of the Military Officers of the Crown.'

A few months later (14 December 1869) the Duke again addressed to Mr. Cardwell a memorandum, in which he took a comprehensive survey of the whole problem. Lord Granville, who is referred to in the Duke's letter, was at the time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, W., 14 *December* 1869.

'I send herewith my memo. on your proposals for Colonial Reduction. It is my business to obey orders, and of course I shall do so; but I hope you will remember that I think the

proposals for Colonial Military Reductions are carried much further than I at all like, or could at all approve of, from a military point of view, and I hope that this may be fully understood both by Granville and yourself. I trust that both Granville and yourself will give the subject of this memo. the most serious consideration.'

MEMO. ON CANADA, THE CAPE, ETC., WITH REFERENCE TO MILITARY REDUCTIONS.

'The case of Canada appears to me to stand in this way—

'Quebec is a powerful and important fortress much improved in its defences, and fully armed. It is the Imperial link, in a military point of view, between the Mother Country and the Colony of the Dominion. It must be occupied by a permanent force of some kind, and cannot be left in an abandoned state, otherwise it would be at the mercy of the first comer. It cannot, therefore, be abandoned by Imperial troops till occupied by a permanent Colonial force. This as yet has not been created, and till created the Imperial troops ought to occupy it. A force of three Battalions of Infantry, three Batteries of Garrison Artillery, and a Company of Sappers, supplemented as these would be by local levies of Militia and Volunteers which would be at hand on an emergency, would form a garrison sufficiently strong to secure the fortress against a *coup de main* and till succour could arrive from home. I think, therefore, that this Imperial garrison must be maintained, at least until a proper permanent local force has been created to replace it.

'The question, however, arises, whether it would not be better, instead of creating a permanent local force, to leave the Imperial troops specified above to perform this duty. My own impression is strongly in favour of such a course, as these troops would form a valuable nucleus around which the local levies, in the shape of Militia and Volunteers, would form at all times, and for all purposes of external defence. The country is healthy, and the maintenance of Imperial troops in the Dominion is not more costly than of those now stationed at home.

'Moreover, as the defence of Canada depends on the fortifications of Montreal as well as of Quebec, and as the Imperial Government has performed its portion of this contract with the Dominion in the shape of improved works for Quebec, I assume that the Mother Country has, by continuing its occupation of the latter fortress by Imperial troops, the right to ask Canada to fortify Montreal, without which the defence of the long frontier cannot be hoped for or looked to with any fair chance of success, whereas in the opposite case the chances would be greatly in favour of our great Colonial possessions. Thus it appears to me that the interests of the Empire, as well as of the Colony, would in every respect be

greatly in favour of such an arrangement as I have suggested above, and the dignity of the Empire as well as its interests would be fully secured. The troops would be placed under the direct authority of the Governor-General of Canada, who by virtue of his office is also Commander-in-Chief, and would consequently not be under the actual authority of the Local Government, but under the direct control of the Home Government, the Governor-General being assisted by, and the representative of, the Crown by virtue of his office.

'The reductions at the Cape, including Natal, seem to me to go beyond what is absolutely essential for the proper defence of those stations. I am, however, anxious to point out the great advantages of the Cape in a military point of view, irrespective of its actual requirements. The occupation of Ceylon, Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, Mauritius, and St. Helena is admitted as a necessity. These are, for the most part, extremely unhealthy stations, and any lengthened residence of troops in any one of those stations is not to be desired. The distance from home of all these stations is very great, the cost of relief most serious. The garrisons for these stations have been reduced to the lowest possible extent consistent with security. The Cape having an excellent climate, affords an admirable military post for a Reserve to all these Eastern possessions, and at the same time presents the facility for relief at stated intervals at far less expense than if it had to be conducted from home.

'Moreover, it would justify to some extent, if occupied as a Reserve, the very low establishments at which some of the garrisons—as, for instance, that of Mauritius and St. Helena—have been fixed. Irrespective, therefore, of the troops actually required for the defence of the Cape and Natal as a station, I most strongly urge the propriety of maintaining at the Cape, for Imperial purposes and as a Reserve to our Eastern possessions, a sufficient force to form this reserve, and to enable the corps serving at the unhealthy stations to be more frequently relieved by interchange of quarters than could be done if such relief were to be conducted from home. There is barrack accommodation for such a reserve at the Cape, and the expense of maintaining troops there would not be found more costly than at home.

The position of the *West Indies* as military stations becomes more isolated when the troops are so much reduced, if not entirely withdrawn from Canada. On former occasions, mutual support has been given on emergencies to the West Indies from Canada, and to Canada from the West Indies. A reduction of 2000 men, mainly from Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, is therefore from a military point of view open to considerable doubt.

'Our principal fortresses abroad are Halifax, Bermuda, Gibraltar, and Malta; a reduction of rank and file is pro-

posed in all these stations. The duties of these garrisons are, however, so heavy, and the heavy armaments of the present day require so much labour and such constant attention, and entail such constant duties both in the shape of guards and fatigues, that I do not deem them safe if at all reduced from what they are present, and I would strongly urge the absolute necessity for maintaining the present establishments of rank and file in these respective stations. As it is, the men have no more nights in bed, considering the heavy fatigue duties, than is requisite for health in hot and relaxing climates in most of them, and as regards Halifax, considering the severity of the winter season.

'In order to make my views clear, I append the reductions in rank and file at all these stations that have been proposed for the coming year's Estimates.

Stations.	Present Strength.	Proposed Strength.	Reduction.
Nova Scotia (Halifax), . .	1920	1579	341
Bermuda, ...	2000	1752	248
St. Helena, ...	475	193	282
Gibraltar, ...	4700	4062	638
Malta, ...	5942	5186	756
Bahamas, ...	325	206	119
Honduras, ...	226	103	123
Jamaica, ...	1603	658	945
Leeward Islands, . . .	1472	555	917
Cape, ...	3442	1280	2162
Total, ...			6731

Again, on 11 January 1870, His Royal Highness wrote to the Secretary of State on the same subject.

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 11 *Jan.* 1870.

'In looking over Mr. Knox's return, which you gave me yesterday, I observe that the reduction of rank and file amounts to about 12,000 men. I am endeavouring to reconcile my mind to the numerous changes which are proposed on so many subjects connected with Army matters, and I hope you will do me the justice to say that I have given every assistance in my power to carry out these changes. There are, however, two points to which I cannot reconcile my mind, the one in the large reduction in Establishment, the other the removal of such a large portion of the troops from the Colonies, and the actual military abandonment of some of these Colonies by the entire removal of their garrisons. These two points are to me so serious that I feel bound once more to entreat of you to consider whether something could not be done to mitigate these two evils.

'*Regimental Establishments.*—I fear that Regiments, for instance in Ireland, where so much mischief exists and where the Government will have to be prepared at many points for a considerable time yet to come, will not be able to give the necessary detachments required; and in such places as Gibraltar, Malta, Halifax, and Bermuda, I doubt the men having a sufficiency of nights in bed for the preservation of health. If you could but consent to, at all events, some corps being kept on a larger Establishment, I should be grateful to you on the part of the Army. You must bear in mind that, though we hope nominally to have a reserve of men, this reserve does not really belong to Regiments, and can only be incorporated with them on the breaking out of a war. Consequently, in times of emergency or anxiety short of war, we can do nothing but recruit up, and we may have a difficulty in obtaining them. Hence any reduction of rank and file in ours is far more serious than when it takes place in other armies, in all of which I believe the Conscription exists. If you would look once again carefully into this question, I should hope that you might be disposed to modify your views. At at events, I feel so strongly that I am bound, in justice to myself, to state to you my anxiety, not to say alarm.

'Again, as regards the *Colonies*: on this point you know my views, and I need not therefore here repeat them in detail; but feeling strongly the vast interests involved in our Colonial possessions and the great risk run in a military point of view by any such vast changes as these now contemplated, I should not be dealing fairly by myself were I not to appeal to you once again at least against the suddenness of the change contemplated. I cannot conceive how a great fortress like Quebec is to be taken charge of when all the Imperial troops are withdrawn. I cannot imagine the false position of the Governor-General of Canada or the Governors of the Australian Colonies, all representatives of the Sovereign of this country, and without a single soldier to maintain or back that authority even against any indignity that might be put upon them by a boat's crew of any nation not on terms with the Mother Country. I will add no more; but I do hope you will consider the points I have now raised.'

On 2 March 1871 Her Majesty also addressed a communication to Mr. Cardwell, which alluded to some doubt she had in her mind as to the wisdom of the wholesale Colonial reductions which were proposed. She also touched upon the relations between the Government and the Commander-in-Chief; and on the following day received a reply from Mr. Cardwell. The latter communication, in view of sub-

sequent events, is of some importance. To begin with, Mr. Cardwell pays a tribute to the assistance which the Duke had given him; and he disclaims the idea that a plan has ever, so far as he was aware, 'been proposed for removing the military department at the Horse Guards to Pall Mall.' He also adds that 'the buildings there are not sufficient to accommodate with any degree of convenience the present establishment of the War Office.'

Mr. Cardwell's prediction was afterwards only too well realised. For the quarters in question, although various departmental services were moved elsewhere in order to accommodate the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, were found to be most unsatisfactory; and their insanitary state produced a considerable amount of sickness in H.R.H.'s *entourage*.

When Mr. Gladstone's Government came into power, the Mr. Trevelyan[1] who is alluded to was given a subordinate post, and whilst holding it made a speech to which the Duke and many others very justly took exception. Mr. Cardwell especially was very much annoyed at this episode. He belonged to the old and correct school of Parliamentarians; and viewed with much disfavour the changes introduced into the amenities of parliamentary life about this period.

THE QUEEN TO MR. CARDWELL.

'WINDSOR CASTLE, 2 *March* 1869.

'The Queen has intended for some time to write to Mr. Cardwell on some things connected with the Army, which give her considerable uneasiness.

'She cannot help having some misgivings as to the extent to which it is proposed to withdraw troops from the Colonies and to carry reductions in the Staff at home. She trusts that the former subject has been well considered in the Cabinet, for the Queen could never forgive herself if she found that she had inadvertently given her assent to anything that could risk the safety of her Colonial possessions. And with regard to the latter, she hopes that nothing will be proposed to her that has not been previously discussed and concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief and the military authorities.

'The Queen is the more anxious on this point, because she cannot shut her eyes to the fact that a disposition exists

[1] Afterwards Sir George Otto Trevelyan.

in some quarters (she fears even among some of the subordinate members of the Government, as, for instance, Mr. Trevelyan), to run down the Commander-in-Chief, and generally to disparage the military authorities as obstacles to all improvement in our Army administration.

'So far from this being the case, the Duke of Cambridge has always acted most cordially, as the Queen is sure Mr. Cardwell will already have found, with successive Secretaries of State, in promoting and giving effect to all well-considered measures of improvement, and ever since he has been at the head of the Army H.R.H. has deserved the Queen's entire confidence, and is entitled to her best support.

'Anything that could tend to lower his position in the eyes of the public would, the Queen feels, be a misfortune as regards the public service, and she is confident that Mr. Cardwell will give his sanction to no measure likely to have this effect. The Queen is led to say this now, feeling very strongly on the subject, before Mr. Cardwell makes his statement in the House, lest in admitting the advantage of having the Military and Civil Departments of the Army under the same roof, he should inadvertently commit himself to what the Queen would feel herself bound to resist as likely to produce the effect she so much deprecates. She means the removal of the Military Departments of the Army from the Horse Guards to Pall Mall: such a step could not fail to damage the position of the Commander-in-Chief, tho' it might be desirable to build a new office for the Secretary of State on the site of Dover House, and in connection with the Horse Guards.

'On this and all other subjects connected with the Army, the Queen is confident that Mr. Cardwell will commit himself to no change in the existing system without giving her previously a full opportunity of considering his proposals.'

MR. CARDWELL TO THE QUEEN.

'3 *March* 1869.

'Mr. Cardwell presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and is able to assure Your Majesty that the reductions which it is proposed to make in the number of troops in the Colonies have been fully considered by the Cabinet; and that the reductions proposed to be made in the Staff at home have been fully discussed with, and concurred in by, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge.

'Mr. Cardwell has experienced, during the short period of his tenure, all the advantages of the disposition which Your Majesty ascribes to H.R.H. of acting, in all respects, most cordially with Your Majesty's Government and particularly with the Secretary for War, and will lend no countenance to any attempt which shall be made to disparage his authority.

'It has not been within the power of Your Majesty's Government to consider, as yet, any scheme for the further amalgamation of the Public Offices in the neighbourhood of the Houses of Parliament; and no plan has ever, so far as Mr. Cardwell knows, even been proposed for removing the Military Departments now at the Horse Guards to Pall Mall. Indeed, the buildings there are not sufficient to accommodate with any degree of convenience the present establishment of the War Office.

'Mr. Cardwell will not fail scrupulously to observe the injunction which he has received from Your Majesty, and on this and all other subjects connected with the Army, will not commit himself to any changes in the existing system without previously laying any such proposals before Your Majesty.

'Mr. Cardwell believes that the result of Mr. Trevelyan's great indiscretion has been to strengthen rather than to weaken the position of H.R.H., and he trusts that the same consequences may follow any attack that may be made, whether flowing from indiscretion or prompted by any unjustifiable motive.'

In the meantime Lord Northbrook's Committee on the reorganisation of the War Office, to which attention has already been called, was proceeding with its work; and its first report was issued on 11 March 1869. It dealt with the creation of a Financial Secretary and the official who subsequently became known as the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, both of which recommendations were subsequently carried out by the War Office Act of 1870.[1] The Committee then again sat to consider the 'Control' or 'Supply' system, the report on which was issued on 7 May; and finally they met to consider the establishments at the War Office and the Horse Guards.

To realise the importance which was attached at the time to the separate existence of the Horse Guards as distinguished from the War Office, we must consider how matters then stood. Although in 1854 the different departments had been amalgamated under the Secretary of State, the Horse Guards still remained a comparatively independent body under the Commander-in-Chief, sitting at Whitehall. It must also be remembered that opinion in those days had not yet become reconciled to the idea of the Army, its

[1] 33 and 34 Vict. c. 17.

discipline and otherwise, being placed entirely under the control of a political official. Nowadays, of course, matters are completely changed; and the political Secretary of State is in undisturbed and indisputable possession of the field, with the result that the military chiefs at the War Office have, and especially of late years, occupied an entirely subordinate position. But at the time we are speaking of a change of this kind was naturally regarded by the military element, and indeed by many civilians, with much disfavour, a considerable amount of sentiment and tradition having attached itself to the military institution which had been located at Whitehall since 1793.

Though the actual point as to whether the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff should remain at Whitehall or be removed to Pall Mall may seem a small and even a trivial one, it was in reality, as the Duke foresaw at the time, one of far-reaching importance as regards principle; and there can be no doubt that the removal from Whitehall to Pall Mall of the Military Staff had the ultimate effect of very greatly lowering the prestige and authority of the Commander-in-Chief. It is true that in theory the maintenance of two concurrent, and in some respects conflicting, institutions like the Horse Guards and War Office was totally indefensible. But in practice the old system, on the whole, worked fairly well; and subsequent history has not shown that the change has been altogether an unmitigated blessing, or that it has conduced to economy. The South African War Commission and the Esher Committee have conclusively shown that in times of great stress matters did not run smoothly or satisfactorily, whatever they may have done in times of peace. The full and indeed inevitable result of Mr. Cardwell's policy did not, however, take effect until many years later. Owing to the peculiar circumstances and prestige which environed the Duke, and the infinite tact with which he conducted his business, it was, during his time, possible to carry out the work with comparatively little friction. Still, in the hands of his successors, not indeed primarily through faults of their own, the existence of a Commander-in-Chief became an anachronism and an

anomaly, with the inevitable result that in time the post was bound to disappear.

To return, however, to the issues which were prominent in 1868-74, it appears that at first it was not considered necessary that His Royal Highness should give evidence before Lord Northbrook's momentous Committee. Hence the following correspondence between the Duke and Mr. Cardwell:—

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE,
PARK LANE, W., 18 *November* 1869.

'Reading over the evidence before the Committee on the Horse Guards organisation, there are many points in it which can easily be explained, and which it will be necessary to explain and elucidate before any Report on the subject is drawn up. I feel that nobody could do this more clearly or more effectively than myself, as my own position is so much involved in the points which are ambiguous. There are also other portions of the evidence which startle me more than I can express, and upon which it will be absolutely necessary for me to have an early discussion with yourself, and probably also with Northbrook as Chairman of the Committee. I have no wish to be examined if you think it better that I should not be; but I feel bound, in justice to myself and to the office, to explain matters and put them in a very different light from which they have been by the several witnesses.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'EASHING, 19 *November* 1869.

'I have spoken to Northbrook, who has been here, on the subject of your letter, and he will take care that you shall have the opportunity of giving evidence, if after seeing him you think it desirable.

'I feel that this is entirely a matter for Your Royal Highness's own decision; though, when the probable views of his Committee are known to you, as they now are to me, it may, perhaps, be convenient if we were first to have some conversation with him upon them.

'I shall be at the War Office all day to-morrow.'

Considering the vast experience which the Duke possessed, the number of years he had been in office, and the promptitude with which at all times he was only too ready to carry out the policy and wishes of his political chief, it seems

strange that he should not have been taken more completely into the confidence of the Government. He had already had experience of numerous Secretaries of State and Administrations, and his relations with his political chiefs, as is abundantly testified by his public and private correspondence, had been of the most cordial and confidential character. With complete self-effacement he had always co-operated most loyally with the Government of the day in carrying out the measures they proposed, even when, as often happened, they ran counter to his own convictions. Yet by the new Administration he appears on many occasions to have been almost ignored.

The creation of a Chief of the Staff has often been advocated; and now that the Commandership-in-Chief has been abolished, we have one, at any rate in name. Whilst, however, the Chiefship was still in existence, there hardly seemed occasion for the appointment of such an official; and this was the view which His Royal Highness took. The two following letters, therefore, are instructive, as showing the situation at the time, and the views which the Duke then held on the subject; and also on the importance of maintaining in a high state of efficiency the Quartermaster-General's Department.

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 21 *November* 1869.

'Though I hope to see you to-morrow at twelve with the view of discussing with you in detail the various subjects of importance that you are anxious to prepare before the meeting of Parliament, I cannot help making an appeal to you with reference to our conversation of yesterday. I am most anxious to assist you in every way in my power to put the whole organisation of the Army on a sound and satisfactory footing, and I doubt not that many matters may be altered and amended in conformity with the views of the present day. But I do hope that no organic change may be adopted as regards the present condition of my immediate department at the Horse Guards. For thirteen years I have now worked hard in my office, and I think nobody can know more of the working of that establishment than myself. It may be possible to make certain amendments and to curtail business; but any organic change would be fatal to an establishment which works most efficiently, and which is really sound in its details.

'The creation of a Chief of the Staff or the abolition of the Quartermaster-General's Departments would, in my opinion, be fatal to the interests of the Army and detrimental to the public service, besides being most distasteful in every respect to myself as Head of the Army, and who is, after all, in the working of the Department, the person most concerned. No confusion of any sort or kind exists in my office; everything proceeds smoothly and harmoniously; and all that is wanted is to bring matters on a more comfortable footing in those branches of the service which are conducted in what is now called the War Office. But it is a mistake to suppose that the so-called Horse Guards are to blame or at fault in what has hitherto been complained of. I can assure you, with my thirteen years' experience, that it will be impossible to work the Horse Guards efficiently or satisfactorily if a Chief of the Staff be introduced into that office and forced upon me. He will be nothing more nor less than a fifth wheel to the coach. If the Commander-in-Chief is fit for his place and has activity enough to perform his duties, the Chief of the Staff will be only in his way and will be useless; whereas if he attempts to undertake all the details now conducted by Military Secretary, Adjutant-and Quartermaster-General, he will have far more on his hands than any one man can possibly undertake to perform, and the duty must be badly done. Moreover, the destruction of the Quartermaster-General's Department would be a fatal error. Every soldier of the slightest experience in war will tell you that the Quartermaster-General's Department in the field is by far the most important office in the Army. If you destroy it in time of peace, how can you create it on an emergency or in time of war? Lord Strathnairn's Committee never put forward such a proposition when it recommended the new Control system. Having devoted my life to the service, and being devoted to it from inclination as well as from my position, I do entreat you not to strike so fearful a blow at the efficiency of our noble Army as would be involved by taking so serious a step; and it is because I feel so strongly on these points that I address this letter to you before I see you, in the hope that you may induce the Committee now sitting not to put forward so disastrous a proposition. I am anxious by every means in my power to further your views, and to assist the Committee in the objects it may desire to attain; but I cannot do so if such sweeping organic changes are contemplated, and this I gather to be the case by reading the questions put to the several witnesses and the replies given by those gentlemen, who I fear are likely to carry much weight in the conclusions of the Committee.

'To you alone I can look for assistance in this emergency, and to you I consequently appeal in this pressing emergency.

'I have no wish to be examined by the Committee, if it is thought better I should not be; but I am anxious to elucidate points in the evidence which have been evidently quite misunderstood, and in some instances almost incorrectly stated. I am satisfied that my explanations will explain away matters which at present seem unaccountable or perplexing; but even after these explanations I fear I shall have little chance of holding my own unless you back me, and it is therefore that I now so strongly appeal to you, which I do from a devoted love to the profession and from a strong sense of public duty.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, *December* 5, 1869.

'When we had our conversation yesterday afternoon, I had not the remotest idea that the subject which you referred to with me for the first time had been treated of and put forward with a certain degree of official authority in a leading article of the *Army and Navy Gazette*, which only came to my knowledge yesterday evening. I confess that my astonishment was great, and that I felt somewhat indignant, that in some way or other this journal should have had access to information which had not reached even myself in conversation or otherwise from yourself as Secretary of State. But I go beyond this, and think that no such information ought to have in any shape been given without Her Majesty having been first informed of the changes that may be intended, and Her pleasure and sanction obtained, which, as far as I know, has certainly not hitherto been the case. I trust you will permit me to say a word upon this point. Any great change in the conduct of military affairs, and involving the position of the Commander-in-Chief, ought in my opinion to receive the sanction of Her Majesty even before it has been definitely disposed of between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief; the latter is the representative of the Crown as the military Head of the Army, and no change in such a position could be contemplated unless the Crown in the first instance gave consent to what is intended. I know that Her Majesty feels strongly on this point, and has frequently expressed Herself in this sense; and I certainly should feel that I were neglecting my duty if I were to agree to anything not first made known to, and sanctioned by, the Queen. Putting my own personal feelings, therefore, entirely out of the question, I feel strongly, in the interests of the Crown, the serious results which must arise from matters of this grave importance being prematurely made known to the public at large through a newspaper article of the description to which I refer. From what fell from you yesterday, I feel satisfied that your views and mine will not differ in this respect, and

therefore all I wish to impress on your mind is the absolute necessity for a stringent investigation as to how this information could have been conveyed to the journal in question with a considerable amount of detail and with a certain tone of authority. Having now had time to reflect upon the few words that passed between us on the subject treated on in this article, I think it may be well for me to give you, as shortly as possible, my views as to the suggestions thrown out to me by yourself. I trust you will give me the credit for a sincere desire to meet, as far as I am able, the variety of changes which have been recently put forward, and to assist you, as far as lies in my power, in meeting the wishes of the Government in the altered spirit of the age. Anything, therefore, that may simplify the business to be transacted between us will at all times receive my willing support.

'But the simplification of business and the entire alteration of the relative positions of the Secretary of State and Commander-in-Chief are two very different things, and whilst cordially supporting the one, I feel bound to enter a most decided protest against the other. The bringing the War Office and Horse Guards into contiguity under the same roof would, I believe, be most desirable so long as the military status of the Commander-in-Chief be maintained without any curtailment of his military authority; but the removal of the Commander-in-Chief to the office at Pall Mall, deprived as he must be, moreover, of all his military surroundings, would place him in a position of subordination which would virtually deprive him of all his specific attributes, and would in fact place him more or less on an equality with the Controller-in-Chief or any one of the Under-Secretaries of State. This would be a degradation which would altogether alter his status in the estimation of the Army and of the public, and would, in my opinion, be most injurious to the interests of the Crown, the real Head of the Army, and also to the public service. It may be urged, and truly urged, that the Secretary of State for War is responsible to the country for all matters connected with the Army, and is also the adviser of Her Majesty on all military matters. I do not for one moment deny this; and you will do me the justice to say that I have ever held this to be the correct and constitutional view of the case. But the Secretary of State, being a high political functionary and a civilian, cannot, as such, take any active part in the command of the Queen's forces, and these duties are consequently delegated to the Commander-in-Chief appointed by the Crown, and to whom the Crown, under the advice of her Ministers, delegates the supreme military authority. Consequently, whilst the theory of the Constitution is entirely maintained, the authority of the Crown over the Army remains intact; and whilst the policy of the Government rests exclusively with the Secre-

tary of State, the exercise of that authority in actual command devolves upon the Commander-in-Chief. Such being the case, it is clearly essential that the Commander-in-Chief should have a certain independent status; this he must lose if he is brought to the War Office at Pall Mall, though he need not lose it if a new War Office be built next to the Horse Guards, or even—which I do not advocate—if an entirely new building for War Office and Horse Guards be erected elsewhere, in which each office is kept entirely distinct and separate, though both may be under the same roof, and the apartments of the Secretary of State and Commander-in-Chief be in close contiguity. Till such time as this is accomplished, I do hope that the Commander-in-Chief will be left undisturbed at the Horse Guards, whilst all communications by letter might be easily abolished, and there could be no difficulty in passing all business between us through Minute Papers, and personal communication can at all times be easily carried on. The other question referred to was that of a Board to assemble twice a week, and to consist of the Secretary of State, the Commander-in-Chief, Controller-in-Chief, and the two Under-Secretaries. Upon this I would observe that, whilst I am and ever have been a strong advocate for what has been called War Office meetings, at which certain questions may be discussed in the presence of the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief by their respective officers, I think that the word Board would be objectionable, whilst its composition, excluding all the principal officers of the Commander-in-Chief and retaining those only of the Secretary of State, would again imply a lowering of the status of the Commander-in-Chief which I should be sorry to see adopted. I should therefore strongly urge the advisability of retaining our weekly War Office meetings in preference to the Board that has been suggested, and against which I entertain very serious objections. As our conversation yesterday was a mere preliminary one, I have only dealt with those points which you referred to at the time, and my omission of any other points must be attributed to my entire ignorance of what may be intended. Though I quite think with you that many alterations and improvements may be introduced into the organisation of the War Office and the official intercourse to be carried on between us, I hope you will bear in mind that the arrangements for conducting the military business of the Army, as carried on at the Horse Guards, answer perfectly well, that it is simpler than those who do not understand its working may imagine, and that it has not led to any confusion in times of great trouble and anxiety such as I have myself seen and been engaged in at various periods. Do not, then, let us upset arrangements which have really worked well, and let us only amend those which have never been properly organised or adjusted; otherwise, in this attempt to do more than is

actually needed, we may do more harm than good, and shake that portion of the system which has really worked efficiently. To-morrow I hope to see Northbrook, and hear from him the details of his recommendations; but meanwhile I feel it a duty I owe to myself as the military representative of the Crown to bring to your notice, in the most forcible manner in my power, the grave objections I entertain against the removal of the Commander-in-Chief from the Horse Guards to the War Office in Pall Mall, as also to the substitution of Board meetings for the ordinary War Office meetings composed as they have hitherto been, and which I believe to have been productive of many useful results.'

As remarked above, the question as to whether the Commander-in-Chief should, or should not, be removed to the War Office, may at first sight seem a trivial one. But in it was bound up the much greater issue of whether the control, and even discipline, of the Army was to be placed unreservedly in the hands of a politician—a result which has since been effected, with somewhat doubtful advantages to the interests of the service. In the following letters the points are fully discussed. His Royal Highness, it may be noted, freely admitted that in reality no dual control existed, and he was decidedly of opinion that, if all departments were under one roof, matters would be simplified. But he felt that his summary removal to the War Office would inevitably lower the dignity of his office, and he maintained that, until a new building were provided, the two departments could be drawn more closely together, and correspondence between them could cease whilst they both remained at Whitehall and Pall Mall. That this plan was possible is shown by the fact that, for many years after, the Inspector-General of Fortifications was located at Whitehall, and that War Office papers were passed backwards and forwards between the two places and minuted without inconvenience or loss of time.

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, *Dec.* 24, 1869.

'A letter from General Grey has reached me on the subject of your communication to Her Majesty, and conveying to me Her sentiments as to the Commander-in-Chief having himself personally a room assigned to him at the War Office.

As you seemed to think that this letter should be replied to by me to Her Majesty, I shall do so after giving the subject the best consideration in my power. You may remember that I have ever had the strongest objection to my removal from hence to Pall Mall, though advocating a combination of the two offices either here or elsewhere. My letter to you of 5 December strongly expresses this opinion, and I cannot therefore go off from it, though, as an alternative to the breaking up of the military departments here, I said I would rather, for myself, submit to the inconvenience of taking a room temporarily at the War Office. I am anxious that you should clearly understand that I do not propose to convey to Her Majesty any opinion I have not entertained from the first moment this question was mooted, and indeed I gave the same opinion as long ago as the summer, when it was first suggested to me by yourself, that a combined office had become an absolute necessity.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'EASHING PARK,
GODALMING, 25 *December* 1869.

'I have just received Your Royal Highness's letter of yesterday.

'In replying to Her Majesty, I feel sure you will have the goodness to make it clearly understood that I did not send my memorandum until Your Royal Highness had read the terms of it; and you will, I am confident, remember that you assured me of your acquiescence to it, not as a matter of necessity, in compliance with pressure, but heartily, in order to assist me in a work of much difficulty.

'It would be most unfortunate if any misunderstanding should arise in the mind of the Queen that the communication had been made to Her without your having been first fully cognisant of it.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 26 *December* 1869.

'Your letter of yesterday's date reached me yesterday afternoon late, and I have therefore been unable to reply to it by last night's post. At the same time, I have deemed it better not to send my letter to Her Majesty till I have had another opportunity of communicating with yourself on the subject of the highly important question which the Queen has put to me. It appears to me necessary that this further communication should take place, from an expression used in your letter to me of yesterday, which I confess somewhat surprised me. I entirely concur in the fact that we have acted most cordially together in trying to carry out great changes and retrenchments which appeared to have become

necessary, and I have assented to several of them, not because I could possibly approve of them, but because I knew the difficulty of the position in which you were placed, and felt anxious to meet you more than half way in such points as suggested themselves as absolutely necessary, more especially as regards the reductions in Regiments both of officers and men brought about by the unexpected and sweeping changes proposed for India. But as regards the grave question now under more immediate consideration, of my having rooms assigned to me at the War Office in Pall Mall, I confess I cannot admit that I gave a "hearty" assent, as expressed in your letter. I did give my assent, and certainly it is right that Her Majesty should know this, but I did so as the alternative, as I understood it, to the breaking up of the Horse Guards Department as at present constituted, by removing certain portions of it to Pall Mall, which you will remember was the first proposal which you made to me. To this I objected in the most decided and positive manner, and it was when the alternative proposal was made to me that I should alone have a room at the War Office that I considered this the less evil of the two, and assented as an alternative which had become unavoidable. The Queen having asked my opinion on this removal, it appears to me that, whilst it is my duty to make known to Her that the proposal was made by you with my knowledge and assent, if the question is put to me as it now is, whether I think the arrangement a good and proper one, I cannot agree to any such view, but feel bound to accord with the expression conveyed to Her Majesty's letter to you that its "effect must be to place him (the Commander-in-Chief) in evident subordination to the Secretary of State for War, and thus lower his position in the eyes of the Army." This very same view I have expressed to you over and over again, on every occasion upon which this subject has been discussed between us. I stated this last summer, when first the subject of building a new War Office was suggested. I stated it strongly to you in my letter of 5 December, and I repeated it in the numerous conversations we have had. Whilst, therefore, I am bound to tell Her Majesty that I assented to Her proposal under the circumstances as stated above, I must, on the other hand, fully agree with Her Majesty that it is a step which I feel it impossible to recommend on principle, and which I fear will have the effect she contemplated, if it should be actually carried out. Nobody feels more strongly than I do the necessity for a combined office, but it must be a new one, where our respective positions can be fully maintained, and not a removal of myself or any portion of my office to Pall Mall. You must remember that I have over and over again said I thought the House of Commons, or rather Parliament, ought to be satisfied with an assurance of what your ultimate intentions were in this respect, and I

think this still. You seemed to take a different view, and hence the modification which suggested itself to you, and which I accepted as a necessity. Pray read my letter of 5 December, which fully embodied my views. I send this by messenger to you, as I am anxious for an early reply, so as to be enabled to communicate with the Queen, and hoping that not one word is contained in this letter which you have not heard from my lips or from my letters over and over again.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'EASHING, 27 *December* 1869.

'I have just received Your Royal Highness's letter of yesterday, and hasten to reply to it.

'The question which requires to be answered, and which I am sure you will feel I am most anxious to see answered in a way agreeable to your own wishes, is this, "How is the new business to be transacted which is about to be thrown upon the Commander-in-Chief?"

'The proposed reorganisation of the Reserve Forces is the chief of several new branches of business, such as Military Education, the Ordnance Council, the Control System, etc. etc.—all of which will involve more intimate relations between yourself and the Secretary of State.

'I entirely agree in the wish that we could move at once into a new building; but since this is impossible, the question arises, "What is to be done, as a temporary arrangement, in the meanwhile?"

'The proposal I made to Your Royal Highness was that we should divide the work of the two offices afresh, and transact different portions of our business in the two buildings, Your Royal Highness transacting at the Horse Guards the portions with which the Secretary of State would be least connected, and bringing to Pall Mall the portions which would bring us into most frequent communication.

'This proposal Y.R.H. objected to, and I gave up. If there is any difference of recollection between us, it seems to be narrowed to the degree of cordiality with which you entered into the proposal, which, with your assent, I consequently submitted to the Queen. But on this point I will not dwell; my anxiety is, as I am sure you have seen it ever has been, to work out the changes in progress in such a manner as might best promote the most cordial understanding.

'Last session I stated, with your entire concurrence, that there is, *in principle*, no dual government of the Army. Lately, in compliance with your strongly expressed wish, I declined to press upon you the institution of a new officer as Chief of the Staff. What is actually in progress is the drawing closer the connection between Your Royal Highness, as

the principal military adviser of the Cabinet, and the person who may be Secretary of State. Various new classes of business have to be transacted between us. What we have to submit to the Queen is, "How can they be transacted best?"

'I was prepared to recommend to my colleagues, and to state in Parliament, that which, with your assent, I have submitted to the Queen; but if any other plan even now suggests itself to Y.R.H. as preferable, I am perfectly ready to enter upon the consideration of it.

'Such is the problem before us, for which we *must* find some solution. I earnestly trust that the answer which Y.R.H. will make to the Queen may be such as to bear the widest opening for an arrangement which the Cabinet will approve, and Parliament receive with satisfaction.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 27 *December* 1869.

'Your letter has reached me of this day's date, and I think it better that I should reply to it again before I write to Her Majesty; nothing can be more satisfactory to myself personally than the sentiments contained in your letter, and I really believe that the difference between us on the general subjects under consideration is not very considerable. There is but one point upon which I have always had a strong opinion, not, I am afraid, altogether in accord with your own views; that is, as regards the room for myself at the War Office in Pall Mall. I prefer this to the alternative of taking a portion of the Horse Guards with me, and I accepted the arrangement which you have submitted to Her Majesty and agreed to it, because I thought it preferable that I should go alone, leaving all my chief work and offices here intact, to breaking up the very excellent military organisation which I think we have in force here. There will be no difficulty in my explaining all this to the Queen; but if I am asked in the abstract whether I do not think the status of the Commander-in-Chief is lowered by my removal to Pall Mall, I cannot in my conscience say otherwise than that I conceive this to be the case, not as intended by yourself, certainly, or by the Government, but that such will, I fear, be the way in which it will be accepted by the Army, and at all events by a large section of the public who are not so well disposed in their views on military matters as you are, and who will look upon any move of this kind as a complete change of relative positions between what the Commander-in-Chief is here and what he would be as the mere head of a branch of the Department in Pall Mall. You may say, and say with much force and truth, the problem to be solved is, "How is the new business to be transacted which is about to be thrown

upon the Commander-in-Chief?" My reply is, as far as I believe and understand that business to be, that pending the new office to be built, it would be conducted by me here just as well as in Pall Mall. I should not propose to remove one single officer, clerk, or messenger from Pall Mall here. Most certainly, but just as I have for a number of years now gone daily, whenever required, to the War Office, or that the Secretary of State has come to see me here (and no Secretary of State has ever objected to such an arrangement), so, in like manner, whilst having their respective offices as at present in Pall Mall, I can see no reason why General Lindsay should not come to me here with his papers once in the course of the day, and the same with any other heads of branches in Pall Mall who would have to report to me. Then as to my seeing you more frequently, I would make it a point of coming daily to you whether I had any business or not on the chance of you having something for me, and I would naturally attend every War Office meeting whenever you proposed to hold one.

If the Secretary of State had a room at the Horse Guards, as the Secretary at War used to have, whilst the Commander-in-Chief had another in Pall Mall, there would be more give-and-take in the arrangement, and it would not be likely to be so easily misunderstood as the present proposal; but I do not at all press this view, for I really think there would be something very inconvenient to both of us without any sufficient advantage resulting therefrom, and my own view is so strong that all that you require and that could be wanted, would be attained by the small inconvenience of a head of a department under me walking down to see me here from Pall Mall, or my walking up to see the Secretary of State or attending a War Office meeting, that I really think the public, or rather Parliament, ought to be perfectly satisfied with such a temporary arrangement, backed as it will be by this statement you will make in opening your Estimates: That our combined office is about to be prepared for us, with the substantial fact being thereupon laid before the House, asking it for the money to carry out such a proposal. Even a personal visit is not necessary on every subject. The heads of departments would in most cases have to act upon Minute Papers. These would be put into a box and sent up here, and my minute would be returned in the same way, and the work easily accomplished. We have now a telegraph between this office and yours. The most instantaneous communication can thus go on between us, and the touch of this magic instrument would bring me to you in less than five minutes by entering through the garden gate.

'If you could agree to this view of the case as a temporary measure, and could reply in this sense to Her Majesty, it would almost follow as a matter of course that I should be relieved of the necessity of any communication to Her

Majesty; but of course I am quite prepared to make known my sentiments to the Queen in such a manner as to show no sort of difference between us, excepting always on that unfortunate point, upon which I cannot write to Her in a different sense to what I have always said to you, viz. that I think the status of the Commander-in-Chief cannot be otherwise than lowered if it be decided that he should move to Pall Mall.

'Hoping that this will be looked upon as a frank reply to an equally frank and unreserved letter from yourself, which I believe to be the only mode in which these subjects can be fairly disposed of between those who are in such intimate official relations as must exist between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief . . .'

CHAPTER XIX

WAR OFFICE *VERSUS* HORSE GUARDS

Third Part of Northbrook Report issued. Lord Northbrook on his Committee. The Control System. H.R.H.'s Views and Letter to Sir Henry Storks. Question of War Office Council. Correspondence with Mr. Cardwell. Removal of Horse Guards from Whitehall. Tenure of Commandership-in-Chief. Consideration by Her Majesty and Cabinet of Words to be used in Commons. Mr. Cardwell's Report to Her Majesty on subject. Mr. Trevelyan's Motion in Commons. Mr. Cardwell emphasises H.R.H.'s non-political position. Sir Richard Airey on the War Office. The Military Secretaryship. Compact that move to War Office only temporary. General Egerton appointed Military Secretary. Tribute to Generals Airey and Forster.

THE third part of the Northbrook Committee's Report was issued on 12 February 1870, and it recommended that the work should be divided into three groups: Military, Control or Supply, and Finance. As regards the Military Department, it recommended that the public duties of the Military Secretary should be confined to the promotion and appointment of officers; that the command of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers should be vested in the Commander-in-Chief; and that an Inspector-General of Artillery should be appointed. Assuming that the Commander-in-Chief was to be brought into the same building as the Secretary of State, it stated: 'Indeed as a practical question, no scheme which is not based upon the accomplished fact that all the departments of military administration are housed under one roof can be otherwise than abortive.'

The recommendations of the Committee as regards the military departments were carried out in different manners. On the simple authority of the Government, and the conditional approval of the Queen, the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff were removed to the War Office, and all correspondence between the two ceased, which latter

arrangement at any rate was undoubtedly an advantage. As regards other matters, however, an Order in Council of 4 June 1870 charged the Commander-in-Chief—in addition to the command conferred upon him under the Letter of Service of 15 July 1856, and subject to the Secretary of State's responsibility for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative—with the discipline and distribution of the Army and the Reserve Forces, with military education and the training of officers of the Army and Reserve Forces, with the enlisting and discharge of men from the Army, with the collection and record of strategical information, and with the selection, promotion, and reward of individuals. On 13 September 1870 Lord Northbrook wrote to the Duke as follows:—

FROM LORD NORTHBROOK.

'STRATTON, MICHELDEVER STATION,
13 *September* 1870.

'. . . I can say with perfect sincerity that I have never recommended Mr. Cardwell to make any changes in the way of carrying on the business of the office which did not seem to be really essential, and on several matters I have given up my opinion in deference to the views entertained by Your Royal Highness.

'As to the Registry, I fear that a united Registry can never work properly if under two heads, and this would virtually and substantially be the case if a clerk of the Military Secretary's Department, who would be under the chief clerk of that department, were to be put in charge of the Registry at the Horse Guards, while Mr. Thompson is at the head of the War Office Registry. This is the reason why it seemed to me to be essential that if Mr. Roberts (against whom I have not a word to say) is employed in the Horse Guards Registry, he should exchange to the Registry Department of the Central Office.

'Indeed, as I wrote to General Forster, it was distinctly understood when the numbers of the Military Department were settled that the Registry was to be worked from the Central Office.

'Mr. Cardwell knows my view on this, for what it is worth, so I beg that Y.R.H. will not scruple to arrange the matter with him in my absence. . . .'

The Control system has already been alluded to in connection with Lord Northbrook's Committee. In 1866 a Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Strathnairn

had considered the question of Army Transport; and the question of the Supply Department was subsequently added to their labours. They recommended that a Controller-in-Chief should be appointed to have control of the united departments of Supply, Commissariat Stores, etc., under Controllers and Deputy and Assistant Controllers. Accordingly in 1868 Sir Henry Storks was appointed Controller-in-Chief, a designation which was afterwards changed into that of Surveyor-General. This official could, and Sir Henry Storks ultimately did, sit in Parliament. Under him were placed the Commissariat, Barracks, Military Stores and Contracts, which obviously had the effect of greatly increasing the Secretary of State's influence and correspondingly decreasing the Commander-in-Chief's. The subject was again considered by Lord Northbrook's Committee, who recommended that manufacture and supply should be placed under the Controller-in-Chief.

The Control system generally caused a considerable amount of friction, and soon became extremely unpopular in the Army. To begin with, the name itself was essentially objectionable. In favour of the system it was contended that, by combining together all the departments of Supply under one authority, matters would be improved and simplified. The system, however, was open to many objections. Amongst others, it took away from the Quartermaster-General's Department many of its legitimate duties. In writing to Mr. Cardwell on 21 November 1869—a letter which has already been quoted in its entirety—H.R.H. thus pertinently alludes to the point: 'The destruction of the Quartermaster-General's Department would be a fatal error. Every soldier of the slightest experience in war will tell you that the Quartermaster-General's Department in the field is by far the most important office in the Army. If you destroy it in time of peace, how can you create it on an emergency, or in time of war?'

In effect, all members of the Control Department considered themselves independent of the local military authorities; and thus on one occasion, when a General Officer Commanding at an important foreign military station

objected to some action on the part of a 'Control' officer and signified his intention of reporting to the War Office, the latter replied, '*I* am the War Office!'

This result the Duke foresaw, as will be seen from the following extracts from letters which he addressed to Mr. Cardwell:—

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'15 *March* 1870.

'How can you think that I would agree to handing over to the Control Department those legitimate and military functions of the department (Q.M.G.'s) which that department can alone deal with, with advantage to the interests of the service? I allude chiefly to the issue of routes and the arrangement of the sea transport.'

Again, on 6 June 1870, he writes to Mr. Cardwell:—

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'6 *June* 1870.

'It would never do for the Control Department to give orders through their officers to the General Officers. It is the General Officers who are responsible, and to them we must look, and they will confer with the Controllers on the spot if necessary.'

Again, General Scarlett, commanding at Aldershot, complained that when the Controller at that station wrote to the War Office he did not see the letter. So that the local Controller could write anything he pleased without the General in command knowing anything of it.

To this Lord Northbrook, in writing to the Duke on 2 February 1870, stated that nothing could be more antagonistic to the whole system than 'that the General Officer Commanding should be passed by in any way.'

Thus, from the very first, the Duke viewed with misgivings the plan of setting up an official in the form of a Controller, dealing with matters which more properly should have come under the cognisance of the Quartermaster-General's branch, and with a position independent of his own. Nor were his apprehensions groundless. Among the Duke's correspondence the following letter from Sir Henry Storks, written evidently in reply to a communication from H.R.H., is instructive. For in it the Controller endeavours to

justify his action in having had communications with Mr. Cardwell on the subject of an expedition to the Red River without consulting the Duke, as chief military adviser to the Secretary of State.

FROM SIR HENRY STORKS.

'WAR OFFICE, *April* 4, 1870.

'I have had the honour to receive Y.R.H.'s note of the 2nd inst. I understood that Mr. Cardwell had communicated with Y.R.H. on the subject of the projected expedition to the Red River, and all the arrangements connected with it; and as the subject was to be considered strictly confidential, no official correspondence has taken place about it.

'I had no notion that Y.R.H. was not acquainted with the object and character of the expedition in all its details.'

The following letters, also selected from the large correspondence of the Duke with Sir Henry Storks, are instructive as throwing light on how matters worked between the Military and Control departments.

TO SIR HENRY STORKS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, *May* 17, 1869.

'As I know that nobody has at all times expressed himself more strongly than yourself as to the Commander-in-Chief being at all times fully informed of everything connected with the Army, and as, since the Control system has been established, I have heard next to nothing as to what is going on at the various stations, such as Aldershot, Ireland, etc., connected with the barracks, etc., I am sure you will have no objection to what I have desired Sir Hope Grant to communicate to you to-day, that I purpose writing a letter to the General Officers concerned, calling upon them to give me all the information I require. I wish you had agreed to my original proposal that all these matters should, as formerly, have passed through my hands, so that nothing should happen without my being made a party to it and aware of it. Had you agreed to this suggestion, no sort of annoyance or difficulty could ever have resulted. As it is, all knowledge of the state of affairs is gradually passing out of my hands. I confess that it annoys and distresses me much.'

TO SIR HENRY STORKS.

'HORSE GUARDS, 22 *May* 1869.

'It is utterly impossible for the School of Chatham to proceed if the necessary requirements of this establishment

are not allowed to be obtained as heretofore. The whole machinery of the Engineer Establishment must come to a deadlock for the want of these necessary stores and others of a similar description.

'What can the Woolwich people know about them? The Director of the Chatham Establishment is the only man who can judge of the requirements, and he makes the demands on *his responsibility*. I hope you will at once see the necessity of complying with reasonable demands of this sort.'

TO SIR HENRY STORKS.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 22 *May* 1869.

'I am so sorry to hear that you are ill, and consequently absent, but hope that you are better, that it may be nothing serious, and that we may soon have you back. For it is high time that a stop should be put to the objectionable direction in which the Control system seems likely to drift us. I cannot for a moment suppose, with your military instincts, that you really wish to see the Quartermaster-General's Department destroyed by the Control; but certainly such will be the case if we do not mind, and should I unfortunately be mistaken in my ideas as to your views, I can only tell you as regards mine, that I cannot be a party to such a result, and that I must enter my most solemn protest against any such arrangement. I am most anxious that these difficulties should all be got over by mutual good-feeling and cordial co-operation, and I hope that you will listen to my earnest entreaties in time, and allow your own good judgment to accord with the military sentiments which we ought both to possess. Therefore it is that I desire so much to see you return, for I feel dissatisfied at a great many things that I see produced by the Control system, and am most anxious that an early stop should be put to what is creeping in. If it should be your real intention to do away with the Quartermaster-General's Department, pray say so candidly, for it is far better to know this decidedly than to find the ground cut away from under one's feet, when of course it becomes too late to act. My view of the Control system has always been, that it should be the great branch of the War Department to obtain and prepare the supplies of the Army, and the concentration of the various supply branches under one head seemed to me to be valuable; but all the military functions of the Staff were certainly not to be interfered with in any respect, and the Quartermaster-General's duties were to be continued in their integrity. This, however, is certainly not the case as matters go on now, and I am losing my functions as Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Army by being kept in entire ignorance of all that is doing as regards the housing and supply of the troops. And yet it is just as essential for me to be fully acquainted with all these

Secretary of State was supported by his immediate subordinates. But, on the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief was expected to represent in his own person the whole of the military side. Now, though few chiefs were better posted in the details of their work than was the Duke of Cambridge, it is obvious that, without the immediate assistance of those who actually superintend the work of the various military departments, the Commander-in-Chief was bound in such circumstances to be placed at a disadvantage as compared with his political colleagues. He therefore naturally wished that the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and any other officers to whom in particular cases he might wish to refer, should be also summoned to these War Office conferences; and it can hardly be denied that this request was reasonable. Hence these letters:—

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'Gloucester House, 10 *April* 1870.

'You were so pressed for time yesterday that I could not say to you all I wished about yesterday's meeting at the War Office, and I therefore think it as well to put my views on paper. You will remember that some time ago, when you proposed to me to have a sort of Council to meet at the War Office once a week, I expressed an anxious desire that such meetings should take place—in fact our old Saturday meetings, which have been entirely discontinued since you have been at the War Office; but I added that I objected to the Horse Guards Staff, Adjutant- and Quartermaster-General, and Military Secretary not attending as they had hitherto done. To that letter I don't think I even got a reply from yourself, but you requested me to attend yesterday, and I did so, in order to meet your wishes, to discuss some matters connected with the Red River. Our meeting of yesterday then took up the description of business we formerly discussed at our Saturday meetings, and the absence of my Staff was at once much felt by me. I am most anxious to throw no obstacles in the way of these meetings, which I have always considered to be of great value and benefit to the service.

'But to make these meetings of real use, and to have a free interchange of opinions between the Military Executive of the Army and the leading members of the War Office, it is essential that the Horse Guards Staff should attend as they did formerly, and I look upon their not doing so, and yet all the War Office officials being present as formerly, as a slight upon the Horse Guards officers, including myself. The whole position of the Commander-in-Chief becomes

lowered by this new arrangement, for though, no doubt, he is responsible for all that happens at the Horse Guards—and I am ready and anxious to take that responsibility—yet he cannot be of the same use in discussion of this kind unless supported by his Staff or heads of departments, who have the details of all business more at their command than he can have, just as your Under-Secretaries are essential to you for details in their several branches. If such an arrangement as the one I propose were not made, the Commander-in-Chief would at these meetings merely occupy the position of an Under-Secretary of State, which I confess I do not think he could possibly accept, bearing in mind the high office which he must necessarily fill. You must remember that these are Departmental Conferences, and that they cannot be looked upon in any other light.

'As no sort of inconvenience or delay can result from reverting to our old form of meetings, I trust you will agree to my proposition for our next meeting.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'WAR OFFICE, 12 *April* 1870.

'I am sorry to find from Your Royal Highness's letter that you view the meetings which I have proposed to hold at the War Office from an entirely different point from that from which I regard them. With Your Royal Highness, as the Executive Head of the Army, I have not proposed ordinarily to interfere, because I do not hold it to be my duty to do so in ordinary cases; and I do not, therefore, want the assistance of the Adjutant-General, the Quarter-master-General, or the Military Secretary. But whenever questions arise in which the executive conduct of the military department is involved, I shall be able to ask for assistance of any of those officers, and shall be much obliged to them if they will afford it.

'It is proposed to make the heads of the Supply and Finance Departments parliamentary officers, and they will have frequently to explain the conduct of their own departments. It is necessary for me to have occasional meetings at which I may discuss with them the questions on which their various duties meet, and would come into collision, if there are no measures taken to secure a good understanding.

'But I have proposed to look to Your Royal Highness as my principal military adviser in a sense and to a degree not yet practised in the office. You have expressed a wish to know the measures about to be taken, before they are taken; and especially to know what goes on about subjects referred to the Ordnance Council, subjects in the Control Department, etc., to say nothing of the new questions which will arise in relation to the Reserve Forces.

'It was for the purpose of giving Your Royal Highness this opportunity, and in order to obtain for myself the advantage of Your Royal Highness's advice, that I proposed to discuss weekly with yourself as head of the Military department, as well as with the heads of the Control and Finance Department, general questions of policy in the War Office.

'I still think that this is a most desirable object, and I trust you will assist me in it. But I do not think I ought to discuss all matters of War Office policy with the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Military Secretary.

'I do not think, for instance, that it was necessary for me to consult any one of them whether there should be an expedition to the Red River, or many of the other questions which were considered last Saturday; and however valuable may be the individual opinion of each of these eminent men, I must reserve to myself the right of asking for it, when I desire to have it. I can only discuss with the heads of departments the various questions which are common to all the departments. To Your Royal Highness, in particular, I am anxious to make known much that probably it would not be necessary to communicate to you departmentally, because, as I have said, I wish to look to you as the military adviser of the Secretary of State in a sense and to a degree which has not yet been practised in the War Office.

'I trust this explanation will satisfy Your Royal Highness that the object I have had in view has been one far from derogatory to your high position, and that I am endeavouring substantially to increase the weight and influence of your opinion in regard to the matters on which it is necessary for me to take decisions on the part of H.M. Government.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
DEVONPORT, 17 *April* 1870.

'I have been moving about for the last few days, and so could not sooner reply to your letter of the 12th. I see no reason why our respective views regarding the meetings at the War Office could not be easily adjusted by our having two description of meetings, the one Confidential, the other taking the form of a Departmental Conference, which I have ever thought most valuable. The former of these would only be attended by yourself and myself, assisted by your Parliamentary subordinate in the War Office, the other attended by my Military Staff as well as by all your Under-Secretaries. I quite agree with you that the Red River question is one that could not be discussed by anybody but ourselves up to the exact point when it has been decided upon and is to be carried out. Then I think the details should be discussed in your presence by the Departmental Officials of the Mili-

tary and Civil Departments. I give this as an instance of the difference and distinction I make. But now let us take the subject of the instructions to the Control Department which Storks put forward. That question in my opinion should be discussed in the Departmental Conference, as all the departments are interested and have a share in the details for carrying on these duties. All sorts of questions on Barracks, Clothing, Allowances, and Regulations of various kinds constantly arise, and would be all the better for free discussion and mutual interchange of thoughts amongst the heads of departments, and these are the subjects I want to see discussed in general at a Departmental Conference, as I will call it for the sake of distinction from the other meetings, which, as you suggest, should be of a more confidential character, on such subjects as either of us may suggest should be brought forward. It is not necessary that a Departmental Conference should take place weekly. It merely should take place when either of us have a certain number of subjects to bring before it, and it could take place the same day as our weekly conference takes place. I am satisfied, when you come to think over the matter, you will see advantage in the proposal rather than the reverse, and my objection to the present arrangement will be entirely met if this plan were for the future to be adopted.'

The War Office Council, whilst the office of Commander-in-Chief still existed, was the eventual outcome of the necessity of possessing some kind of consultative body to advise the Secretary of State; and in its final form the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director-General of Ordnance, and the Director-General of Mobilisation and Intelligence, had seats upon it also. Still the council was in reality an informal one, created and assembled by the Secretary of State; and, according to the evidence given before the War Commission by the military chiefs, these were far from occupying upon it an authoritative position. That this view was upheld by the Esher Committee is shown by their recommendations that an Army Council, formally constituted by Order in Council, should be created in place of the informally constituted War Office Council—an outcome which gives even greater point to His Royal Highness's contentions. For if the military element of the council, as represented by the military chiefs as well as by the Commander-in-

Chief, were virtually impotent, how much more so would have been the Commander-in-Chief sitting alone as the representative of all? Still it must be remembered that even military experts do not always agree; and it is possible that the lack of power possessed by the late military régime is in part to be attributed to the considerable amount of disagreement between them which at times took place.

In the January of the following year (1871) the Duke made a last effort to save his office and the military departments under him from the humiliating rapidity with which the new plan was to be carried out, in reply to which he received the letter from Mr. Cardwell which is printed below.

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 18 *January* 1871.

'I certainly had no idea from our conversation of yesterday morning that you intended at once to carry out the proposed removal of the Horse Guards to the present War Office. At all events I presumed that the Queen's pleasure would first be taken, and that we should look deliberately into the question of accommodation, about which, in spite of everything I hear to the contrary, I entertain considerable doubt. Sir R. Airey brought me, however, last night a set of plans which seem to dispose of the case at once, and I understand that you are anxious to carry out the arrangement without delay.

'I am perfectly aware of the difficulties you and Mr. Gladstone have to deal with in this question, and I doubt not that the subject will be fully discussed by Parliament; but I am still strongly impressed with the opinion, after much anxious deliberation since yesterday, that Parliament will be satisfied with the assurance that the new buildings are agreed upon and at once to be commenced; and I am satisfied that in the eyes of the Army and the country it would be a serious lowering of the status of the Commander-in-Chief to remove his department from the present Horse Guards to Pall Mall, whereas it would come perfectly natural for the two departments, War Office and Horse Guards conjointly, to go into a perfectly new building.

'If, therefore, Mr. Gladstone and yourself could spare me this annoyance I should be deeply grateful to both, and, so far as I am personally concerned, I shall be happy to avail myself of the room set apart for me at the War Office to any extent that you may deem desirable, as my personal conveni-

ence must not for a moment stand in the way of the public service.

'Should, however, the present decision be adhered to, I would entreat that at least it should be dependent on the possibility of carrying out the change with comfort and without disadvantage to the Department over which I preside, and which may in these times be at any moment put to a severe test, and that, further, the Queen's pleasure should be taken in the first instance. In laying the plan before Her, I hope it may be clearly pointed out that it comes from yourself, and that I am not supposed to support it farther than to obey the wishes of the Government in carrying it out.

'I grieve that my protracted indisposition has prevented me from being a great deal more at the War Office of late than I could have wished to have been, and obliges me at the present moment to have recourse to a letter in preference to making this communication to you myself. I have asked Sir R. Airey to be the bearer of this letter to you in the course of to-day.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'War Office, 18 *January* 1871.

'I mentioned to Sir R. Airey yesterday that nothing would be done until the Queen had been advised by Mr. Gladstone and myself and had given Her consent.

'But I most strongly advise Your Royal Highness to assent to it freely. No other course is, in my opinion, open to us or to yourself, and I am perfectly willing to carry the changes into effect in whatever way may be most agreeable to yourself.

'We have great difficulties to contend with, and we must diminish them by every step in our power.'

The tenure of Commandership-in-Chief was at the beginning of 1871 a much-debated question; and in view of impending parliamentary discussion some correspondence on the subject passed between H.R.H. and Mr. Cardwell. The latter at first appears to have been in favour of a five-years tenure; and on 14 February 1871 called on the Duke at the Horse Guards between five and six, apparently to discuss the terms to be used in a submission to the Queen on the subject. After he had left, the Duke wrote to him contending that the post could not be regarded as coming within the category of ordinary Staff appointments, but that it ought, on the contrary, to be specially considered; during this day several other communications on the subject passed between them.

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'WAR OFFICE, 14 *February* 1871.

'Will you have the goodness to read the enclosed and let me have it again, saying if you approve the form of expression?'

'It is not intended to remove H.R.H. the F.-M. Commander-in-Chief from his office. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government it would not be desirable to do so. At the same time, as regards the tenure of the office, it is not intended to maintain the exception in the Royal Warrant which restrains the application of the ordinary rules to the Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the Military Secretary.'

TO MR. CARDWELL.

'HORSE GUARDS, 14 *February* 1871.

'I don't like the expression "remove," which I think is rather too abrupt. I would say, "It is in the opinion of the Government not desirable to make any change in the command of the Army, which is to continue as at present in the hands of H.R.H. the F.-M. Commander-in-Chief."

'With regard to the application of the exception to the five-years rule, as I understood that it is not to be made applicable to myself, I think this had better be more clearly defined than I understand it as expressed in your minute, from which it might be supposed that my tenure of office would cease at the end of the next five years.

'With regard to the case of the Military Secretary, there can be no doubt that the office is to be held for five years subject to renewal.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'WAR OFFICE, 14 *February* 1871.

'I had not sent the Paper to the Queen when I received your note; and I think I had better mention the subject to the Cabinet to-morrow before I do so, and show them your words. I am not at all devoted to the words we wrote this afternoon, and it is the point on which probably much care is requisite to avoid useless and disagreeable controversy.'

FROM MR. CARDWELL.

'WAR OFFICE, 15 *February* 1871.

'I enclose a copy of a letter which I have just sent to the Queen.

'I think it will be agreeable to you.

'I have no other copy, and shall be obliged if you will have the goodness to return it to me.'

'Mr. Cardwell presents his humble duty and reports to Your Majesty that the proper answer to be given in the House of Commons on the subject of the position of H.R.H. the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has been considered by the Cabinet. Mr. Cardwell acquainted the Cabinet with the view of the subject which Your Majesty had done him the honour to convey to him, and the Cabinet was of opinion that the application of the five-years rule need not be insisted upon. The following words were considered by the Cabinet suitable to the occasion:—

'"The position of the Officer Commanding-in-Chief must be looked upon as an exceptional one as compared with that of any other Staff officer, and therefore cannot be regulated by a mere reference to time. It will of course be necessary for him to be in harmony with the Government of the day, and his continuance or removal must depend upon considerations of public policy."'

This, then, may be taken as expressing the opinions of the Prime Minister and the Government; and in view of subsequent developments it is well to bear it in mind.

TO MR. CARDWELL

'Gloucester House, 16 *February* 1871.

'I return with many thanks the Copy of the Submission you have sent to the Queen, which, as I understand, exempts me from the application of the five-years rule, to which, as you are aware, I attach the greatest importance, as such exemption will maintain the position of the Commander-in-Chief in the administration of the duties devolving upon him.'

On 16 February 1871 Mr. Cardwell introduced the Army Estimates, and in the course of his speech said:—

'Her Majesty's Government think that the position of the Officer Commanding-in-Chief must be looked upon as an exceptional one as compared with that of any other Staff officer, and that, therefore, it cannot be regulated with mere reference to time. His continuance in and removal from office must depend upon considerations of public policy. I conceive, then, that it would be a mistake to apply to the person holding that office a condition derived from the mere limits of time.'

At the same time, however, Mr. Cardwell stated that he saw no reason why these considerations should apply also to the office of Military Secretary.

On 21 February Mr. Trevelyan moved:—

'That in the opinion of this House no scheme for military organisation can be regarded as complete which does not

then arose, by whom was this official to be appointed?—and a lengthy discussion ensued upon the subject.

It is needless to remark that, with the introduction of the system of selection, much work of a very delicate nature would be thrown on those whose duty it was to select; and the Duke was by no means anxious to concentrate too much power in this respect in his own hands, though the manner in which he had hitherto administered the affairs of the Army and distributed the patronage which fell to him was such as to inspire the greatest confidence in all concerned. But perhaps his attitude generally as regards this question cannot be more pertinently described than by quoting the following extract from a leading article in the *Times* at this period:—

'Patronage and power are not always distasteful things, and yet the Commander-in-Chief desired none of these, but rather shrank from the perplexities which an honest discharge of duty would create. He did not want the privilege of putting, by his own mere will, one officer over the head of another. If he overrated the difficulties of effective selection, and we hardly know that he did, he at any rate had no desire for the influence or power which the system might bring.'

The following letters, however, which passed between the Duke and Sir Thomas Biddulph, well describe the different standpoints from which H.R.H. and Mr. Cardwell approached the subject:—

FROM SIR THOMAS BIDDULPH.

'ST. JAMES'S PALACE, 27 *January* 1871.

'Since I had the honour of seeing Y.R.H. yesterday, I received from the Queen the answer Mr. Cardwell sent to the letters written to him by Her Majesty, to which I alluded.

'The substance of the letter is as follows regarding the Military Secretary:—

'"As regards the Military Secretary, that officer is at present a member of the personal Staff of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. But the measures which Your Majesty's servants desire to submit to Parliament in the coming session will impose on H.R.H. an amount of selec-

tion hitherto unknown in the Army. This will greatly increase the power of the Crown, while it will impose a heavy burden both on the Duke of Cambridge and also on the Secretary of State, who will be called upon to sustain in Parliament the choices made by H.R.H. whenever that choice shall be questioned.

'"Mr. Cardwell feels that to render this possible the Military Secretary should, like the Adjutant-General, be a military officer of high rank approved by Your Majesty, and appointed for a limited period. This is not intended to make him independent of the Commander-in-Chief, but subordinate as the Adjutant-General is. This is the change submitted for Your Majesty's approval, and without it Mr. Cardwell feels sure that Parliament will not consent to vest in the Commander-in-Chief the extensive power of selection which is necessary both for the abolition of Purchase and also for the union of the Reserve Forces with the Regulars. As regards the position of the Commander-in-Chief, it has appeared to Mr. Gladstone and to Mr. Cardwell that the exception in the Royal Warrant will be difficult to defend on principle, but that good reason may be shown why the Duke of Cambridge, or any successor who may be administering that high office with advantage to the public service, should, under the letters of service, continue without any enforcement which limits the tenure to five years. The tenure would continue during Your Majesty's pleasure.

'"The question of locality is one which there appears an actual necessity to meet by a temporary arrangement, and there is now the opportunity of making such a temporary arrangement by the space which the recent reductions have given in Pall Mall. It has always been very inconvenient, as General Peel pointed out and Sir James Graham's Committee in 1860 affirmed, that the two offices should be separate. But the union of the Reserve Forces with the Regulars adds so immensely to this inconvenience that the urgency of the union is extreme. By this temporary arrangement the necessity for an immediate decision as to the permanent building will be averted, and Mr. Cardwell will be very glad if, with time for consideration, it shall be found possible to erect the new buildings on the much preferable site of the present Horse Guards."

'Mr. Cardwell then proceeds to assure the Queen that these proposals are not made with the view of silencing public clamour, but in the confident assurance that they will be beneficial to the public service.

'I write this rather hastily to Y.R.H., feeling sure that the Queen will wish that Y.R.H. may be at once put in possession of all the circumstances.

'I leave at once for Osborne, where every communication addressed to me shall be immediately laid before the Queen.'

TO SIR THOMAS BIDDULPH.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, 27 *January* 1871.

'I have received your letter of this day's date, in which you give me the substance of Mr. Cardwell's reply to the Queen's observations.

'As regards the main point, the new arrangement of the Military Secretary, it appears to me that the answer is no answer at all.

'It implies that the Commander-in-Chief, in his own interest and for his own comfort, quite irrespective of his sense of public duty to his Sovereign and the Army, could make a less judicious selection of an officer for the responsible post of Military Secretary, with all the onerous duties connected with such a post, than the Minister of the day, whatever party might happen for the moment to be in office. This in all reason and fairness I must positively deny. Who is more interested in such a choice than the Commander-in-Chief, in whom the responsibility now rests, and always ought to rest?

'If the new arrangement really means anything, the Military Secretary so selected must be an *imperium in imperio* over the Commander-in-Chief. If it is not to be so, what is the object in making the change? I do not really see how, with honour, the Commander-in-Chief could accept a position so lowered as it would be by such an appointment. It would imply an utter want of confidence in the judgment and tact of the Commander-in-Chief, to which I, for one, do not feel I could with fairness and justice to my own character submit.

'That some new regulations are needed for making selections I fully admit, but these should be made after much deliberation and consideration by the Secretary of State and myself. These once made, I should of course be prepared to carry them out to the best of my ability. There is nothing in this explanation which at all changes my opinion and my earnest hope that Her Majesty may not feel disposed to agree to it. As regards the five-years rule for the Commander-in-Chief, it would be far better to leave the regulation as it is; but after the explanation given it may not be deemed necessary to hold out about this if the Queen finds it difficult to do so. As regards the transfer of the office, I hope the Queen will insist upon it that the Horse Guards site should be *decided* upon before the temporary transfer to Pall Mall takes place. If this be not done, you may rely upon it they will afterwards try to get out of it, for I know they have all the plans ready for the War buildings on the Thames Embankment, as I have already gone over them with Mr. Ayrton. I would also hope that the Queen would insist that, even for a temporary transfer, it must be clearly and distinctly understood that ample and good accommoda-

tion be found for us at Pall Mall, the possibility of which I greatly doubt.

'In conclusion, it appears to me that the appointment of Military Secretary in the manner suggested implies such a slur upon my reputation for fairness and honesty, that no honest man could advise me to submit to so serious an indignity being cast upon me; and that, moreover, when not one charge of any sort or kind has been made against me for all the years I have been in office, even by my most bitter enemies. I should like further to know who knows the Army better: I, with my experience of it for years, or any officer anybody would like to name?

'I now leave the matter with the utmost confidence in the hands of the Queen, who, I know full well, will thoroughly appreciate the remarks and observations I have ventured to make.'

FROM SIR THOMAS BIDDULPH.

'OSBORNE, 28 *January* 1871.

'I had the honour of receiving Y.R.H.'s letter, which I have submitted to the Queen. I am to acquaint Y.R.H. that Her Majesty entirely agrees in all the objections you put forward against Mr. Cardwell's proposal for reorganising the Military Secretary's Department.

'Lord de Grey was here yesterday, and the Queen spoke to him very strongly on the subject and commissioned him to see Lord Halifax, and with him to discuss the question with Mr. Cardwell, with the understanding that the Queen cannot consent to any change being made which Y.R.H. may consider detrimental to the authority and status of the Commander-in-Chief. Lord de Grey has readily undertaken to do this, and if any further difficulty arises Lord Halifax is to come down here to submit to the Queen his opinion.

'Mr. Gladstone, who was to have come to-day, has been prevented by the death of a relation.'

In the following letter it will be observed that Her Majesty 'expresses herself willing to allow a temporary arrangement to be made with reference to the transference of the offices (Horse Guards) to the War Office, *provided it is temporary*, and that Y.R.H.'s accommodation is separate, with a separate entrance, and is still called the Horse Guards.'

How this compact of 1871 on the part of the Government was kept, is well demonstrated by the fact that the military departments are still located in Pall Mall, and are likely to be so for a year or two longer!

FROM SIR THOMAS BIDDULPH.

'OSBORNE, 29 *January* 1871.

'I am desired to inform Y.R.H. that the Queen has received an answer from Mr. Cardwell in reply to the message transmitted by Lord de Grey, very similar in substance to his former letter, viz. that according to the proposed arrangement the Military Secretary would be chosen much in the same manner as the Adjutant-General, and that he would be equally subordinate, as that officer is. Her Majesty has replied that, before any proposal to alter the position of the Military Secretary was submitted to Her, Y.R.H. should have been consulted in the matter, and that Her Majesty cannot consent to any change injurious to Y.R.H.'s position.

'With reference to the limitation of five years, the Queen has signified that she can only consent to it with the understanding that it shall not apply to Y.R.H., and leaves it to the Government to consider whether they can successfully maintain the exception in Y.R.H.'s case while they support an opposite principle.

'The Queen expresses herself willing to allow a temporary arrangement to be made with reference to the transference of the offices to the War Office, provided it is temporary, and that Y.R.H.'s accommodation is separate, with a separate entrance, and is still called the Horse Guards.'

FROM SIR THOMAS BIDDULPH.

'OSBORNE, 1 *February* 1871.

'I have the honour to acknowledge Y.R.H.'s letter of yesterday's date, with the enclosure relative to Colonel Airey's appointment as Military Secretary by Lord Hardinge, which I have submitted to the Queen.

'Her Majesty desires me to say that Lord Halifax, who came here last night, brought with him an explanatory memorandum of Mr. Cardwell's, with Y.R.H.'s observations added to it.

'The Queen trusts that this matter may be now settled to Y.R.H.'s satisfaction, and Her Majesty is writing to Mr. Cardwell to say that Her Majesty will approve of the arrangement now proposed. The Military Secretary being chosen by the Commander-in-Chief, and approved by the Secretary of State, and his tenure of office to be for five years, all responsibility for appointments, etc., being as now in the Commander-in-Chief.'

Memo.

'The exemption of the Military Secretary from the five-years rule is not to be continued; but the rule is applicable to the Military Secretary, with the same power of reappointment as in other cases.

'The Military Secretary will be selected by the Commander-in-Chief with the approval of the Secretary of State.

'H.R.H. considers that the position of the Military Secretary is that of a public officer of high importance, and that his salary was raised some years ago by the Treasury on that very account.

'In the late revision of the Estimates the salary was reduced from £2000 to £1500, being the same as that of the Permanent Under-Secretary at the War Office.

'The Military Secretary will, as a matter of course, continue to conduct the general correspondence of his office in close intimacy with the Commander-in-Chief, but will not be considered a mere member of the personal Staff.[1]

'As far as I understand the question that has arisen, it appears to me that the views herein expressed meet the case, the great point being that it be clearly understood that the Commander-in-Chief continues to be responsible for the patronage of the Army, subject to such regulations as may be laid down to meet the altered mode of promotion in the Army. The general responsibility of the Secretary of State as it at present exists will, of course, be maintained.'

In August of the same year, during which the Duke was away on leave abroad, the question was still being discussed, as the following letters from Sir Richard Airey show:—

FROM SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 21 *August* 1871.

'Mr. Cardwell asked me to call to-day, and I went over the list of Lieutenant-Generals—from Scarlett down to Teesdale (R.A.)—with him. He had prefaced by saying, it was *necessary* in the *new order of things*, "and the expectations of the House of Commons, to have an officer of high military rank in the position of Military Secretary."

'I told him that, in my opinion, there was only one officer in that rank who I thought combined what was necessary, and that was Sir J. Lindsay.

'Amongst the Major-Generals Egerton was the best, by far—and the best altogether. He said he had a very high opinion (and all that) of Egerton, but it would not satisfy the public, and the general idea of the complete fusion which was expected, and so forth!—but that he would willingly employ him as a sub-Commissioner, and proposed Eyre as the Military Commissioner.

'He said, finally, he would have no objection to Lindsay if Y.R.H. proposed him.

'Whatever happens, Y.R.H. must propose the officers—it must not be the Secretary of State's *nomination*!

[1] Original up to this point in Mr. Cardwell's handwriting, afterwards in that of H.R.H.

'Were it to be the latter, I would rather that Y.R.H. should resign.

'With regard to the maintenance of the appellation of "Horse Guards," he said he hoped Y.R.H. would not press it; but, if you did, he would sanction our letters being dated 'Horse Guards, War Office"; and at the same time he would again decentralise, and cause the Surveyor-General's letters to be dated "Control Department, War Office."

'He said he was entirely averse to the 91st being "kilted." It was expensive to officers, expensive to the public in equipment, injurious in a sanitary view, added to the difficulties of recruiting, was a dress not calculated for and therefore abandoned in war, and that Scotch Regiments were not made up of Scotchmen.

'He then hinted at Lugard for Military Secretary. I said I did not know Y.R.H.'s opinions.

'I have seen Walker. Have got from him all I wanted to know, and I will communicate further on this subject.

'Mr. C. said he did not wish to *interfere* in *the most remote degree* with anything military; that he wished to give two dinners to the Principal Military and the Foreign Officers, as Minister for War, on the occasion of the manœuvres.'

FROM SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, *Saturday*, 26 *August* 1871.

'I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 24th.

'I think it may be considered definitely settled that Egerton will succeed Forster as Military Secretary, on condition that Y.R.H. will allow Armstrong to be added to the office. This is to produce the outside impression that there is an infusion of fresh blood!

'He is very high up in the Colonels list; but it would be as well to yield this, and when he becomes a Major-General Y.R.H. can select another.

'I have had no end of discussions. Northbrook is always a gentleman, and always *listens*, but he is most *determined*, and exercises much more influence, and has much more sway, with Mr. C. than all the rest put together!

'I can see *very plainly*, and Y.R.H. must permit me to say equally plainly, that it is expected hereafter that, after fairly discussing and combating all measures with opinions and advice, that the General Commanding-in-Chief will acquiesce and at once carry out any decision or measure, and that, failing such line of official conduct, the Government are *more* than prepared at once to remove him.

'It is needless, till Y.R.H.'s return, entering into all that has been confidentially said to me on this point.

'I fear it will be impossible to obtain better terms than

"Horse Guards," War Department, with "Control Department," W.D.

'I go down to Aldershot to-day, remain till Monday, to see about the brigading and divisioning of the troops.

'As there will be six clear days after 9 September, while the Brigades and Divisions are under their respective instructors, I think during that interval Y.R.H. can settle then the ulterior movements of the whole force. There will be plenty of transport, so that the movements may be extended to Bagshot, etc., and extemporised, which I think will be much better practice if troops be tolerably handy.'

On 26 August His Royal Highness writes this characteristic letter to Sir Richard Airey in answer to several which he had received from him:—

TO SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'HOMBURG, 26 *August* 1871.

'I am in receipt of your two letters of 23rd and 24th, and was on the point of writing to Mr. Cardwell in accordance with your recommendations when your second letter reached me. I shall now wait in accordance with the views contained in this letter. Let me, however, before all things, thank you *most warmly* for the admirable manner in which you have supported me in this difficult business. Indeed, I don't know what on earth I should do without your aid, and I feel I could not get on. I must therefore *entreat* of you not for a moment to think of *abandoning* me in my difficulties. I am afraid the work is most annoying, vexatious, and severe. You are experiencing what I have had to go through for the last year, but I hope there may be some daylight ahead when we get this question of the Military Secretary once settled; and when I get back I shall of course take all this work off your hands again, and I shall hope to see you take your leave and some rest after the manœuvres are over. It is very evident that Mr. Cardwell is entirely in the hands of the three gentlemen you name, and that he only expresses the views they inspire him with. I only wish he knew more of the Army himself, and I verily believe he would be much more easy to deal with than he is now, when he leans on others ill-disposed to all military inspirations, and who induce him to take views which would not emanate from himself. I quite agree with you that the more the subject is considered the more clearly it comes out that Egerton is by far the best man, and really almost the only man well qualified for the post of Military Secretary. I do not at all agree with the view that he ought to be a very *big* man in the eyes of the public. If he is, that will largely take away from the position of the Commander-in-Chief himself, which I presume to be the object, though

that certainly would not be ours. No; what is wanted is a thorough man of business, of thorough honesty of purpose, looked up to as such by the Army, and respected by the profession, and knowing the services and claims of every officer in the Army. There is no man who comes up to these requirements so well as General Egerton, and his conciliatory manner and deportment is an additional point in his favour. I therefore sincerely hope he will be accepted, after all. Lindsay has many good qualities, is a thorough gentleman, but is a *Guardsman*, has no field service, and knows nothing hardly of the Line. Steele would have many advantages in his favour, but has also many of the disadvantages of Lindsay.

'Horsford is a nice fellow, and personally I like him *much*, but I fear he is not enough of a man of business. What is this idea of an *Assistant* Military Secretary? That is quite something new to me, and I presume intended as an addition to the Staff, for it never can be intended to remove Johnson, who is put there as an *Indian* officer, for purely local Indian purposes, and is *paid* by the Indian Government. Consequently he cannot be removed to be replaced by an *Imperial* officer. Armstrong is a good man. . . . He will shortly be a Major-General, which as *Assistant* Military Secretary would be hardly proper. Would it? You have seen a great deal of Colonel Wolseley lately; would he do as *Assistant*, as he seems to be *persona grata* at the War Office? I only suggest it, as they press for *fresh blood*; but pray don't recommend him without feeling *quite certain* about him.

'As Reynolds is unfit for work in the field, will you, with Forster, select one of these three officers, Wolseley, Robertson, Wilkinson? Either of these would, I think, do well.'

The story can now more fittingly be continued by the following letters which General Forster, the Military Secretary, addressed to the Duke:—

FROM GENERAL FORSTER.

'H.G., 26 *August* 1871.

'I was hurried to save the post yesterday when I had the honour of writing Y.R.H. I have since received the enclosure from Lord Northbrook in answer to mine to him. Y.R.H. will no doubt deem it satisfactory. The new proposals will require to be digested with care.

'As far as I can judge from what I have heard from Airey, the discussions which have taken place between Mr. Cardwell and himself have been very *tedious* regarding the new Military Secretary. My idea is that Mr. C. seeks for an officer to fill the post of decided liberal politics. He made a great mistake when he said in the House that the Military Secretary must be a man of high military rank; for, with all

humility, I don't see any officer senior to me who would suit Y.R.H., and as to the Secretary of War naming Y.R.H.'s Military Secretary, that was decidedly objected to when the new arrangement was proposed. If Mr. Cardwell had at once stated that the Military Secretary should be an officer more distinguished in his profession than the present occupant, that would have been a very easy matter; but this comes of people talking about what they do not understand. I only hope that Y.R.H. will not submit to the nomination of the Secretary for War in making the appointment.

'It is a matter in which certainly I am in no way personally concerned. *That* I fully admit; but it is one of very serious consequence as affecting Y.R.H.'s high position, I may say socially as well as professionally, and therefore I cannot but feel deeply interested in the result. I have written to Colonel Johnston to request he will, if not inconvenient, return on the 4th, as I have very particular business on that day in the country, and must ask Y.R.H.'s permission to be absent for a few days. Johnson will have been absent upwards of five weeks, and Y.R.H. will, I understand, require him for the manœuvres. There seems to be an intention of getting up a *petite guerre* in India which will give somewhat more trouble probably than the Abyssinian did.

'*I am told* that the War Office have failed for the present in their new arrangements relative to paying the troops, and have sounded Cox and Co. as to whether they will go on as hitherto for a time, which they will accept. A good service pension is vacant by the death of Colonel Wright, which I mention in consequence of Lord Dalhousie's recommendation to Y.R.H. in favour of Colonel Maxwell, 88th Regiment, who has good claims and service.

'As Y.R.H. has never in my letter alluded to your health, I most sincerely trust it is all that can be desired.'

TO GENERAL FORSTER.

'HOMBURG, 26 *August* 1871.

'I have again heard from Airey, who no doubt keeps you informed of all that is passing between himself and Mr. Cardwell. I think his last letter is more hopeful as regards General Egerton succeeding you whenever the time comes, which *I most deeply regret* as approaching, for I know I never shall be half as well supported as I have ever been by yourself. In fact I often think, "*Had I not better go myself?*" and thus leave the way open for the changes they seem so determined to make. My only reason for doubting is that I do not like to abandon the Crown and the Army, and I think you will say I am right in this, though I should like to know your opinion upon it. . . .'

FROM GENERAL FORSTER.

'*Half-past* 5 P.M., 29 *August* 1871.

'I have received Y.R.H.'s memo. regarding the address of your letters. This morning I received a minute from Lugard saying the Military Secretary's room at the War Office was ready, and that the office was to remove there on Thursday next. I therefore proceeded to inspect the apartments; and I send a copy of a minute I have sent in answer to Lugard's memo., which I *also* forward so that Y.R.H. may be acquainted with the state of affairs. I think I have adopted the most prudent course, and I trust you will approve of it.

'The bag *is waiting*.'

Minute Paper.

'We are now ready to receive your division. Will you therefore kindly instruct Mr. Coleman to be ready to move with his sub-division on Thursday into rooms 11, 12, and 26 in this building, and Mr. Treeth and clerks on Friday into rooms 27, 28, and 30?

'Your own room is ready, and Colonel Johnson's room will in all probability be ready on Saturday.'

GENERAL FORSTER TO SIR E. LUGARD.

'HORSE GUARDS, 29 *August* 1871.

'I have looked over the apartments at War Office intended to be occupied by the establishment of the Commander-in-Chief, and with every possible desire to facilitate the move of the Officers and Clerks to the War Office, I trust I may be permitted to remark, in H.R.H.'s absence, that until the bridge of communication in course of construction is completed the transaction of business will be very much delayed and will be attended by very serious inconvenience. H.R.H. will be in England on the 5th prox.; and I would request a delay of a very few days before the change takes place—particularly as I understood from Mr. Thompson, whose civility I would beg to acknowledge, that the bridge alluded to will be finished in a very short time.'

LORD NORTHBROOK TO GENERAL FORSTER.

'WAR OFFICE, 30 *August* 1871.

'Lugard has sent me the enclosed.[1] I hope that you will not object to permitting your Department to move at once, as the delay, Mr. Thompson informs me, will seriously interfere with all the arrangements which I understood had been agreed upon by every one concerned.

'However, if you prefer it, I will telegraph to Mr. Cardwell

[1] Copy sent to H.R.H. on 29 August.

for instructions, as I cannot take upon myself to authorise the postponement of the move without his distinct authority.

'*PS.*—I have told the messenger to wait for an answer.'

MEMO. FOR H.R.H. FROM GENERAL FORSTER.

'*Six o'clock* P.M., 30 *August.*

'I have just returned from War Office. I was very calm and very firm with Lord N., and distinctly told him that if Y.R.H. had given me as sudden an order for the removal of this office as that which I have received, I should very respectfully state that it would be impossible to *carry it out.*

'I heard no more of *telegraphing to Mr. Cardwell*, and the best terms I could make were, that no action should be taken in the matter until Y.R.H.'s return; that I should then be able to transact the business of the office now pending during your stay in London *before* you went to Aldershot to take command; and that during the last fortnight you were absent we would proceed with the change. I could do no more, and thought myself fortunate in accomplishing thus much, and I think this can be done without any extreme difficulty, so I shall commence to-morrow packing up papers not immediately required, and we will do all we can to facilitate and expedite matters. The interview went off very comfortably.'

The eventual selection of General Egerton for the post of Military Secretary was announced in the following letter of Sir Richard Airey's, which also deals with other matters of interest:—

FROM SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 30 *August* 1871.

'I have had my final conversation with Lord Northbrook. It will now only be necessary for Y.R.H. to communicate your wishes to the Minister of War for the nomination of Major-General Egerton as Military Secretary, with Colonel Armstrong as an assistant.

'This last appointment is considered necessary by the Secretary of State in consequence of the extension of the office caused by the amalgamation of the Regular and Reserve Forces, and the critical Reports of a confidential nature which will be required of any officer's qualifications and attributes, physical, social, and moral, previous to selection and recommendation for promotion. On my pointing out that his rank as a Colonel was an objection, Lord N. said he did not see that, as the Military Secretary's Department would be a very important one and requiring officers known to the service.

'On 8 September the different camps are to be established on their grounds. The 1st Division under Grant at

Aldershot with the Household Brigade and 3rd Dragoon Guards. The Guards and one Battalion Rifles, three Middlesex Regiments, Battery Horse, two Batteries Field Artillery, all at Aldershot.

'The 2nd Division under Carey at Hartford Bridge Flats. The 3rd Division under Staveley at Woolmer.

'The Volunteers join the 2nd and 3rd Divisions on the 9th at their Camps.

'On Y.R.H.'s arrival on the 5th or 6th, any instructions can be issued to the respective camps for their proceedings for the first six days, which are generally to be in changing ground, taking up positions offensive and defensive, outpost duties, entrenching, encamping, supply of ammunition in the field, and such like.

'General operations during last six days, terminating in one general combined operation in such manner as you may decide, showing the whole Force.

Y.R.H. must, *ad interim*, consider the carrying on the service of the Army at Headquarters, which will not stop—Egerton and Mackenzie will be the Staff Officers of the Force in the Field. Ellice and myself will have to carry on the Army duties and be with your Y.R.H., I presume. The Umpires must be officers of rank, assisted by subordinates. You know all the Lieut.-Generals. They are few. In Major-Generals there are Russell, Percy, Wm. Napier (a good one and ready), Steele, P. Herbert, Simmons.

'I do not know whether Y.R.H. would think of Codrington.'

Her Majesty's views on the whole subject will be gathered from the following letters:—

THE QUEEN TO MR. GLADSTONE.

'BALMORAL, 3 *October* 1871.

'The Queen is desirous before Mr. Gladstone leaves to write to him on a subject which of late has caused her much anxiety, and on which, had she felt stronger, she would have spoken.

'It is the question of the future relations of the Commander-in-Chief with the Secretary of State for War. The question is not merely what will be the Duke of Cambridge's position, but what will be the future position of the officer entrusted with the command of the Army.

'The Queen cannot help seeing the increasing disposition of Parliament to interfere with all executive functions, and she deprecates in the strongest manner interference with the discipline of the Army.

'The Queen concludes that very shortly the provisions of the new system for the organisation of the Army and Reserve Forces will be submitted to her, under which promotion is to be by selection.

F. M. H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge K.G.
From the painting in the possession of H. M. The King
at Buckingham Palace



'Mr. Gladstone well knows how just will be the jealousy of any supposed political partiality in this matter. In the Queen's opinion, the only means by which the new system can be made to work satisfactorily will be by making the Army and the public feel that the non-political Commander-in-Chief is clearly the head of the Army as regards promotion and discipline, and that no change which has taken place has diminished his importance and authority in these respects. There is another point to which the Queen will advert, viz. the removal of the Commander-in-Chief's office from the Horse Guards to Pall Mall.

'It was distinctly understood that this removal was only a temporary measure, and plans have been submitted for the erection of an entire set of new buildings. None of these plans appeared very satisfactory, and they all agreed in one point, which the Queen must consider a very extravagant and unnecessary scheme to build a new Commander-in-Chief's office near the present Horse Guards, while the old building is quite sufficient for its purpose, and might be united to the War Office by the erection of a new War Office adjoining it.

'The Queen earnestly asks Mr. Gladstone to bear these matters in mind when the Ministers assemble again for business. . . .'

FROM SIR HENRY PONSONBY.

'BALMORAL, 6 *October* 1871.

'The Queen has received Y.R.H.'s letter with reference to the position of the Commander-in-Chief in his relations with the Secretary of State for War.

'Although Her Majesty hopes that a frequent intercommunication of ideas between Y.R.H. and Mr. Cardwell, which will be facilitated by the union of the two offices under one roof, will lead to a complete and harmonious understanding on all military matters, it would be vain to deny that the Queen is fully aware of the possible dangers which may arise if a certain amount of independence of political control be not accorded to the Commander-in-Chief. Her Majesty had already addressed a letter to Mr. Gladstone on this subject (a copy of which I have the honour by the Queen's command to enclose), in which Her Majesty also alludes to the necessity of coming to some decision with respect to the new War Office, as the present state of uncertainty must not only cause much inconvenience, but be detrimental to the public service.

'The Queen is fully aware of the valuable services rendered by General Forster, and will make inquiries whether the reward of a Pension, as desired by Y.R.H., can be awarded.

'It is very desirable that his successor should be an officer in whom your Y.R.H. has the fullest confidence, and who will at the same time work harmoniously with the War Office

officials; and the Queen hopes that Major-General Egerton will justify the recommendation of Y.R.H. and its acceptance by Mr. Cardwell.'

General Egerton, the new Military Secretary, on receiving notice of his selection, wrote as follows to the Duke:—

FROM GENERAL EGERTON.

'31 VICTORIA ROAD,
KENSINGTON, W., 11 *October* 1871.

'I have the honour and gratification of receiving Y.R.H.'s communication of yesterday informing me that you had been pleased to select me for the post of Military Secretary in succession to General Forster, and that Her Majesty the Queen had graciously approved of the appointment.

'I desire to express to Y.R.H. my most grateful thanks for this renewed and especial mark of your favour and confidence. I only assure you that no exertion shall be wanting on my part in the endeavour to fulfil the important duties that will devolve upon me to Y.R.H.'s satisfaction and the advantage of the service.'

Finally, the following letter of Sir Richard Airey's throws an interesting sidelight on the history of the War Office at this period, and the different influences which were then at work there:—

FROM SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'HORSE GUARDS, 4 *October* 1871.
6 P.M.

'Yesterday and to-day there have been long conferences in Mr. Cardwell's room. *Present*—Mr. Cardwell, Lord Northbrook, Storks, Vivian, Lugard, and myself, lasting both days to this hour; more discussions and notes taken to be embodied in a minute, which Y.R.H. will see when printed "confidentially" for more elaborate consideration when Y.R.H. returned, but nothing decided.

'It is decided to give every Regiment two Battalions, if it can in any way be accomplished, but no substantive arrangement has been arrived at.

'The question of future promotion also argued without any particular result, and will require much consideration. The organisation of the Staff of the Army also discussed. They are all strong, headed by Northbrook, for one General Staff. Also, official correspondence considered, but all questions left for final consideration next week.

'I hope Y.R.H. will postpone your Inspection tours. I consider it quite necessary that Y.R.H. should be present

during this month when all details are arranging for submission by Mr. Cardwell to the Cabinet, when I am quite unequal to combat ideas of five civilians, inspired by Lord Northbrook, who is an "out-and-outer," and backed by Mr. Knox, who has not a military idea in his conformation.

'I find Mr. Cardwell by himself, *by far* the most reasonable and right-thinking of the whole party.

'I am so tired I cannot write more, and indeed have not much more to say.'

Though the following letters have no direct bearing on the history of events with which this chapter deals, this may not be an unfitting opportunity of recording the esteem and affection with which the Duke regarded his old and faithful friends, Generals Forster and Airey.

General Forster[1] was one of the Duke's earliest and most intimate military friends. He had served as his A.A.G. from 1847-1852 during the time H.R.H. commanded the Dublin District, and from 1860-1871 he was his Military Secretary at Headquarters. Hence it may be easily imagined how deeply the Duke felt this final official severance from such an old friend. How cordial and uninterrupted had been the friendship is evidenced by the enormous correspondence between them, which dates as far back as 1847. Indeed, when H.R.H. and General Forster were not together, hardly a day passed in which the Duke did not write to him, not only on military, but on every other conceivable subject, many of these letters, of course, being of the most confidential and private character.

Writing to General Forster on 31 August 1871, the Duke says:—'Your leaving me, my dear old friend, makes me feel very low; and altogether the future looks so black that I do not look forward to it with any degree of pleasure. . . .'

MEMO. BY GENERAL FORSTER FOR H.R.H.

'28 *October.*

'If Y.R.H. should think fit in your recommendation of my application for pension to advert to the position of Military Secretary having been held (until the late *arrangement*) during your pleasure, and has now been made tenable for five

[1] Lieutenant-General W. F. Forster, K.H., joined the 3rd Foot Guards before Bayonne in 1814, and served with the Brigade of Guards in Paris 1815, after Waterloo. He was gazetted Cornet in 1813, Colonel in 1854, and Major-General in 1858. Died 1879.

years only, I think Y.R.H. alluding to this subject would be very beneficial in promoting my interest, and add very much, if possible, to the grateful feeling I beg to express towards Your Royal Highness.

'The *Gazette* is all right regarding my successor, but the precise date in *Morning Post* was not given.'

OFFICIAL LETTER TO MR. CARDWELL.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, *October* 31, 1871.

'I forward herewith a letter with enclosed memorandum from Lieut.-General Forster, which I trust may be taken into favourable consideration. Lieut.-General Forster will to-day cease to be Military Secretary, a post which he has filled to my entire satisfaction and with great advantage to the public service for over eleven years under my immediate eyes. Personally this loss will be much felt by myself, as we have ever worked together with great cordiality, with frequently, not to say generally, very heavy pressure of business upon the Military Secretary's office, and I am satisfied that the Crown and the country has been efficiently and faithfully served by the Lieut.-General. The exceptional circumstances under which an office held during pleasure, which in fact amounts as nearly as possible to a position of permanence, has been now changed to one to be held during five years only, makes me feel a confident hope that on this ground, if on no other, the request now made will be favourably entertained, and if to this be added the knowledge that Lieut.-General Forster has served the State continuously for fifty-eight years, I trust it will be felt that a pension has been fully and fairly merited by so worthy and devoted a public servant.'

TO SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'C.-IN-C.'S OFFICE, *April* 18, 1873.

'I was indeed delighted to see your handwriting once again to-day, for it is a clear proof that you are mending rapidly and will soon be yourself again. But what an awful accident you must have had, and what an escape yours has been. Thank God all is now coming right. But you must not attend to business too soon, and you must just think of getting well and strong again. Your message shall be given to my mother. You will be sorry to hear that I have had a sad loss by the death of my dear old faithful steward and servant of forty-five years, Mr. Ramothaly, who died very unexpectedly at Brighton on Tuesday night. This sad event has brought me back suddenly to London, where I shall now remain permanently—I don't know what I shall do without him. I hope Lady Airey is not the worse for the anxiety she has gone through. Pray give her my best regards.'

TO SIR RICHARD AIREY.

'GLOUCESTER HOUSE, *January* 10, 1874.

'I cannot express to you in words the sorrow and deep regret I have just experienced on receiving your letter dated from Lowndes Square. To lose your valuable assistance and advice is no small matter, and I can say with truth that I have passed through periods when, without your support, I really hardly know how I should have got on, and so I fear it may be again. But besides this, when I look around me to see who there is to succeed you, I am really quite at a loss what to think on the subject. Your high standing in the Army, the experience you have acquired, the respect with which you are looked up to by all members of the profession, and by society and the world generally, give you advantages which no other General Officer that I see possesses to the extent which you do. If, therefore, it is even yet not too late to alter your decision, I should rejoice at it. If, however, you should adhere to the decision you have come to, I have nothing to say, alas! against your resolve, but to express a hope that you will give me ample time to look about me so as to make the great change as little felt as it can be, for you must remember that, at the present moment, I have another important member of my Staff incapacitated from illness, so that I am really in no small difficulties. I would also beg that you would kindly, for the present, say nothing to the world on the subject, as it would, I think, facilitate my making arrangements to meet so great an emergency, and so serious and grave a change. Of course we shall have many opportunities of discussing these matters further, but meanwhile I would only further ask, before a final decision is arrived at, whether we could not make an arrangement for so facilitating and lightening your attendance at the office that you might find it possible to have the time to yourself for air, exercise, and recreation, which you in common with all of us so greatly need.'

Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to His Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press

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